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Around one third of the Earth’s surface is covered by the Pacific
Ocean. When looking at “the“ Pacific, public and scientific dis-
course – especially in Europe - is mostly centered on the peri-
phery of this ocean, which includes important actors like
Australia, the USA, Russia, China, Japan as well as the boo-
ming Asian and Latin-American states.
This ignores that the Pacific itself is not only covered by water,
but is also a political space in the sense of different political
units summarized in the term of Pacific Island Countries
(PICs). In fact, the Pacific Islands Region has been one of the
politically most dynamic regions of the world in the last de-
cade and even more so today. There are ongoing transforma-
tions to regionalism and the regional system of cooperation,
in national politics and in the relationships to larger actors as
well as the international activities of the Pacific Island States.
This book brings together renowned international experts on
politics in Oceania as well as researchers and scholars from
Germany to provide a comprehensive overview of many of
these current developments and issues in the Pacific Islands
Region. It offers a theoretical framework as well as contribu-
tions analysing actors, institutions and structures in Oceania,
substantiated by case studies from various island states.
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Foreword 
Dear readers, 
the joint history of Germany and the South Pacific dates far back. Romanti-
cized pictures of the “South Sea” played an important role early on, and they 
still continue to effect us in notions of holiday dreams underneath palm trees. 
The pictures of white beaches and blue ocean are not false – however, tangi-
ble economic interests attracted the first Germans to come to the Pacific at the 
end of the 19th century, especially the trade with coco products. The next 
steps then were territorial claims to protect the trade. New Guinea and Samoa 
were the largest German protectorates and colonial regions in the Pacific. 
This is long a thing of the past, but the few decades of colonial presence 
of the German Empire had manifold impacts on the social history of the is-
lands‘ populations, which are still visible in the 21st century – in toponyms, in 
words with German origins, in the basic principles of education or in the 
continuing social commitment of the churches. Also in the realms of econo-
my and trade there are still significant relations, albeit the emerging Asian 
states are nowadays unquestionably of more significance for the Pacific Is-
land Countries than the former European colonial powers. New links between 
Germany and the Pacific nations arise from a similar range of interests in 
global issues, particularly with regard to the challenges of climate change. 
Germany welcomes that the intensive endeavors of Pacific Island Countries 
to pool their interests and voices in regional organizations, e.g. in the “Pacific 
Islands Forum“ (PIF), the “Secretariat of the Pacific Community“ (SPC) and 
the “Melanesian Spearhead Group“ (MSG). 
During our inaugural visits to the Pacific islands world we were able to 
experience the economic and political potentials of the young islands coun-
tries ourselves. However, the Pacific Islands continues to need strong partners 
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and external assistance to reach the international standards in the fields of 
good governance, health, education and sustainable resource exploitation and 
to overcome the still widespread poverty. The Millennium Development 
Goals of the United Nations will probably be not attainable without deduc-
tions in the South Pacific. Thus it is a matter of course that Germany – also as 
an important actor within the European Union – remains visible and present 
in the Pacific in order to contribute to the positive development of the region. 
In 2012 the Federal Foreign Office sponsored a touring exhibition on the 
colonial history of Germany in Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Palau. Fur-
thermore Germany supports development projects in the entire Pacific Islands 
region as the largest donor under the framework of the European Develop-
ment Fund. The Embassies in Canberra and Wellington finance so-called 
micro-projects in several islands, which serve as models of sustainable pro-
gress on the local level. 
This anthology explores the situation in the Pacific Island Countries in a 
comprehensive way and thereby creates a reference work of special value for 
everyone who is connected to this fascinating region. We thank the initiators 
and the authors for this unique compilation! 
 
Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich,  
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in New Zealand 
Dr. Christoph Müller,  
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Australia 
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 Introduction 
Andreas Holtz/Matthias Kowasch/Oliver Hasenkamp 
Around one third of the Earth’s surface is covered by the Pacific as the 
world’s largest ocean. The Pacific Ocean is bordered by the booming states of 
South-East and East Asia, by Latin America and the United States of America 
as the last remaining superpower. China as a global challenger of American 
supremacy is preparing to break up existing structures not only in the Pacific. 
The Pacific island nation Japan is one of the most important economies along 
with the US, the EU and China. Finally, Russia and the Korean peninsula 
with its latent crisis are bordering the Pacific Ocean. But this listing hints that 
when we speak (especially in Europe) of “the” Pacific, we mean the framing 
periphery, the so-called Pacific Rim States. It is overlooked that the Pacific is 
not only water but also a political space in the sense of different political units 
summarized in the term of Pacific Island countries (PICs) that we will deal 
with in this book.  
From the viewpoint of political science, the PICs – not all of them are 
fully sovereign states in terms of legal sovereignty – are a nearly blank slate. 
The constitutional constructions are a paradise for jurists and political scien-
tists interested in sovereignty issues. Here we find French overseas territories, 
US territories and islands under New Zealand sovereignty, a British Overseas 
Territory, associated states and an Indonesian colony. Besides the 14 (includ-
ing Australia and New Zealand) independent states, they show various forms 
of state sovereignty. 
The PICs, in addition to the countries of the Lesser Antilles in the Caribi-
an, are the only island countries in the world to form a region and to have 
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structural similarities, so that they can note a communal nature (Tönnies 
2012) and not just common interests (Bull 1985, 2002). Despite these struc-
tural similarities as small island states (with the exception of Papua New 
Guinea), the different islands are very heterogeneous. In Vanuatu alone no 
less than 110 different languages are spoken by around 200,000 inhabitants. 
In Papua New Guinea there are even more than 800 languages. Countries like 
Kiribati have a total land area of around 800 km². At the same time Kiribati 
islands spread over an area of approximately 3.5 million square kilometers 
including the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). To refer here to a common 
state population with similar interests would ignore the complexity of the 
cultural, political and geographical framework within the country. It is this 
complexity that prevents conventional approaches to a definition of the Pacif-
ic Islands region. If we restrict ourselves to the characteristics of small island 
states, we have to exclude PNG and the bordering states such as Australia and 
the US. And even this region would hardly be homogenous given the ethno-
logical division into the sub-regions of Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia. 
Although terms such as Oceania or the South Pacific include Australia, New 
Zealand and parts of Indonesia, the question arises whether people from 
Western Australia define themselves as being a part of the Pacific. And what 
about the Pacific Island countries north of the equator? So it makes sense to 
use alternative concepts for the definition of regions. 
What is the underlying idea and the motivation behind this book? First, 
there is a practical motivation, because we all feel connected to the Pacific, do 
research on Pacific issues and publish scientific papers and books with a 
focus on the Pacific Islands region. Moreover, we are together organized in 
the German NGO Pacific Network. According to the rules, the network aims 
to “make known the political, economic, ecological and cultural situation of 
the Pacific Island countries to a wider audience in Germany. This is primarily 
Introduction 3 
 
done through publications, lectures and seminars” (http://www.pazifik-
netzwerk.org). The network meets once a year in the frame of the general 
assembly dedicated to a common theme. The meeting in 2014 dealed with 
“Politics and Power in the Pacific Island States”, not least to mitigate the 
dominance of anthropological work on the Pacific Islands region. The results 
of this conference has led to this book project. In addition to the participants 
of the conference, internationally renowned scientists from different disci-
plines (political science, but also anthropology, law, economics and geogra-
phy) were asked to contribute. We wanted to open the project to a larger pub-
lic, which is why we decided to publish in English language and make it 
available as an open access publication. In this context we would like to thank 
the University Press of Saarland University for expertise and advice. 
Beyond the practical motivation there is a professional motivation. Little 
research on the Pacific Islands region has been published in Germany dealing 
with issues of political science, political geography and political anthropolo-
gy. This may be partly a result of the great distance between Central Europe 
and the Pacific Islands region. And it is supposed that the region seems to 
have no practical and theoretical significance for German politics and science. 
However, this assumption is wrong in many ways. First there are historical 
relationships between Germany and the Pacific Islands region through the 
former German colonies (eg Bismark archipelago and Samoa). Secondly, the 
Pacific is of high political and economic relevance. With China, Japan and 
the United States the region is bordered by three economic powers, and by the 
economically emerging countries of Latin America – a fact that an export 
nation like Germany can not ignore. Politically, the Pacific is the border be-
tween East and West. It is probably the line of conflict of the 21st century, 
although the civil war in Ukraine currently marks a renewal of the Euro-
Atlantic conflict line. So, it seems that the 21st century will be a Pacific 
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century, replacing the 20th American century. The Pacific may become the 
region of a new “Great Game” underlined by Hayward-Jones (2013:1) from 
the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, who starts her paper 
with the analysis that “the centre of global economic gravity has moved to the 
Asia-Pacific” (see also Kowasch and Lindenmann 2014). The Chinese influ-
ence in the Pacific is permanently growing, characterized by an expansion of 
China’s sea fleet. Becoming the dominant power in the Pacific, Bejing fills 
the vacuum left by the Western disinterest (Reilly 2003:63). Nevertheless, the 
American President Barack Obama highlights the importance of the Pacific 
for the US: “The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay” 
(Obama, quoted by Patrick, 2011). His Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
(2011) extended the “Great Game” to an Asia-Pacific region from India to the 
West Coast of the US: “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global 
politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the 
Americas, the region spans two oceans - the Pacific and the Indian - that are 
increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's 
population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy (…). It 
is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like Chi-
na, India, and Indonesia“. So the Pacific is booming! 
The question remains unanswered, how the Pacific itself perceives these 
superlatives. And with the term “Pacific” (not only) Europeans do refer to the 
periphery, but rather to the Pacific Island countries. We are not denying the 
importance of the periphical states on the PICs, because their influences can 
not be overlooked. Yet the periphery seems to overwhelm the core also in the 
field of research and publications. Anyone who searches political science or 
political geography papers about the Pacific core region, frequently finds 
literature on Pacific peripherals. 
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Whilst there is a large number of journals with the Pacific in their name, in 
Europe for example the Journal de la Société des Océanistes (France) or 
Pacific Geographies (Germany), most of the papers however deal with the 
periphery. In other European journals, we make the same observation. The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs (Great Britain) and the Polish 
Antypody rarely publish papers concerning politics in the PICs. The theoreti-
cal approach to existing problems in the PICs seems to lead a shadowy exist-
ence in publications from Europe and even from the Pacific. Most of the 
journals are also interdisciplinary; none deals only with political science is-
sues.  
In the Pacific, including journals from Canada, the US and East Asia, 
there is a larger offer of journals focussing on the Pacific, eg The Contempo-
rary Pacific, Pacific Economic Bulletin, Journal of Pacific History, Journal 
of Pacific Studies, Pacific Affairs, Pacific Focus, Comparative Law Journal 
of the Pacific, Revue Juridique Polynésienne, Asia Pacific Viewpoint and 
Pacific Islands Report. Some of them are clearly differentiated concerning the 
disciplines, others are interdisciplinary. Nevertheless, most of the articles 
neglect the PICs. Asia Pacific Viewpoint even demonstrates this in its name, 
the former name of the journal was Pacific Viewpoint. Moreover, there is still 
a gap in political science that can hardly be filled by some anthologies (eg 
vom Busch 1994, Crocombe and Ahmed 1983).  
In addition, a theoretical analysis with the phenomenon of the small size 
of the PICs, with state weakness in several regions and with pronounced 
asymmetries and disparities in the Pacific Islands region lacks in the context 
of political science and political geography. Research institutions focussing 
on other regions are far ahead. The Hamburg GIGA Institutes of Latin Ameri-
can, African and Asian Studies, the Latin America program of the prestigious 
Berkeley University and the Bayreuth International Graduate School for 
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African Studies (BIGSAS) are three examples that also provide specific theo-
retical publications. For the Pacific such institutions are very rare. The re-
search group CREDO (Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur 
l’Océanie) in Marseille, the Australian SSGM (State, Society and Governance 
in Melanesia) in Canberra (Australian National University), the East-West-
Center in Hawaii or the Bergen Pacific Studies Research Group (Norway) are 
interdisciplenary orientated or focussed on anthropological topics. The same 
is true with the Pacific Studies Association. Moreover, Germany lacks such 
research groups or institutions dealing with Pacific Islands issues. With the 
present book, we want to fill this gap, especially with the focus on the PICs 
and not on the periphery. 
In this context, there is also the question which sometimes ambivalent 
consequences are arising from small state structures and which are influenced 
by regional and global (re)organization. Here we are able to identify different 
levels of analysis, from global structures to regional reflections and local 
actor analyses. Furthermore, we have to deal with different but not excluding 
realms like economics, institutions and social structures. These levels and 
realms are also reflected in the composition of the bookchapters. Theoretical-
ly-based contributions by Joanne Wallis and Andreas Holtz (1) form the basis 
for the description of political structures and their impact on a regional and on 
a state level of the PICs. Wallis discusses current concepts of regions and 
proposes a security policy approach that includes the core of the PICs, but 
also peripheral actors and structures influencing the region. Holtz stresses out 
that the asymmetries between Australia and the PICs are being interpreted as 
a material basis for their state identities and their self- and external percep-
tions which in turn form their interests. After the more theoretical and prepar-
atory contributions of the first book section, the remaining sections investi-
gate regional and local levels in the above mentioned realms. The second 
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section shows that a political analysis of the PICs can not be done without 
regarding the peripheral actors. Derek McDougall and Andreas Holtz (2) 
dedicate their contributions in this book to China and Australia, two states 
that do not belong to the region in a narrower sense but to its periphery. 
A political science analysis must consider various interdependent levels: 
not only political actions between state and non-state actors, but also political 
actions within the states. Moreover, it is not sufficient to define states as ac-
tors, but also as supranational institutions and economic structures.  
Henning Blatt and Oliver Hasenkamp deal with institutional actors. 
While Blatt analyses the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Hasenkamp chooses a 
different approach by discussing the influence of the PICs in supranational 
institutions in the light of their limited political capacities. So the chapter 
adresses a dimension of power, which goes beyond the mere physical threat 
potential of (state) actors and deals with soft and smart power responsives 
(Nye 1990, 2004; Noya 2004) that are more adequate to small states. Hence, 
the concept of power is more subtle and more dependent on the context here. 
After the contributions on regional and international aspects, Peter Lin-
denmann and Graham Hassall address political home affairs topics. In his 
article, Lindenmann questions the relationship between national identity, 
awareness of the Western model of state and state sovereignty. According to 
Stephen Krasner (1999, 2004, 2005, 2010) he does not see state sovereignty 
as an entity that exists or does not exist, but that allows intermediate positions 
with diverse nuances. State sovereignty is always the result of internal recog-
nition of the state by its citizens, which aims at the relationship between state 
and citizen. From the Western point of view, democracy is considered as the 
best governance form which raises the question of universality. Therefore, 
Graham Hassall tries in his article to reflect and explain the state of democra-
cy in the Pacific Island countries. 
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Policy that deals with power and authority is always put into a context. Clas-
sical political approaches are specific on the potential for violence and thus 
more on the physical power of an actor. In fact, power goes beyond this one-
dimensional perspective and involves also economic aspects in terms of im-
posing interests. For this reason, it is essential to also adress the economic 
context of the PICs. The contribution of Klaus Schilder deals with global 
economic structures, which are also reflected in the Pacific Island region and 
which impact on local economies. However, the question arises who reorgan-
izes local economies, and what the impacts of liberal economic paradigms 
are. 
Even after a reorganization, the economies of the PICs remain limited 
and weak, which led to the question of whether these states can survive with-
out foreign aid. Another question is how this economic weakness affects the 
national sovereignty. Geoff Bertram asks of whether small state sovereignty 
contributes to the wealth of these countries. The concept of state sovereignty 
must be rethought in light of the structural weakness of the PICs. Eike Blitza 
presents in his contribution, which concepts and ideas are available for this 
purpose. 
State sovereignty not only depends on material conditions, but also on the 
acceptance of people towards their state. Such acceptance is based on national 
identity that appears as an orientation feature in an increasingly confusing 
world. In this context, Hermann Mückler investigates the role of pre-state 
regulatory mechanisms in the PICs. 
The performance of Pacific economies depends on their wealth of re-
sources. There is a clear distinction between the resource-rich countries of 
Melanesia and the resource-poor countries of the other Pacific sub-regions. 
The latter are the so-called MIRAB-economies (Bertram/Watters 1985), 
which are analysed in the contribution of Tisdell. 
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In resource-rich countries of the Pacific Islands region, there is a phenomenon 
that can also be observed in other regions, the so-called resource curse or 
“durch disesase”. The resource thesis links resource wealth to economic crisis 
and political instability (Auty 1993, Mehlum et al. 2006). In his contribution, 
Matthias Kowasch investigates the resource curse thesis and reflects the situa-
tion of resource-rich Melanesian countries and territories. He makes a com-
parison study between New Caledonia, Bougainville and West-Papua, whose 
common point is an independence movement. In New Caledonia, a referen-
dum about political sovereignty will be organized between 2014 and 2018 
(Kowasch 2010, 2009). 
The political situation in Bougainville, an island that is part of PNG, is in 
the centre of the chapter written by Volker Böge, who highlights that mining 
exploitation has not led to economic prosperity and peace. He approaches the 
topic with a theoretical focus on conflicts (Böge 1998, 2005). The exploita-
tion of the Panguna mine in Bougainville resulted in an ecological desaster, 
conflicts over compensation payments and finally a civil war for political 
independence. The civil war is considered as the bloodiest conflict in the 
Pacific island after the end of World War II. Böge analyses the actual politi-
cal situation on the island where a referendum about independence should be 
held between 2015 and 2020. 
In addition to the civil war in Bougainville, the violent clashes of differ-
ent population groups in the Solomon Islands represent another soucre of 
conflict in the Pacific Islands region. Sinclair Dinnen describes in his chapter 
the background to the conflict and especially the intervention by the Australi-
an leaded Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Since 
RAMSI was the first military intervention in the Pacific Islands region since 
1945, the operation is symbolic for a new era in the Pacific regional policy 
(Kabutaulaka 2005). Therefore it is advisable to read this chapter together 
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with the contribution of Henning Blatt and to compare it with the explana-
tions of Manuel Schmitz about East Timor. 
Although East Timor does not geographically belong to the Pacific 
Ocean, the little country can be added both to the group of Small Island states 
and from the security policy viewpoint to the group of Pacific Island coun-
tries. Regional experts such as Ronald May speak of an arc of instability 
(May 2003), that stretches, according to Brendan Nelson (former Conserva-
tive Australian Minister of Defence), from Timor Leste in the West to Fiji in 
the East (see also McDougall 2009:204). Thus, Manuel Schmitz represents in 
his chapter the political situation in Timor Leste, which is an independent 
state since 2002, and describes the background of the Australian intervention. 
The intervention was justified by a fear of regional destabilization and an 
assumed lawless space, which could in turn have resulted in refugee flows 
and terrorism (Fernandes 2005, Kingsbury and Leach 2007). Finally, there are 
differences of opinion between Australia and East Timor over the maritime 
border. In these waters there are extensive gas reserves, claimed by both 
states. In 2006, Australia and East Timor agreed to suspend the border con-
flict for the next 50 years to exploit the gas reserves in common. Neverthe-
less, the conflict is an example for the political asymmetry between Australia 
and its neighbors, rarely for the benefit of the small island states. In addition, 
the case of East Timor shows that Australia plays the role as a regional power 
in South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands region, and thus provides an inter-
face between both regions.  
The asymmetries between Fiji and Australia are slightly lower. With a 
population of approx. 904,000, Fiji is actually at the limit to be a small island 
state whose definition provides up to one million inhabitants (Sutton and 
Payne 1993). Equipped with a good infrastructure and economically relative-
ly successful, Fiji is an outstanding power within the group of Pacific Island 
Introduction 11 
 
countries. Fiji is of the few PICs with the capacity to maintain regional and 
basically global political relationships, highlighted by Steven Ratuva in this 
book. Despite these favorable conditions, Fiji has extensive domestic prob-
lems that destabilize the country. Currently, Fiji is suffering from the effects 
of the fourth coup in its history. The conflictual situation is partly a result of a 
deep split in Fiji’s ethnic communities of indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians 
and the serious economic differences between the groups. Therefore, Fiji’s 
“democracy” was described as a facade (Ravuvu 1995) or as Pacific apartheid 
system (Dasgupta 2000). Manfred Ernst describes the state of the Fijian de-
mocracy under military rule on the eve of Fiji’s first democratic elections 
after eight years and discusses how much the life of Fijians is affected by 
these developments. 
There is no doubt that such a book requires the contribution of different 
people. Thus, we want to take the opportunity to express our deep thanks to 
all authors for their cooperation and their patience. Without them, this book 
would not have been possible. We are grateful to the Association of 
Protestant Churches and Missions for their financial support. We are also 
thankful to the publishing house, which was always positive despite many 
delays, and which contributed with expertise to the success of this book. We 
thank the Pacific Information Centre in Neuendettelsau for support and en-
couragement. Concerning expert advice, we are particularly grateful to Stew-
art Firth and Simon Batterbury. In addition, we have to thank Stefanie 
Ehmke, Rieke Mattiesch and Adrian Fennell as well as Andrew Rennison for 
translation work and Benjamin Hasenfratz for the editorial work. Finally, our 
thanks go to our families and friends who have achieved and supported our 
project over a long period.  
Finally, it is almost superfluous to mention that any spelling mistakes are 
not the responsibility of the authors, but of the editors.  
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 Is Oceania a Regional Security Complex? 
Joanne Wallis 
Abstract: This chapter considers whether Oceania can be classified as a 
regional security complex, using Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s regional 
security complex theory. The central idea of that theory is that security inter-
dependence is regionally patterned and that regions can be identified using 
the lens of security. While in 2003 Buzan and Wæver concluded that Oceania 
did not constitute a regional security complex, this chapter argues that devel-
opments since that time mean that the region can now be classified in this 
way. Security challenges have emerged and been securitised, and in order to 
address them the region has become linked in deep and strong patterns of 
interaction and interdependence. The transnational nature of many of these 
challenges mean that it is no longer possible to analyse or resolve the securi-
ty problems of one Oceanian state in isolation from the remainder of the 
region. 
Keywords: Oceania, security complex, regionalism 
 
 
  
18 Joanne Wallis 
 
Introduction 
The region of Oceania, often referred to as the ‘South Pacific’ or ‘Pacific 
Islands’, is most commonly defined in geographic terms as stretching from 
West Papua in the west to Easter Island in the east. The most important dis-
tinguishing feature of the region is the ‘smallness’ of its states and territories; 
ranging from Niue with a population of 1.398 people, to Papua New Guinea 
with a population of approximately 6.5 million. Smallness is said to pose 
inherent physical, economic, social and political vulnerabilities which make 
small states ‘especially susceptible to harm’ (Commonwealth Advisory 
Group 1997:13; Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank 2000; United Na-
tions 1998). The other important feature is the region’s ‘islandness’; it con-
sists of 29 island states and territories spread over 30 million km², 98% of 
which is ocean. Islands are said to experience additional vulnerabilities: re-
moteness and insularity; small geographic size; and environmental factors 
(Armstrong/Read 1998; United Nations 2005; Witter et al. 2004). 
Oceania is commonly broken up into three broad cultural areas, which 
although controversial (Thomas 1997), have been generally accepted and 
adopted within the region. The first is Melanesia, which comprises the arc of 
islands to the immediate north and east of Australia, starting in the Indonesian 
province of West Papua, through Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Va-
nuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia. In general, Melanesian states have larger 
populations and land masses, and rich natural resources. Melanesian societies 
are generally ethnically and linguistically diverse, and tend to be organized 
around quite egalitarian socio-political structures. The second is Polynesia, 
which comprises the triangle of states above New Zealand and stretching up 
to Hawaii. It therefore includes: Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Cook Islands, Tokelau, 
Wallis & Futuna and French Polynesia. Polynesian islands are small and 
Polynesian societies tend to be ethnically and linguistically homogenous and 
Regional Security Complex 19 
 
organised around quite hierarchical sociopolitical structures. The third is 
Micronesia, which comprises the band of islands to the north of Melanesia, 
starting from Palau in the west, and then moving through Guam, Nauru, Mar-
shall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia to Kiribati in the east. Microne-
sian islands tend to be very small, homogenous and hierarchical. 
This chapter considers whether there is an alternate way to define the re-
gion, using Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s regional security complex theory 
(RSCT). The central idea of RSCT is that “since most threats travel more 
easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is 
normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes” 
(Buzan/Wæver 2003:4). According to RSCT, a region is “the level where 
states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities 
cannot be considered separate from each other”. Therefore, “security com-
plexes are regions as seen through the lens of security” (ibid:43-44). When 
considering security in Oceania it is useful to use RSCT as it focuses on the 
security challenges and responses that unite the region, which might help to 
identify more informative patterns of security interaction and interdependence 
than geographic or cultural approaches to defining the region. 
In their 2003 book, Buzan and Wæver argue that Oceania is an ‘unstruc-
tured region’, and therefore that it does not constitute a regional security 
complex (RSC). In this chapter I argue that developments since that time 
mean that Oceania can now be described as a RSC. I begin by describing the 
main tenets of RSCT. I then use RSCT to analyse events and developments in 
Oceania in order to argue that a RSC has emerged in the region. 
Regional Security Complex Theory 
According to RSCT, a RSC is “a set of units whose major processes of secu-
ritisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security prob-
lems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from each other” 
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(Buzan et al. 1998:201). Desecuritisation occurs when “actors stop treating 
each other as security problems and start behaving as friends” 
(Buzan/Wæver 2003:56). Securitisation occurs when a security problem is: 
“posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent 
object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain for-
ests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival 
necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is 
not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics. The securitising actor 
therefore claims a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules, 
for reasons of security” (ibid:71)1.  
To identify a RSC it is necessary to study the “security discourses and se-
curity practices of actors” (Buzan/Wæver 2003:48). That is, to ask how re-
gional states define security problems and how they interact to respond to 
these issues. Interaction generates security interdependence, which differenti-
ates a RSC from surrounding security regions. Therefore, RSCT utilises a 
constructivist approach, which holds that meaning is socially constructed. 
Consequently, ideational factors such as beliefs, expectations and interpreta-
tions are as important as material measures when thinking about a state’s 
priories, behaviour and relationships (Farrell 2002; Onuf 1998; Wendt 1992). 
A standard RSC will consist of “a pattern of rivalry, balance-of-power, and 
alliance patterns among the main powers within the region” (Buzan/Wæver 
                                                          
1
  Because Buzan and Wæver are working with assumptions, it also appears possible to explain 
the process of securitisation using Berger and Luckmann’s definition of reification. Accord-
ing to Berger and Luckmann, reification describes the perception of human phenomena as if 
they were something other than human products, such as existing realities or natural condi-
tions. Reification is therefore the human ability to forget its own creatorship of the human 
world (Berger/Luckman 1989:89). Within a process of securitisation human assumptions be-
come constructions which are considered and assumed as realities. These assumed realities 
can be seen as basic motivations for acting. However, it remains unclear whether this acting 
leads to one or another direction. Therefore, it is also necessary to analyse major influences 
(see the following article). These might be global turning points and/or interests derived 
from domestic affairs. 
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2003:47). Accordingly, RSCs are typically defined by “durable patterns of 
amity and enmity” (ibid:45). Amity ranges from “genuine friendship to ex-
pectations of protection and support”, while enmity is a “relationship set by 
suspicion and fear” (Buzan 1986:189). Great powers can also penetrate a 
region, and if they come to “dominate a region so heavily that the local pat-
tern of security relations virtually ceases to operate” this may result in “over-
lay”, which hinders the emergence of a RSC (Buzan/Wæver 2003:61).  
A RSC does not occur in ‘unstructured security regions’. Unstructured 
regions occur for either or both of two reasons: “first, where local states have 
such low capability that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond 
their own boundaries; and, second, where geographic insulation makes inter-
action difficult (for example, islands separated by large expanses of ocean)” 
(Buzan/Wæver 2003:62). There may also be situations where states in a re-
gion have “not yet achieved sufficient cross-linkage” to bind them together in 
a RSC, which are known as “pre-complexes”. There may also be situations 
where security interdependence is present, but it is too thin and weak to con-
stitute a RSC, known as “proto-complexes” (ibid:4). 
Oceania as a RSC 
In 1991 Buzan characterised Oceanian states as “very weak powers [that] are 
separated by vast insulating distances of water” (1991:165), which he said 
hindered security interaction and interdependence. Buzan argued that the 
Pacific Islands Forum, the region’s primary multilateral political institution, 
binds Australia, New Zealand and Oceanian states into a “loose security 
community” (ibid:195). In 2003 Buzan and Wæver argued that Oceania was 
an unstructured security region, on the basis that the region’s states were “too 
weak as powers to generate security interdependence on a regional level” 
(2003:64). While they admit that states in Oceania “did develop some loose 
regional forums”, they argue that “distance and water” prevented Oceania 
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becoming a RSC (2003:136). I argue that developments since they made that 
assertion mean that Oceania can now be described as a RSC.  
Four variables can be used to determine whether a RSC exists in Oceania 
(Buzan/Wæver 2003). First, there is a boundary which differentiates the Oce-
ania from its neighbours, primarily determined by the membership of the 
Pacific Islands Forum. Second, there is an anarchic structure, as Oceania is 
composed of more than two states. Third, polarity is evident, as power is 
distributed amongst those states. Fourth, there is evidence of the social con-
struction of a RSC, for as discussed below, there are patterns of amity and to 
a lesser degree, enmity, among Oceanian states. 
In order to trace the formation of the Oceania RSC it is necessary to look 
a “pattern of security connectedness” (Buzan/Wæver 2003:73). The first 
question is whether issues have been successfully securitised by Oceanian 
states. If they have been, then the links and interactions between Oceanian 
states to address these issues much be tracked.  
States in Oceania have been increasingly securitised since the late 1990s, 
facing issues such as civil conflict, coups (or attempted coups), political in-
stability, corruption, population displacement, tension over resource exploita-
tion and distribution, economic underdevelopment, rising crime, natural dis-
asters and climate changes. The primary cause of many of Oceania’s security 
issues is often attributed to the fact that Oceanian states have been character-
ised as weak both as states (with low levels of political cohesion, particularly 
in Melanesia) and as powers (as they command small economic, political and 
military resources, both in absolute terms and relative to non-Oceanian 
states).  
At independence the departing European and Australian colonial powers 
endowed Oceania with Westphalian-style states. However, particularly in 
Melanesia, the colonial powers drew their territorial borders arbitrarily and 
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took little account of existing social and political groupings. This meant that 
the borders of most Melanesian states were artificial. For example, the Bou-
gainville region was included in Papua New Guinea, even though it is part of 
the Solomon Islands chain and had many more links to those islands before 
colonisation (Ghai/Regan 2000). Colonisers also did little to develop a sense 
of national identity in Melanesian states; few shared one indigenous language, 
a common culture or a pre-colonial history of unitary rule. As a result, at 
independence many Melanesians had little sense that they belonged as ‘citi-
zens’ of their state (Bennett 2002).  
Many Oceanian states are also characterised as weak because centralised 
political institutions have struggled to take hold, again particularly in Melane-
sia. Prior to European colonial contact Melanesian communities were small; 
they typically consisted of only a few hundred people, most of whom under-
took subsistence horticulture supplemented by fishing, hunting and gathering. 
Consequently, precontact Melanesian societies were ‘stateless’, in the sense 
that they lacked any centralised political or administrative institution equiva-
lent to a government. Sociopolitical leadership status was ascribed in some 
places, inherited in others, and sometimes acquired through a combination of 
both. Most commonly, sociopolitical power was held by big men, who 
achieved their status through a combination of competition with others and 
the cultivation of a personal following through the distribution of wealth, 
social relationships and the demonstration of skills (such as magic, oratory or 
bravery) (Kiste 1994; Sahlins 1963). Moreover, for the most part, colonial 
governments were highly centralised in capitals and other major trading cit-
ies, and worked through existing indigenous governance systems. In the lead-
up to independence a measure of self-rule was introduced, along with stand-
ardised Western models of Westminster-style liberal democratic governance 
and justice. These new models had very little relevance to most Melanesians, 
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who continued to live according to local sociopolitical practices in rural areas. 
This means that the state has ‘never existed’ for many Oceanians (Kiste 1994; 
Nelson 2006). For example, there are many areas without any convenient 
communication system, such as post or telephones (although privately-owned 
mobile telephone companies are changing this); many people are not con-
nected to a state-supplied electricity system or water service; many children 
do not have access to secondary schools; and many people do not have access 
to economic services, such as banks or markets in which to sell their produce. 
Consequently, non-state actors and entities, including families, clans, tribes or 
ethnic groups retain social and political authority and engage in economic 
activity. 
The apparent weakness of Oceanian states has contributed to man-made 
security issues such as conflict and political instability. It has also under-
mined the region’s ability to respond to issues such as natural disasters and 
climate change. Importantly, most of the region’s security issues are internal 
to its states (although conflict can have cross-border implications, as illustrat-
ed by the case of the spill over of conflict in Bougainville into Solomon Is-
lands; see Böge and Dinnen in this volume). As the region’s security prob-
lems are mostly internal this calls into question the assumption that RSCT 
should focus on the security concerns of states, given that non-state actors and 
their systems of security interaction play a significant role in the region. 
However, given that RSCT focuses on states, I will adopt that focus in this 
chapter, which will be structured around the interrelated levels of analysis 
proposed by Buzan and Wæver: the domestic level, particularly “domestically 
generated vulnerabilities”; the regional level of “state-to-state relations”; and 
the global level, which covers the region’s interaction with neighbouring 
regions and the role of global powers in the region (2003:51). 
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The domestic level 
Many Oceanian states are characterised as ‘weak’ when measured against a 
Westphalian ideal-type, which means that domestic security dynamics are 
usually dominant. After decolonisation in the late 1960s to early 1980s, insta-
bility emerged in the form of unstable political institutions and poor govern-
ance, limited economic development, law and order problems and environ-
mental challenges. During this period the most significant security crises were 
found in Melanesia. In the lead-up to Vanuatu’s independence in 1980 pro-
French rebels challenged the colonial government, and were only pacified 
after the newly independent government invited the Papua New Guinea De-
fence Force to intervene (with Australian support). In 1987 Fiji experienced 
two coups, when the military removed the elected government and the heredi-
tary monarchy. In 1988 a secessionist and internal conflict ignited in Bou-
gainville. In 1998 societal tensions bubbled over in Solomon Islands between 
settlers from the island of Malaita and the occupants of the island of Guadal-
canal on which the capital, Honiara, is located, culminating in a coup in June 
2000.  
These events encouraged some commentators to diagnose the Africanisa-
tion of Oceania (Reilly 2000) or the emergence of an arc of instability in the 
region (Dibb et al. 1999). While these concepts crystallised the challenges 
facing Oceanian states (Ayson 2007), they were unpopular in the region; 
Oceanian elites “hated being lumped together as a single entity: a group of 
failing countries with a common volatile and insecure identity, limping along 
together in their collective instability” (Dobell 2012:33). Scholars argued that 
the Africanisation descriptor narrowly focused on the state’s ability to pro-
vide public goods, and failed to recognise the importance of political process-
es and interactions (Fraenkel 2003), and that the so-called arc of instability 
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characterisation was “an overgeneralisation, an oversimplification and even 
an exaggeration” (Rumley 2006:18; Hegarty 2004).  
These characterisations also overlooked the fact that in Oceania’s rural, 
subsistence populations, politics and society is often influenced more by ‘tra-
ditional’ or ‘customary’ factors than by the assumptions and conventions that 
undermine the Westphalian state and Westminster political model. In Mela-
nesia’s subsistence populations relations between individuals and groups tend 
to be dominated by reciprocal social obligations, commonly manifested in the 
ritualized exchange of foods and gifts. Social relations are essentially based 
on kinship, and rights and obligations flow from membership of an extended 
family, described as wantokism. In Melanesian Pidgin wantok literally means 
‘one who speaks the same language’, but it is more generally used to describe 
“relations of obligation binding relatives, members of the same clan or tribal 
group, and much looser forms of association” (Dinnen 2001:203). While the 
wantok system and big man leadership model are often characterised as con-
tributing to corruption and cronyism (Fraenkel 2004; Larmour 1997; Moore 
2008) they are also a significant provider of social support (White 2007). 
Indeed, while Oceanian states might not provide significant public goods and 
services, many are provided by non-state groups such as clans, tribes and 
churches. As a result, many Oceanians identify “more as members of tradi-
tional non-state societal entities (…) than as citizens of the state” (Boege et 
al. 2008:3). Given the prevailing role of non-state actors, “the ‘domestic’ is 
often as much about the alternative story to the state system as about what 
does on within particular states” (Buzan/Wæver 2003:224).  
Indeed, alternative forms of statehood are emerging in Oceania. These al-
ternative forms have moved beyond trying to (re)build Westminster political 
institutions to instead working with local socio-political practices and institu-
tions in a process described as “hybridity” (Richmond 2009). Rather than 
Regional Security Complex 27 
 
viewing local practices and institutions as spoilers or hurdles to building lib-
eral democratic institutions, hybridity focuses on their “strength and resili-
ence” (Boege et al. 2009:13-14). From this perspective it proposes a plural-
istic approach which acknowledges local agency and power structures and 
seeks to work with them to achieve mutually agreed outcomes (Richmond 
2010).  
The regional level 
The presence of a RSC depends on significant levels of security interdepend-
ence among a group of states, which requires substantial interaction among 
them. In Oceania regional security interaction has been generated more by 
weakness than by strength, and there has been relatively little of the enmity 
that is assumed to emerge when states live under anarchy.2 Indeed, the most 
common forms of conflict have been domestic. Moreover the ex-colonial 
powers, particularly Australia, France and the United States, have retained a 
strong presence, which has minimised the likelihood of conflict between 
states. Therefore, until the late 1990s the level of security interaction in Oce-
ania was arguably too low to sustain a RSC.  
The situation changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when transna-
tional security issues such as drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, 
illegal migration and HIV/AIDS emerged to challenge the region and its indi-
vidual states. The threat of terrorism was also mooted (Wainwright 2003), 
although it was treated with scepticism (Greener-Barcham/Barcham 2006). 
Natural disasters and the effects of climate change (including rising sea lev-
els) posed increasing challenges, as did the over-exploitation of natural re-
sources, particularly fisheries, forests and minerals. Domestic security issues 
                                                          
2
  It is debatable whether the degree of enmity is low because Oceanian states have had insuffi-
cient capabilities, and whether they would act more like the competitive, power-maximising 
states identified by neorealists if they had sufficient capabilities. 
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created by political instability and conflict also attracted attention at the re-
gional level, as the Bougainville conflict highlighted how conflict in one state 
could cross borders into another, in this case Solomon Islands. Each of these 
issues was in turn securitised by the region’s states.  
In response, the Pacific Islands Forum (see Blatt in this volume), which 
has a membership comprising all independent states in the region, Australia 
and New Zealand, strengthened its role. Although the Forum had been created 
in 1971, it was not until this period that it began to encourage security interac-
tion and interdependence. While the existence of a regional organisation does 
not necessarily indicate the existence of a RSC, the key was the Forum’s 
move into military-political security. The Forum created a Regional Security 
Committee in 1988 that allows Forum members, representatives of regional 
law enforcement secretariats, stakeholders and development partners to dis-
cuss regional security concerns, securitises issues and promote cooperation to 
encourage coordinated responses to securitised threats.  
The Regional Security Committee’s functions have been elaborated by a 
series of declarations made by Pacific Islands Forum members. The first, the 
1992 Honiara Declaration, was a response to concerns about the potential 
impact of transnational crime, and sought to promote law enforcement coop-
eration across the region. This was followed by the 1997 Aitutaki Declara-
tion, which agreed to enhance existing security cooperation and widened the 
region’s security agenda to include threats from natural disasters, environ-
mental damage, economic, social and environmental policies and external 
threats to state sovereignty. The 2000 Biketawa Declaration was the most 
important development. While it acknowledged the principle of ‘non-
interference in the domestic affairs of another member state’, it asserted the 
need that in a ‘time of crisis or in response to members’ request for assis-
tance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being 
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part of the Pacific Islands extended family’. The 2002 Nasonini Declaration 
then committed Forum members to international counter-terrorism measures 
implemented after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The 2004 Auck-
land Declaration further committed Forum leaders to greater regional coop-
eration on security issues. In 2005 Forum members also agreed to the Pacific 
Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration, which pro-
vides a framework for enhanced regional cooperation, including on security 
issues. While implementation of the Plan atrophied, the Forum has recently 
conducted an extensive review in order to generate new momentum for its 
implementation. Forum members have also signed the 1985 South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the 1995 Waigani Convention to Ban the Im-
portation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes 
and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous 
Wastes within the South Pacific Region.  
The Pacific Islands Forum also created institutions and mechanisms that 
encourage regional interaction to address security issues. The Forum Fisher-
ies Agency helps Oceanian states sustainably manage their fisheries resources. 
In 1992 Forum members adopted the Niue Treaty, which provides for en-
hanced cooperation on the monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing. 
Beyond the Forum, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community runs a Regional 
Maritime Program, which assists Oceanian states to implement measures for 
the safety and security of shipping. The South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation plays a role in ensuring the sustainability of non-
tuna fisheries in the region. Other regional security agencies that promote 
regional interaction and interdependence include the Pacific Islands Law 
Officers Network, the Oceania Customs Organisation, the Pacific Immigra-
tion Directors’ Conference, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, the South 
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Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence Network and the Pacific Aviation Secu-
rity Office. 
Although Australia and New Zealand are members of the Pacific Islands 
Forum, Buzan and Wæver classify them as part of the Southeast Asian RSC 
(2003:158). Until the late 1990s Australia and New Zealand had been reluc-
tant to become overly involved in addressing Oceania’s security issues. Since 
that time, Australia and New Zealand have increasingly advocated the expan-
sion of the Forum’s military-political role, actively securitised issues facing 
the region and encouraged regional responses to these securitised issues. The 
change in Australia and New Zealand’s approach can be partly attributed to 
the events of 11 September 2001. In the aftermath of those terrorist attacks, 
the international community became concerned about the threat posed by 
weak states, and ‘failed’ states were identified as a major threat to interna-
tional order and security (United States 2002). Australia and New Zealand 
securitised the perceived weakness of Oceanian states, which was seen as 
making them vulnerable to terrorists or transnational criminal groups (Firth 
2005; Henderson 2006; Herr 2004; Shibuya 2005).  
The securitisation of state weakness encouraged Australia and New Zea-
land to embark on an era of new interventionism in Oceania, starting with 
their light-touch intervention in Bougainville in 1997 and then the much 
heavier-footprint Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
in 2003 (Dinnen 2004; see also Blatt in this volume). This interventionism 
was guided by the belief that they needed to restore stability in weak Oceani-
an states in order to enhance their own security. While Australia and New 
Zealand already had extensive development assistance programs, the new 
aspect of their policy was that they adopted a whole-of-government approach 
which involved more government agencies (McLeod/Dinnen 2008). Australia 
and New Zealand inserted police officers and public servants directly into 
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Oceanian police forces and government departments to operate as employees 
of those agencies, rather than as technical advisers or consultants. 
The most significant manifestation of this new interventionism and sign 
of increased security interaction in the region was the RAMSI, which de-
ployed at the invitation of the Solomon Islands government and with the 
endorsement of the Pacific Islands Forum under the Biketawa Declaration. 
The RAMSI initially consisted of over 330 police offers and 1,880 military 
personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji; 
although the majority came from Australia. Phase I of the operation was de-
signed to restore law and order, while Phase II was to assist the recovery of 
the institutions of governance and the economy. In its early stages the RAMSI 
managed to restore security, implement a gun amnesty, arrest militia leaders 
and clean-up the police force.  
As the RAMSI achieved initial successes, in 2004 the Australian gov-
ernment decided that Nauru was ‘on the verve of state failure’. It subsequent-
ly entered into an agreement with Nauru, under which it provided a Secretary 
of Finance and Director of Police, each supported by Australian advisers, to 
improve financial management and strengthen the professional standards of 
the Nauru Police Force.3 Australia’s operations in Nauru were later strength-
ened when Pacific Islands Forum leaders agreed to support Nauru under the 
Biketawa Declaration. This agreement created the Pacific Regional Assis-
tance for Nauru in 2005 as a mechanism for Australia and other countries to 
operate in Nauru, another indication of security interaction between the re-
gion’s states.  
In 2004 Australia also embarked on the bilateral Enhanced Cooperation 
Program (ECP) in Papua New Guinea. The ECP involved the insertion of 230 
                                                          
3
  Agreement between Australia and Nauru concerning additional police and other assistance to 
Nauru, Melbourne, 10 May 2004. 
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Australian police advisers into the Papua New Guinea police force and Aus-
tralian public servants seconded into government agencies. Like the RAMSI, 
the ECP attracted relatively widespread public support in Papua New Guinea. 
However, it was resented by certain political leaders and Australia had to 
withdraw its police in May 2005, after the constitutionality of arrangements 
that gave Australian police immunity were successfully challenged.  
The controversy surrounding the ECP signalled emerging questions about 
Australia and New Zealand’s new interventionism, including whether it was 
managing to strengthen ‘weak’ states and achieve sustainable gains 
(Fry/Kabutaulaka 2008). These questions became louder in April 2006, when 
rioters destroyed much of the Solomon Islands’ capital after the national elec-
tion and an increased Australian military deployment was required to restore 
stability. Therefore, it is worth questioning how closely Australia and New 
Zealand’s new interventionism agenda corresponded with the security inter-
ests of Oceanian states. As noted, much of Australia and New Zealand’s in-
terest in the region was motivated by their securitisation of state weakness. 
This meant that security considerations were a driving force of their actions 
and they did not critically analyse what state ‘weakness’ means in Oceania, 
and the complex and diverse reasons why Oceanian states might be weak. As 
they focused on perceived threats such as terrorism and transnational crime, 
they also risked overlooking more profound domestic human security issues 
such as personal safety, gender equity, access to education and health care 
and equitable access to economic opportunities. 
In keeping with this approach Australia has also shifted partial responsi-
bility for one of its securitised threats – the arrival of asylum seekers by boat 
– into Oceania. This shift began in 2001 with the Australian government’s 
Pacific Solution. Under this program, asylum seekers who travelled by boat 
were processed in either Papua New Guinea or Nauru, according to bilateral 
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agreements with both countries. In order to manage these processing facili-
ties, large numbers of Australian and other expatriate workers were deployed, 
particularly in Nauru. The consequences of this program were particularly 
damaging in Nauru, which became increasingly dependent on Australian 
funding and personnel (Maclellan 2013). While a new Australian government 
ended the Pacific Solution in 2008, that government later re-introduced the 
program in 2013, this time with the intention of both processing and settling 
asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea and Nauru. While none have yet been 
resettled in Papua New Guinea, approximately 100 have been resettled in 
Nauru, which is already generating challenges as they struggle to integrate 
into the Nauruan community. 
Australia, and to a lesser extent, New Zealand, are also prominent securi-
ty actors in the region via their extensive defence and policing support. In 
particular, the Australian Defence Cooperation Program supports military 
forces in Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji (the latter’s support has been 
suspended since the 2006 military coup) and police and other security forces 
elsewhere in the region. Australia also runs the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, 
under which boats and ongoing assistance are provided to Oceanian states. 
Australia and New Zealand also convened the inaugural South Pacific De-
fence Ministers Meeting on 1-2 May 2013, to consider opportunities to en-
hance regional cooperation, which was attended by Australia, Chile, France, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. Australia and New Zealand 
also have extensive policing deployments, with officers involved in active 
policing, training, capacity building and the provision of resources. Most 
notably, the Australian Federal Police run the Pacific Police Development 
Program, which provides training, capacity building and leadership at a re-
gional level and bilaterally. Australia also funds the Pacific Transnational 
Crime Coordination Centre in Fiji and bilateral transnational crime teams. 
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Australia and New Zealand’s extensive involvement in Oceania means that 
they may considered to be either members of the Oceania RSC, to merely 
penetrate the region, or to constitute an overlay. As they are members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum and have been heavily involved in securitising issues 
and in responding to security threats in the region, their security interests 
appear to be sufficiently interrelated and interdependent with Oceanian states 
to constitute more than mere penetration. It is also difficult to argue that they 
constitute an overlay, as they are not so dominant that local security relations 
have ceased to operate, as Oceanian states are increasingly forming alterna-
tive regional and sub-regional organisations that are playing a military-
political role. Therefore, it appears that Australia and New Zealand are mem-
bers of the Oceania RSC.  
However, this situation may be changing. Outside Australia and New 
Zealand’s reach, Melanesian states have strengthened the role of the Melane-
sian Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG consists of Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and the FLNKS (Front de Liberation Natio-
nale Kanak et Socialiste, representing the Kanak population of New Caledo-
nia; see Lindenmann in this volume). While the MSG was formed in 1988, it 
has taken an increasingly activist role. This has been encouraged by Fiji, 
which has been suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum since its military 
coup in 2006, and facilitated by China, which has funded the MSG Secretariat 
in Port Vila. The MSG had primarily focused on economic and cultural mat-
ters, but has recently expanded to political and security issues. Importantly, 
the MSG has discussed creating a regional rapid response security force to 
respond to threats to regional and international borders, as well as to natural 
disasters and internal conflicts. The MSG has already established a Humani-
tarian and Emergency Response Coordination Centre, focused on coordinat-
ing responses to natural and man-made disasters. 
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In addition, allegedly with funding from China, Russia and some Arab states, 
in 2010 Fiji held an ‘Engaging the Pacific’ meeting as a rival to the Pacific 
Islands Forum. In 2013 this meeting evolved into the Pacific Islands Devel-
opment Forum (PIDF), which explicitly excludes Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States, but which includes civil society and private sector actors. 
In addition, 30 countries from Europe, Africa, Latin America, North America 
and Asia attended the meeting as observers. Oceanian leaders have agreed to 
establish a PIDF Secretariat in Fiji, possibly with Russian, Chinese or Kuwai-
ti funding (Tarte 2013). Fiji has also encouraged Oceanian states to form an 
alternative caucus grouping at the United Nations, the ‘Pacific Small Island 
Developing States’ group, which has effectively replaced the Forum in this 
role and minimised Australia and New Zealand’s influence. 
The global level  
The increased willingness of Oceanian states to act outside the Pacific Islands 
Forum, and more broadly outside Australia and New Zealand’s spheres of 
influence, has been encouraged by developments at the global level. Given 
the smallness of Oceanian states, both as states and as powers, it does not 
require many resources for external actors to make a significant impact on 
local security relations. Traditionally, the most significant external powers 
involved in the region were France, which retains control of New Caledonia, 
Wallis and French Polynesia, and the United States, which maintains formal 
associations with Hawaii (which is part of the United States), American Sa-
moa (unicorporated territory) and several Micronesian territories: Guam (or-
ganized unincorporated territory) and the Northern Mariana Islands (Com-
monwealth of the USA); Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia have Compacts of Free Association with the United States.  
France and the United States work with Australia and New Zealand under 
the Quadrilateral Defence Cooperation Group to coordinate air and maritime 
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surveillance in the region. These states also cooperate via the United States-
run Pacific Partnership, which since 2006 has conducted annual humanitarian 
assistance missions. Australia, New Zealand and France are also party to the 
1992 FRANZ (France, Australia and New Zealand) Agreement, and to subse-
quent bilateral agreements, to promote cooperation in their responses to natu-
ral disasters and to facilitate defence cooperation in the region. 
While France and the United States have penetrated the region, until re-
cently Australia has exercised a degree of primacy, if not hegemony, in Oce-
ania. Global developments are changing this situation. Most significantly, the 
‘rise’ of China (Kang 2007; see also McDougall in this volume) has motivat-
ed the United States to ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific (Roundtable 
2013). There are claims that the United States is seeking to balance’, ‘deter’ 
or ‘contain’ China (Christensen 2011; Friedberg 2011; Xiang 2012), although 
some commentators identify the potential for the United States to build a 
‘concert of powers’ (White 2012) or achieve ‘accommodation’ with China 
(Etzioni 2013).  
This changing power dynamic is being played out on a smaller scale in 
Oceania, where it has been argued that “China’s entrance into the region has 
accelerated the erosion of the United States as a unipolar power”, and that 
consequently that the United States is engaged in ‘soft balancing’ against 
China (Lanteigne 2012:23). While China’s Assistant Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Cui Tiankai declared in 2012 that China is “here in this region not to 
seek any particular influence, still less dominance” (quoted in Flitton 2012), 
in 2011 then United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted her 
concern that “[w]e are in a competition with China (…) China is in there [in 
Papua New Guinea] every day in every way trying to figure out how it’s go-
ing to come in behind us, come in under us” (quoted in Quinn 2011).  
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Given how marginal Oceania is to the international strategic environment 
there is only a minimal risk that China and the United States will engage in 
zero-sum competition for military influence in the region (Dibb 2012). How-
ever, the United States has increased its number of high-level visits to Ocean-
ia and has engaged more actively in multilateral regional institutions. It has 
also increased its strategic military deployments, most notably expanding its 
base in Guam, its shiprider program and the Pacific Partnership. The United 
States has also increased its aid, trade and investments and opened the 
USAID Pacific Island Regional Office in Papua New Guinea and the new 
regional defence, environmental and labour hub at its embassy in Fiji. The 
United States has also stepped-up its relationships with its traditional allies in 
the region, Australia and New Zealand.  
While the United States has made large aid and trade pledges to Oceania, 
whether they are approved by Congress and translated into actual expenditure 
is not guaranteed, particularly given the United States’ budgetary restraints. 
Indeed, the Congressional Research Service has cautioned that: “the depth of 
the Obama Administration’s ‘rebalancing’ toward the Asia-Pacific region 
(…) may be called into question as time goes on. As yet, it does not appear 
that the Administration has translated its pronouncements into an across-the-
government plan to implement the new elements of the strategy” (Manyin 
2012:10). In this regard, although the United States has increased its military 
engagements in Micronesia, it has more marginal interests in the rest of Oce-
ania.  
Similarly, although there is a body of so-called China threat literature 
which claims that Oceania could provide a testing ground for China’s strate-
gic power against the United States (Dobell 2007; Henderson/Reilly 2003; 
Shie 2010; Windybank 2005), and China has invested in bilateral and multi-
lateral diplomacy, and increased its aid, trade and investment in Oceania, 
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several commentators argue that Oceania is “marginal in China’s strategic 
landscape” (Yang 2009:145; Zhang 2007). More by accident than design, 
China’s influence in the region has been enhanced by the response of Austral-
ia, New Zealand and the United States to the 2006 Fiji coup. These powers 
condemned the coup and adopted sanctions against the Fijian regime, in the 
expectation that their pressure would encourage a return to democracy. The 
Fijian regime instead adopted a Look North policy and sought closer engage-
ment with China, other East Asian partners and global emerging powers. 
Therefore, the United States’ increased penetration of Oceania should in-
stead be understood as “reasserting the status quo rather than issuing a stra-
tegic challenge to China” (Firth 2013:288). Similarly, while China is enhanc-
ing its penetration of the region, “there is not sufficient evidence to suggest 
that China has a clearly defined and well-coordinated strategy to fill a power 
vacuum in the Pacific” (Zhang 2010:50). This suggests that neither state is 
engaged in a concerted strategy to compete for influence in Oceania. 
Other external powers, such as Japan, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Iran, 
Cuba, Russia and the United Arab Emirates are also penetrating Oceania as 
aid donors and diplomatic partners, widening the region’s choice of aid part-
ners of regional states. However, there is no suggestion that these states are 
engaged in deliberate competition for power in Oceania, beyond satisfying 
their own goals of diplomatic recognition or improved international influence. 
It is not necessarily important whether these external powers are actually 
competing for influence in Oceania. Instead, what is important is how Ocean-
ian states interpret their behaviour, since these interpretations can be enough 
to influence behaviour. In this regard, Oceanian leaders have encouraged an 
interpretation that there is emergent competition for influence in the region. 
Winnie Anna Kiap, Papua New Guinea High Commissioner to the United 
Kingdom, has observed that external powers are increasingly competing for 
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influence because “when a vacuum is left [by the withdrawal of the United 
States and the United Kingdom], another country moves in to fill it” (quoted 
in Tahboub 2013). Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill has ob-
served that Papua New Guinea will take advantage of the interest that these 
external powers have in Papua New Guinea and look for economic opportuni-
ties in Asia (O’Neill 2012). The Fijian High Commissioner to the United 
Kingdom, Solo Mara, has observed that: “Washington has ramped up its 
presence and involvement in response to China’s increasing abilities and 
influence”, which he interpreted as “Washington’s realization that is must be 
more involved in the South Pacific or risk losing its influence entirely” (Mara 
2013). Former Prime Minister of Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka, has similarly observed 
that China is ‘filling a vacuum’ in the region (quoted in Radio New Zealand 
2013). However, this perception is not absolute, with Henry Puna, Prime 
Minister of the Cook Islands, observing that: “our engagement with major 
powers should not be viewed as the subject of competition, but as representa-
tive of shared goals of mutual benefit and reciprocity” (Puna 2013). 
The interpretation that external powers are competing for influence has 
opened up global opportunities for Oceanian states, which no longer neces-
sarily need to identify themselves as falling within an uncontested Australia 
and New Zealand sphere of influence. Instead, Oceanian states may believe 
that it has more choice as to which external power (or powers) they engage 
with (Porter/Wesley-Smith 2010). Indeed, Oceanian states may believe that 
they are able to play competing great powers off against each other, as they 
might provide a determining factor in a balance of power situation, if enough 
side with one great power over the other. Oceanian states already appear to be 
astutely playing-off perceived Chinese and American competition in order to 
access increased development assistance, concessional loans, military support 
and international influence. However, in the unlikely event that these great 
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powers begin to compete for political-military influence in Oceania, this 
might have security implications for Oceanian states, which could find them-
selves drawn into a wider global battle for influence. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has considered whether there is an alternate way to define Ocean-
ia, using RSCT. Based on the analysis above, it appears that a RSC has 
formed in Oceania. Since the late 1990s security challenges have emerged 
and been securitised. In order to address them the region has become linked 
in deep and strong patterns of interaction and interdependence. The transna-
tional nature of many of these challenges mean that it is no longer possible to 
analyse or resolve the security problems of one Oceanian state in isolation 
from the remainder of the region. The Pacific Islands Forum has played an 
important role in this process of securitisation, interaction and interdepend-
ence, particularly as a result of its 2000 Biketawa Declaration, which has 
been used to justify interventions in Solomon Islands and Nauru. Australia 
and New Zealand have also played an important role in encouraging the secu-
ritisation of threats and in addressing those threats, driven by the characterisa-
tion of the region as an arc of instability. Therefore, a security orientated 
definition of the region, which includes members of the Forum, Australia and 
New Zealand, differs from conventional geographic or ethnological ap-
proaches. However, in recognition that the arc of instability characterisation 
is highly controversial and that Australia and New Zealand’s interests do not 
necessarily always accord with those of Oceanian states, the region is increas-
ingly creating new mechanisms that exclude these powers. The possible 
emergence of new states in Bougainville and New Caledonia might also 
change the orientation of the region. Whether these developments affect the 
Forum’s role, and consequently the existence of the Oceanian RSC in its 
current form, remains to be seen. 
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 Regional Action in the Face of Global Turning Points 
and Regional Asymmetries 
Theoretical considerations on the regional political and economic transition 
in Oceania 
Andreas Holtz 
Abstract: The following article attempts to theoretically capture a theory for 
the change of the regional architecture in the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) 
with the focus on the dimensions security policy and economics. Based on the 
structural weaknesses of insular small states on the one side and Australia as 
regional power on the other side of a very pronounced power continuum, the 
equally distinctive asymmetries between Australia and PIC are being inter-
preted as a material basis for the state identities and self- and external per-
ception, which in turn form the base for interest-driven action. Yet to analyse 
the nature of these actions – co-operative/constructive, neutral versus self-
serving and conflicting – other variables like global turning points, which 
influence the action focus of regional policy-makers, need also to be looked 
at. 
Keywords: Regional order, asymmetries, constructivism, Oceania, Aus-
tralia, structural change 
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Introduction 
The region of the Pacific insular small states1, or in short the Island Pacific or 
Pacific Island Countries (PICs)2, shows some specific features especially with 
regards to its small stateness and its island situation. While the term “insular 
small state” is generally suitable for the states of this region, it is not free 
from defects. The classification of small stateness for instance is somewhat 
arbitrary for want of a consistent definition of the word “small”. Notwith-
standing of this inconsistency, the specialist literature points to a limit of a 
million inhabitants (Maass 2009:64ff; Sutton/Payne 1993:582). The term 
“insular” in its basic definition signifies an area surrounded by water while 
not exhibiting any land borders3. In the following, the debate about small 
                                                          
1
  In this context only states, which are recognized as fully sovereign states should be consid-
ered. Other units without full sovereignty will not be taken into account in this contribution 
(see Blitza in this volume). States with full sovereignty in Island Pacific are Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. These twelve states, characterized by 
their structural attributes as insular microstates (with the exception of PNG), form the Pacific 
core. 
2
  Within the scope of this contribution the term PICs signifies a political region while Island 
Pacific means a geographical region excluding Australia and New Zealand. Oceania refers 
the geographical term including Australia and New Zealand (to get information about the no-
tion of region in the context of security politics see Wallis in this volume). An economical 
perspective of region is provided by Goertz and Powers. They argue from a social-
constructivist point of view that regions are constructed by regional economic institutions 
which themselves are already regarded as institutions social constructs (Powers/Goertz 
2011:2388). In contrast to other approaches they do not argue exclusively; thus states may be 
part of more than one region (ibid.:2391), like for example Turkey or Australia. Overall, it 
turns out that regions become regions simply by denotation. Region therefore fulfill the re-
quirements of reification as an extreme form of objectification defined as the process, by 
which human activity and society attain the character of objectivity (Berger/Luckmann 
2009:94f). 
3
  This means that by this definition PNG could not be considered as insular small state be-
cause of its number of population and its land border with Indonesia. As integral part of 
Melanesia, PNG displays cultural commonalities with the other PICs. Therefore PNG is gen-
erally viewed as a PIC and not as part of Southeast Asia. Timor Leste (see Schmitz in this 
volume) presents a similar confusing picture. Although Timor Leste shares a land border 
with Indonesia, has slightly more than one million inhabitants and is geographically consid-
ered as part of Southeast Asia, the state is counted to the group of PICs as reference region 
because of the Australian influence, its political instability and its structural problems. To-
gether with the Indonesian region of Aceh, Timor Leste marks the Western beginning of the 
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stateness, state weakness and its functional capacity will briefly be reflected 
here in order to create a link between real circumstances and the resulting 
asymmetries and identities, their perception and affordances, eventually pro-
posing an explanation for the change in the region. 
PICs as an own state group 
The PICs form a conglomerate of states in a sea area, which encompasses 
about one third of the global surface. The term conglomerate already points to 
a certain ambivalence as it means both accumulation as well as heterogeneous 
blend, suggesting resemblances and differences at the same time. The differ-
ences within the PICs become especially clear when looking at the tripartite 
structure of the subregions Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia (see chart 1 
in the appendix) while the allocation of certain signs from signifier to signifi-
ant respectively classifications of non-Western systems by representatives of 
Westerners are always to be observed with caution (see in general 
Chakrabarty 2010:160f). 
At the same time the PICs also exhibit the similarities of a state group re-
flected especially by their insularity as well as by their concept of a small 
state. These common characteristics make the states of the reference region in 
the Pacific a community of states. To this effect, the PICs could be called a 
regional community embedded in a global society. The basic idea of commu-
nity points at the structural resemblance of collective parts. Given their core 
data (see chart 3 in the appendix) and specific mutual challenges, the PIC 
form a structure i.e. a certain way, of linking up as elements of a system and 
establishing an order (Lüdtke 2007:639). This concept of structure addresses 
the nature of the PICs, whereby common characteristics manifest common 
orientations. Likewise does every state in itself also form a system marked by 
                                                                                                                             
so called Arc of Instability (see figure 1 on page 77, see also Dibb et al. 1999:18, May 2003), 
ending with Tonga in the East (Dobell 2012:33f, Evans 2012:2). 
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a certain structure. Finally, external norms and structures also have an impact 
on the Pacific states whilst encompassing their whole outside – the interna-
tional system of global relations, economic systems or simply ecological inci-
dents to name but a few. 
Along with the Lesser Antilles, the PICs are the only states worldwide, 
which are regionally adjoined at least by maritime borders, and besides their 
nature as states display some further structural common characteristics. Like 
Tönnies points out, we here have a communal character of the same nature 
(Tönnies 2012:231ff; Lichtblau 2012) and not just a state society with com-
mon interests (Bull 2002, 1985:31-49)4. In spite of these structural similarities 
as insular small states, there is hardly any region with more heterogeneous 
units. In Vanuatu alone, 200,000 inhabitants communicate in no less than 110 
(in PNG even more than 800) different languages. States like Kiribati dispose 
of a mere land area of 811 square kilometers, yet the islands of Kiribati 
stretch on a surface of about 3.5 millions square kilometers of the so-called 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). To refer to the PICs as one state territory and 
one population would obviously ignore this complexity.  
Characteristics of insular small stateness: Structures and small states 
One problem when dealing with small states arises when trying to define a 
universal concept of small stateness (see Dommen 1985:1-15). The basic 
difficulty is the defintion of the term ‘small’ or ‘smallness’– particularly as 
the number of states with up to a million inhabitants accredited under interna-
tional law has been rising steadily up to the millennium5. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
4
  In this context Dirk Gerdes (1998:648) speaks about characteristics of homogeneity of a 
region, which can be described as natural within the meaning of a conservative-organicistic 
conception and/or functional in terms of a unitary-republican conception. 
5
  In 1975, 33 states belonged to this group. Until 1980 this number increased to 39. Since 1995 
the number has remained stable around 42 of 194 states (= 21.65%) (see www.cia.gov/lib 
rary/publications/the-world-factbook/ retrieved 12 July 2014). Many states are threatened by 
secessionist aspirations. Geser assumed 70 of these aspirations to the millennium turn (Geser 
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generally approved and instrumentalised quantitative limit of one million 
inhabitants shows the arbitrariness of demarcation, particularly since the 
number of inhabitants is always dynamic and does not reveal a lot about the 
qualitative abilities of a state. 
Looking back in time, the definition of small stateness has displayed a 
wide scope of interpretations. The spectrum ranges from authors, who con-
sider small stateness as a structural determinant (Buchholz 1984:154-156) to 
those who dismiss this (Holtz 2008). Small stateness carries both positive as 
well as negative connotations (Anderson 1999:31). Very small states are 
usually considered pro-democracy, while this does not seem to be true for 
larger small states (Anckar 2010:6; see in addition Hassall in this volume). 
The economic research agrees on the economic vulnerability of small states 
(see e.g. Briguglio 1995), while the consequences of this within the scope of a 
small state openness are equally considered as an advantage (Easterly/Kraay 
2001:104f; Armstrong/Read 2002:452) as well as a disadvantage (e.g. Srini-
vasan in 1986)6. Clearly the concept of quantity is an obstacle to all definition 
attempts, consequently, just attributes and characteristics of small states can 
be determined to serve as a base for analysis7. 
Another method equates small states with weak states, marking them as 
having certain capacity deficits by definition (see table 1). Here the state 
efficiency plays an important role (see chart 2 in the appendix). Does a 
                                                                                                                             
2001:98). Referring to the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization, Beary count-
ed in 2008 22 secessionist aspirations. The collapse of a bigger or big state increases the 
spreading of small states. 
6
  According to some authors, structural disadvantages of small stateness can even be compen-
sated (Ray 2003:179). 
7
  Exceptions are for example Tom Crowards (2002) and Charles Taylor (1969). Using indica-
tors like the size of a territory, population and GDP for a cluster analysis, Crowards compiles 
a statistically meaningful classification while Taylor’s results show absolute figures. Accord-
ing to Taylor, a state is to be considered as small with a territory size less than 142,822 km², 
a population less than 2,928,000 people and with a GDP of less than 1,583 Mio. US$. How-
ever, Taylor’s approach is discrediting itself by using figures of 1969 and therefore only re-
ferring to a certain point in time. 
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(small) state comply with the demands of modern democracy, rule of law and 
welfare state and at what level does it develop economically and socially? 
Table 1: Weak states compared to non weak states (c.f. Handel 1991:52, 53) 
 Weak State Strong State 
Population Very small Very large 
Area Very small Very large 
Economy  
1) GNP small in absolute terms 1) GNP very high in absolute terms 
2) Little or no heavy industry 2) Very large, highly developed heavy industry (including weapons) 
3) High degree of specialization in a 
barrow range of products 
3) Very high degree specialization in large 
variety of products 
4) Small domestic market, hence high 
dependency on foreign markets for 
imports and exports 
4) Very large domestic market, hence little 
dependence on foreign export/import trade 
5) R and D very low in absolute terms 5) R and D very high in absolute terms 
6) High dependendce on foreign 
capital 6) No dependence on forein capital 
Military 
Power  
1) Cannot defend itself against exter-
nal threats by its own strength; high ot 
total dependence on external help 
1) Can defend itself by its own power against 
any state or combination of states; very little 
reliance on external support 
2) Total (or very high) dependence on 
weapon aquisition in foreign countries 
2) Has full array of nuclear weapons and their 
delivery systems 
3) A high proportion of strength alway 
mobilized or at its disposal; longer-
range war potential very low 
3) Domestic production of all weapon systsems. 
Large standing armies, combined with very high 
war potential 
Inter-
national 
System  
1) Limited scope of interests (usually 
to neighboring and regional areas) 1) Global interests 
2) Litle or no influence on the balance 
of power (or the nature of the system) 
2) Weighs heavily in world balance of power; 
shapes the nature of the international system 
3) Mainly passive and reactive in 
foreign policy 3) Pursues a dynamic and active foreign policy 
4) Tends to minimize risks, especially 
vis-a-vis the powers 
4) Tends to maximize gains (rather than mini-
mize risks) 
5) Can be penetrated relatively easy 5) Relatively difficult to penetrate (depends on 
nature of the internal political system) 
6) Strong support for international law 
and norms and of international organ-
izations 
6) Low regard for international law and organiza-
tions; prefers power and summit policies 
In this reference frame not all small states are automatically accounted for as 
weak. Just as ‘smallness’, the term ‘weakness’ always needs to be viewed in 
relative terms – albeit in a reduced manner. What for example are the qualifi-
cations for being considered developed or not? This apparent vagueness 
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makes it important to apply a more operational approach in favour of a quali-
tative concept rather than a quantitative definition (Hey 2003:3). According to 
such concept, weakness goes beyond the state efficiency and mere function-
ing, but rather refers to insufficient capacities and with it the vulnerability of 
a state. Small and/or weak states are more susceptible to various shocks of 
any kind, insular small states are even more affected (Easter 1999:408; 
Briguglio 1995:1622)8. 
Apart from this susceptibility, weakness presents itself above all in com-
parison to others (Knudsen 1996:5). Only by such comparison does a small 
state become a small state. 
This relative concept is also described by Hans Geser (2001) who classes 
‘small’ as ‘immanent’ (‘substantial’), ‘contingent’ (‘relational’) and as ‘per-
ceived’ (‘attributive’) smallness (Geser 2001:89ff). This substanial smallness 
depicts certain features of a state such as its territorial size, population etc., 
and is thus quantifiable. The relational smallness is more difficult to allocate, 
as the state needs to be looked at both as a whole and in relations with others. 
Lastly, the attributive smallness addresses the self-perception of a state 
(ibid.:90). 
The concept of vulnerability and the related efficiency of states also plays 
a part in the concept of small states by Hein (1985), he thematizes the state 
ability to support its population. Here, the level of analysis is no longer the 
state, but the individual citizen. The small stateness is secondary, while its 
                                                          
8
  Easter shows that among the 28 most vulnerable states belong 25 to the group of small states. 
18 of those 25 states are also island states (Easter 1999:408). Critics like Paul Sutton object 
that Easter’s vulnerability index is one-sided directed on economics and environment: ”The 
Vulnerability Index provides an excellent measure of the economic and environmental vul-
nerability of all developing countries and underlines the particular vulnerabilities of small 
states but does not bring out their social, cultural and political vulnerabilities“ (Sutton 
1999:397). It would be desirable to have a multidimensional vulnerability index underlining 
possible interdependencies between political, economic, social and cultural consequences of 
vulnerabilities. 
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functionality is in the main focus. Although said problems are obviously 
connected with the smallness of a state, here it remains in the background 
(ibid.:21). His concept of smallness therefore does not offer a definition, 
however touches on it through characterizations and descriptions of other 
definition attempts and analyses. 
Keohane's (1969:295-296) systemic analysis of weak states categorizes 
states as ‘great’, ‘secondary’, ‘middle’ and ‘small’. A state is ‘great’ in terms 
of a superpower, when it can alter the structure of the international system by 
itself (‘system-determinating’). ‘Secondary’ refers to a great power, that has 
no means to alter the structure, but may still influence it (‘system-
influencing’). The group of ‘middle’ powers can only influence the system in 
collaboration with other powers of their categories and can no longer act 
alone (‘system-affecting’). Lastly, weak or ‘small’ states can not affect the 
system at all, but rather are themselve being influenced by it (‘system-
ineffectual’). In his said approach, Keohane negates the perspective of the 
actors in favour of a system analysis.  
The attempt to define small states categorically is bound to fail. The use 
of respective limits according to the population figure is ultimately arbitrary 
and lack objectivity. Already Erling Bjøl therefore did not refer to small 
states, but to ‘small state roles’, which corresponds to Gesers ‘attributive 
smallness’ and allows for an almost constructivist view from today’s perspec-
tive. He did not define the small state, but allocated certain roles to it corre-
sponding to its abilities (Bjøl 1971:29). Christopher E. Diggines (1985:193) is 
putting – somewhat biased – a negative spin towards these roles whilst focus-
sing on specific problems a small state could be defined by. A small state is 
therefore identified by its specific attributes (Liou 2002:1291,1293), well 
illustrated in dimensions such as economics, politics and society which are 
broken down in the following table on the next page. 
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State efficiency and its absence 
The small state characteristics more often than not tend towards the capacities 
of the respective states, in this case of the PICs. From this, conclusions can be 
drawn with regards to the state efficiency, mainly represented by its ability to 
state sovereignty (see also Blitza and Lindenmann in this volume). According 
to the state functions as put together in chart 2 of the appendix, Rokkan 
(1975:562-600) defines four central dimensions of modern stateness, namely 
the territorial and constitutional state as well as the democratic nation state 
and the social interventionist state.  
Table 2: General indicators of insular small states 
Dimension Characteristics 
Economy 
Narrow product pallet 
Open market 
Dependence on imports/exports 
High unemployment rats 
Migration  
Limited resources 
Small domestic markets 
Low economic potential 
Foreign Policy 
Security interest less pronounced than interest of economic welfare 
Pursuit of further legal provisions to govern international relations 
Rule-Taker 
Domestic Policy 
Institutional constancy 
Omnipresent government 
Strong personification 
Society 
Social cohesion 
Tradition & social conservatism 
Social intimacy 
Striving for autonomy 
Source: Sutton 1999:397-402, 1987:3-25; Lowenthal 1987:26-49; Payne 1987:50-62; Neu-
mann/Gstöhl 2006:3-36. 
Four assets can be extracted from this as base for good governance: Ideally 
the government should aim at keeping the inner and the outer peace and thus 
minimize collective risks (security function); the institutionally secured en-
forcement of legal security (rule law function); the protection of potential 
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democratic participation (democracy function) and a generally accepted con-
nection of economic efficiency and distribution justice (social function). With 
the help of these ideals strengths and weaknesses of the respective states 
become apparent. The respective size of the gap can reveal weak or even 
functionally inefficient states, which Jackson (1993) describes as quasi-states. 
Other authors speak of states with a restricted statehood. Such a limitation can 
be seen in those states whose governments have only partial or no control 
over the internal or foreign use of force – i.e. a legitimate monopoly on the 
use of force – and only few or no means to enforce political decisions of the 
central government. In other words: “Areas with restricted stateness lack at 
least partially in ‘effective territorial sovereignty’ as a minimum characteris-
tic feature of modern stateness“ (Risse 2005:6, “Räumen mit begrenzter 
Staatlichkeit fehlt es zumindest teilweise an ‚effektiver Gebietsherrschaft’ als 
Minimalcharakteristikum moderner Staatlichkeit”). This is certainly not only 
true for already desintegrating states stricken by violent conflicts, but also for 
those, of which restricted statehood is a result of lacking political, administra-
tive and economic capacities (ibda.:7): “State strength (…) is not measured in 
military terms. It is, rather, in the capacity of the state to command loyalty – 
the right to rule – to extract the resources necessary to rule and provide ser-
vices, to maintain that essential element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, and to operate within 
the context of a consensus based political community” (Holsti 1996:82). Ob-
viously there seems to be a correlation between state weakness, state failure 
or even state decay (Spanger 2002:4). For the post-colonial PICs, the lacking 
state capacities have negative consequences leading into corruption, violence 
and crime. It is dangers like these which Canberra perceives as a security 
threat to Australia (Patience 2005:1f). 
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In this context, the security function of a state is of prime importance in the 
political science research. Thereby, security does not just imply the conven-
tional militarily aspect as protection from an external threat, but rather en-
closes on a much larger scale both also ecological protection as well as the 
prevention of risks resulting from state weakness and lacking state capacities 
and thus its deficient functional ability. Along the lines of these areas of state 
functionality, there are different possibilities of discussion. Here the concept 
of security can initially be subdivided in state security and human security. Is 
a state safe from external influences and does it execute an appropriate pow-
erful control? Moreover, can this state ensure the security of its citizens? This 
last question reveals an inaccurrency in one aspect, which strongly corre-
sponds with the concept of a shared sovereignty (see Blitza in this volume), 
wherefore this question should again be asked in full: Can only an own state 
ensure the security of its citizens? In this case the principle of non-
intervention under international law would be trifling. Even already possible 
legitimatable interventions on humanitarian grounds would have to be modi-
fied to that effect, that not the intervention as such but its omission needs to 
be justified (see ICISS 2001; Debiel 2004:61-81). If the functional efficiency 
of a state is no longer given and if it therefore poses the potential danger of a 
spreading destabilization in its environment, an intervention seems almost 
mandatory (Fearon/Laitin 2004:36f). 
In summary, the PICs including PNG and Timor Leste factually belong to 
the group of insular small states characterised by their smallness, a distinctive 
vulnerability, hardly any own capacities and thus by a general structural 
weakness. This also applies for PNG, which due to its land border to Indone-
sia and its own size is not formally considered an insular small state any 
more. This group defined by vulnerability and weakness refers to one side of 
a region marked by very distinctive asymmetries. On the other side of this 
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continuum there is the continental state of Australia, which in all key parame-
ters is head and shoulders above not only each individual single Pacific island 
state, but also partly above them as a group (see charts 3 and 4 in the appen-
dix)9. Australia perceives itself as the solid guarantor for safety and prosperity 
amidst an unstable and vulnerable region (Rajaram 2003:290-306). In Aus-
tralia’s view this results in “special responsibilies in the region” (Australia 
2003:92) and an “unquestioned, and often unacknowledged belief that Aus-
tralia has a right, or even a duty, to speak for the inhabitants of the region, to 
represent them to themselves and to others, to lead, and to manage them” 
(Fry 1996:2). The existing asymmetries shape a claim for leadership, best 
described by Destradi (2010:903-930) as a leader-initiated leadership and 
with intermediate and soft forms of a hegemony. The Australian claim to 
leadership originates in the power generating asymmetrical interdependence 
(Nabers 2012:124) between Australia and the PICs as well as the intention to 
deploy it (Knorr 1975:18,237). These strong asymmetries between the re-
gional leading power Australia10 and the PICs as its followers determine 
                                                          
9
  This asymmetry corresponds with the distinction between vulnerability and sensitivity within 
the context of interdependent occurrences. An interdependence implies mutual cost impacts. 
Without these, an interdependence would rather be a connectivity (Keohane/Nye 1985:76). 
Thus, interdependences occur if a national actor shows a high sensitivity towards external 
developments. Using this definition of interdependence, a breakdown of relations by one ac-
tor would cause higher costs than its maintenance. Under asymmetric conditions the sensitiv-
ity tends to be only on the weak pole of above mentioned asymmetry continuum. It may be 
that this weak pole is vulnerable to shocks while for the strong pole, these register as sensi-
tivity at best. 
10
  According to Nolte (2012:34) a regional leading power is a state, which is providing a com-
bination of power resources, role definitions and external perceptions and therefore fulfilling 
criterias of requirement, resources, the ability to implement and acceptance. “Leadership 
must therefore be described as political activity, which often takes place in institutionalized 
contexts [Pacific Island Forum] or is aimed at institutionalization [any influence expansion 
of the PIFs, e.g. Biketawa] in order to stimulate social change [change of regional architec-
ture], is best described as policy-or situation-specific [with regard to policy fields such as 
security and economic policy], proceeds with limitations on action [exogenous influences], 
features a normative component [Pacific Plan] and (...) leads to a community building be-
tween leaders and followers, or larger social groups [increase cooperation or integration 
where appropriate]" (Nabers 2012:130 (bracketed additions by Andreas Holtz); “Führung 
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perceptions, identities and actions. Asymmetries can trigger off actions, still 
irrespective of direction or shape11. Due to reasons of self-protection weak-
ness is motivation enough to act for states with more distinctive capacities. 
Thus weak states are supported from the outside, e.g. in terms of aid money 
or even by some military interventions. Since about a decade (2003) the PICs 
region has experienced this change from cooperation to intervention, while 
replacing Rumley’s below mentioned aid-front (see p. 74) with an interven-
tion front. Especially against the backdrop of said evident asymmetries and 
the known record of structural weaknesses in the PICs the question comes up, 
what has caused this change and why at this point in time (see in addition the 
second article of Holtz in this volume, 109ff)? 
Theoretical approaches for the explanation of change 
The use of terms like perception and identity already points to a constructivist 
approach, which within international relations -unlike other theories- allow 
for a thematization and explanation of change through implemention of 
norms, identities and interests. Given the great number of various approaches 
and applications, it is hardly possible to refer to a constructivist approach, 
which is why these are usually referred to as metatheory or “higher-level 
                                                                                                                             
ist demnach als politische Aktivität zu bezeichnen, die häufig in institutionalisierten Kontex-
ten stattfindet oder auf Institutionalisierung abzielt, damit sozialen Wandel antreibt, als poli-
tik- oder situationsspezifisch zu verstehen ist, unter Handlungsbeschränkungen verläuft, eine 
normative Komponente besitzt und (…) zur Gemeinschaftsbildung zwischen Leader und Fol-
lower oder größeren sozialen Gruppen führt“. 
11
  According to Doris Gerber (2012:88), activity results from reasons. Those reasons are at the 
same time of internal and external origin as, for example, exogenous affordances are moti-
vating. By doing this, these affordances create interests. However, these interests are leading 
to real actions by an endogenous interpretation. “Even if one takes an externalist position, 
according to which the reasons for action are no mental states, but rather external matters be-
longing to the conditions of the act, even then you have to have some idea of how these sup-
posedly external reasons for the actor are being recognized as his own” (ibid.,”Selbst wenn 
man eine externalistische Position vertritt, nach der Handlungsgründe keine geistigen 
Zustände sind, sondern vielmehr externe Sachverhalte, die zu den Bedingungen der Hand-
lung gehören, auch dann muss man irgendeine Idee davon haben, wie diese angeblich ex-
ternen Gründe für den Handelnden als seine Gründe anerkannt sein können”). 
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research perspective” (Krell 2004:369; also Katzenstein et al. 1996:35f). 
Constructivist approaches above all deal with origins of interests and the 
significance of interplay between matter12 and its perception: “Constructivism 
is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped 
by human action and interpretation depends on dynamic normative and epis-
temic interpretations of the material world” (Adler 1997:322). In the focus is 
thus the being -of either social action or of material circumstances- and its 
interpretation for the construction of action-guiding assumptions. 
The connection of a being with its interpretation refers to the lacking ex-
plainability of other approaches, however without blending those out or com-
peting them. Thus neither the power focus nor the (presumed) striving for 
power is called into doubt by realism and neorealism, nor is the purpose-
rational action of liberal approaches ignored. Quite on the contrary it is possi-
ble to use various different approaches, without expecting a single one would 
compete to offer the only possible explanantion (Katzenstein 1996:2). Con-
structivist explanation approaches are rather considered to be an extension 
and a co-operative supplement (see, generally, Barkin 2010, Guzzini 2013). If 
in the following real existing asymmetries, matter in various different shapes 
and both low capacities and perceptions, acceptances and reifiactions are 
                                                          
12
  „The concept of matter is one of the central concepts of human thought. Already the ancient 
philosophers put the matter in the focus of their considerations. Up to the present day the 
term that, as such, is already an attribution, has lost none of its ambiguity, standing at the 
same time for a rigid materiality as well as a meaningful metaphor (eg, if a difficult matter is 
mentioned). Matter is simultaneously passive and active in terms of bio-organic activity. 
This ambiguous parallelism becomes very apparent in the feminist literature that can be used 
as an illustration for the below-discussed connection between asymmetry, identity and ac-
tion: “The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified as prior. This sig-
nification produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and 
simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes its own action. If the body signi-
fied as prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or representational 
status of language, which claims that signs follow bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not 
mimetic at all. On the contrary, it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue per-
formative, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims 
to find prior to any and all signification” (Butler 2013:510, originally 1993:30). 
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mentioned, this is by no means eclecticism, but a necessary complement: 
“The people are living beings whose material needs create a determining 
factor when forming their interests, but eventually interests are predominant-
ly a result of their ideas, and not their genes; since interests are presumptions 
of possibilities to satisfy ones needs, and these presumptions are historical 
and culturally variable” (Krell 2004:349 with a reference to Wendt 
1999/2010:133; “Die Menschen sind Lebewesen, deren materielle Bedürfnis-
se einen entscheidenden Faktor bei der Formierung ihrer Interessen bilden, 
aber letztlich sind ihre Interessen überwiegend ein Ergebnis ihrer Ideen, 
nicht ihrer Gene; denn Interessen sind Annahmen über Möglichkeiten zur 
Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen, und diese Annahmen sind historisch und 
kulturell variabel”). 
The connection of a being with its interpretation also refers to the physi-
cal connection of matter, here of the small stateness or the state weakness, 
and a certain and ultimately constructed existence, meaning a certain identity 
that corresponds to the attributive small stateness of Geser and the small-state 
roles of Bjøl. Thus Wendt considers (1998:386f) the organizational identity of 
a state as ‘I’ resulting in the forming of certain interests according to his self-
concept. Though these interests are fundamentally identical, their interpreta-
tion and their gratifications differ. This is described by the ‘Me’, i.e. self-
attribution of meanings about me through the eyes of others (ibid.:387). The 
above quotation of Fry about the virtually natural responsibility of Australia 
is presumably to be interpreted by the existing asymmetries between Austral-
ia and the PICs. According to this theory, the asymmetries in the PICs would 
be relevant to action. Australia acts the way it does because it supposes this 
action to be expected owing to its self- and external perception (gen. Wendt 
2010:346). Australian security-political interests emerge from this self-
confidence and in accordance to a “secure and stable archipelagic screen” 
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(Ayson 2007:222). Therefore, exogenous influences on the formation of in-
terests are virtually ruled out. The reality looks quite different though: Inter-
ests develop with and “within the processes of social interaction” 
(Godehardt/Lembcke 2010:25; “(…) in den Prozessen der sozialen Inter-
aktion”), that is to say they are each individually dependant on endogenous 
and exogenous influences. 
Identities do not only shape interests, but also a certain role behaviour re-
acting to and at the same time creating expectations and ultimately structures 
(Vertzberger 2010:221f). This process of reification describes the conception 
of human phenomena, as if they were things, a given irrevocable reality “as if 
they were non-human or even superhuman. (…) Reification is the understand-
ing of human products as if they were something different: Natural phenome-
nas, consequences of cosmic laws or the revelation of a devine will. Reifica-
tion implies that man is willing to forget his own authorship of the human 
world“ (Berger/Luckmann 2009:94f; “(…) das heißt als außer- oder gar 
übermenschlich. (…) Verdinglichung ist die Auffassung von menschlichen 
Produkten, als wären sie etwas anderes als menschliche Produkte: Naturge-
gebenheiten, Folgen kosmischer Gesetze oder Offenbarungen eines göttlichen 
Willens. Verdinglichung impliziert, dass der Mensch fähig ist, seine eigene 
Urheberschaft der humanen Welt zu vergessen (…)“). This is by no means 
meant as a radical-constructivist refusal to objectively shared realities. An 
island is and remains a piece of land surrounded by water, and by that stays 
an objectively shared reality beyond discursive deconstruction. Nevertheless, 
interpretations about islands belong to the human world described by Berger 
and Luckmann, whereby insular small stateness is also an objectively shared 
neutral reality, the interpretations of which can only happen with hindsight 
and also allows for various alternatives. The process of said reification is like 
the interpretation of real conditions a process of constant and complicated 
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learning, whereby identities are created and perpetually dynamically modi-
fied13 (Ulbert 2003:400f). This learning contains the opportunity for a reas-
sessment and thus room for alternatives. The evaluation of certain events – A 
and B result in C – indicates the “two effects of structure” (Wendt 2010:165). 
The first effect is of causally determined: C is a result from A and B. In con-
trast, the second effect is of a constitutive nature: Only as part of C do be-
come A and B the way they perceive themselves. A and B constitutes them-
selves by action. Thus structures lead to actions, while at the same time only 
actions create structures.  
Applied on the region of the PICs, similar conclusions could be made in 
view of said existing assymetries with Australia. In virtually all aspects of 
state functionality and resulting policy areas, Australia is clearly ahead of the 
PICs, both individually as well as as in comparison between the whole group 
PICs with the single state Australia (see chart 3 in the appendix). The existing 
asymmetries form the material basis reflecting an objectively shared reality in 
relation between Australia and the reference region of the PICs. The reference 
to these asymmetries is due to their identity-creating effect on the involved 
actors and their perception. At the same time, the perceived identities do also 
have an impact on the interpretation of the asymmetries, which are no longer 
just there, but are rather subject to a certain dynamism. Again, interpretations 
of these asymmetries rather belong in the human world of Berger and Luck-
mann14, which is marked by self- and external perception and the consecutive 
actions or by identities and interests respectively: Asymmetries “create 
                                                          
13
  Reese-Schäfer describes identity as “self image of a society, which is generated by discur-
sive processes” (1999:261; “Selbstbild einer Gemeinschaft, das in diskursiven Prozessen 
erzeugt wird”). 
14
  The term interpretation could also be substituted by the term observation. In this context I 
like to refer to Heinz von Foerster, whereby “objectivity is the delusion that observations 
could be made without observers” (von Foerster 1998:154; “Objektivität sei die Wahnvor-
stellung, Beobachtungen könnten ohne Beobachter gemacht werden”). 
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fundamental differences of perspective between the more powerful and the 
less powerful” (Womack 2004:359). Anecdotal to this, Australia’s former 
foreign minister, Downer, once casually called the PICs “busted arse coun-
tries” (Downer, cited from Dobell 2012:2), hinting at possible interpretations 
of self- and external perception and leaves no doubt about the perceived role 
on the part of Australia. In the continuum between friend and foe, the percep-
tion of at least some of the PICs has got worse, whereby their lacking state 
efficiency could be considered a security threat and lead to negative sanc-
tions. Within the scope of the Pacific Islands Forum and according to its 
Biketawa-Declaration from 2000, this is likely to lead to a proactive behav-
iour including the option of an intervention replacing the former low-key 
action including supporting aid money.  
Why though the change in Australia’s perception of the PICs? To answer 
this question it is beneficial to apply the constructivist approach in favour of 
the rationalists, which assume that identities and interests are exogenously 
predetermined and lead to a certain rational benefit calculation. Structures are 
considered to be existing, explaining the causality of actions, however not yet 
permitting statements about their constitution. Constructivists in turn aim to 
highlight the social construct of actors, preferring a holistic perspective, 
which focusses on both causal as well as on constitutive effects on identities 
and interests (Wendt 2010:166). With this rational and goal-orientated ap-
proach an action can be explained, but not so a change, as the given structures 
do not account for change. Change is not possible, thus the maxim would be a 
lack of alternatives. 
In the classical theoretical approaches of international relations this lack 
of alternatives is demonstrated by the (supposed) anarchy of the international 
system, by which the self-help imperative supposedly only allows for one 
way of action.  
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Three cultures of anarchy 
The self-concept of a state is based both on matter as well as on the interpre-
tation of matter; material needs or else idealised aims can precede ideas. The 
self-concept of a state also shapes its identity. Interest is based on identity, 
action is based on interest. Action is an expression of the incongruity of vi-
sion and reality, in the context of this analysis of regional claims and global 
imperatives. Here the connection between socialising matter (asymmetries) as 
a constitutive element, ideas as an endogenous element and affordances as an 
exogenous element in terms of the motivation for an idea or an interest-driven 
action becomes clear. It is thus “safe to say that the dimension of socialisation 
[here: of Australia and the PICs, remark AH] need to become the focus of a 
research programme for political leadership. This dimension is based on 
anextensive reformulation of interests and identities both on the part of the 
leader as well as the followers” (Nabers 2012:129f; “(…) davon auszugehen, 
dass die Sozialisationsdimension ins Zentrum eines Forschungsprogramms 
zur politischen Führung gerückt werden muss. Diese Dimension beruht auf 
einer komplexen Reformulierung von Interessen und Identitäten sowohl auf 
der Seite des Leaders als auch des Followers”). This in turn raises the ques-
tion what determines the respective action focus– co-operative, neutral or 
egoistical – and what impact regional and global interactions have. 
A situation effected by such interdependencies is determined by the con-
sideration of the actors and their mutual role perception, so that the anarchy 
of an international system does not necessarily only lead to self-help in a 
rivaling or even hostile environment (Lake 2009:10). This interpretation of 
environment results in a certain role concept of friend, rival or enemy 
(Buzan/Waæver 2010:50), leading to either co-operative (friend), neutral 
(rival), conflictive or even interventionist (enemy) action. Wendt circum-
scribes this way of acting as cultures of anarchy in the international system. 
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In accordance with Martin Wight (1991:7-24) he is describing a structure 
based on Hobbes (enemy, conflictive-interventionist, compulsive norm abid-
ance), on Locke (rival, neutral-institutionalised, norm abidance out of inter-
est) and lastly on Kant (friend, co-operative, norm abidance out of conviction) 
(Wendt 2010:247). These structures lead to a certain action and vice versa. 
This underlines the connection between causal and constitutive effects and 
demonstrates a potential opportunity for change while ignoring any lack of 
alternatives. 
Regional leading powers like Australia therefore represent states, which 
connect identities of states that are regionally rather strong and globally rather 
weak. Structures (in this case global) can therefore be examined once they are 
reflected in psychic patterns of interaction such as action. The asymmetrical 
process influences the action (or interaction) through the role learnt by social-
isation as well as the therefore mutual role concept of the weak and the strong 
and their respective perception. Situations lead to an action, which in itself 
constitutes the situation through action, therefore causal and constitutive 
effects are mingled. Strong and weak do both exist (constitutive element) and 
are also assessed (‘endogenous element’). It is only the culture of the terms 
strong and weak that creates the meaning of these words and with it the re-
spective behaviour patterns of strong and weak culture within the scope of 
strong or weak orders (Lebow 2010:558). These behaviour patterns can then 
appear in three aforesaid dimensions (see in addition also the ‘level of con-
struction’ of Katzenstein et al. 1996:41). By means of learning and interaction 
processes these dimensions may alternate or run side by side. 
Eventually the question arises whether there is such thing as an ‘asym-
metric’ identity both on the part of the generally rather weak followers as well 
as on the part of the regional powers usually much better equipped with 
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comprehensive capacities15. The consideration of identity in the formulation 
of interest is standard both generally (Reese-Schäfer 2000; Welders 
1996:275-318) as well as in the context of Australian Foreign regional and 
security policy (Holland/McDonald 2012:184-206). In relation to Australia, 
especially cultural influences are taken into account, according to which Aus-
tralia's identity is based primarily on Western values that are adopted as 
common and used to justify political action (ibid.:194). Here the view of 
Western values as exogenously given structures predominates16, which virtu-
ally oblige to a certain action without any alternatives. Pluralistic views, that 
norms and values are dependent on culture (Wheeler/Dunne 1996:91-107) are 
rejected here. Just how much the real materialistic basic conditions as regards 
to the supposed connection between very distinctive asymmetrical circum-
stances and Australian identity affects the Australian regional policy in the 
Pacific, is however not addressed. Yet it appears that it is just this awareness 
as a prerogative of interpretation of its own strenghth when compared to the 
weak PICs is decisive for Australian action. Particularly the Howard govern-
ment (1996-2007) claimed the ultimate security-cultural interpretation of 
debates on Australia’s security and identity and thus also determined, “which 
risks are perceived, what topics have priority and which strategies are deemed 
appropriate” (Daase 2009:137; “welche Gefahren wahrgenommen werden, 
                                                          
15
  Such an ‘asymmetric identity’ refers to a material fundament and, thus, to the relation of 
cultural identity and social reality (Bruendel 2000:12), to the relation of idea and matter re-
spectively. The aim here is, indeed, to explain how identity is produced without neglecting 
identity’s material substrate. Thereby the approach of material structuralism is invalidated 
which negates a pure idea driven being by preferring a material being as awareness-raising 
(Welch 2013:71ff). Such a pure materialism, based on material symmetries, would result in 
the repetition of the same patterns of behavior which, in this context, could only be altered 
by changing existing asymmetries and their material fundaments. 
16
  An example for this is the assumption that human rights were universally valid. The precon-
dition for this assumption would be that Western thoughts were the only possible environ-
ment and therefore the only possible outside whilst ignoring the manifoldness of human cul-
ture. This exogenous approach would lead again to an assumption of a ‘no-alternative’ reifi-
cation. 
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welche Themen Priorität haben und welche Strategien als angemessen 
angesehen werden”; see in addition also Westen 2012). 
However, this prerogative of interpretation must not be perceived uncriti-
cally. While the asymmetries between the PICs and Australia are obvious, 
their interpretation and articulation remain dynamic. The entirety of this ar-
ticulatory practise may well be called a discourse (Laclau/Mouffe 1985:105; 
for the special case of Australia see Holland 2010:643-661). Here, a discourse 
signifies a “fixation of meaning in a network of difference relations” (Glasze 
2008:191; “Fixierung von Bedeutung in einem Netz von Differenzbezi-
ehungen”), a “specific system of differences (…) which does not reflect but 
firstly create a specific sensory world and the ‘order of the things‘” (Hebek-
us/Völker 2012:35; “spezifisches System von Differenzen (…), das eine 
spezifische Sinnwelt, eine ‚Ordnung der Dinge‘ nicht abbildet, sondern aller-
erst produziert”). This describes theorizing that social structures between the 
PICs and Australia (and vice versa) have either a fixed base and can without 
alternatives be explained by just one meaning of asymmetry, or else that these 
meanings are constantly newly assigned, admitting various alternative inter-
pretations of material circumstances (Laclau/Mouffe 1985:112; Spies 
2009:49). A combination of both approaches is also possible, which on the 
one hand consider the external structures of meanings, while on the other also 
deploys the explanatory capacity in view of existing asymmetries. This con-
tains the possibility of an intellectual self-classification as either a co-
operative, interventionist or neutral regional power. This does not mean, “to 
only describe what one is, but to identify with something while it could well 
be something other” (Brodocz 2000:38; “dass man nur bezeichnet, was man 
ist, sondern dass man sich mit etwas identifiziert, obwohl man sich auch mit 
etwas anderem identifizieren könnte”). An evident lack of alternatives is 
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therefore deciphered as a decision between several alternatives17. This raises 
the tangible question what has led to the paradigm shift in the Australian 
security and regional policy in the reference region of the PICs, reflected in 
the change from a co-operative to an interventionist leadership. It is therefore 
essential to combine system- and action-theoretical approaches (Godehardt/ 
Lembke 2010:25) in order to come up with arguments for one of the most 
important questions in the Australian foreign and security policy: “There is 
currently one question in Australian foreign and strategic policy that matters 
more than any other: How does Australia respond to the shifting great power 
dynamics in our region?” (Dewar 2011:2; White 2011). This question points 
to a larger analytical framework: If Australia’s security policy in the Pacific 
as previously researched has been interpreted as a rather pro-active role and 
was analysed accordingly (Graham in 2008, Peebles in 2005, Powles 
2006:43-56, Robertson in 2004, Rumley/Forbes 2006, Rumley 1999), Dew-
ar’s quotation shows the very opposite, namely Australia as a power preyed 
upon by global structures. 
Global turning points and regional unrest as affordances 
If asymmetries shape the objectively shared reality between the PICs and the 
regional power Australia, affordances determine their meaning and with it 
also their interpretation. Affordance means the capacity of an object or indeed 
a social process to motivate to a certain behaviour. The motivation comprises 
an offer-orientated character (as sender) and an interpretation-orientated char-
acter (as receiver). The ability to interpret results from the actors ability to 
learn. The nature of interpretation does invariably hold an alternative. The 
interpretation of an offer thereby depends on the objective, hence the 
                                                          
17
  In this context I would like to refer to Butler again (see footnote 12): “[The status of lan-
guage] is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, inasmuch as this sig-
nifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to find prior to any and all sig-
nification” (Butler 2013:510, originally 1993:30). 
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intention to action, what refer to the connection of exogenous and endoge-
nous elements. This appeals to the person who must deal with a situation. 
People and their wills are socially conditioned, which particularly demon-
strates the close interdependence between agent and structure, meaning that 
the will or the intention do not stand alone, but are preset by the respective 
situation. 
In this connection not only the real being is to be examined, but also the 
interests basing on it. These are influenced by the objectively shared reality 
(here of the asymmetries). The reduction of ‘Australia’ on the ruling people 
refers to the individual-psychological bases of politics arising from socialisa-
tion and conditioning respectively arising from socialisation and conditioning 
under the conditions of asymmetries. The interpretation of asymmetries de-
pends on the interpretation of individual situations. External structures in 
psychology have the character of a situation (Reis/Holmes 2012:64), which in 
itself is considered within the scope of affordance (Ross/Nisbett 2011:4; 
Flunder 2006:21-34). Situations therefore only indirectly affect a particular 
action by means of their interpretations. On a security-political level these 
assumptions correspond with the concept of amity and enmity in Buzan and 
Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (2003; see also Wallis in this 
volume), whereby not the threat itself, but more so the perception of it is 
significant. 
In this context we return to the anarchy of international systems, which 
emerge from non-existent higher institutional regulation mechanisms as an 
objectively shared reality like, for example, the asymmetries between the 
PICs and Australia. Indeed, this reality does not only lead to a certain action, 
on the contrary, the anarchy of the international system contains different 
levels of meanings depending on the respective constitution of the interpret-
ing actors. Here, any potential action imperatives from exogenous structures 
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are in the focus, but rather those endogenous elements from the respective 
actors (Ulbert 2003:401). Thus, the identities of the actors are created not 
only from matter and structures originating from it (constitutive and exoge-
nous element), but they are also based on ideas, while creating structures in 
the process (endogenous element). 
Therefore, structures do not just exist, but are dynamic: “The forming of 
identity is thus a process of social definition on the part of the actors and 
their collective view on themselves and the world” (ibid., emphasis in the 
original; “Identitätsbildung ist damit ein Prozess sozialer Definition der 
Akteure, der auf den kollektiven Akteursvorstellungen der Handelnden über 
sich und die Welt basiert”). Consequently, interests are not just defined by a 
certain benefit-maximising rational choice, but “actors (…) (define) their 
interests (…) in the same process in which they define the respective situati-
on“ (ibid.:402; emphasis in the original; “Akteure (…) ihre Interessen (…) 
gleichzeitig in dem Prozess (definieren), in dem sie auch die zugrunde liegen-
de Situation definieren“;, see also Wendt 2010:23ff). 
Hypothetically, these interests in the example of Australia as the most 
important power in Oceania depend on the ambivalent identity as a state both 
receiving and sending out imperatives18. Here the field of controversy be-
tween regional planning activity and global imperatives becomes apparent. 
Australia absorbs the exogenous elements in shape of exogenous affordances 
and transforms them on a regional level. Interests therefore originate from 
(global) structures, their transformation or turning points and the resulting 
                                                          
18
  The alleged plural used here does not only refer to the identities of involved actors, but 
indicates also that one actor has more than one identity. Identities are depending on the spe-
cific contexts. Identities in our context therefore mean identities accrued from the reference 
region. Thus, Australia’s regional identity is one of a regional leading power while its identi-
ty towards the USA as Canberra’s main ally is one of a follower. The situation is similar 
with regard to the identities of the PICs. While they are followers in their relation to Austral-
ia and latterly in their relations to China (see McDougall in this volume) the PICs are com-
petitors among themselves. 
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change of existing norms. They are the result of a structural passive actor’s 
identity which in this case determines Australia’s action in the region. We 
have however seen that this exogenous approach convinces only up to a cer-
tain point, because structures and actions arising from identities and interests 
can be mutually dependant and must not be considered in isolation from each 
other. The process to the definition of a situation is at the same time the defi-
nition of interests. 
Here the basic problem is taken up: To what extent are the inside and the 
outside directional to relevant to action? Ultimately the question is, whether a 
state alone is responsible for its own action or whether certain imperatives 
structures are action-guiding (Flunder 2006:33). Wendt (2010:366) claims 
that actors diachronically create and reproduce identities and narratives about 
who they are. Only when this has occurred would interests form as a basis for 
a specific action. From this perspective, the structural influences of external 
factors as mainly insinuated in sytemic and rationalistic approaches of inter-
nationational relations would not be significant. As it would certainly not be 
helpful to regard both approaches as competitive, a complementary and coop-
erative point of view is preferred here. Both forces influence decisions. The 
social conditioning of the leader should also be noted, who can weigh out 
several options for state action and has multiple options to decide between 
egoism (conflictive action), cooperation or non-action/ neutrality. Yet exter-
nal structures are by no means unimportant, because they still have a huge 
influence on any decision-making in shape of social conditioning. Global 
turning points like in security and economics (see generally Ferguson et al. 
2011; McDougall/Shearman 2006) need to be included in this analysis along 
with the individual development of the rule-makers who incorporate global 
turning points or norm changes into their interpretation of said asymmetries 
as objectively shared realities and by that underlining the interdependence of 
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the different levels. This refers to the concept of embedding, the concurrent 
theorisation of regional, global and local paradigms to the explanation of 
certain behaviour patterns of regional powers (Prys 2012:206). The embed-
ding of regions in a global system unavoidably requires the mentioning of the 
interdependent relations between region and regional periphery. 
Some of the significant variables for change in the Australian Pacific pol-
icy is firstly the ever increasing and provacative -to Australias supremacy- 
presence of China in the region (D’Arcy 2007; see in addition also McDou-
gall in this volume). Turning points in the global structures appear in the 
shape of the increasing liberalisation of the global economy (Mohamed 2008; 
Ferguson et al. 2011), the system-change from a bipolar to a multipolar global 
order and the related regionalisation of the international system after 1989 
(Betz 2012:210) as well as a security-political paradigm shift in the face of 
the international terrorism. 
The end of the bipolar structure as of 1989 led to a re-regionalisation, that 
is to an increased importance of regions and thus of regional powers. Since 
then regional powers have taken over vital structuralisation duties and by that 
regional responsibility. Australia also follows this path, claiming an increased 
global weight as a consequence of its stronger regional position of power. 
Australia’s ambition as middle power (Cotton/Ravenhill 2012) lead to a con-
flict of capacities, as overall global challenges call for more than middle-sized 
capacities. In order to to actively partiicipate in at least the most important 
issues, own forces must be split in a more efficient manner. Australia’s com-
mitment in Iraq and Afghanistan and its interests in South-East Asia19 led to a 
general desengangement on its own backyard while the security-political and 
economic influence as core areas of the maintaining its interest do selectively 
                                                          
19
  Australia is, thereby, like for example Turkey, to be considered as a bi-regional power with 
interests in the Pacific as well as in Southeast Asia. 
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increase. The reduced Australian commitment on a large scale created gaps, 
which especially China is only too happy to close. The associated erosion of 
the regional system calls for further investment in the core areas to avoid 
destabilizations20. 
Regarding Australia the end of the cold war against the backdrop of an 
eroding bipolar world order resulted in a system of Four Fronts: “A coopera-
tive security front was developed to Australia's north; an aid front was in 
place in Australia's east; an environmental security front has been agreed to 
Australia's south; and, in 1997, a trade front was constructed to Australia's 
west” (Rumley 2006:37; emphases by the author). With this concept Canberra 
envisaged a safety ring around Australia. In this, the PICs are considered to 
be Australia’s self-appointed natural sphere of influence (Rumley 1999:188), 
which dates back to the colonial age and also views the island Pacific as an 
anglo-saxon area of influence21. Most noteworthy here were the ideas on co-
operative security (in contrast to interventionistist security) and altruistic aid 
(as opposed to the conditional aid). Yet when the attacks in New York and 
later on Bali sent shock waves through the security systems, they triggered a 
shift to non-state-related threat scenarios, unheard of to date. This order was 
therefore shaken to the core (Rumley 2006:38). Denationalised authority 
respectively the absence of a state monopoly and the new circumstances 
called for an appropriate reaction and a review of the concepts of uncondi-
tional support and of co-operative security. The then applicable maxim of the 
                                                          
20
  A side effect of this strategy is that global interests can be achieved by regional activities. 
During the US war against Iraq, Australia was able to be in loyality to Washington without 
increasing Australian troops in Iraq unduly. Requests for an increase of Australian contribu-
tions could be rejected on the ground that Australia’s troops are required in the Pacific to 
maintain regional order respectively to fight against terrorism in its own backyard (Patience 
2005:4). 
21
  This „Australasian Monroe Doctrine“ (Rumley 2012:39) is of British origin and was contin-
ued by the then independent Australia. The reason for that doctrine was to keep other Euro-
pean colonial powers, namely Germany and France, out of the region (Holtz 2003:39; v. 
Krosigk/Jadin 1994:33). 
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so-called Dibb report (Dibb 1986:60) was dropped first as a proposal for 
Australias defence policy, whereby Australia was not likely to face threats 
due to their geographical position. 
The security-political turning points origin in the intensifying change of a 
state to a non-state threat scenario after the terrorist attacks in New York on 
11 September 2001. If 9/11 marked a global review on security, Australia 
experienced its very own trauma with the attacks on Bali and Djakarta on 12 
October 2002 and 9 September 2004 (Rumley 2006:42) having had a yet 
bigger impact on the Australian policy and public (Henderson 2006:177). 
While the primary effect of 9/11 on the PICs is still controversial and no more 
unambiguously represented, however apparently already existing security-
political tendencies were strengthened enormously by the attacks, so here 
there is a significant consecutive effect (Kaim 2011:3, 5; Butter/Christ/Keller 
2011:9; Burke 2008:209). Not only the military potential of a state is in the 
focus, but also economic, ecological and social threats. Drug and human 
trafficking, terrorism as well as transnational and national crime are more 
tangible and much more likely than interstate wars (see in general Balzacq 
2011). The threat potential caused by such asymmetrical situations, manifests 
itself in the so-called arc of instability (figure 1, on page 77) and was instru-
mentalised by the Howard government to justify an interventionist security 
policy, after the population had by a changed political rhetoric been persuad-
ed of the need for also military interventions (Holland 2010:645)22. The 
                                                          
22
  It would go beyond the scope of this article to shed more light on Australia’s domestic 
affairs which have played their parts in Australia’s paradigm shift regarding the Pacific (see 
in general Burke 2008), although under the aspect of asymmetrical relations between states 
domestic imperatives should rather be considered on the part of the more powerful states 
than on the part of weaker states (Womack 2004:360). Basically, it can be briefly said that 
the political rhetoric in Australia as a part of Australia’s security culture has been sharpened 
supporting thereby an atmosphere of fear (de Castella et al. 2009). The question remains how 
fear as central human phenomena becomes politically exploited. Here a citation of Austral-
ia’s former Prime Minister Robert Menzies seems to be appropriate: “(Fear) das also been a 
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security framework within which Australia officially operates in the Pacific is 
outlined significantly by the ICISS study of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) 
(2001) (Makinda 2004:430-436), according to which the individual human 
security takes precedence over the state. State sovereignty should be defined 
as being accountable for the protection of citizens (ICISS 2001:74; Werthes 
2011:277-290). Where the state does not act or is not able to act towards this 
responsibility, there is an obligation to intervene with the prospect of 
strengthening or restoration of state sovereignty (ICISS 2001:75). 
The second big turning point at global level is the increasing liberalisa-
tion of economic systems. After the disaster of the Second World War, the 
system of Bretton Woods was established to regulate currency systems, and 
with that represented an institution, which was both to simplify and stabilize 
                                                                                                                             
recognized and potent instrument of domestic policy” (Menzies, cited from Lawrence 
2008:18). Corey Robin considers political fear as “a political tool, an instrument of elite rule 
or insurgent advance created and sustained by political leaders or activists who stand to 
gain something from it, either because fear helps them pursue a specific political goal or be-
cause it reflects or lends support to their moral and political beliefs – or both” (Robin 
2004:16). In this context it would be a worthwhile challenge for further research to analyze 
statements of the political representatives (Curran 2006). These statements range from for-
mer Australian Prime Minster Howard’s “traditional, conservative and individualistic“ (Hol-
land/McDonald 2012:194) position of strength to a tendency of a more responsible position 
of his successor Rudd (Rudd 2006:46-50). Regional disorder and regional insecurity became 
interpreted as attack to the White Australia policy respectively as attack to Western values in 
general. The thus resulting pessimistic component in Australia’s security perception and se-
curity culture indicates to the presuppositions, which lead to a pessimistic perception fol-
lowed then by a more proactive regional security policy and to an increasing regional en-
gagement up to regional interventions. By doing this Canberra’s behavior is ambivalent. On 
the one hand is Australia’s identity as leading regional powers, while the same country on 
the other hand is guided by a kind of European Angst in an adversely perceived Asian envi-
ronment (Brailey 2003; Mols 1998:125; Philpott 2001:371-388). Central to such a political 
analysis is the assumption that national discourses determine national cultures. Hence, angst 
as a determining factor leads to the above mentioned proactive engagement (Tang 2008:453, 
gen. Bleiker/Hutchison 2007). Angst does not have to be of existential importance. It is al-
ready sufficient that a relative danger does exist. This relative danger can be politically ex-
ploited. Especially the Howard government used the Australian angst for a regional clamp-
down from which is said that there is no other alternative because instability would be con-
nected to the danger of terrorism (Cahill 2004:3). Thus, refugees and asylum seekers are 
generally placed under suspicion of terrorism what can be considered as “’securitisation’ of 
Australian policy discourse” (Burke 2008:208). 
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the teamwork of all relevant actors. The oil crisis of the 1970s marked the 
failure of this rigid system. 
Figure 1: Australia’s arc of instability 
 
The consequently newly established or at least reformed institutions like the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund have adapted and liberalised the global markets up to date 
(Osterhammel/Petersson 2007:86ff; Thirlwall/Pacheco-López 2008 62ff; 
Chwieroth 2010:138ff; WBGU 2011:107ff). Existing economic and devel-
opment systems like the one of non-reciprocal commercial relations between 
the states of the European Community and the group of the Africa-Carribean-
Pacific-States (ACP) were replaced by a system of WTO-compatible Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), consequently reciprocal commercial 
relations (Schmieg 2008:16, also Meyn 2008:19-40). These EPAs as a result 
of the biggest global trade and economic negotiations are deemed to be a 
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motivation to liberalisation also of regional and commercial systems (see in 
addition Schilder in this volume). 
Results: Distinctive hierarchies from asymmetries 
The connection of basically anarchic conditions at international level and 
pronounced asymmetries leads under the premise of an egotistic self-help of 
the affected states to a hierarchy with conditions of super-and subordination 
ratios and thus to a stable order. Here leading powers offer a variety of goods 
such as and above all security and receive the loyalty of their Followers in 
return. In such a relationship, both sides benefit of hierarchies: “Hierarchy is 
defined by the extent of the authority exercised by their ruler over the ruled. 
The greater the number of possible actions by the ruled that the ruler can 
legitimately regulate, the more hierarchical is the relationship” (Lake 2009:9, 
51ff). Within this hierarchy, the classical state duties of the Follower are 
delegated to a leader rendering the anarchic concept of self-help in the oppo-
sition of co-operative help relations more and more unattractive (ibid.:10)23. 
The basis of hierarchy is the presence of authority, thus of a legitimized rule. 
In this case there is consent between the rule-maker and rule-taker, which can 
be considered as an identity of leadership24. The rule-maker receives his 
                                                          
23
  Good examples for this assumption can be found within the region of the PICs. Kiribati, 
Nauru and Tuvalu have accepted the Australian Dollar as their national currency, while the 
Solomons and PNG were not able to maintain a certain level of security without Australian 
support (see Dinnen and Böge in this volume). Samoa has delegated its defense policy to 
New Zealand what is similar to the formally independent states of the former UN Trust Ter-
ritory of Micronesia (Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands and 
Palau). Within the framework their Compact of Free Association with the USA these states 
have also delegated their defense policy (see in general Leidhold 1991:143-230). Washing-
ton’s multifaceted intervention rights in these Micronesian states ensure in the context of a 
“sovereignty for sale” (Drezner 2002:76) even for the PICs for an unusual high level of fi-
nancial transfers. 
24
  Such an identity of leadership is often based on common interests. In the case of the relations 
between Australia and the PICs these common interests are based on a political deal. While 
the PICs in the absence of economical capabilities demanded for economic support, they of-
fered stability and therefore security. This exchange between prosperity and security does 
not seem to work anymore as Australia prefers to provide security by intervention. 
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rights to ensure him the leadership position by his follower on a voluntary 
base25. Asymmetries reflecting existing state capacities which make room for 
pressure are not significant here. The rule-maker is fully recognised as such 
(ibid.:8) and the hierarchy feeds of it. This authority delegated by members of 
a group on a leader in the absence of capacities and asymmetries is most 
striking. Ideally, authority by force is not needed since the followers are al-
ready convinced of the authority of their leader, which would be the usual 
case if the role concept of the actors was that of friends. If in turn actors are 
classified as being rivals or even enemies, the persuasive power of their ar-
guments might decrease in favour of enforced results. In this case the given 
capacities and asymmetries do indeed matter. Here, there need to be made a 
distinction between the internalization of values, norms and positions on the 
part of the followers on one side and orders on the other (Nabers 2010:69, 
2010b:949). 
Between these both extremes there is also a potential third way, whereby 
the mere existence of inherent asymmetries affects the self- and external per-
ception to such an extent that the potential followers seem to have no alterna-
tives than to cooperate with the respective leader. In this case the legitimacy 
is obtained neither by voluntary recognition nor by compulsion, but by a 
recognition enforced by the asymmetries as defined by of a normative 
strength of the factual. A way out of this predicament offers any potential 
alternative suppliers of state goods. In the PICs such an alternative emerges in 
the shape of the ever itensifying appearance of China in the region (Hanson 
2008; Hanson/Fifita 2011). 
                                                          
25
  In this context it is possible to use the term leadership, which is described as “effective and 
sustainable when foreign elites acknowledge the leader’s vision of international order and in-
ternalize it as their own” (Nabers 2010:69). Thereby it is distinguished between power and 
leadership: “Leadership, again in contrast to brute power, is inseparable from the wants and 
needs of followers, but these wants and needs may be changed through social interaction” 
(ibid.). 
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Within this alternative and providing that it settles permanently, changes in 
the asymmetry complexes between the PICs and Australia would have to be 
revealed, which according to the aforementioned definition of hierarchy 
should lead to a reduction of the duties on the part of the leading power26. 
These duties formerly assigned to the original leading power could then and 
under the premise of cost reduction be delegated to the contender of the re-
gional leading power27. 
In view of the apparent asymmetries between the PICs and Australia, ac-
tion or the change of actions can be justified by their purpose to protect the 
existing regional order. External influences pose a threat to this order either 
existentially by means of security challenges or by a hierarchy-reducing offer 
of demanded goods by one or several external powers, in this case mostly 
China and Taiwan. The increasing commitment of both of these Chinese 
states erodes the existing hierarchy and destabilises the existing regional 
order. Instead, there is now – from the point of Australia – an impending 
construction of an alternative hierarchy under Chinese authority establishing a 
new order. This also refers to the fact that the erosion of existing order does 
not necessarily imply disorder (for the PICs this opinion is shared by Reil-
ly/Henderson 2003), but simply the setting of an alternative order, whereby 
                                                          
26
  The measurement of hierarchies within the reference region of the PICs might be possible by 
a time based comparison which takes account of the corresponding caesura. This comparison 
should comprise any indicators reflecting dependencies. Already existing methods to meas-
ure hierarchies, for example those provided by Douglas Lemke (2002:77), are hardly ade-
quate for the PICs. Lemke’s approach argues in a military and technical way. It measures the 
military and technical relations of states located in area determined by dyad of at least two 
states competing for leadership. Before China became active in Oceania, there was neither 
competition for regional leadership because of Australia’s (military) dominance. Only Fiji 
and PNG maintain an army without having any transport capabilities for longer distances. 
For the sake of completeness it shall be mentioned in this context that within the region of Is-
land Pacific (see footnote 1) there has been a steady competition between the single PICs, 
mainly between Fiji and PNG. 
27
  Financial support both from China and Taiwan is paid without conditions to the PICs. Tradi-
tional donors like Australia however attach conditions like good governance to their assis-
tance. 
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China’s commitment does not necessarily have just negative connotations 
(Wesley-Smith/Porter 2010; Hanson 2008). 
Hierarchies contain the deliberate or structural assignment of duties in-
cumbent upon a leader seen to belegitimate. Inevitably this involves the con-
veyance of some parts of state sovereignty. Whether this is done under com-
pulsion as we see it in Iraq, or due to historical insights like in the European 
states towards the European Union or else like in the PICs due to distinctive 
asymmetries in recognition of their own limited state existence, is not of 
prime interest when looking at the resulting sovereignty transfer, as the prin-
ciple of state sourvereignty is now no longer indivisibly. Against the back-
drop of distinctive asymmetries a divided state sovereignty is likely, as with 
Krasner (1999, 2004, 2005) represented in the PICs in various shapes of qua-
si-states (Jackson 1993). 
The conditions of a basic anarchy between states does not always result 
in an intensified and realistic self-help imperative, but also – as with the cul-
tures described by Wendt – in the emergence of different forms like hierar-
chies, particularly under asymmetrical conditions and frames. This can be 
explained by the awareness of the respective states (and their leaders) that 
some duties are better taken care of by other states or institutions due to miss-
ing own capacities, or because a certain service comes at too high a price. The 
inclination to hierarchisise becomes more distinctive, the greater the asymme-
tries between the involved parties are. Subordinated states recognize the dom-
inant state and position themselves under its protection. This affects their self-
perception, their identity and their interests, whereby a distinction between 
compulsion and voluntariness has to be made (Lake 2009:176). Asymmetries 
can effect conflict and with it compulsion. Another possible szenario would 
be that some states follow other states as they are convinced of their 
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legitimacy to lead. In this case cooperation and subordination are regarded as 
the cheaper and profitable option than the abstination from it. 
In this logic, the behaviour or the alignment of the behaviour of a region-
al leading power, like here of Australia, would depend on the behaviour of the 
follower and therefore just be reactive. The behaviour of this power regarding 
“its” region would then no longer be exogenously determined by turning 
points but rather originates regional-endogenously in itself, from out the re-
gion. In terms of a distinctive asymmetry the collectively shared interpreta-
tions lead through the role allocation to the creation of a stable identity, along 
with a clear understanding of ones own position and some expectations to-
wards other actors. A leading power acts here in anticipation of what its fol-
lower would expect it from him, which points to a regional-endogenous ac-
tion direction. Any informal authority of the leading power can only prevail if 
there is a congruence of interests between itself and its followers. Only then a 
legitimacy, which is based on conviction and can renounce compulsion, is 
granted. This conviction itself is based on the benefit given to the follower by 
hierarchy and with it by the goods being offered by a regional leading power 
as a regional factor. The higher the opportunity costs in a state, the more 
attractive does a hierarchy as system base and as a cooperation mechanism 
become (Lake 1999:54). Likewise, legitimacy can only be vocalized by the 
followers, what can also be described as a reverse asymmetrical or reflected 
power. A power only becomes a leading power through the support of the 
followers. If the followers in turn stepped out of line, for instance to support 
another power in shape of a dyade, the system of conviction and legitimacy 
would no longer work. In that case the leading power would have to intervene 
to protect the order-generation followship which after all, constitutes the 
leadership. This is certainly true in view of the interference of China in the 
PICs region. 
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A hierarchical order on the basis of asymmetries can lead to a congruence of 
the self-perception of Australia as a leading power and the expectations of the 
PICs. This congruence of the socialisation of Australia as a leading power and 
the PICs as its followers forms the basis for the legitimization as a regional 
power, because this also corresponds with the interests of leaders and follow-
ers (Nabers 2012:129f). This congruence based on the different ends of an 
asymmetry creates different interests and priorities forming a certain kind of 
order. As a hypothesis it can be said that interventions always happen at a 
point in time, when this order is disturbed by interfering external actors 
posing an alternative to the present system or the change of external – here 
security and economical – conditions. The intervention of Australia can be 
interpreted accordingly as a restoration of order. Therefore, the independent 
variables to explain the change of Australian leadership action in the refer-
ence region would be due to the disturbances of the existing order as well as 
in the existing asymmetry and its ability to react to those. Interventions thus 
would have the function to preserve existing power relations. Without these 
disruptions the system would be entirely hierarchical, thus stable and there 
would be no reason for interventions. Interventions or the threat of interven-
tions in the area of application of the Pacific Island Forum have been envis-
aged since the Biketawa-Declaration of 2000. Such interventions, which have 
been implicitly threatened and in case of Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 28 have also been carried out, are said to serve the 
correction of systemic interferences of the regional system Oceania. Asym-
metries in this context are said to have the functional character of the system 
preservation (Anderson 2005:28f). 
 
                                                          
28
  See Dinnen in this volume. 
84 Andreas Holtz 
 
Conclusion 
The process of ‘identity learning’ through asymmetries and the influences of 
the (global) environment dominate the motivation to respective actions, 
which only emerge as real action by interpretation. Exogenous and endoge-
nous elements are therefore not to be examined seperately: 
  Asymmetry  Identity 
Affordance  Interest   Action 
Assumptions about the properties of others do therefore affect ones own ac-
tion and only then trigger this particular anarchy which influences the action 
of states. By this token, anarchy is not natural, but a product of cognitive 
processes as well as of perception and interpretation: “If they [the political 
decision makers, AH] think that a state is hostile, behaviour that others might 
see as neutrally or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted 
duplicity. This cognitive rigidity reinforces the consequences of international-
ly anarchy” (Jervis 2010:49). According to Waltz’s classic assumption that 
states would only differ in terms of their capabilities (Waltz 1979:92), anar-
chy would within the inevitably arising asymmetries in fact lead to hierar-
chies which theirselves are generating a certain meaning. 
Asymmetries especially demonstrate how big the range of hierarchies 
within a given geographical area is. The regional balancing of power under 
the conditions of asymmetry is hardly feasable without any outside help. This 
is the material level, while at the same time there is also an immaterial or else 
an imagined level of perception. Thus, asymmetries represent the ‘What’ of 
the leading power, the measurable data in a mere allocation of ressources, 
whereas the ‘How’ marks the area of the affordance, i.e. the interest and the 
decision. Here, these are primarily those mechanisms affecting interests in 
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relation to the region and which – hypothetically formulated – emerge from 
the self-understanding of asymmetric conditions (Lukes 2005 491-493). 
The discussion about of identity points to self- and external perceptions 
on the basis of objectively shared and strikingly distinctive asymmetries be-
tween the PICs and Australia. This perception leads to certain inside and 
outside expectations. Nevertheless, this only explains the action as such and 
not its consequences, which can be either co-operative, neutral or else conflic-
tive-interventionist. Effectively, identity is only one of many different com-
ponents for interests, action and consequently for a potential change. In order 
to fix this deficiency, global turning points should also be regarded as chang-
es of global norms and structures as affordances. This is the second compo-
nent for the explanation of change. Ernst von Glasersfeld points out that cog-
nitive beings acquire knowledge earmarked for their own advantage, which is 
why knowledge can never be objective (von Glasersfeld 1997:187). Piaget 
(1970:38) describes this behaviour of earmarking as a reaction to disturb-
ances. These endanger the stability of a system, so that their effects on the 
same must be averted by purposeful activity, which in turn contains the want 
for stability as some sort of cardinal affordance. This purpose-driven attitude 
implies at the same time the pursuit for something that is subjectively ap-
proved of in the respective context. Negative experiences are not repeated. 
According to Maturana (1970:39), living systems operate inductively and 
conservatively, whereby sitations recur and are only repeated once they are 
considered as being efficient. Australia treated the PICs in a certain manner 
so long as it would deem it beneficial to itself. External or internal turning 
points however create disturbances or instabilities which are to be removed 
by means of a certain purpose-driven action, explaining not only the actions 
as such but also their purpose. To come back to von Glasersfeld: “Knowledge 
exists in the means and ways, which the cognitive subject has developed to 
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adjust to the world it experiences” (von Glasersfeld 1997:187; “Wissen 
besteht in den Mitteln und Wegen, die das erkennende Subjekt begrifflich 
entwickelt hat, um sich an die Welt anzupassen, die es erlebt”). 
The asymmetries between the PICs and Australia as objectively shared 
realities give rise for the need for their interpretation. This result could be 
change, either of a co-operative or interventionist kind or else the neutral 
zero-option. These three options depend on the change of global norms and 
subsequently global structures, which in form of affordances influence the 
interpretation of the asymmetries and themselves decisively. Conversely, the 
results of that interpretation do (not only) influence global norms and struc-
tures individually, their dynamic existence and change respectively. The 
mechanism constituting the interdependence of identity and structure by way 
of example of the PICs and Australia in the truest sense of the word, also 
works “one level up” with regards to global norms as base for global struc-
tures, shaping national identities and at the same time laying their own foun-
dation. Therefore, structures are not static, but rather dynamic. Nevertheless, 
this complex interplay does not only consider the exogenous but also the 
endogenous elements, which taken together make change explicable. In such 
a compound of system- and action-theoretical approaches, minimal however 
recurring changes to a performance or a structuring action as an endogenous 
element allow for alternatives. By admitting inclusion of potential alternatives 
in an idea, these are not only thought of but are already put into practice in an 
initial step.  
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Appendix: 
Chart 1: Pacific Sub-Regions 
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Chart 2: State Functions at the Interface of States and Their Environment 
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Chart 3: Basic Data for the Pacific Island Countries29 
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  Unless indicated otherwise, all data refers to 2012. Sources: CIA World Factbook, World 
Bank, Transparency International, Freedom House, UNDP and local statistics. 
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Chart 4: Asymmetries between Australia and the PICs in some core areas30 
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30
  Unless indicated otherwise, all data refer to 2012. Sources: CIA World Factbook, World 
Bank, Transparency International, Freedom House, UNDP and local statistics. 
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 Reweighted Islands or Restructuring the Islands? 
Australia as a Regional Power in Oceania 
Andreas Holtz 
Abstract: Regarding the asymmetries between Australia and the Pacific 
Islands Countries it is obviously not a mistake to consider Australia as a 
regional power within this region. In this chapter I shall attempt to explain 
how Australia as a regional power has changed its objectives within the re-
gion. I argue that Australia’s paradigm shifts in economical and security 
issues are mainly motivated by global changes. Although Australia is the 
driver in the region, its global influence is rather limited. Australia seems to 
be a rule maker and a rule taker at the same time. Therefore Australia trans-
lates global imperatives to its regional sphere of influence. I will show that 
this general direction of Australia’s policy has not changed in the last dec-
ades, no matter which government ruled the country. Furthermore I will in-
vestigate the Chinese imperative as challenge of Australia’s leadership in 
Oceania. This challenge is not only of regional importance as Australia’s 
uses its regional influence to reach a higher level of influence on the global 
stage. Australia’s global middle power ambitions are not to be realised with-
out being a strong leading power in the Pacific. I conclude by attempting to 
predict the emphases of the Abbott administration’s Pacific policy. 
Keywords: Pacific Island Countries, Australia, Fiji, regional security/ 
economic system, China, intervention, Pacific regionalism 
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Introduction 
There is hardly any other region with more pronounced asymmetries between 
the regional/region constituting states than Oceania. Comparing Australia as 
Oceania’s leading power with the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), not only 
the pure differences in size and population are clearly visible, but also differ-
ences in other relative and absolute indicators like political, economic and 
military capabilities become evident. Traditionally, Canberra’s role in this 
regional game was that of a cooperative and caring hegemon. By the incisive 
terror attacks of 9/11 a change of programme at the global stage has arisen. 
Subsequently, Australia has changed its behaviour from cooperation to inter-
vention (Barcham/Greener-Barcham 2006:67-82). Thus Australia has 
changed from a caring hegemon to an interventionist and order providing 
power (for further discussion about these specific meanings see Destradi 2008 
and Nolte 2006). However, a deeper analysis of Oceania’s regionalism over 
the last quarter century shows a more detailed picture. 9/11 as well as the 
impact of the so called Bali bombings in 2004 seem to have been turning 
points in Australia’s relations to its Pacific neighbours. 
This is surprisingly true and false at the same time. The original turning 
point as a consequence of the ceding globally influencing Cold War-
bipolarity was not apparent at that time. The structure of bipolarity provided 
an order with clear hierarchies and regional subordinations. After 1989 a new 
world order emerged providing a system of multipolarity. Thus, the signifi-
cance of regions increases with growing relative power and influence of re-
gional powers at least in their regions (Hurrel 2007:128). Growing relative 
power of the then more significant regional powers brings forth also growing 
responsibilities and duties of the regional powers within their corresponding 
regions. Regarding this background 9/11 is not a turning point in Australia’s 
Oceania policy or rather its regional security and economic policy, but a 
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consecutive intensification of an already existing idea about regional order in 
Oceania (Dinnen 2012:61). Consecutive determinants are influencing results 
without being the original event leading to a certain result. 9/11 was not the 
original trigger but a truly important opportunity to realise already existing 
ideas. However, if only the fact is regarded that Australia uses military force 
in Oceania to restore law and order in the Solomon Islands or to threaten 
implicitly to do so in other PICs without being authorized by the UN Security 
Council, than certainly a paradigm shift from a hands-off to a hands-on ap-
proach is obvious (Mc Leod/O’Reilly 2009:215; Dinnen 2008:3)1. 
Australia’s ambitions as a leading power are distinct regarding the 
asymmetric relations between Australia and the weak PICs which are not able 
to resist such ambitions. The main driver of Australia’s role as a regional 
overlord was Australia’s former conservative Prime Minister John Howard 
who was in power from 1996 to 2007. In December 2007, Howard was re-
placed by Labor’s Kevin Rudd followed by Labor’s Julia Gillard in June 
2010. Rudd replaced Gillard in June 2013 for a second term. After dissolution 
of the parliament in September 2013, Rudd was replaced by the conservative 
Tony Abbott in the same month. The change from Rudd to Gillard and back 
was more a personal change than a political change. Because of Rudd’s dev-
astating results in opinion polls after a long period of popularity and growing 
                                                          
1
  A blueprint for this putative paradigm shift is written by the former ASPI-researcher Elsina 
Wainwright (2003:1): “Now Australia faces a new challenge: how to promote our interests in 
these island territories as they struggle to achieve viability as independent sovereign states in 
a tough world. Many of them are, to a greater or lesser degree, failing. In the process they are 
calling into question the sustainability of the policy approaches we have adopted towards our 
Pacific Island neighbours since they became independent—policies characterised by gener-
ous aid and a hands off approach.“ Some keywords of this citation are worth to discuss. 
What kind of interests does a state like Australia has in weak and non-aggressive island 
states? Who benefits from these interests? A tough world is a perception referring to hard-
core realism. Perceptions tend to reveal something about intentions: How is it possible to 
consider the world as tough? Maybe our world could be also seen as peaceful and friendly. 
Finally the perception of failing states justifies any intervention. But who has the right to 
judge about the failure of a state? Where is the border between a failing or even a failed state 
and a functioning state? ASPI is financed by Australia’s Defence Department. 
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dissatisfaction with his leadership within the Labor Party, its right wing 
forced him to resign. His successor Julia Gillard had no experience in foreign 
affairs. Because Rudd’s experience as a former diplomat he was asked to 
serve as a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore it is possible to draw a line 
between Howard’s Pacific policy and Rudd’s respectively to compare both 
approaches. 
As a graduate in Chinese language and Chinese history of the Australian 
National University Rudd joined the Australian Department of Foreign Af-
fairs in 1981. Until 1988 he spent several years as a diplomat in various Aus-
tralian embassies including Beijing. He soon realized that the Australian-
Chinese relationship is an essential component in Australian foreign and 
economic policy. It seems to be necessary to keep this in mind while analys-
ing Australia’s Pacific policy because China is becoming a regional actor of 
increasing importance in the PICs. Apart from Australia’s relations to China, 
Rudd’s Labor government set new standards also in other policy areas. In 
contrast to his predecessor Rudd showed an astonishing ability for self-
criticism when he apologized for injustice against aboriginal Australians 
(Johnston 2008) or by implementing an effective environmental policy for the 
first time in Australia’s history. In spite of the superficially idealistic or better 
soft-realistic approach of the Rudd-Gillard government the political reality 
remained stable. Six years of Labor government had not been enough to 
change existing structures but enough for the structures to change the gov-
ernment’s ideas. In that period of time between 2007 and 2013 the political 
rhetoric addressed to the PICs became more moderate. However, the content 
of Australia’s Pacific policy remained unchanged. With the change of Aus-
tralia’s government after the last election in June 2013, Labor was defeated 
by Tony Abbott, Australia’s current Prime Minister. While writing this, Ab-
bott has been in power for less than one year. So far it is difficult to provide 
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solid findings of Tony Abbott’s idea about a sustainable Pacific policy, yet it 
seems highly unlikely that Abbott will change already existing approaches to 
deal regionally in Oceania. Though it is also obvious that Abbott refuses to 
follow some paths of the Rudd/Gillard-administration in some realms which 
are also important to the PICs. While Rudd/Gillard at least tried to prepare the 
ground for a sustainable environmental policy worthy of the name, Abbott 
avoids any further efforts on this issue. His new government refused to take 
part in Warsaw climate change-meeting in 2013 on a ministerial level. Fur-
thermore it also refuses any commitments regarding extra funds to climate 
change despite a request of Pacific Islands’ leaders for additional support of 
the low-lying atoll island states like Tuvalu or Kiribati. Rather Abbott consid-
ers climate change science as “absolute crap”, doubting that there are any 
climate-related changes. Consequentially, Australia has snubbed the United 
Nations in its attempts to collate a unified international agreement to limit 
global greenhouse emissions (Sharma 2013). Furthermore, the Abbott gov-
ernment realises now what it had announced as opposition to the former La-
bor government, namely that Australia is not willing to give a blank cheque to 
cover loss and damages refering to the climate change. Australia categorically 
rejects to support a multilateral fund as the Green Capital Fund although the 
country played a central role in the creation of that fund, its mandate, opera-
tions and policies. 
The regional reaction to Abbott’s closed eyes was clear: “Tony Abbott 
must listen to the scientists and not play politics with the survival of Austral-
ia's friends in the region“ (Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs Tony 
de Brum cited by Milman 2013). Australia’s ecological– as well as its aid 
pull-out – is absorbed by China that, while Canberra overturned Australia’s 
policy on climate change, announced US$ 1 billion in concessional loans for 
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the PICs (MacMillan 2013)2. Australia’s pull-out in questions of climate 
change is only one example of what happens in the region these days. In gen-
eral it can be said that a structurally stable region becomes more and more 
eroded by external influences as well as by Australia’s general withdrawal in 
regional affairs. This seems to be contradictory as Australia increases its 
efforts in regional security and economic policies. However, there is no true 
contradiction. Australia’s middle power ambitions (Cotton/Ravenhill 2012) 
run like a thread through Australia’s last governments (Howard, Rudd, 
Gillard, Abbott) and require an increasing level of Australian influence not 
only in regional but global affairs. Because Australia’s capabilities are not 
unlimited, Canberra has to revise its own priorities. In this context an increas-
ing Australian influence in other regions like Irak, Afghanistan, some African 
countries or on a general global level means to reduce its activity in the own 
backyard to save capabilities. Of course, the asymmetries between Australia 
and the PICs are still impressive but not that stable anymore. Canberra ob-
serves this process of regional erosion, which means nothing else than a re-
gional instability. Its reaction is not a generally increasing activity but a high-
er engagement in core areas of interest like security and economy. This does 
not avoid erosion but keeps and protects regional hierarchies in these core 
areas. As a result there is still an erosion which is though not a danger any-
more. 
                                                          
2
  China offered also ano other billion in commercial loan facility aministered through the 
Chinese Development bank. China has also promised to support the PICs to enter the big 
Chinese markets. Therefore Beijing has announced to remove 95% of commodities from Pa-
cific Least Developed Countries (LDCs). These announcements will enhance the diplomatic 
influence of China in the PICs and therefore will contribute to an erosion of the Australian 
hierarchy in Oceania which is supposed to lead to a growing regional instability. However, 
observers do not believe that at least the smaller PICs are not likely to increase their debts by 
taking on additional loans. Some of the PICs recognise Taiwan rather than China and will 
probably reject The Chinese offer (Hayward-Jones/Brant 2013). 
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Australia’s Pacific policy consists of various policy fields. The most im-
portant ones are certainly Australia’s regional economic and security policies. 
Although these policies are denominated here as Australia’s policies, those 
labellings are not fully correct. ‘Australia’s’ policies must be seen in combi-
nation with global structures and therefore in a global context. It is important, 
always to notice Australia’s policies (as well as the policies of other units) as 
being connected to their national, regional, inter-regional and global envi-
ronment. For this reason it is necessary to operate with a multilevel analysis 
and to consider possible interdependencies. 
Australia’s Pacific Policy until the Rudd Administration 
The Australian led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
was in action between 2003 and 2013. Many observers consider this mission 
as a turning point in Australia’s Pacific policy. Following their views that 
Australia has changed its regional hands off approach to a rather sustainable 
hands on approach (Wainwright/Harris 2005:54-61). In fact what is consid-
ered as a new interventionism (Fry 2008:72-86) is only the newest example of 
what could be best described as an intervention history in the Pacific3. Be-
sides RAMSI the Australian led intervention in the bloody secession conflict 
of the resource rich island of Bougainville from Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
should be mentioned. The Australian led Peace Monitoring Group included 
                                                          
3
  In the 1950’s Australia suggested to assume the British part of the British-French condomin-
ium of the New Hebrides. In 1980 Canberra supported the Papua New Guinea Defense Forc-
es to logistically oppress the so called Santo-Rebellion on the biggest New Hebrides island 
of Espiritu Santo (Gubb 1994). During the Vila riots in Vanuatu’s capital Port Vila in 1988, 
Australia’s navy was ready to intervene. However the decisive order was never issued. In 
1999 Australia’s military forces intervened in Timor legalized by the UN Security Council 
reolution 1264 as part of the multilateral intervention mission INTERFET (see Schmitz in 
this volume). Beginning in 1998 Australia intervened with other regional forces in the civil 
war in Bougainville (see Boege in this volume). However, this intervention was invited by 
both conflicting parties. This unarmed Peace Monitoring Group ended in 2003. However, 
these former invitations differ from what is described as a hands on approach because this 
new interventionism means armed military interventions without a mandate from the UN Se-
curity Council. 
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some 3,800 Australian troops as well as around 300 civilian personnel 
(Woodbury 2014:8, see Boege in this volume). One of the main proponents of 
the Australian led intervention in Bougainville was former Australian minis-
ter of foreign affairs Gareth Evans. In this position Evans defended unarmed 
and peaceful civil interventions (Fry 2004:4, Hanson 2003:259). Later he 
became one of the authors of the then influential ‘Responsibility to Protect’-
Report (R2P) issued by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001). R2P suggests changing the internationally 
valid principle of non-intervention into a principle of intervention if a state is 
obviously not able to protect its citizens. In cases of substantial violations of 
human rights R2P suggests that the international community has not only the 
right to intervene but even a duty to assist restructuring law and order to pro-
tect human beings. This approach develops a new understanding of security. 
Security in this sense is distinguished in human security and state security. 
Older approaches did not distinguish between the two and only accepted the 
idea of state security. Following such an approach, individual security results 
from state security and not the other way round. 
Although Evans thought about peaceful, unarmed and civil interventions 
in the Pacific he brought back the idea of interventions on the agenda. The 
then Prime Minister John Howard expanded Evans’ concept in the light of 
9/11 and as one of America’s closest allies in the war against terrorism. Like 
the Bush-administration in Washington Howard reserved the right for Aus-
tralia to fight international terrorism and to protect Australian security inter-
ests by preemptive military actions without special consultations or accord-
ance with authorisations from the respective institutions (Baker 2005:225). 
Allthough Australia’s capabilities are considerably larger than even the 
sum of the Pacific Islands States capabilities (see the previous article in this 
volume), Canberra was sought to act legally correct and in accordance with 
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international law. Historically and in terms of global politics Australia was 
integrated into the structured global system of bipolarity. Regions were seen 
as regional appendices of the global structure. Therefore the authority of 
states with a regional significance was rather limited. Separate activity in 
their backyard with consultations of the bipolar hegemons was not possible 
because there was simply not an own backyard. With the end of bipolarity as 
of 1989 things changed dramatically. After a short period of unipolarity best 
described as George Bush senior’s idea of a new world order, the global polit-
ical order became restructured into a world of regions. This renaissance of 
regions was also a renaissance of regional powers. In other words, regional 
powers like Australia4 got their own backyard again or sometimes for the first 
time. From the ashes of a bipolar structure new powers emerged with their 
responding regions of interest. From this point of view it does not seem a 
coincidence that shortly after the end of the Cold War the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) adopted the Honiara5-Declaration in 1992. The topic of this 
declaration was to arrange mutual assistance to fight crime. With this conven-
tion security was first put on the agenda of the PIF. The idea of mutual assis-
tance to fight crime enabled the PIF member states for the first time in PIF’s 
history to consider domestic affairs of its members. Until 1992 the PIF’s 
intention was only to promote economic and social development. Politics, 
respectively security, were explicitly not on the agenda of the PIF (Firth 
2001:278). In 1997 the PIF adopt the Aitutaki-declaration discussing several 
mechanisms of intervention. In analogy to the above mentioned idea of Evan 
Gareth’s unarmed and peaceful civil interventions the PIF’s notion of inter-
vention was to intervene with the instruments of preventive diplomacy. 
                                                          
4
  Or the famous BRICS states (Brasil, Russia India, China, South Africa) which have nothing 
else in common than more or less fast growing economies. The acronym was created by 
Goldman Sachs chairman Jim O’Neill. 
5
  The names of the PIF-declarations result from the respective place of their annual meetings. 
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Regarding the crises in Fiji and on the Solomons it became obvious that such 
a kind of soft-interventionalism is not the appropriate instrument to restore 
law in order. In 2000 the PIF seemed to accept that amendment by adopting 
the Biketawa declaration. This declaration is often described as a turning 
point in regional security politics. First of all it was a revolution inside the 
PIF as the mode of decision-making was changed. Up to 2000 only decisions 
by consensus were accepted. This rule gave the weak PICs more power to 
influence decisions. Up from 2000 this mode was changed to a mode with 
sufficient consensus which practically reflects the reality of assymetries not 
only on a regional level but also inside the PIF as almost 75% of the PIF 
budget is financed by Australia and New Zealand (Peebles 2005:60). Howev-
er, what seems to be even more important in our context is the decision of the 
PIF to accept further rapid reaction mechanisms without specifiying these 
further mechanisms. The range of these mechanisms comprises economic 
sanctions as well as physical interventions (Anderson 2005:28f). 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 shocked the world and also the Islands Fo-
rum. Almost one year after these attacks the Forum members met in Suva to 
adopt the socalled Nasonini declaration. This declaration might be seen as a 
direct response to the changing global security perception after 9/11. Regard-
ing this change in global security policy the PIF demanded a more active 
stance in regional security issues. Two years later, in 2004, the Forum adopt-
ed its Auckland declaration to promote regional integration and a rearrange-
ment of the Pacific Island Forum including its organisational structure and its 
original aims. Among these aims were social development and economic 
prosperity. However, security issues and in general domestic affairs of its 
member states were explicitly excluded from the Forum’s agenda. This 
changed dramatically as more or less natural appendix to the Biketawa decla-
ration. Security as well as good governance jumped to the top of the PIF’s 
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agenda and became two its central objectives. What was even more important 
was the agreement to develop a road map for the island’s development that 
became popular under the name Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional 
Cooperation and Integration. Since then this Pacific Plan has been considered 
as the blueprint for an increasing level of cooperation and integration between 
the PICs and the bigger state of New Zealand plus the region’s traditional 
hegemonial power Australia. 
By analysing the Pacific Plan the significant interests in Pacific regional-
ism become apparent. Security refers to the Australians claims to Pacific 
regionalism. As economically prosperous country, welfare aims have not the 
highest priority in Australia’s Pacific policy. This is not surprising consider-
ing the economic asymmetries between Australia and the PICs. To keep it 
more simple: what could the PIF offer to Australia’s economy? This, of 
course, is completely different from the PICs point of view. This dichotomy 
provides a perfect platform for a kind of asymmetric regional trade: Australia 
offers welfare to security while the PICs need welfare to sustain their political 
and economical stability and to reduce their vulnerability6. By avoiding any 
kind of instability they indirectly produce the regional security which is de-
manded by Canberra. In this sense Australia’s economic capabilities are used 
as an instrument of Australia’s security topics. In view of the relative 
strengths7 between the PIF’s member states the PIF declarations up from 
Biketawa have shown its real character: the PIF has changed to a de facto 
Australian institution to provide political legitimacy to Australian regional 
actions. It is the multilateral camouflage of unilateral Australian actions in the 
Pacific. Internationally this regional strategy is secured by the R2P report (see 
Firth 2001:280). 
                                                          
6
  This might be described as a kind of inverted asymmetry. 
7
  Almost 75% of the PIF’s annual budgets are paid by New Zealand and Australia. 
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Therefore the argument of non-intervention, which was one of the leading 
maxims of the United Nations precept of non-interference, became more and 
more extenuated. If a state is not able to protect its population in cases of 
emergency the international community has the right or even a duty to substi-
tute a state and its sovereignty in order to protect its population. In a nutshell, 
this means that if a state is failing the responsibility to protect, it will be trans-
ferred to the international community. Humanitarian interventions are not 
only considered as a possible alternative but as a duty (ICISS 2001:XI). How-
ever, the only regional power which has the capability to intervene is Austral-
ia (and to a lesser degree also New Zealand). Australia reserves the right to 
act and to intervene regionally avoiding the suspicion to act as a neo-colonial 
power (Field 2003:24-25). Indeed there are some concerns in Australia about 
this neo-colonial perception. Thus, claiming unilateral regional acting openly 
is avoided by all means. To unify these extreme and dichotomic poles of 
intervention and anti-colonialism, Australia uses the PIF to legitimate its 
actions. 
Powerful Markets: Regional Foreign Trade Policy and the EU 
In addition to the region’s political reconstruction Australia also supports new 
directions in its economic architecture. Like having regard to the political 
reconstruction it is apparent that Australia’s economic strategy in the region 
has also changed, firstly, as a result of global economical realignment, and, 
secondly, after the breakdown of the global system of bipolarity. Until the 
beginning of the 1990s Australia’s regional policy can be best described as 
defensively altruistic and protective. Since then a process of paradigm shift 
can be observed here. Australia operates more actively in the region by ex-
panding the globally leading economic approach of neoliberalism to the PICs. 
One result is that development assistance is tied to good governance and that 
trade between the islands states and Australia has to be reciprocal. The main 
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difference between the current regional trade system and its predecessor is 
that the past system was non-reciprocal while the current one is reciprocal. 
The old regional trade was determined by the South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Co-operation Agreement (SPARTECA) signed on 14 July 
1980 in Tarawa/Kiribati. It came into force 1 January 1981. This non-
reciprocal trade agreement was concluded between Australia and New Zea-
land and the majority of the Pacific Islands States8. It offered a duty-free and 
unrestricted access for specified products originating from the PICs to the 
markets of Australia and New Zealand. In particular it were the textiles, 
clothing and footwear industries which were the major beneficiaries through 
the preferential access to the region’s major markets. 
Retrospectively one can note that SPARTECA was a regional reflection 
of the global trade agreements between the European Community States and 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). The then Europe-
an Economic Community entered into a trade and development treaty with 
the former European colonies by the treaty of Yaoundé in 1963. Yaoundé was 
an indirect result of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) of Rome signed in 1957 to reduce customs duties to establish a 
custom unit. It proposed to create a common market of goods, workers, ser-
vices and capital in Europe. Among the signatories only Luxemburg, Italy 
and Western Germany were without colonies at that time, while Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France still pocessed its colonies, mainly in Africa. It was 
clear that these non-European territories could not be considered as part of the 
EEC. Therefore the signatories created a special system of trade policies 
between the EEC and the European colonies respectively the then newly 
independent states to continue the close trading relationships between the 
                                                          
8
  Cook Island, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
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European states and their former colonies (Menck 1999:764). In 1973 the 
United Kingdom joined the EEC. This meant that British contracts between 
the UK and its (former) colonies became part of the negotiations between 
Europe and the ACP-states. The treaty of Yaoundé was followed by the first 
treaty of Lomé signed in 1975 between the European Community and 71 
African, Caribbean and Pacific states. The core of this treaty and its successor 
treaties Lomé II-IV was the non-reciprocal trade between Europe and the 
ACP states9, which meant that products of the ACP states were allowed to 
access the European market without almost any restrictions10 under a system 
of unilateral trade preferences, while at the same time the ACP states were 
allowed to protect their own local markets. Critics like Robert Kappel empha-
size that these treaties should not aim to fight against underdevelopment or to 
promote investments in ACP states, but to support Eurpean economic inter-
ests and to control the ACP states politically with regard to the bipolar com-
petition between the capitalist and socialist blocs. Following Kappel, the 
Lomé agreements supported a postcolonial conception of cooperation within 
a grown system of patronage between Europe and its colonies respectively 
Europe and its then former colonies (Kappel 2002:116f). Therefore it is an 
important consideration not to foget the bloc confrontation of that time. The 
Lomé agreements were also used as an instrument of an anti-communist 
Western containment policy. By the end of the socialist bloc in the early 
1990’s this policy was not longer necessary. Therefore the European Com-
munity was not longer willing to support its expensive policy of the Lomé 
agreements. The resolving of the East-West conflict brought a radical break 
in global politics and a change in the political significance of the ACP states 
                                                          
9
  Another core was the so called STABEX mechanism. The EC guaranteed to compensate 
losses caused by market fluctuations for some mainly agricultural goods (Thibaut/Nohlen 
1994:626). STABEX was financed by the European Development Fund. 
10
  There were some exceptions made for agricultural products. 
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which has been pushed into an increasingly marginal role. One result of the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994 was an erosion of 
the then existing non-reciprocal trade system that was seen as a contradiction 
to the just established World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its obligations. 
In this atmosphere of global restructuring it were primarily Germany and the 
UK who refused compensation payments to the ACP states in order to reduce 
their losses after the end of the non-reciprocal system. It is not an exaggera-
tion to state that Berlin and London became one of the most important drivers 
to end the Lomé model in the global North-South policy (Nuscheler 
1996:473f)11. 
The successor of the Lomé Agreements was the Agreement of Cotonou 
which entered into force in 2002. While the Lomé agreements had provided 
non-reciprocal preferential access for ACP countries into the EU market, this 
was challenged in the WTO by non-ACP countries such as Australia, and was 
deemed as WTO incompatible. The ACP countries were given a wavier by 
the WTO until the end of 2007 to put in place WTO compatible arrangements 
with the EU. Cotonou included the creation of reciprocal trade agreements 
between the European Union and regional blocs of ACP states12 by establish-
ing new systems of cooperation which are now known as the so called Euro-
pean Partnership Agreements (EPAS; see Schilder in this volume). The EPAs 
are seen as comprehensive trade agreements which are supposed to decrease 
transactions costs, improve transparency and establish bigger markets as well 
                                                          
11
  In 1996 the European Commission issued a Green Paper to analyse the shortcomings of the 
Lomé agreements naming a limited and non-diversified production base, missing approaches 
of good governance and the system of preferences within the larger complex of the non-
reciprocal trade system. 
12
  This means that there are not any negotiations anymore between Europe on the one side and 
the group of ACP states on the other side. By negotiating with single blocs of states or even 
with single states the EU is destroying the united front of the ACP group which is decreasing 
its corporate bargaining power and is playing the ACP states interests off against one other 
(Schilder et al 2006:23f). 
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as a better intergration into the global economy. As a result it is supposed that 
growth will increase growth which is equated with better conditions for de-
velopment. Finally, the Cotonou agreement recommended forcing regional 
integration as this was supposed to increase the bargaining power of the con-
cerned countries and helps them to benefit from economies of scale (Meyn 
2008:20-24). In addition to that the EU argued by following the theoretical 
approaches of functionalism (Haas 2004; Conzelmann 2003:141-169). As it 
has been experienced by the European Union itself, it was supposed that re-
gional economic intergration would generate spill over effects leading direct-
ly to political integration. One might say, that this point of view could be 
described as eurocentric as the conditions within the single negotiating group 
are completely different from the conditions of the European process of unifi-
cation (Meyn 2008:24). 
In a nutshell, it can be emphasized that the global economic conditions 
have changed from non-reciprocal to reciprocal trade. What happens then in 
the region of the PICs? The Cotonou Agreement became specified in 2004 to 
be suited and compatible to the local Pacific conditions. Like in the general 
agreement, the EU also recommends good governance and an increasing 
integration into the global economy as a problem-solving tool to the PICs 
(Reichert et al. 2009:10). The former non-reciprocal trade agreements be-
tween the EU and the PICs shall be changed into reciprocal trade agreements. 
Furthermore, since 2008 the ACP states are required to adjust their trade 
policies to be compatible to WTO obligations. If they refuse to do so the EU 
will claim the right to impose penal duties which would impede the essential 
exports of the PICs13. 
                                                          
13
  It is not possible to reproduce the general discussion about EPAs in this article. To get some 
more information see, for example, Schilder in this volume. However, it should be noted 
here briefly, that EPAs are often seen critically. Critics fear a possible local displacement ef-
fect due to European agricultural products (shock of food self-sufficiency) and industrial 
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Australia’s reaction to that global framework in North-South trade agree-
ments provided by the EU was to implement the Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (PACER) in 2002. PACER followed the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) concluded in 2001 (see chart 1).  
Chart 1: Trade agreements involving PICs (Source: Braxton 2009:6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PICTA: Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 
PACER: Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement 
SPARTECA: South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
PATCRA: Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement 
MSG: Melanesian Spearhead Group 
WTO: World Trade Organisation (Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, PNG, Solomons, Tonga, Samoa, 
Vanuatu) 
PICTA regulates the terms of trade and services as a free trade agreement 
among the particular Pacific Islands States excluding Australia and New 
                                                                                                                             
products (development shock) and therefore the danger to choke off regional trade (regional 
shock). Furthermore it is to be expected that exchange rates (foreign trade shock) and nation-
al revenues could fall (budget shock). Finally it is assumed that democratic processes could 
be undermined (shock of democracy and stability) because the EPA negotiations are normal-
ly not embedded in national democratic policy processes (Groth 2006:7-9). Some observers 
go so far as to say that the Pacific becomes recolonized by free trade agreements (Kelsey 
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Zealand. PACER expands this free trade area to Australia and New Zealand. 
However, PACER is not an internationally binding free trade agreement, but 
only a compulsory convention that a free trade agreement between the PICTA 
states and Australia and New Zealand must be concluded if the PICs make 
similar commitments to other states outside the PIF member countries aspart 
of an international agreement. Even if that is not the case, PACER envisaged 
that negotiations among the PACER agreement with the aim to provide a free 
trade area in Oceania should have been initiated by 2011. Because the PICs 
are in the negotiating process to conclude an EPA with the EU, the PACER 
agreement became effective. Two of them, PNG and Fiji have already signed 
an Interim Partnership Agreement in 2009. Although the EU launched negoti-
ations with Pacifc ACP states in 2004 it became obvious in 2007 that the 
entire group of these states were not able to conclude a comprehensive EPA 
with the EU. Therefore, Fiji and PNG initialled an Interim EPA (IEPA) in 
order to protect their sugar and fish exports respectively14. 
PNG ratified the IEPA in 2011 while Fiji finally refused to ratify. By the 
conclusion of the IEPA’s, and just even by the negotiations about such an 
agreement, PACER entered into force. In October 2013 the EU suspended its 
negotiations to a comprehensive EPA with all states of the region except 
Australia and New Zealand (Cook Islands, East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, the 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Sa-
moa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). The comprehensive 
agreement should have covered trade in goods, trade in services, development 
co-operation and trade-related issues like food health and safety issues, tech-
nical barriers to trade, agriculture, sustainable development and competition. 
                                                          
14
  PNG will liberalise 88% of EU imports while Fiji will liberalise 87%. The full EPA is likely 
to cover the same realms as the IEPA plus development cooperation provisions, a fisheries 
chapter, social and environmental issues and competition.  
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The reasons for the failed negotiations between Brussels and the Pacific ACP 
states are numerous: Vanuatu, for example, requested to obtain special treat-
ment in terms of tariff liberalization due to its unique fiscal circumstances, to 
obtain market access for its Kava production to the EU, and to eliminate any 
obligations about tax informations and exchange agreements going beyond 
OECD’s commitments (Islands Business 2013). Even more important, how-
ever, were serious divergencies over fisheries management, “where Pacific 
countries refused EU requests to bring in changes to Pacific countries’ na-
tional laws on fisheries management, as well as specific commitments on 
access to Pacific fisheries resources under the agreement. Instead, the region 
referred to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission as the 
competent forum” (ACP 2013). 
The main driver on the side of the PICs was PNG. PNG insisted on its 
IEPA concluded in 2009 to save its tuna exports to the EU. Fiji initially fol-
lowed PNG’s point of view to save its sugar industry. It seemed that both 
countries sacrificed regional solidarity to their national interests. PNG assess-
es that Article 37(4) of the Cotonou Agreement is still in force. This article 
describes what some observers consider as ‘variable geometry’ (Tabureguci 
2014). This means that a diverse region with different needs like the PICs, 
should be treated individually. This interpretation consists that PNG’s IEPA 
is not a contradiction to a comprehensive EPA between the EU and the whole 
group of Pacific ACP states. However, this opinion is not shared by the EU: 
“According to the EU a fundamental principle for the EPA was that signato-
ries to the Interim EPA (PNG & Fiji) must be part of the comprehensive EPA. 
They reiterated that there cannot be two agreements running in parallel, in 
other words, the Interim EPA and comprehensive EPA it was fundamental 
that all 14 countries be part of the comprehensive EPA” (PINA 2013). 
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Although PNG ought to have known that insisting on its IEPA meant to peril 
regional solidarity respectively a joint Pacific negotiation group, the country 
opted out of the shared position within the PICs that negotiations about a 
regional EPA would be negotiated regionally. Inofficially, “Brussels had also 
not made a secret of its insistence that Pacific members of the ACP bloc 
should opt for an IEPA, not a comprehensive one” (Pareti 2013). In contrast 
to PNG Fiji then made a turnaround and refuses to ratify its IEPA preferring 
instead with the regional position. While PNG is opting out Fiji slips into the 
role of the regional Pacific leader, emphasizing that “the region is now faced 
with three inevitable repercussions that may impede progress. This, he (Sha-
heen Ali, Fiji’s Secretary for Industry and Trade) said, were erosion of export 
preferences, the elimination of duty free access to the European Union mar-
ket in 2014 and the removal of sugar production quotas in 2017. ‘The value 
of the Economic Partnership Agreement the Pacific is negotiating with the 
European Union is declining, even before the agreement is concluded’” (Lal 
2013; see also Stoneman et al. 2010:74). The EU then decided to suspend the 
negotiations with the PICs in October 2013. Shortly afterwards EU Trade 
Commissioner Karel de Gucht met the Pacific ACP Fisheries and Trade Min-
isters in Honiara on 12 December 2013 to resuscitate the negotiations. De-
spite these attemps Fiji accused the EU to dictate directions of the negotia-
tions (Roquefeuil 2014:25). 
This brief summary about the EU-PICs negotiations clearly shows the 
problems the PICs fear with regard to free trade arrangements. As mentioned 
earlier Australia considered these global negotiations about WTO-compatible 
free trade arrangements as a trigger to implement regional agreements like 
PACER Plus. In the end both argeements show obvious asymmetries between 
the negotiating groups: PICs vs EU respectively PICs vs. Australia and New 
Zealand. And indeed the fear of the PICs to be disadvanced due to these 
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asymmetries appears not to be without reason, although Australia's approach 
to the PACER Plus negotiations is different to that, taken in traditional free 
trade agreement negotiations. Officially, Australia's primary objective is to 
promote the economic development of the PICs through greater regional trade 
and economic integration. To be integratetd and to be liberalized are the eco-
nomical cornerstones of the Pacific Plan which are in global correspondence 
to the global paradigm shifts in the EU-ACP negotiations. Critical remarks 
about potentially negative impacts on the developing countries in general and 
on the PICs in particular remain unheard. Model calculations for Tonga and 
Vanuatu clearly show that market liberalisation reduces those countries’ rev-
enues most likely by around one third (Nathan Associates 2007). 
In July 2013 the trade ministers of the Pacific Forum member states 
adopted a roadmap for the PACER Plus negotiations. In the current (March 
2014) negotiation round trade in services and investments are subjects to 
discussion. However, what is seen as a setback to the PACER Plus talks is the 
missing progress over labour mobility and development assistance (Ratuva 
2004:4, see in general Ritchie 2009:14-18). These two points are vitally im-
portant to the PICs. As typical MIRAB15 countries (see Bertram and Tisdell 
in this volume) “labour mobility would relieve social pressure as a result of 
growing populations and the lack of employment opportunities. It would also 
provide a ready source of remittances, which is a key source of foreign ex-
change for many islands economies of the Pacific” (Pareti 2013b). Labour 
mobility would also relieve critical shortages of manpower in some sectors of 
Australia’s and Zew Zealand’s economy (Walmsley et al. 2005). Therefore 
the PICs asked to enhance the seasonal workers programmes as well as to 
                                                          
15
  The acronym MIRAB stands for MIgration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy (Ber-
tram/Watters 1985). 
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seek further inclusions of new sectors like sugarcane, cotton, accommodation 
and aquaculture (ibid; see also Opeskin/MacDermott 2009).  
The negotiations between The EU and the PICs caused some unrest in 
Canberra being afraid of losing influence in its own backyard. From this point 
of view the implementation of PACER Plus is an inevitable consequence. 
Australia was afraid to lose its position as the most important exporter in the 
region (Kelsey 2004:19f). PACER Plus opens the door to regional trade under 
liberal WTO-conditions. Critics like the Fijian economist Wadan Narsey note 
that the main aim of PACER Plus is to secure sales markets mainly for Aus-
tralia’s economy. Others insist that SPARTECA as already existing non-
reciprocal trade agreement should be modernized to SPARTECA Plus (Brax-
ton 2009). 
Despite regional critics Australia and, to a lesser degree, New Zealand 
are not willing to reconsider their objectives. It was in particular Australia 
emphasizing that the one who pays the bills also has the right to decide. Eu-
rope’s push to restructure its economic relations to the ACP states can be 
considered as a global break having regional repercussions also in the Pacific. 
This push was the opening pitch to restructure Australia’s backyard. This 
restructuring still causes increasing dependencies which contribute to consol-
idate Australia’s leading position in the region (Braxton 2009:8). 
The Pacific Plan as political and economical road map 
It was shown that Australia rearranges the region of the PICs economically 
and politically. The reasons for this rearrangement are turning points in global 
economy and global politics. An output of the Auckland declaration of the 
annual Pacific Islands Forum meeting was the agreement about the develop-
ment of a Pacific Plan to support regional integration and development. This 
Pacific Plan was adopted by the 2005 Forum meeting in Port Moresby. The 
political as well as the economical rearrangement of the Island Pacific region 
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under the aegis of Australia can be summarized in this Plan. This agenda for 
action is intended as a living document that will evolve with current situations 
and challenges. The Plan consists of four core elements, namely economic 
growth, sustainable development, good governance and security (Forum 
Secretariat 2005) which is an obvious regional reflection of aims defined by 
global actors like the WTO or the EU. The two last mentioned elements good 
governance and security refer explicitly to the development of the Islands 
Forum into an effective political institution under the security-oriented auspi-
ces of Australia. The goal to achieve good governance in the PICs is not only 
politically, but also economically motivated. The main source of many of the 
PICs revenues is Official Development Assistance mainly provided by Aus-
tralia. It is in Australia’s interest that these amounts will be used only for 
specific purposes. Good governance is widely seen as the main reason for an 
improper use of ODA and also as a decisive reason for possible state failures 
within the region of the PICs (Duncan 2004:1). 
The Pacific Plan is the preliminary result of several decisions including 
the Biketawa declaration as the most significant one have been made by the 
Pacific Islands Forum since 1992 (Rolfe 2006:86) to rearrange the region’s 
political and economical architecture. Marking the end of the bipolar world 
this date is not a coincidence. Talking about the Pacific Plan as preliminary 
result it is that RAMSI (see Dinnen in this volume), the Pacific Regional 
Assistance for Nauru (PRAN)16, PICTA and PACER/PACER Plus have to be 
                                                          
16
  At first glance it appears that PRAN was established mainly because of Nauru’s disastrous 
state. Nauru is insolvent. Before Nauru’s rich phosphat resources became exploited, the 
country had had one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. However, bad economi-
cal and political management spoiled the state. Nauru’s attempt to establish itself as a tax 
haven lead directly to sanctions imposed by OECD’s Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering. Because of Nauru‘s performance in financial matters, the country was added to 
Washington’s list of rogue states. The US suspected Nauru of money laundering, the dispos-
al of offshore banking-licences and passports to foreigners (van Fossen 2003:237-275). In 
2004 Nauru’s President Harris requested financial assistance in Australia. Nauru and the 
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also categorized as part of the Pacific Plan even though these events had 
happened before its formal adoption. 
The Plan is also an expression of a joint responsibility for the region 
which is realized by the establishment of a multilateral Pacific Regional Po-
licing Initiative (PRPI 2006) which is indeed a de facto Australian lead unit 
(Dobell 2003:16). Such a unit is able to provide the capabilities to further 
policing tasks like the civil police forces as one important component within 
the framework of interventions like RAMSI (Hawke 2004:10). The reasons 
given for such a policing initiative are security interests of mainly Australia. 
Furthermore Australia is inexpansive able to take account of the self-chosen 
role as Washington’s deputy in the Pacific (Hanson 2003:254). By doing so 
Canberra operates within the narrow range between humanitarian aid and 
activities percepted as neocolonialism. The neocolonial perception intensifies 
itself if a joint Pacific police force lead by the PICs is likely as well as ironi-
cally to be declined by Australia because of the loss of national sovereignty 
(Henderson 2004:21).  
The Plan includes a number of steps. The first step scheduled between 
2006-2008 and encompassed the harmonization of national processes in the 
                                                                                                                             
PNG island of Manus were the main components of Australia’s Pacific Solution meaning 
Australia’s policy of transporting asylum seekers to detention centres on Pacific island na-
tions, rather than allowing them to land on the Australian mainland. The Pacific Solution 
was implemented between during 2001–2007, and was supported not only by the then con-
servative government under Premier Howard, but also supported by the Labour opposition. 
During the election campaign Labour leader Kevin Rudd promised to stop this policy. How-
ever one year later, in 2008, Rudd opened a detention camp on Christmas Island. Nauru re-
ceived more than 100 million Aus$ for the deported asylum seekers. The country feared a 
gaping hole in its economy after Australia had pledged to end the system (Topsfield 2007). 
In 2012 Rudd’s successor Julia Gillard reopened the camps on Manus and Nauru which were 
described by Amnesty International as cruel and inhumane (Amnesty International 2012). In 
July 2013 PNG and Australia signed a Regional Resettlement Agreement including that asy-
lum seekers are to be sent from Christmas Island to Manus or elsewhere in PNG. Canberra 
also asked the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu to join this agreement (Chand 2013). Canberras 
payments to Nauru and PNG within the scope of the Pacific Solution symbolize how the 
PICs are involved in Australia’s interests (Keith-Reid 2004b:44). To use Satish Chand’s 
words, it is the “Pacific solution to an Australian problem” (Chand 2013). 
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realms of economy, good governance, security politics etc. (Maiava 2006:9). 
Most progress could be achieved on the field of economy by implementing 
PICTA and PACER respectively by the negotiations over PACER Plus. 
However, some questions remain on how effective economic cooperation 
between the PICs might be as their economies are mostly not complementary 
but similarly structured and as the regional trade between the PICs is rather 
limited (see annex of the previous article). Furthermore it should be asked 
how the small island economies are able to absorb the absence of tax and 
customs duties (Thomas 2004:19). Under the mentioned circumstances the 
implementation of the Pacific Plan appears to be mainly motivated by Aus-
tralian interests. 
The next step has a duration of nine years between 2006 and 2015. Until 
2015 it is planned to accomplish four main goals resulting in the mentioned 
core elements economic growth, sustainable development, good governance 
and security. The different objective agreements are marked with numerous 
subobjectives which are explicitly defined and equipped wth a corresponding 
strategy. It is conspicuous that most of the subobjectives are derived from the 
Plan and not from real regional stuations or/and problems. Because the Plan 
is not oriented on regional needs but in pursuance of specific and previously 
defined objectives, it is possible to conclude that the Plan interferes with the 
existing regional order to arange a new one. However, officially, the Plan is 
aimed to cooperative regional management without inroads into national 
sovereignties (Forum Secretariat 2005:4,6) which seems to be a contradiction 
to the achievement of the above mentioned core elements of the Plan. 
To achieve these elements, objectives and subobjectives, it is necessary to 
establish new institutions and, respectively to expand already existing ones. 
Regarding the very limited capabilities of most of the PICs the question arises 
how these new initiatives and institutions can be realized under the formal 
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condition of equal participation. In most cases there will be no other alterna-
tive than filling vacancies with specialists from Australia and New Zealand. 
This in turn means that the administrative frame to the regional rearrangement 
is dominated mainly by Australia and, to a lesser degree, by New Zealand. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the PICs refuse to accept the Plan. The 
implementation of the Plan would not be possible without corresponding 
pressures from mainly Australia. If nobody wants this Plan, why does Aus-
tralia endeavour to implement the Plan? 
Australia at the crossroads: Terrorism, China and the US 
If Australia’s place within international relations can be described as a re-
gional power that is, as Nolte (2012:29) emphasizes, in some respects differ-
ent from the description as a middle power. What both concepts have in 
common is that regional powers or middle powers are located inbetween local 
and global level. Casually speaking it is possible to consider these powers as 
being in a sandwich position between those two levels. Australia is then in an 
ambivalent situation as guided leader. This seems to be necessary to mention 
before analyzing Australia’s interest in the Pacific. 
So far it was shown that economic and security reasons are significant to 
Australia’s approach. Canberra’s security policy is heavily influenced by its 
perception of its environment. An important reason for Australia’s actions on 
the national, regional and global stage is fear because of its geopolitical loca-
tion as a European island in an alien Asian environment. This picture can also 
be drawn in other colors like a stable and wealthy Western democracy sur-
rounded by poor and instable Asian anarchy. This perception is also influenc-
ing Australian elections. The Australian average voter is considered as aspi-
rational voter reflecting a large group of voters. This group is concerned 
about its future, fearing a possible social decline (Smith et al. 2006:11; 
Goot/Watson 2007). Conservative rhetoric, an often one-sided media 
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reporting and the mentioned negative perception of Australia’s environment 
support this tendency. The result is a dichotomic and exclusionary view of the 
world differing between “them” and “us” which was even exacerbated after 
the terror attacks in New York 2001 and in Bali one year later (Castella et al. 
2009; also Lawrence 2008). The fear of “them” is revealing itself as fear of 
Islamic terrorism as an activity disturbing order and stability and also as fear 
about an asianisation as a result of an uncontrolled immigration. Although 
there has not been a sole piece of evidence that that terrorist could choose 
weak Pacific Islands states as a refuge, like the Taliban did in Afghanistan, 
this was exactly what was feared. Canberra was convinced that preventive 
interventions could be a suitable instrument to avoid a Pacific Afghanistan in 
Australia’s backyard as well as uncontrolled and illegal migration from the 
PICs and mainly from PNG. Thus, it is of importance for any Australian gov-
ernment to show political activism in the fight against terror. Unfortunately, 
from the government’s point of view, some 70% of the Australian’s are 
against the Australian intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. By a rearrange-
ment of Australia’s intervention policy in direction of the Pacific as Austral-
ia’s own backyard, Australia’s government manages to balance the Australian 
citizen’s need of security and a relatively inexpensive and innocuous im-
provement of Australia’s position as a responsible middle power on a global 
level. Furthermore, this change of perspective enables Australia to do its 
duties as a close ally in America’s coalition of the willing, without meeting 
the demands for an increasing participation in the US conflicts. To keep it 
short, Australia faces the problem to deal with obvious contradictions (Fry 
2004b:7). 
The interventionism of the Howard administration rested on the assump-
tion that it might be necessary to stabilize failing states first before ODA is 
able to work effectively. Some people might interpret this as the main 
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objective of the Australian interventionism not being to help foreign states but 
to safeguard and to amortise Australian investments. Here it seems to be nec-
essary to emphasize that until RAMSI in 2003 Australia considered failing 
states mainly from a development perspective. Until 2003 the humane dimen-
sion was an altruistic maxime in Australian policy in the region of the PICs. 
Then, the Howard administration changed this human dimension into a secu-
rity dimension (Hawksley 2004:19). 
Another important reason for Australia’s activity is its self-concept as a 
middle power on the global level. Australia considers itself as a close ally of 
the USA, a pioneer for Western values and democracy, as a model state for 
democratic institutions and as a hegemon in the Pacific. Canberra sees itself 
as Washington’s deputy in the region representing US security interests as 
Australia’s own interests if necessary by interventions (Callick 2003:22). 
Howard’s minister of foreign affairs Alexander Downer thereupon appeased 
Australia’s Southeast Asian neighbours that this interventionist approach was 
only targeted at the PICs to stabilize the region. Economical reasons, like 
some might see in Australia’s involvements in PNG, the Solomons and Timor 
Leste (see Schmitz in this volume), are officially of secondary importance 
(Buchsteiner 2006:5). 
China’s Interests in Oceania17, PICs Interests in China and its effects 
The region’s stability appears to be endangered by Chinese interests in the 
PICs although the relevance of the PICs is of minor importance to Beijing in 
comparision with other regions. Chinese official approaches in foreign policy 
in general were described as an interdependence of a person interacting with 
other persons. These were emphasizing a cardinal similarity as well as a basic 
ability to learn (Eun-Jeung 2000:423). China idealizes this liberal approach 
                                                          
17
  See also McDougall in this volume. 
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officially as its foreign and security policies were marked by harmony and 
peace. Beijing’s interpretation of current international relations is marked by 
its perception of multipolarity as global order. In this percepted multipolar 
system of global politics, trust is significant to the relations between political 
units. Therefore China is supporting multilateralism in general while it is 
refusing hegemonial claims (Chen 2006:325f). However, this is just a nomi-
nal condition. China is aware of existing realities referring to the global US 
supremacy. At second glance China’s official multilateral approach therefore 
appears rather as a wish than reality. Beijing’s multilateralism is not altruistic, 
but rather guided by its own interests. Multilateralism is to be supported as 
long as China plays a leading part, as long as a multilateral system remains 
fully controllable. As a result Beijing likes to support mulilateralisms only 
under its control to achieve a crucial position as global power (Möller 
2003:5f). 
China stands ready to take a more active role in international relations as 
its economy became more integrated into global economy (Medeiros/Fravel 
2003:22-35). In a more active and globally oriented foreign policy Beijing 
sees a good opportunity to achieve own interests. Therefore it is necessary to 
safeguard much-needed raw materials for China’s booming economy. Thus 
leading to China’s interests in the Pacific, which are, firstly, to contain Amer-
ican (and therefore Australian) influence in this strategically important region 
and to expand its own influence, and, secondly, to contain the Taiwanese 
influence as a result of China’s One-China-Policy (Möller 2005:83f) and, 
thirdly, to get access to raw materials mainly in PNG. These three areas of 
interest have implications for Australia’s position as the traditional leading 
power in the Pacific. This demonstrates clearly Canberra opportunities and 
limits at the same time. Australia’s opportunities as a supraregional and struc-
ture-building power are limited and, despite of being a close ally to the US, 
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its influence on American politics is just as limited as its influence on China. 
However, as a partner of both states Australia is able to act as a mediator 
(Maclellan 2002:51). 
Australia’s relations to China are ambivalent. On the one hand, China is 
Australia’s most important trading partner – with a share of some 20% it is 
well ahead of Japan (11.4%) and the US (9%). In 2011 more than 73% of 
Australia’s raw material exports went to China18 (Australia 2001:2). Between 
1999 and 2004 the bilateral trade between both countries has doubled (Möller 
2006:3). At the same time Canberra notices China’s increasing interets in the 
region of the PICs which was considered as hazardous by the Howard admin-
istration. In contrast to Howard his successor Kevin Rudd tried to cool things 
down without overlooking the possible negative implications. Therefore it 
was possible to keep the important role as a mediator between China and the 
US. As a graduated sinologist und former diplomat in China, Rudd knows 
political processes of decision-making in Beijing as well as China’s economic 
significance. Rudd tried to get China more involved in multilateral institu-
tions (Hofmeister 2010:74). Thus, Rudd showed not only a better understand-
ing than his conservative precursor, but this also suited China’s interests con-
cerning its official multilateral foreign policy approach. However, because of 
a lack of explicit knowledge of China’s strategies in foreign policies the Aus-
tralian senate warned of possible dangers and risks (Australia 2006:183). 
Always hungry for new sources of raw materials, China is not only a re-
markable key item in Australia’s balance of trade, but economically also very 
active in the PICs. In almost any major projects, like mining in PNG, China is 
mostly one of the major partners. This means not only a deceasing influence 
of Australia respectively of Australian companies, but also a danger to the 
                                                          
18
  This is a strong surge compared to 2001. For example the share of iron ore and concentrates 
increased from 15.5 % of Australia’s raw materials exports in 2001 to 57% in 2011. 
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political stability of the concerned PICs. Beijing’s methods are not always 
sensitive and have crossed the border of bribery in states usually vulnerable to 
corruption. The excavation of raw materials is often done by Chinese and not 
by local workers. Furthermore Chinese companies are mostly disobeying 
environmental law. The desired effects of employment are therefore not suffi-
cient, pollution and ecological degradation in general is strongly increasing 
what promotes ecological migration to the aeras of excavation and therefore 
to an uncontrolled growth of former small villages to bursting towns with 
negative side effects of alcohol and drug abuse, crimes and prostitution re-
spectively HIV. What seems to be even more important in the PICs is that 
indigenous landrights are violated. Land is not only a salable and individual-
ized product, but a commonly used part of Pacific life. Land is tradition, cul-
ture and food security. In a nutshell, land means life. Indigenous landrights 
are often incomprehensible to many people outside the Pacific islands. Eco-
logical migration due to pollution means that people migrate to other areas 
which might be considered as violation of landrights of those area’s inhabit-
ants (see for the example of Bougainville Böge in this volume19). These quar-
relings about the distribution of land destabilize the PICs and are among the 
main sources of conflicts in these states20 (LMCN 2008; Wilson 2008; Loode 
et al. 2008; McIntyre 2008; Holtz 2011). 
However, even more important to Australia is China’s strategical inter-
ests in the region concerning its One China-policy and due to its competion 
                                                          
19
  For the Ramu mine as another example see Forell 2009. 
20
  The problem of landrights and its conflict potentials is recognized by Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat maintaining the Land Management and Conflict Minimisation Project (LMCM). 
The LMCM “is an initiative of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) that was en-
dorsed by the Forum Regional Security Committee and the Forum Officials Committee in 
2006. The project focuses on the interlinkages between land management and conflict mini-
misation, and approaches land issues in the Pacific from a holistic point of view, combining 
both economic development and conflict prevention perspectives. The recognition of the cen-
trality of customary land tenure in the lives of the people of the Pacific is the key underlying 
principle upon which the LMCM project is founded.”(see Blatt in this volume). 
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with the USA. Taiwan is politically active in the PICs to gain support for its 
sovereignty. The Chinese appendix seeks to convince the PICs of recognizing 
Taiwan as a sovereign state and of acting as a mouthpiece of Taiwan in inter-
national organizations and institutions like the UN21. Taiwan’s aspirations to 
be recognized as an independent state or even as the only legal and democrat-
ic China are neither negotiable nor disputable to Beijing. Within this competi-
tive framework both competitors are not prim at the choice of methods. Both 
countries have enough economic capabilities to ‘convince’ even the bigger 
actor in Oceania’s small theater. Moreover, however ridiculous it might seem, 
some Pacific Island Countries leaders as well as leaders from globally more 
or less unimportant states are flattered to be welcomed in Taipei and Beijing 
with the same honours as their colleagues from Paris or Canberra (Reil-
ly/Henderson 2003:100). 
By far the most important argument for the PICs to maintain good rela-
tionships to China is that China in contrast to Western states does not claim 
for democratic developments within the PICs as a condition to grant devel-
opment assistance. There is simply no need to bargain the value of good gov-
ernance and those of development assistance. In total, China offered the PICs 
some 400 million US$ under the umbrella of the so called Pacific Island 
Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum as development 
assistance (Davis 2007). Beijing as well as Taipei simply do not care about 
corruption or lack in good governance. Australia’s or Europe’s questions 
about good governance, democracy etc need must not to be answerd anymore. 
                                                          
21
  Currently Taiwan has diplomatic relations with the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Palau, Marshall 
Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu plus 15 other states outside the region of the PICs. Tonga was 
also part of this group until 1998. The Pacific Kingdom decided to change the side recogniz-
ing China. In the same year also Marshall Islands decided to recognize Taiwan followed by 
Palau in 1999. PNG recognized Taiwan also in 1999, what was, however, withdrawn acouple 
of days later when the then prime minister of PNG, Skate, lost his power. Then, PNG’s dip-
lomatic recognition reverted to China (Hegarty 2007:13). 
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China is happy to fill the gaps caused by Western idealism as these gaps are 
not that difficult to fill. In comparison to other regions or states, China does 
not need enormous amounts of money to convince the PICs of following the 
Chinese way. It is then not really surprising anymore that Fiji’s prime minis-
ter and former coup leader Bainimarama rather seeks good and close relation-
ships to China than to Australia or other Western states. Also it is not surpris-
ing if the in some regards still absolutist governed Kingdom of Tonga likes to 
be flattered by Chinese diplomats (Nadkarni 2005:6). However, also Taiwan 
knows how to play the keys of an ‘effective payment’. Taiwan does not con-
tradict information published by the Australian journalist Graeme Dobell that 
only 15% of Taiwan’s ODA-budget comes from its official Taiwan Interna-
tional Cooperation and Development Fund. 85% of this amount is adminis-
tered directly by the department of foreign affairs without providing an ac-
count of how and what for this money is used. This non-transparent use of 
Taiwanese money simply invites to interpret such an abuse of assistance 
money. One might ask who becomes assisted for what reason by this money 
(Dobell 2007:11f)? 
The increasing competition between Australian supremacy and its Chi-
nese challenger has not only impacts on this Pacific region of states but also 
on a domestic level within the PICs. A suitable example for this could be 
most obviously observed the Solomon Islands22. One of the causes of the 
                                                          
22
  There are also some examples from opther PICs. In 2005 the presidential election campaign 
at the Marshall Islands also included a parlamentarian poll about whether China or Taiwan 
should be recognized as the only sovereign Chinese state. Marshall Islands members of par-
liament were offered between 6,000 US$ and 10,000 US$ for the ‘right’ poll 
(www.taipeitimes.com, 08 April2014). In 2000 it was assumed that Taiwan paid 100,000 
US$ for Taiwans supporters on the islands. Furthermore, Sung (2000:2) estimated that addi-
tional 7 Mio. US$ from inofficial sources were transferred from Taiwan to the Marshall Is-
lands. In Tonga Prince Tupouto'a obtained some 13 Mio. US$ in June 2004 for ‘technical 
cooperation’. The aim of this money was to improve Tonga’s telecommunication infrastruc-
ture and its electricity grid. The companies oprating in this business areas are both owned by 
the Tongan royal family (Keith-Reid 2004:26f). 
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conflict on the Solomons was the highly corrupt local elite profiting from the 
Chinses-Taiwanese Pacific competition. Money that had been declared as 
subsidies disappeared in the Solomons’ bureaucracy, which caused social 
unrest. 
Members of parliament in the Solomon Islands earn almost 7,000 € a 
year. Taiwan offered them payments of some 90,000 € in addition to pay-
ments to some members of parliaments to buy their votes. Dobell (2011:11ff) 
mentions sums between 2,700 € and 4,500 € paid to parliamentarians to vote 
for the pro-Taiwanese candidate Snyder Rini for the office of Solomon Prime 
Minister during the 2006 elections. After Rini’s election on 17 April 2006 
anti-Chinese23 riots broke out in the Solomon Islands capital Honiara. Only 
ten days later Rini resigned from the office of Prime Minister (D’Arcy 
2007:1). The crisis on the Solomon Islands shows even more examples of 
destabilising effects resulting from Chinese and Taiwanese interferences. 
During the violent conflict before the RAMSI intervention in the Solomons, 
Honiara requested the UN twice for assistance in September 2002. One 
month later the UN sent an observer team to Honiara. The Security Council 
advocated a coordination framework to implement a peacebuilding office in 
Honiara to mediate the conflict. In March 2003 Rini’s predecessor to the 
office of prime minister, Allan Kemakeza, supported Taiwan in striving to 
become a member of the UN. China responded immediately to that support 
by threatening to use its veto in Security Council with a view to any UN-
peacebuilding actions on the Solomon Islands (Ponzio 2005:176; Yang 
2011:97; Sheridan 2006:224). The Solomon Islands ought to have known that 
the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state and, even more so, the support 
of Taiwan to become a UN-member would bring about negative sanctions. It 
                                                          
23
  Chinese here means ethnical Chinese consisting both, citizens from China and Taiwan. 
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does not seem to be an unfounded suspicion that Honiara’s decision to vote 
for Taiwan was on behalf of Australia’s interest to keep the UN out of the 
Pacific game so as not to jeopardize Canberra’s policy of the free hand in the 
region of the PICs. Furthermore, this skillful move to play the Taiwan-card 
enabled Canberra to contain China’s influence in this part of the Pacific. This 
is of strategic interest to Australia as well as to her most important ally the 
United States. 
The US interest in the PICs was not as high as its interest in in other parts 
of the world. After 1945, Washington used the Pacific Islands as a first line of 
defence as a lesson learned from the Pacific war. Also, islands like Guam or 
Okinawa were used as natural aircraft carriers to control East and Southeast 
Asia. During the period of the Cold War, Washington was one of three su-
preme powers in the Pacific. While France controlled large parts of Polynesia 
and New Caledonia and the United Kingdom was the colonial power on some 
Melanesian Islands like Fiji, the Solomons and earlier also in Papua New 
Guinea, the US administered large parts of Micronesia by the so called United 
Nations Trust Territory of Micronesia. This territory was necessary to keep 
Japan down and the Soviet Union out. By the end of bipolarity in 1989 and 
the early 1990s, Washington reduced its influence in Micronesia. The New 
World Order, as declared by George H.W. Bush was the end of history (Fu-
kuyama 1992) for some decision makers. Without any enemies, the strategic 
significance of Oceania was dispensable. Washington withdrew troops, inter-
ests and influence from the region. America’s Pacific Century later on con-
structed by Hillary Clinton (2011) was not on the agenda at the end of the 
Atlantic age. This gap invited an emgerging power to step in. China expanded 
its influence in the Pacific Islands region and filled the void (Reilly/Hender-
son 2003:94-104). 
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Another example related to the Sino-US-competition was to be observed in 
Kiribati. In the 1990s, Kiribati had diplomatic relations with China. In 1997, 
the island country permitted China to build an astronomical observation sta-
tion, officially to support the Chinese space program. Inofficially, however, it 
was assumed that the real reason for the station was to collect information 
about an American missle test range in the neighbouring islands of Kwajalein 
(Reilly 2002:20). In 2003, Kiribati switched its diplomatic ties from China to 
Taiwan, and China closed its observation station immediately. Before the 
changed recognition, some political manoeuvrings between Taiwan, China 
and the USA became obvious. On 4 July, 2003, Kiribati elected a new gov-
ernment. One of the most important topics during the election campaign was 
the Chinese missle range. Taiwan sought to take advantage of this situation 
by supporting the presidential candidates financially. By doing so, Taiwan 
could be sure to be recognized by the then newly elected government (Pareti 
2004:18ff). Inofficially, the US welcomed this step which terminated the 
Chinese observation activities without American interference. After the 
recognition of Taiwan and the closure of the Chinese observation station, the 
relations between Kiribati and the US have improved significantly (Fickling 
2003). This example shows that the Chinese Oceania policy is a by-product of 
its general foreign policy, the main topics of which are the Chinese-American 
relations. In conclusion, this example illustrates the fact that the Chinese 
Oceania policy is shaped, among other things, by the global competition be-
tween Washington and Beijing. 
This also shows that the direction China is taking in Oceania is intended 
to destabilize the region in order to break into it and benefit from its strategic 
significance. By now, it is China and no longer Australia that is deploying the 
highest number of diplomats in Oceania (Dobell 2007), while the numbers of 
regional US diplomatic posts was continuously reduced (Reilly/Henderson 
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2003:99) although Washington is by all means aware of China’s increasing 
importance, especially in the Southwest Pacific (D’Arcy 2007:18; CRS 
2007). There are fears that the PICs will gain a similar strategic importance 
like they had during the Second World War. However, this only appears pos-
sible in an unlikely worst case scenario. On the other hand it points out that 
China’s Oceania policy cannot be understood without regarding Beijing’s 
relations to the US. Accordingly, it is not surprising that China is significantly 
modernizing its blue water naval forces including aircraft carriers and subma-
rines (Li et al. 2006:18). Beijing’s military planning in the Pacific as well as 
the Indian Ocean is determined by the so-called offshore defense strategy of 
the Second Island Chain or String of Pearls24 which is similar to the Ameri-
can strategy of the Strategic Denial in Micronesia during the Cold War.25 
This Second Island Chain includes mainly the Southeast Asian Islands of the 
Philipines and the Micronesian islands of Guam, the Marianas and Palau but 
also the Melanesian Islands of PNG and the Solomons (USA 2006:11). Bei-
jing’s strategic plannings developed from a near coast and near seas to a far 
seas approach (Li 2009:144-169). Some are currently even talking about a 
Third Islands Chain, believing that such a strategy would refer to the ability 
                                                          
24
  The so-called String of Pearls refers to the Chinese presence originally beginning at the 
island of Hainan via the Street of Malacca to the Persian Gulf to protect its sea line of com-
munication at the Indian Ocean and to contain Indian influence. This strategy seems to be 
expanded also to the Pacific Ocean (Pehrson 2006; Polymeropoulus et al. 2001:13). 
25
  Even now this region is of some strategic importance to the American defense forces: “The 
Freely Associated States (FAS), together with Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, have 
been regarded as a security border of the United States, the defense of which is considered to 
be key to maintaining vital sea lanes. In addition to being home to the Reagan Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, the FAS are located strate-
gically between Hawaii and Guam. According to some military experts, the FAS provide a 
vast buffer zone for Guam, which serves as the ‘forward military bridgehead’ from which to 
launch U.S. operations along the Asia-Pacific security arc stretching from South Korea and 
Japan, through Thailand and the Philippines, to Australia. The U.S. military is building up 
forces on Guam to help maintain deterrence and respond to possible security threats in the 
Pacific” (Lum/Vaughn 2007:5). 
144 Andreas Holtz 
 
to project power, capable of reaching America's bases in Hawaii (Wallis 
2014; Buchanan 2009). 
One very important pearl in China’s String of Pearls is Fiji. The island 
state has established strong diplomatic and military ties with China after the 
Western governments of Australia and New Zealand attempted to isolate the 
Fijian regime after its 2006 coup d’etat. Fiji’s interim Premier Bainimarama 
immediately responded by a Look North policy, which aimed at strengthening 
political and economic ties to countries outside the traditional Western scope, 
mainly China. Other Pacific states have followed Fiji’s lead (Wallis 2014). 
China’s growing military, diplomatic and economic presence in the South-
west Pacific is covered by some worrisome rumors about a planned Chinese 
navy base in Fiji and a growing Chinese fishing fleet, which is suspected of 
providing cover for Chinese intelligence monitoring (Buchanan 2012). 
Since the mid 2000s Australia as well as New Zealand and the US react-
ed to this local trend which is part of global trend of the Southern hemisphere 
countries to bandwagoning Western influence by playing the Chinese card. 
The US have shifted its strategic priorities from Europe to Asia (although 
some might say that the Ukraine crisis brings the US back into Europe), mov-
ing its navy mainly to the Pacific. Washington has re-opend some of its aid 
and trade missions in the region and has expanded its security ties with its 
traditional allies Australia and New Zealand26. The strengthening of the old 
                                                          
26
  Since New Zealand has banned nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships visiting its ports in 
1985, the bilateral security relations between Washington and Wellington have been more or 
less frosty. Because the US traditionally refuses to say whether its navy ships are nuclear-
powered or not, New Zealand has refused entry to its ports to all of them. As a reaction, the 
US suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand resulting from the Australia, New Zea-
land, United Stets Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) in 1986 until US Navy ships were re-
admitted to New Zealand ports. New Zealand, it was rumored, was considered as a friend, 
but not as an ally anymore. Some 24 years later, a new defense pact, the Wellington Declara-
tion, between the US and New Zealand was signed as a strategic co-operation document to 
restore relations (Vaughn 2011:1). It commits the two countries to regular foreign ministry, 
trade and military talks. 
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trilateral security obligations, a diplomatic reawakening of Western states in 
the region and the above mentioned EPA agreements between the PICs and 
the EU, which can be understood as an economical offence, counter-balance 
Chinese influence in the Pacific and restore a pre-eminent Western orienta-
tion in the Pacific Islands States. 
This policy of containment as a result of the new significance of the Pa-
cific Islands States became obvious when US Secretary of State Hilary Clin-
ton decided to attend the 43rd Pacific Islands Forum Meeting in the Cook 
Islands in August of 2012. If one of the most prominent government members 
of the world’s largest economic and military power attends a meeting of 
weak, small and economically more or less insignificant island states, some-
thing important must be going on. The importance of China is also reflected 
in plans of the Australian military to invade Fiji and to intervene militarily in 
PNG in cases of an armed conflict (e.g. between the US and China), the out-
break of civil unrest or the breakdown of the order. These plans became pub-
lic by an article of the Sydney based newspaper The Australian, revealing 
secret chapters of Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper (Cogan 2012). In 
case of an armed conflict between Beijing and Washington, Australian De-
fence Forces are not only to protect Australian territory, but also to target the 
Chinese Navy. Australian submarines would play a crucial role in such a 
conflict. These submarines are not to be built yet. Although these submarines 
will be built in Adelaide, “the design contract will be worth many billions of 
dollars27 to the winning country because the designer would also be involved 
in building them and maintaining them through their life cycle” (Stewart 
2014). So far, German ship builders seem to have the greatest chance to get 
this lucrative deal. 
                                                          
27
  Prasad (2012, also Packham/Vasek 2012) calculates with some 40 billion Aus$ to revamp 
Canberra’s submarine fleet. 
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As mentioned above, while Australia’s economic ties to China are strong, its 
political ties are still determined by the US-Australian relations. Australia 
needs markets as well as security, and therefore seeks engagement more than 
containment or even confrontations while on the other hand Australia “ap-
peared to be adopting a hedging strategy in relation to China (…). A trilat-
eral security dialogue involving Australia, Japan and the US also suggesting 
hedging in relations to China (…). Closer security relations between Austral-
ia and India could be taken as evidence of the same trend (…)” (McDougall 
2009:143). This was reflected in the three basic pillars of the Rudd and 
Gillard administrations’ foreign policy for Australia: the alliance with United 
States, Asian engagement and multilateralism (Tow 2008:21). Rudd’s multi-
lateral approach in Oceania became obvious when he talked about a new 
approach to Australia’s arc of instability: “Such an approach would empha-
sise the ‘economic’ rather than the ‘military’; and ‘economic development 
challenges as a priority’, not as ‘afterthought’. The approach would be ‘pro-
active’ rather than ‘reactive’; and ‘long term’ rather than ‘last minute’” (Fry 
2008:9). This appears to be a reasonable approach, but does it reflect political 
reality and the policy of Australia’s new conservative government? 
Abbott’s Policy in Oceania: Self-Consciousness or High-Handedness? 
Just as Rudd was not able to change Australia’s foreign policy behavior, Aus-
tralia’s new government, lead by Tony Abbott, will not be able to change it 
either. As a sensible and non-ideological conservative (Switzer 2014), Abbott 
is unlikely to bring back Howard’s no-nonsense, hands on-approach in Oce-
ania. On the other hand, it is also unlikely that Abbott will act altruistically. 
Because of its position somewhere in between political allegiance and eco-
nomic interests, some observers assume that Australia’s foreign policy is 
made of pure pragmatism, which also reflects Abbott’s personal attitude: 
“Abbott’s conservatism has British roots. His influences are figures such as 
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Edmund Burke, Roger Scruton, and Michael Oakeshott, who in their different 
ways championed a pragmatic worldview that is skeptical of political radical-
ism and foreign adventurism. It’s an anti-ideological form of conservatism 
that has almost no connection with what Americans call ‘conservative’” 
(Roggeveen 2013). 
Pure pragmatism seems not enough for many Australians. As Michael 
Fullilove (2014), director of the Sydney based think tank Lowy Institute for 
International Policy pointed out, Australia is “not a super heavyweight, but 
we are certainly not a flyweight. People say we’re a middle power. But 
there’s nothing middling about Australia. We are a significant power with 
regional and global interests. (…) Our great and powerful friends are becom-
ing, in relative terms, less great and powerful. And wealth and power are 
moving eastwards, towards us. (…) Now the tyranny of distance has been 
replaced by the predicament of proximity. Our new economic opportunities 
come with new political risks. We are closer to the world’s booming mar-
kets—and closer to the world’s developing crises. (…) On the one hand, sen-
timents towards China have warmed six points this year, the equal highest 
level since 2006. On the other hand, nearly half of Australians think it’s likely 
that China will be a military threat to Australia in the next twenty years, up 
seven points since last year.” Furthermore, after praising Abbott’s minister 
for foreign affairs Julie Bishop for her determined policy against Fiji, 
Fullilove demands a more capable military: “Australian defense spending is 
too low given our strategic circumstances. Indeed, our defense spending has 
scaled down at exactly the moment when other countries in the region are 
scaling up.” He also demands for a comprehensive Australian foreign policy 
which indicates in his eyes a “willingness to see ourselves as actors not com-
mentators and to take aim at the really big issues”. Finally he asks whether 
Australia “want(s) to be a little nation, with a small population, a restricted 
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diplomatic network, a modest defense force, and a cramped vision of our 
future? Or do we want to be larger—a big, confident country with an ability 
to influence the balance of power in Asia.”  
While Howard was convinced that the weak PICs should be treated like 
rude kids who need a strong hand, Rudd tried to convince by words more than 
by actions. The methods were different, but the motivation to increase Aus-
tralian influence, to realize Australian interests and to stabilize the region was 
the same. Abbot’s pragmatism will likely be somewhere in between, follow-
ing a carrot and stick approach, meaning that friendly rhetoric and multilat-
eral approaches are applied as long as they are useful for Australia. If nobody 
is following the carrot, Canberra is willing to use the stick. 
Fiji’s Interests28 
This carrot and stick policy implies that the weak PICs have no other option 
than to follow Canberra’s leadership. Besides using the opportunities result-
ing from their membership in international organisations (see Hasenkamp in 
this volume), China makes the difference. Using heavy-weighted China as an 
ally, Fiji challenges the Australian supremacy in the region. Globally, Fiji’s 
reach is not very far. Locally, however, its influence must not be underesti-
mated. Although suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum due to its long-
lasting lack of a democratic government, Fiji is the political and economic 
center of the Pacific Islands States, at least if the Pacific is considered without 
Australia and New Zealand. It is debatable whether Australia (and to a lesser 
degree New Zealand) should be seen as a Pacific power29. Many Pacific 
                                                          
28
  See Ratuva in this volume. 
29
  The self-perception of the Australians is not necessarily a Pacific one as a minority of the 
Australians is geographically located to the Indian Ocean. They might consider Australia as 
an Asian power. I would like to thank Derek McDougall for pointing this out to me. 
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Islands States traditionally do not consider Australia one of them30. However, 
“Australia always wants to be a power perceived as being in the South Pacif-
ic as well as being the South Pacific power” (Dobell 2014). As a hegemon, 
Australia aims at keeping that status quo, but Fiji, armed with strong self-
confidence, a good measure of courage and the willingness to take a risk, 
wants to challenge this hegemony. Fiji’s regional behavior could have come 
straight from the textbook: As Schweller points out, an “offensive band-
wagoning is done exclusively by lesser aggressors, which I call limited-aims 
revisionist states. Typically, the lesser aggressor reaches an agreement with 
the unlimited-aims revisionist leader on spheres of influence, in exchange for 
which the junior partner supports the revisionist leader in its expansionist 
aims” (Schweller 1994:93f). In other words, Fiji is not satiated and therefore 
a revisionist state: “a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts opportun-
istic revisionist powers” (ibid). Bainimarama is clever enough to play this 
game from a powerful position, knowing that China is providing ongoing 
support due to common interests. China is a revisionist state that is challeng-
ing Washington’s supremacy on a global level. One step of Beijing’s way to 
global importance is to destabilize the region while simultaneously providing 
it with aid. China needs unrest in the region to become an irreplaceable helper 
because such a position is probably the best precondition to become a system 
determinating31 state on a regional level. System-determination on a regional 
level means for Beijing to invigorate itself for global competition. Globally, 
                                                          
30
  When the Pacific Island Forum was founded in 1971, many of the PICs tried to keep Canber-
ra out of the organization. Even then Australia was not considered a Pacific power. 
31
  A rather old but still highly valuable article by Robert Keohane (1969:295-296) demon-
strates how the roles in the political game are clearly apportioned: Great powers are determi-
nating the global system while secondary powers are only influencing this system. Middle 
powers then are only system-affecting while small states are system-ineffectual. On a re-
gional level the roles and the actors may be changing. The operational framework, however, 
remains the same. This very short excursus shows that different approaches can be used to 
explain Australia’s regional behavior as alternatives to the current constructivist fashion of 
explaining international relations. 
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China is still challenging US supremacy: a system-influencing secondary 
power challenges a globally system-determinating power (Art 2010:359-391). 
Hence, China as a global challenger needs regional support (and, of course, 
regional resources), whether it be in Oceania, Africa, Asia or in Latin Ameri-
ca. This ‘top-down-bandwagoning’ is in the interest of Fiji and other (global-
ly) system-ineffectual states. The structure of this behavior is also visibly 
considering Australia as a global middle-power and a regional giant at the 
same time. The Australian giant is challenged by the Pacific dwarfs that are 
striving to evolve into tiny giants, friendly supported by Chinese interests. 
Canberra reacts by strengthening its relations with Washington to balance out 
China as a new emerging power in Oceania. China receives political support 
by a multitude of small, respectively weak, states, not only in Oceania. China 
then supports these weak states by economically compensating their absolute 
weaknesses. This enables the small states to challenge regional supremacy, 
like Fiji does in Oceania. To restore the regional order, Australia needs sup-
port from the US. Only regional order and stability allows Australia to use its 
own forces to engage in other important places with the goal of securing Can-
berra’s middle power fantasies. This briefly describes the relations, depend-
encies as well as interdependencies between regional and global levels and 
their actors. 
Beijing’s involvement in Oceania challenges the Australian-led regional 
status quo and therefore also weakens Western positions globally. Fiji is a 
regional beneficiary or junior partner of this strategy and, thus, a revisionist 
state that is doing what Schweller described as jackal bandwagoning: “’Jack-
al’ bandwagoning, with a rising expansionist state or a coalition that seeks to 
overthrow the status quo, decreases system stability” (ibid). As the excluded 
country Suva wants to get back what it has lost as a result of Bainimarama’s 
coup: “(…) international status as a democracy, membership of the Forum, 
Reweighted Islands 151 
 
full recognition of the prerogatives of the Suva elite that serve the Supremo 
and a comfortable economic relationship with Australia (…) while pushing 
on with revisions to the way the Pacific operates. This is the long game in the 
new dance between Suva and Canberra” (Dobell 2014). Therefore, the Aus-
tralian-Fijian relations are only superficially characterized by Fiji’s non-
demodratic domestic affairs. In fact, it is a competition between the tradition-
al hegemon who wants to secure its position and its revisionist challenger 
who wants to keep Australia (and also New Zealand) out of the region. Fiji’s 
aim is therefore nothing else than an attempt to redefine Oceania’s regional-
ism without the traditional leading powers. 
The Abbott administration clearly recognizes this tendency. A redefini-
tion of Pacific regionalism would undermine Australia’s middle power ambi-
tions significantly. While Abbotts predecessors regarded Fiji’s putsch regime 
as undemocratic and without any legitimation, Abbott seems to be more 
pragmatic. His minister for foreign affairs, Julie Bishop, visited Fiji in Febru-
ary 2014 to restore the bilateral relations between Suva and Canberra after 
seven years of mutual hostility (Callick 2014). After the elections in Fiji, 
which are announced to be held in September 2014, Australia is offering the 
end of sanctions, support of Fiji’s way back to democracy and to fully restore 
normal diplomatic relations (Dobell 2014b). All together this means that 
Bainimarama’s Fiji has played its Chinese card effectively and successfully. 
Now it is possible to enjoy China’s and Australia’s support (Dobell 2014c). 
However, it must be noted that Fiji is not a beneficiary because of its own 
efforts but a regional beneficiary due to global competition. Fiji’s revisionism 
is a direct result of changing Global structures as well as Australia’s reactions 
to its challenged regional primacy.  
The Fijian example reflects new opportunities for the PICs. Their own 
weakness is not an absolute disadvantage anymore but rather a more and 
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more insignificant characteristic. However, this kind of conclusion goes too 
short. Fiji’s assertiveness is a result of the increasing Chinese involvement in 
Oceania. Therefore, even Fiji as a regional challenger of Australian suprema-
cy is only a small piece on the Chinese strategic chess board. The global par-
adigm shift in world politics toward the Asian-Pacific countries leads to a 
focus to the PICs and therefore to states of relatively low international im-
portance. Fiji is obviously able to use this development for its own objectives. 
Without the big brother in Beijing, however, Australian supremacy cannot be 
challenged. Canberra’s main competitor therefore remains China, and not 
Fiji. The Sino-Australian relations are highly ambivalent. Australia’s most 
important trade partner is also perceived as its most dangerous security threat 
– at least within Oceania. 
Conclusion 
As Hugh White analyzed, China’s rise as economic and political power holds 
some implications. For decades, the US has played an important role in assur-
ing Asia’s stability, but recently, Beijing is dramatically challenging this 
status quo. Washington’s reaction is to strengthen its trilateral alignment with 
Japan and Australia as well as its quadrilateral alignment involving India32. 
This clearly declares Asia and Oceania as significant areas in Global security 
strategies. Oceania is back on the map. This new old significance of the re-
gion encourages the weak PICs to challenge the regional security architecture. 
Like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, small Pacific Islands States like Fiji are act-
ing as camouflage for the Chinese dragon. This deal reweights PICs influence 
and leads, as a result, to a changing Australian regional policy in Oceania. 
With the support of their mighty friend China, the PICs revise the status quo 
by endangering the current stability in the region. In this context, “Canberra 
                                                          
32
  This quadrilateral alignment is then a virtual counterpart to the above mentioned String of 
Pearls. 
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and Wellington would become powerful outsiders, not natural insiders” (Do-
bell 2014). Returning to the question that is raised in the title of this essay, the 
PICs are reweighted by Chinese interests and therefore part of a process of 
Australian-led restructuring in the region that aims to balance this re-
weighting. 
This realistic approach is supported by renowned strategic thinkers and 
Australian policy makers. Reflecting the ambivalence of Australia’s relations 
to China (trade partner and security threat), former Australian Prime Minister 
Rudd was hoping for China’s peaceful rise while preparing for the worst (e.g. 
by buying new submarines). His academic counterpart Hugh White argued in 
2005 that the Chinese challenge of US supremacy in Asia was no longer a 
theoretical one but had become reality (White 2005:469-480; see also Morini 
2012). According to White, Australia should take a more hardline view and 
therefore has to prepare for a growing Chinese military power challenging 
U.S. power in East Asia. 
This shows clearly that external determinants play an important role 
(among others) in influencing Australian security interests and, as a result, 
that its regional policies, too, are driven by external influences. Other external 
influences are, as shown above, global economic and political restructurings 
like the liberalization of global economics or the turning point in security 
politics after 9/11. 
On the other hand, we must not neglect the fact that the asymmetries be-
tween Australia and the PICs are extremely distinctive. Without disturbances 
from the outside, Australia is able to play the crucial role in Oceania. Canber-
ra is the traditional hegemon in a regional hierarchy. For the existing ambiva-
lence, this means that Australia is on a regional level structure-determinating 
and at the same time structure-influenced. Australia is unable to determine 
global structures while it sets the benchmarks in Oceania. This sandwich 
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position seems to be characteristic for Canberra’s approaches in regional 
security, trade and economic politics. These characteristics determine Aus-
tralian governmental actions. There seems to be no alternatives to the What in 
the sense of sustaining regional hierarchies while there are obvious differ-
ences about How to act. In contrast to Howard’s harsh commanding domi-
nance, the Rudd administration followed a direction which can be described 
as a soft and moderate, or even institutionalized, realism. Abbott, however, 
obviously stands for unideological pragmatism. The politics remain while 
their style is changing. 
Australia’s shaping power in Oceania has a functional component to sus-
tain existing relations while the PICs point of view is more revisionistic. This 
functional component is defined by Australia’s purposefulness which is, for 
example, the core of Kevin Rudd’s speech to the Pacific Islands Forum in 
Port Moresby 2008. In this speech, later becoming known as the Port Mores-
by declaration, Rudd announced to extend Australia’s development assistance 
to the PICs. However, this extension was attached to conditions such as 
measurable success within the target countries (Chand 2008). Australian 
interests are implicitly included in this success, so that an extended develop-
ment assistance is transformed to a non-altruistic instrument of Australian 
politics. 
In contrast to the conservative Prime Minister Howard, the Labour Prime 
Ministers Rudd and Gillard followed more multilateral approaches in Austral-
ian foreign policy, which are probably not going to be changed by the prag-
matist Abbott. While Rudd served as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, his decisions were influenced by his religious convictions. Rudd 
avows himself to Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s teaching and its engagement for the 
weak (Rudd 2006:22-30), which stands in deliberate contrast to the so-called 
Brutopia of the Christian right in the environment of his conservative 
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predecessor Howard (Rudd 2006b:46-50). Keeping this in mind, it comes as 
no surprise that the first Rudd administration closed the Pacific detention 
camps in 2008 which were part of the Pacific Solution33 introduced by the 
Howard government in September and October 2001. Prime Minister Gillard 
re-opened the camps in 2012, which was heavily criticized by the conserva-
tive opposition (Maley/Franklin 2010). The then opposition leader Abbott 
attacked Gillard that she wasn’t doing anything to protect the lives of people 
attempting to reach Australia by boat (Broom 2014) while, according to Wik-
iLeaks, an unnamed key Liberal Party strategist told US diplomats at the 
same time that the issue of asylum seekers was “fantastic” for the coalition 
and “the more boats that come the better” (Anonymous 2010). This can be 
considered an example of opportunism or even hypocrisy, while it is also 
possible to view this as the political pragmatism Abbott is well known for. It 
is obvious how both sides used the Pacific Solution for their purposes. Alt-
hough also a part of its immigration policy, the Pacific Solution is clearly also 
a brick in Canberra’s Pacific policy. The PICs are therefore not only the tar-
get of Australian regional politics in Oceania but, ironically, in this way the 
islands are coming back as a thorn in the flesh of Australian domestic politics. 
While Hugh White argued in 2005 that the Chinese challenge of US su-
premacy in Asia is no longer a theoretical one but had become reality, the 
same link between theory and practice is also obvious in Abbott’s policy 
approaches. Opposition leader Abbott announced to “stop the boats” (Abbott 
2013), while the Prime Minister Abbott allowed removing boats with asylum 
seekers to outside Australian territorial waters. These turn-backs mean that 
those boats have to remain outside the 24-mile-zone or to return to where they 
came from. This harsh command reflects the same pragmatism can be 
                                                          
33
  The so called Pacific Solution means to expel asylum seekers from the Australian mainland 
to detention camps at Manus Island in PNG and to Nauru. 
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expected with regard to the Pacific Solution in particular and the PICs in 
general. In conclusion, the above analysis of the situation shows that as long 
as “Australia’s invasion anxiety” (Burke 2008) exists and is (ab)used for 
political aims, its policies regarding Oceania will not change. This means that 
Canberra’s Pacific policies are also driven by domestic determinants. Both 
the internal and the external levels, or rather endogenous and exogenous fac-
tors, are crucial for Australia as a regional power in Oceania. Thus, Austral-
ia’s regional behavior cannot simply be explained in the framework of a one-
dimensional analysis only. To achieve better research results, it is necessary 
to use a multilevel approach (see previous article). 
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 China and Oceania 
Derek McDougall 
Abstract: This paper provides a review of China’s contemporary involve-
ment in Oceania. There are two main aspects: geopolitical and geoeconomic. 
From a geopolitical aspect it is clear that at the very least China wants to 
have the status of the leading power in East Asia, and to be a major influence 
in the Asia-Pacific more broadly. As an aspiring global power, irrespective of 
the regional context, China would want to have some influence in Oceania. A 
more specific reason for China’s involvement would be its rivalry with Tai-
wan, manifested most obviously in competition for diplomatic recognition 
among the Pacific island states. From a geoeconomic perspective, China is 
particularly interested in obtaining resources from Australia, although other 
states such as Papua New Guinea could also be relevant in this respect. 
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This paper provides a review of China’s contemporary involvement in Ocean-
ia. By Oceania I mean Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific island coun-
tries (PICs). This region covers a vast area of the Earth’s surface, mainly in 
terms of ocean although Australia as the world’s smallest continent is a sig-
nificant size. The population of the region is about 40 million, with Australia 
(22 million), Papua New Guinea (6.3 million) and New Zealand (4.3 million) 
being the most populous countries. Strategically the region is important be-
cause of the vastness of the area it covers and its proximity to major power 
centres in Asia. Economically Australia and Papua New Guinea in particular 
are important providers of mineral resources and oil and gas; Australia and 
New Zealand are important agricultural exporters. Australia and New Zealand 
are primarily countries of European settlement, although the indigenous ele-
ments are important in both countries (about 2% indigenous in Australia, 
about 15% Maori in New Zealand); New Zealand also has about 5% of its 
population from Polynesia (non-Maori). Australia in particular has become 
more multicultural, with earlier waves of immigration from continental Eu-
rope now being complemented by immigration from various Asian countries, 
especially China and India.  
This context is important in understanding the rationale for China’s in-
volvement in Oceania. There has been much focus on the phenomenon of 
‘rising China’ and the prospects for an ‘Asian century’ in which China fea-
tures prominently. This helps to explain why China has involved itself in the 
affairs of Oceania. There are two main aspects: geopolitical and geoeconom-
ic. From a geopolitical aspect it is clear that at the very least China wants to 
have the status of the leading power in East Asia, and to be a major influence 
in the Asia-Pacific more broadly. Asia-Pacific here can be taken to refer to 
East Asia and the Pacific region in general, extending as far east as the Amer-
icas; clearly Oceania is relevant in terms of the broader definition. As an 
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aspiring global power, irrespective of the regional context, China would want 
to have some influence in Oceania. A more specific reason for China’s in-
volvement would be its rivalry with Taiwan, manifested most obviously in 
competition for diplomatic recognition among the Pacific island states; there 
could also be some concern about the position of the overseas Chinese com-
munity in various states of the region. From a geoeconomic perspective, Chi-
na is particularly interested in obtaining resources from Australia, although 
other states such as Papua New Guinea could also be relevant in this respect. 
In developing this argument I will discuss the geopolitical and geoeco-
nomic aspects of China’s involvement in in relation to Australia and New 
Zealand, and then the Pacific islands. Having established the nature of Chi-
na’s involvement I will then comment on the implications for other actors in 
the region, starting off with Australia and New Zealand, and the Pacific is-
lands, and then giving attention to external actors such as the United States, 
Japan and other Asian states, and the European countries. 
Australia and New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand are often grouped together by the outside world. 
There are certainly many commonalities between the two countries in foreign 
policy as in other matters but there are also important differences. New Zea-
land presents itself as a small power and in relative terms is more oriented 
towards the Pacific islands region than is the case with Australia. Following 
the dispute over visits by nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered US ships in the 
1980s, the emphasis on the security relationship with the US is far less than is 
the case with Australia. Australia is more self-consciously a ‘middle power’ 
and more oriented towards Asia than New Zealand is. Australia is a bigger 
actor than New Zealand in the Pacific islands region; Australia is more ori-
ented towards Melanesia, New Zealand towards Polynesia. 
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In terms of the geopolitical perspective Australia is more important to China 
than is New Zealand. Australia is viewed as the major US ally on the southern 
flank of the Asia-Pacific but with the potential to be weaned towards more 
independent policies (just as New Zealand was in the 1980s). Australia’s 
close economic relationship with China (discussed below) might potentially 
provide some leverage for China in this respect but this situation has not been 
used to China’s advantage in an overt way. In terms of China’s goal of win-
ning a preeminent position in East Asia and maximizing its influence in the 
Asia-Pacific, having support from Australia or at least minimizing opposition 
would be highly desirable. Australia is also in a position to have some influ-
ence on the Asia-Pacific policies of the US, as well as conducting an active 
diplomacy in relation to major powers within the region such as Japan and 
Indonesia (and India in terms of the Indo-Pacific perspective). On many of 
the issues affecting East Asia and the Asia-Pacific Australia is not a major 
influence in its own right, but it can exert influence in conjunction with other 
powers. From China’s perspective strengthening relations with Australia can 
be important in minimizing the possibility of an anti-China alignment emerg-
ing in the region or even to combat the soft balancing against China that un-
derpins many aspects of diplomacy among the powers most immediately 
affected by China’s rise. 
Many of the same points underpin China’s geopolitical perspective in re-
lation to New Zealand, but on a smaller scale. New Zealand can have some 
influence in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, particularly when it works in 
conjunction with Australia. New Zealand’s ties with the US are weaker than 
Australia-US ties, but there is still some substance in the New Zealand-US 
relationship. New Zealand’s links with the various Asian countries can also 
be relevant in the broader context of how international issues are dealt with in 
the region through multilateral diplomacy. China is therefore justified in 
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giving some attention to building its relations with New Zealand as a means 
of achieving its geopolitical objectives. 
As far as the geoeconomic dimension is concerned Australia is again far 
more important to China than is New Zealand. Australia is a major supplier of 
raw materials to China, especially iron ore and coal. China is also an im-
portant investor in the resources sector in Australia. These resources are not 
indispensable as far as China is concerned because there are other suppliers 
available such as Brazil. However without the resources provided by Austral-
ia there would be less competition among China’s suppliers. Australia ranked 
sixth among China’s sources of imports in 2012 (Australia 2013). From Aus-
tralia’s perspective China has assumed the position of major destination for 
exports and major source of imports, amounting to 31.6% of Australian ex-
ports and 18.8% of imports in 2012-13 (ibid.). 
In New Zealand’s case China buys primary products such as dairy, wood, 
wool, seafood and meat and sells machinery, clothing and furniture. This 
trade was important to New Zealand, but less so to China. In 2012 China was 
New Zealand’s second most important export destination, and its leading 
source of imports (13% of exports, 16% of imports) (New Zealand 2013). 
The Pacific Islands 
Turning to the Pacific islands we have a complex picture, particularly in 
terms of geopolitics, but geoeconomics also has some relevance.1 Although 
the region is small in population its politics are quite complex, with fourteen 
island countries in the Pacific Islands Forum as well as a number of territories 
linked to either France (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and 
                                                          
1
  Two edited books on China and the Pacific islands region are Terence Wesley-Smith and 
Edgar A. Porter (eds) (2010), China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?, New York; Anne 
Marie-Brady (ed.) (2010), Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pa-
cific, Singapore. A single author work is Jian Yang (2011), The Pacific Islands in China’s 
Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games, Basingstoke. 
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Futuna) or the US (American Samoa, Guam, Northern Marianas; the US state 
of Hawaii is also part of Polynesia). 
From a geopolitical perspective China’s aim is to achieve and expand its 
influence in this region; this enhances China’s position as an East Asian and 
Asia-Pacific power and as a global power. There is nothing particularly sinis-
ter in this goal; it is a normal part of the behaviour of a great power. China is 
not aiming to make the Pacific islands region a ‘Chinese lake’,2 but it does 
aspire to be among the most significant powers active in the region. In pursu-
ing its goal China has made use of multilateral diplomacy, its role as a dia-
logue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum being a good example in this re-
spect. It has focused also on the major Pacific island countries such as Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji. As the case of post-2006 Fiji makes clear China’s di-
plomacy in the region accepts the governments that emerge irrespective of 
their democratic credentials. 
One particular aspect of China’s geopolitical involvement has been its 
competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition by the Pacific island 
countries. Generally China has been more successful with the larger countries 
such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji; apart from the two major PICs, the Fed-
erated States of Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu all recognize the 
PRC. Taiwan has had more success with some of the smaller countries; the 
largest state recognizing Taiwan is Solomon Islands, with the others being 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu (Herr/Bergin 2011:19). 
In recent years the China-Taiwan conflict has stabilized, reflecting a more 
discreet approach by the Kuomintang government in Taiwan but perhaps 
indicative also of China’s growing economic and political strength. In the 
                                                          
2
  Writing in 2013 John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly saw China as having a long-term goal 
“to ultimately replace the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Pacific Ocean” 
(Henderson/Reilly 2003:95). ‘Pacific Ocean’ is broader than ‘Pacific islands region’. From 
the perspective of 2013 the argument seems exaggerated. 
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Pacific islands region this situation has led to a ‘truce’ in the competition 
between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition by the island countries. 
Although not strictly speaking a geopolitical issue the presence of over-
seas Chinese communities in a number of Pacific island countries is another 
factor affecting China’s involvement in the region. The most significant con-
centrations of overseas Chinese are in Fiji (estimate of 8,000 to 20,000) and 
Papua New Guinea (6,000 to 20,000). French Polynesia (14,000), Guam 
(4,000), Northern Marianas (13,000) and Solomon Islands (1.200 to 3,000) 
also have significant numbers by regional standards.3 The overseas Chinese in 
the Pacific island countries are most commonly involved in business activi-
ties. They sometimes attract resentment from the population at large, particu-
larly when an economic downturn is occurring. Anti-Chinese rioting has 
occurred in recent years in Solomon Islands (2006), Tonga (2006) and Papua 
New Guinea (2009). While not a major consideration affecting China’s role 
in the Pacific islands region, China would have concerns about any ill treat-
ment of people from China or of Chinese descent. 
From a geoeconomic perspective the Pacific islands region is not of ma-
jor importance to China. Papua New Guinea is of some importance as a sup-
plier of minerals and timber. Papua New Guinea is not indispensable in this 
respect but it is helpful to China to have a number of suppliers of the minerals 
it needs for its burgeoning industries. China might figure prominently in the 
trade figures for other Pacific island countries, but for China itself the region 
is not a major trade partner. 
China’s aid relationship with the Pacific island countries is one aspect of 
China’s involvement in the region that warrants comment. China’s aid is 
partly a means of reinforcing its diplomacy in the region but in some cases it 
                                                          
3
  The figures are from Yang 2011:112. 
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provides a means of facilitating access to raw materials for export to China 
(without amounting to resources diplomacy as such) (Brant 2013:158-177). 
Allowing for the difficulties of defining ‘aid’, Philippa Brant concludes that 
“China’s total aid (…) approximates that of other important donors (Japan, 
NZ, European Commission), but is significantly less than Australia’s” 
(ibid.:167); she refers to one analysis that claimed Papua New Guinea ac-
counted for 58% of China’s total aid to the PICs in 2009 (ibid.). As men-
tioned previously China deals with governments in the region irrespective of 
their democratic basis. This approach applies also to the aid it provides. Aid is 
generally offered on a ‘no strings’ basis, often as grants or concessional loans. 
There can be some projects that are major in the context of a small Pacific 
island country and thus have a big political impact, but are not necessarily 
expensive for a large country such as China. A good example would be the 
way in which China has provided Samoa with various government buildings, 
parliamentary offices, court offices and a sports complex as gifts. 
Implications of China’s involvement in Oceania 
Having provided an overview of China’s involvement in Oceania, giving 
attention to both geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions, I turn next to 
assess the implications for the various actors in the region, both local and 
external. I argue that Australia and New Zealand have responded to China’s 
involvement with a combination of accommodation and soft balancing 
(McDougall 2012:1-17). For the Pacific island countries the more complex 
international environment signalled by China’s expanding role in the region 
provides more options for their international policies. For the various external 
actors the Chinese factor has encouraged greater competition in their attempts 
to win influence in the region, with soft balancing being relevant in some 
instances such as the US. 
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Local: Australia and New Zealand 
Both Australia and New Zealand have viewed the strengthening of economic 
ties with China as an important goal. Australia in particular has benefited 
considerably from the strengthening of these ties. Taking exports and imports 
together, China accounts for about 25% of Australia’s external trade. In New 
Zealand’s case the dependence is less but trade with China is still above 15% 
of New Zealand’s total trade. 
While Australia and New Zealand both benefit from the economic rela-
tionship with China, at a geopolitical level there has been a concern that Chi-
na should not become too dominant in the region. Australia in particular has 
emphasised the importance of the US alliance for Australian security; the 
subtext is that China is one concern where the US alliance could be relevant. 
Australian governments have generally acted on the assumption that they can 
maintain a strong relationship with China while also acting to strengthen the 
US alliance.4 Apart from the US alliance Australia has also fostered relation-
ships with major Asian powers such as Japan, Indonesia and India; although 
in each instance there are factors unique to the particular relationship, there is 
also an implicit soft balancing occurring in relation to China. This is not in-
tended as a strategy for containing China but is meant to contribute to a com-
plex environment where there are many possible political alignments and no 
one power is dominant. New Zealand’s approach is similar but in a lower 
key; its relationship with the US is less intense than Australia’s and it is more 
of a minor actor in relation to the major Asian powers. 
As far as the Pacific islands are concerned China’s involvement in the re-
gion makes it more difficult for Australia and New Zealand to dominate the 
                                                          
4
  Hugh White has argued that inevitable tensions between China and the US will constrain 
Australia’s ability to maintain positive relationships with both powers (White 2010, 2012). 
For another perspective, see McDougall 2014:319-342. 
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region than would otherwise be the case. With China as an active actor it is 
possible for Pacific island countries to strengthen their ties with China as a 
way of reducing the influence of Australia and New Zealand. As discussed 
below, this situation has been most evident with post-2006 Fiji, but the option 
is also available to other Pacific island countries. 
Local: Pacific Islands 
The general point for the Pacific island countries then is that China’s expand-
ing role in the region provides them with more options in terms of their inter-
national policies. While China can be an important trading partner and source 
of aid in a number of instances, more significant is the way in which China’s 
involvement in the region contributes to a more complex international envi-
ronment. This situation in turn enables Pacific island countries more scope to 
‘pick and choose’, thus enhancing their independence. The best example is 
post-2006 Fiji where the military government has developed a ‘Look North’ 
strategy to enhance its independence and to avoid the consequences of sanc-
tions imposed by Australia, New Zealand and other countries to encourage 
Fiji to return to democracy. While other countries might follow Fiji’s lead 
should their circumstances be judged to warrant such a course of action, there 
have been no significant moves in this direction. At the same time the percep-
tion that China’s involvement provides more scope for independent policies 
on the part of Pacific island countries might encourage other external actors 
to take the region more seriously. External actors cannot assume that Pacific 
island countries are firmly within a Western-led sphere. 
With the truce in the China-Taiwan competition in the Pacific islands re-
gion, the bidding war that had occurred at times in the past is now over. At 
the same time it appears that both China and Taiwan are maintaining good 
levels of aid to the states that accord them diplomatic recognition. Should the 
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competition resume in the future this would be another aspect of China’s role 
in the region that would again have implications for the local states. 
External actors  
For the external actors China’s enhanced role contributes to the more com-
plex international environment in the region (Firth 2013:286-293), providing 
more competition for their own efforts. This has been most obvious perhaps 
in relation to the US but it is also a factor for other external actors.  
United States: The change of emphasis in US strategy known as the ‘Pacific 
pivot’ began in 2011. The rationale was the need to shift from an undue pre-
occupation with the Middle East and Southwest Asia to allow for the emerg-
ing issues in the Asia-Pacific. While China was a major consideration under-
lying the new strategy the whole of the Asia-Pacific was affected. In visiting 
Australia in November 2011 President Barack Obama announced enhanced 
cooperative efforts with Australia; among other things there would be provi-
sion for US Marines to spend time in training and transit in northern Austral-
ia. There have also been attempts to improve relations with New Zealand, 
although these attempts are not necessarily related to the ‘Pacific pivot’ as 
such. In relation to the Pacific islands a concern about Fiji’s ‘Look North’ 
strategy has led to more direct US involvement in Pacific island affairs, with 
the US no longer prepared to delegate these matters to Australia and New 
Zealand. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the meeting of the 
Pacific Islands Forum in Rarotonga, Cook Islands in August 2012, the first 
such attendance by a US Secretary of State. 
Japan and other Asian countries: In the past Japan was probably the most 
significant of the Asian countries involved in Oceania. The political and eco-
nomic ties with both Australia and New Zealand remain important; Japan, 
along with South Korea, is the northern bastion of the US alliance system in 
the Asia-Pacific. ‘Soft balancing’ against China is relevant to Japan’s 
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relationship with both Australia and New Zealand. In the Pacific islands re-
gion China’s role is relevant to Sino-Japanese rivalry more broadly. While 
this rivalry is played out most fully in Northeast Asia, the Pacific islands 
region is one context where Japan would be wary of China expanding its 
influence with detrimental consequences for Japan’s own role in the region. 
Among the other Asian countries Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and 
other Southeast Asian countries have significant political and economic rela-
tionships with Australia and New Zealand. In the Pacific islands region Tai-
wan has been in competition with China in the past. Fishing fleets from Tai-
wan and South Korea have been relevant to the fisheries issues in the region. 
Malaysian-based companies have been involved in extracting timber from 
countries such as Papua New Guinea. Indonesia has been developing a higher 
profile in the region to counter Melanesian support for West Papuan inde-
pendence; this issue continues to be important in Indonesian relations with 
Papua New Guinea. For these various Asian actors increased Chinese in-
volvement is not necessarily directly relevant to their own concerns but simp-
ly part of the more complex international environment in the region. 
European countries 
The United Kingdom, France and the European Union appear most relevant 
for this topic. The United Kingdom was historically close to Australia and 
New Zealand, and the political, economic and cultural ties remain important. 
Britain was also the major colonial power in the South Pacific, but has now 
largely withdrawn from involvement; Britain regards Australia and New 
Zealand as having the major post-colonial responsibilities in this region. From 
the British perspective then, China’s role in Oceania is not a major considera-
tion, except insofar as that role has a bearing on the international involvement 
of Australia and New Zealand; if the Antipodean countries are affected then 
this in turn could have an impact on the ties these countries have with Britain. 
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In the case of France there are important political and economic ties with 
Australia and New Zealand, but more particularly territorial responsibilities in 
relation to New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. China is 
part of the more complex international environment in the region, but is gen-
erally not a major consideration for France in this part of the world. 
The same point could be made about the European Union, with its watch-
ing brief for EU issues in relation to Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific 
islands. As a significant aid donor in the Pacific islands, the EU would be 
aware that Chinese entry into this field has been a complicating factor for its 
own endeavours; however there is no evidence of EU hostility to China’s role 
as an aid donor. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that China’s involvement in the affairs of Oceania has 
been motivated by geopolitical and geoeconomic factors relating to its East 
Asian and Asia-Pacific and global roles. In regional and global terms Austral-
ia and New Zealand (to a lesser extent) are the major focus; however China 
has also assumed an increasingly important role in relation to the Pacific 
islands. While economic links are important to China, particularly with Aus-
tralia, China’s motivation is mainly to increase its political influence in the 
region. This is part of its role as a major power. China’s expanding role has 
important implications for both local and external actors in Oceania. The 
Australian response has been characterized by a combination of accommoda-
tion and soft balancing; New Zealand appears to have followed Australian 
policy in this respect but in a more low key way. For the Pacific islands, most 
obviously Fiji, China’s higher profile in the region has expanded the available 
diplomatic options. For the external actors China’s role has mostly been a 
matter of making the international environment in Oceania more complex; in 
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the US case one could argue that the ‘Pacific pivot’ has been partly influ-
enced by China’s greater involvement in Oceania. 
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 The Pacific Islands Forum as a Peace and Security 
Policy Player in Oceania 
Henning Blatt 
Abstract: War and military conflicts amongst states have always been major 
threats to international security. Nevertheless, other sources of instability in 
the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields constitute such 
threats, too. Over the past 40 years, the PIF has evolved into the key promot-
er of peace and security in Oceania by addressing non-military issues in the 
region. With the Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation of 
1992 and the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security of 2002, the PIF 
established a framework to enhance the capacity of member states to counter 
terrorism and organised crime. The adoption of the Biketawa Declaration in 
2000 brought about a new tool to manage internal crises within the Forum 
states on a regional level, resulting in the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands in 2003, the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru in 2004, 
and the suspension of the military regime of Fiji from participation in the 
organisation in 2009. In addition, the PIF is increasingly engaged in drawing 
world attention to the specific threats that climate change and sea-level rise 
pose to some of its member states. With these contributions to peace and 
security in Oceania, the PIF qualifies as a regional arrangement within the 
meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
Keywords: nuclear tests, terrorism, organised crime, statehood, failed 
state, climate change, sea-level rise, international security, regionalism 
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Introduction 
The time of the Cold War was influenced by the notion that only interstate 
conflicts were likely to affect international peace and security. The world 
community generally assumed a system of individual national interests, po-
tentially leading to entitlement attitudes towards other states, which at worst 
would escalate into military conflicts. The Pacific area has not seen such 
classic interstate conflicts in form of a military confrontation since the end of 
World War II. 
However, the perception of peace and security has changed along with 
the end of the bipolar world order. Particularly the Security Council of the 
United Nations – according to Article 24 paragraph 1 of the United Nations 
Charter the primary organ entrusted with the maintenance of international 
peace and security – is increasingly focusing on issues, which bear no immi-
nent antagonistic moments but are in the interest of all states alike1. Follow-
ing a meeting of the Security Council in 1992, when for the first time in its 
history heads of state and government had been summoned, its President 
issued the following statement: “The members of the Council note that United 
Nations peace-keeping tasks have increased and broadened considerably in 
recent years. Election monitoring, human rights verification and the repatria-
tion of refugees have in the settlement of some regional conflicts, at the re-
quest or with the agreement of the parties concerned, been integral parts of 
the Security Council’s effort to maintain international peace and security. 
(…) The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in 
itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of 
instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have 
become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a 
                                                          
1
  Talmon (2005:180) calls these aspects “general phenomena”, Yamashita (2007:565) “gener-
alized ‘issues’”. See with a focus on the term of international security Häußler (2008:50ff). 
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whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest 
priority to the solution of these matters” (UN 1992:2f). 
Such matters may include the proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism 
and organised crime, as well as precarious statehood and even climate change 
– all of them being policy areas in which the Pacific Islands Forum has been 
active during its now 40-year history: “Peace and security in the Pacific, 
indeed the world, can no longer be seen in the narrow sense of defending a 
state from external threats of a military nature. It is now understood that they 
are closely linked with generating conditions that in the words of the Forum 
Vision ‘allow people to lead free and worthwhile lives’, and the capacity of 
states to implement effective, efficient and equitable economic and political 
governance at all levels” (Fong Toy 2006:37). The Forum’s work in these 
areas is set out below. 
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
In the years 1946 to 1996, the USA, the United Kingdom and France detonat-
ed a total of 305 nuclear bombs in the Oceanic area2. The 1st Forum in 1971 
devoted much of its discussion to a previously announced French test series 
and called on France to cease its nuclear tests. France however refrained from 
any reaction towards the Forum and carried out the tests regardless, causing 
heads of state and government to follow-up the matter during their 3rd meet-
ing in September 1972. When France in early 1973 pronounced another test 
series, Australia and New Zealand took the matter up in two separate lawsuits 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 June 1973 the ICJ or-
dered the temporarily suspension of the tests to deescalate the dispute. Yet 
France disregarded this order and ignited numerous other bombs in July and 
August 1973. The arrival of a new government under Giscard d’Estaing 1974 
                                                          
2
  The USA detonated 103, the United Kingdom 9 und France 193 nuclear bombs (Crocombe 
2008:555). According to Fischer (2002:230), the total amount of bombs detonated was 250. 
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was followed by an injunction to end the atmospheric tests and an announce-
ment to continue underground (Firth 1987:102). With that the ICJ considered 
the dispute settled and closed both proceedings. 
At the 6th Forum 1975, New Zealand first put forward the idea of a con-
tractually agreed nuclear-weapon-free zone. Initially, the proposal failed due 
to Australia’s concerns over a negative impact on its relations with the United 
States (Firth 1987:137). When in the years 1981 and 1982 two more protest 
resolutions remained without response and there was no prospect to prevail 
against France on this issue, the 14th Forum 1983 reverted to the idea of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone – notably at the initiative of Australia (SPFS 
1983:2; O’Neil 2004:569ff). The following year, heads of state and govern-
ment decided on the establishment of such a zone and mandated a working 
group put together by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (a 
predecessor of the former South Pacific Forum Secretariat and the present 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat) to draft an international treaty (Ogashiwa 
1991:96ff; O’Neil 2004:571ff). The resulting Treaty of Rarotonga3 was 
signed by eight Forum members on the occasion of the 16th Forum 1985. The 
17th Forum 1986 then approved three protocols in order to extend the effects 
of the treaty to each of the five nuclear powers USA, Soviet Union, China, 
United Kingdom and France. In April 1992, France declared a moratorium on 
its tests and the final halting in February 1996. Only two weeks later France 
ratified the three protocols of the treaty. 
It is sometimes argued that the actual benefits of the Treaty of Rarotonga 
are only minor, having by no means created a zone that is actually nuclear-
free (Firth 1987:138ff). Thus it neither prohibits the passage of nuclear-
powered warships and their entry into ports nor the performance of 
                                                          
3
  South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, signed in Rarotonga on 6 August 1985 and came 
into force on 11 December 1986. 
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manoeuvres and weapons testing. Also Australia is said to have campaigned 
for the treaty in order to channel and ultimately limit the opposition of the 
island states against nuclear weapons (Firth 1987:138ff). In any case, the 
Forum itself considers the Treaty of Rarotonga to being explicitly relevant to 
peace and security by referring to it as a measure “of enhancing global and 
regional peace and security” (PIFS 2004:31). 
This is also in line with the United Nations Security Council’s stance on 
nuclear weapons. In resolution 1540 (2004) (UN 2004), the Council affirmed 
that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security, and in resolution 1887 (2009) (UN 2009), it regarded the 
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as being a contribution to the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Terrorism and organised crime 
Following the Lockerbie air disaster in 1988, the Security Council for the first 
time classified international terrorism as a threat to international peace and 
security in resolution 731 (1992) (UN 1992b). In resolution 1373 (2001) (UN 
2001), which is connected with the events of 11 September 2001, it empha-
sized “the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terror-
ist acts”, and called into life the Counter-Terrorism Committee in order to 
monitor the efforts of the states in the fight against terrorism. Only a few 
weeks later in resolution 1377 (2001) (UN 2001b) it called international ter-
rorism “one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in 
the twenty-first century”. 
Certainly the meaning of terrorism for the Pacific island states is different 
from that for the Western industrial countries. While for example Australia – 
at least in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 – represented a potential target 
for terrorist attacks and was explicitly named by al-Qaeda, which already had 
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tried to establish respective human and logistic capacities there (White 
2007:176f), there are no such indications with regards to the island states. 
These states are simply unattractive targets given that terrorist attacks would 
only have a very limited political impact and would ultimately not be worth-
while4. 
In fact, special security interests of the Pacific states are more affected by 
organised crime, namely money laundering in some so-called tax havens 
(Nauru, Cook Islands, Vanuatu), drug trafficking (especially via Palau, Fiji 
and Papua New Guinea) and illegal arms trade (Boister 2005:39ff; Henshaw 
2008:116f). Though these activities in the Pacific may only be minor by glob-
al standards (Wesley-Smith 2008:48), they nevertheless present a veritable 
threat potential for the regional island states. The Forum hereby refers to 
“major security vulnerabilities facing the Pacific region” (PIFS 2004:27), 
however without specifying the nature of these risks. 
The highjack of a New Zealand aircraft caused the Forum leaders to ad-
dress those issues of regional security for the first time at their 18th meeting 
1987. They set up a working group, which later on formed the Forum Re-
gional Security Committee (FRSC) and which over the years should emerge 
as a central body of regional security work. On its suggestion the 23rd Forum 
1992 approved the Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(SPFS 1992:48). In it, the Forum leaders identified specific threats to the 
security of its states and decided on intensified cooperation in this field, such 
as joint action in relation to the freezing or seizure of funds from or for organ-
ised crime, particularly drug trafficking. Already in the following year, they 
stressed the need for an appropriate legal framework (SPFS 1993:61). 
                                                          
4
  Critical towards terrorism fears see Fraenkel (2005:120ff) and Greener-Barcham/Barcham 
(2006:67ff). According to Herr (2006:117), the Pacific island states would – if at all – only 
serve as a base for terrorist attacks. 
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Henceforth, the realisation of this declaration appeared annually on the Forum 
leaders’ agenda. Yet its implementation falls short of the objectives declared 
(Clements 2008:143), not least because of the limited resources of the Forum 
island countries. 
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the 33rd Forum 2002 adopted 
the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security (PIFS 2002:14). Herein, the 
Forum leaders committed themselves to the global efforts in the fight against 
international terrorism and commissioned the FRSC to monitor the action at 
national level set by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). As a result, the 
FRSC supported the island states, in particular when preparing their reports to 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee. In addition, the Nasonini Declaration 
urged the swift implementation of the Honiara Declaration, however without 
setting any new standards (Tavares 2010:120). 
Despite high ambitions, the results of the Forum’s work in the field of 
terrorism and organised crime are still modest. Ultimately, the Forum in its 
current form will not be capable to do more than to create and to engage in 
appropriate channels of communication between the member states (Nabers 
2006:74), to create demand analyses (Henshaw 2008:119) and to initiate the 
establishment of counter-terrorism focal points in national administrations 
(PIFS 2004:28). Most visible are probably the numerous model laws, most of 
which were inspired by the FRSC and subsequently developed by the Forum 
Secretariat (Spillane 2006:201f). These do not only relate to terrorism and 
organised crime in general, but also in detail to human trafficking, drug traf-
ficking and arms control, as well as extradition of persons and customary 
regulations. Periodically the Forum calls for the implementation of those 
model laws. Should a Forum island country detect a respective legislative 
need, the Forum Secretariat on request provides available human resources to 
192 Henning Blatt 
 
adapt existing laws (Boxall 2005:173), but here again little process has been 
made so far. 
Precarious statehood 
The Forum’s former principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of Mem-
ber states 
One of the Forum’s key principles since its inception in 1971 is the non-
intervention in internal affairs of its members (Richter 2004; Urwin 2005:13). 
Up until the year 2000, the Forum had not been involved in any internal con-
flict in Oceania and mostly refrained from adopting any position in this re-
spect. This especially concerns the independance movement on Espiritu Santo 
(Vanuatu) until its suppression in 1980 (Holtz 2003:72ff), the independance 
movement on Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) and its evolving civil war up 
to the cease-fire in 1998 (see Böge in this volume), the Fiji coups of 1987 and 
2000 (see Ratuva and Ernst in this volume), and lastly the unrest on Guadal-
canal (Solomon Islands) up to the peace treaty in 2000 (siehe Dinnen in this 
volume). 
Biketawa as a realignment 
With the overturn of Fiji’s Prime Minister and the unrest on the Solomon 
Islands, the year 2000 became the annus horribilis in the region (Urwin 
2005:16). Under the impact of these events and at the urging of Australia and 
New Zealand, the Forum leaders decided at their 31st meeting in October 
2000 on new course in the future and approved the Biketawa Declaration 
(PIFS 2000:9). In it they commit themselves to guiding principles such as 
good governance, human equality and the rule of law, but also to indigenous 
rights and traditional values. At the same time Biketawa is reserving a proce-
dure applicable in certain conflict situations, triggered either by a state’s re-
quest for assistance or in a ‘time of crisis’. This procedure includes among 
other the dispatch of a fact-finding mission and the formation of high-level 
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contact groups. Should the conflict continue in spite of specifically named 
sanctions, ‘targeted measures’ come into effect. 
Biketawa marks a decisive step towards strengthening the institutional 
solidarity within the region (Duxbury 2007:188), for the first time formulat-
ing the Pacific states’ wish to grant the Pacific Islands Forum a greater role in 
dealing with international security issues (Richter 2004; Tarte/Kabutaulaka 
2002:76). At the same time, it exemplifies that under certain conditions the 
internal affairs of a Forum member may become a matter of the entire Forum 
(Urwin 2005:17). 
Yet the declaration does not specify its basic principles as to the condi-
tions and consequences of their application, but leaves this to the discretion of 
the Forum leaders. This poses the risk that their decisions under the declara-
tion appear primarily politically motivated, thus rendering these decisions 
tenuous (Kefu 2005:26f)5. Corresponding criticism especially relates to Aus-
tralia’s and New Zealand’s de facto dominance and resulting supremacy of 
interests within the Forum6. If however regional measures in line with the 
Biketawa Declaration are actually taken and thus are perceived as regionally 
legitimized, the security architecture in the region is unlikely to be harmed 
(Shibuya 2004:114). 
With the Biketawa Declaration the Forum leaders follow to some extent 
a path, that has already been tread on by the United Nations Security Council 
on a global level since the end of the Cold War. In resolution 688 (1991) (UN 
1991), the Council for the first time recognized human rights violations as a 
                                                          
5
  This is especially true for a potential suspension of a Forum member, which is nowhere 
implied in the declaration (see Firth 2008:124). 
6
  Firth (2001:280) argues: “Under these circumstances, the future role of the Biketawa mecha-
nism might well be to confer the imprimatur of regional legitimacy on what are essentially 
bilateral interventions undertaken by Australia and New Zealand, which will claim to be act-
ing on the basis of a mandate given by the Pacific Islands Forum.” According to Tavares 
(2010:126), the Forum’s biggest ‘achievement’ is to have conferred political legitimacy upon 
the regional implementation of the national interests of its largest members. 
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threat to international peace and security. Then, with resolution 940 (UN 
1994), it passed probably the “most aggressive resolution ever adopted” 
(Levitt 1998:360), for the first time authorising coercive measures to remove 
a de facto government and restore the democratic process. According to the 
handling by the Security Council, humanitarian crises, human rights viola-
tions and violations of democratic principles are matters potentially threaten-
ing international peace and security (Bothe 2007:478ff). The fact that the 
Security Council hereby more often than not emphasizes, that the individual 
situation is unique in one way or another, and thus needs an extraordinary 
reaction, is probably an expression of the fact that such situations are not yet 
considered a fully accepted legal basis for a forced action under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter (Yamashita 2007:564). 
A combination of the above-mentioned problems can be observed in the 
so-called failed states or failing states. Certainly this term still lacks decisive 
contours, but the states concerned are attested an inability to settle disputes 
peacefully, making them appear as a structural threat to world peace (Geiß 
2005:306)7.  
Biketawa places itself at the service of the fight of said humanitarian cri-
ses, human rights violations and violations of democratic principles. Some-
times it is therefore seen as the political basis for regional coercive measures 
under Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations (Graham/Felício 2006: 
292). Yet the declaration is by no means of any compulsory nature. It is not a 
legally binding document. Neither does it obligate to a certain action, nor 
does it give the Forum or the Forum members any powers (Angelo 2008:68). 
It is a regional expression of the Responsibility to Protect (Clements 2008: 
                                                          
7
  Yet in view of their political, economic and geographical marginality it seems rather unlikely 
that a failure of the Pacific island states would produce similar effects on the international 
community, as was for example observed in Afghanistan (Herr 2006b:93ff). 
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142ff), which also only formulates a political conviction, without subjecting 
any situations of massive human rights violations to legally binding rules – let 
alone measures deviating from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter 
(Payandeh 2010:480ff). 
Biketawa I: Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
Initially it was not foreseeable that Biketawa would ever be used for more 
than rhetorical purposes (Firth 2005:94, 2008:126). However, it was first 
applied just three years later in 2003, when the government of the Solomon 
Islands asked the Forum for help in addressing its continuing security prob-
lems. The peace treaty of 2000 failed to stop the ethnic unrest on Guadalca-
nal. Through the ongoing struggles an unprecedented economic and social 
decline of the Solomon Islands set in (Fraenkel 2004:120ff). This situation – 
which made the country in the eyes of some commentators appear as a failed 
state (Wainwright 2003:6; Kabutaulaka 2005:291ff; Otter 2006:119ff) – made 
the Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza call Australia and the other Forum mem-
bers for help in mid-2003. They replied with the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (Fraenkel et al. 2014; see also Dinnen in this 
volume). 
In July 2003 RAMSI was deployed on the Solomon Islands. The mission 
initially consisted of a total of 2,225 people, distributed on a police force with 
335 police officers, a military component of about 1,800 soldiers and a civil-
ian part with 100 employees of various government authorities of the states 
involved. Its initial success was immense (McDougall 2004:221). As of mid-
2004, the focus of the mission shifted to classical state-building tasks (Ponzio 
2005:179). The work of RAMSI had so far been based on the three pillars of 
Law and Justice, Economic Governance and Growth as well as Machinery of 
Government (Solomon Islands 2009:115ff, 143ff, 153ff). As a result, particu-
larly courts and prisons were reopened or variously supported, the national 
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finances were completely rearranged and long-term reforms of the political 
and economic sector were addressed. This change of tasks of RAMSI was 
also reflected in the personnel composition of the mission. After a gradual 
reduction of the military part, only about 200 soldiers, but instead 350 police 
officers and 180 civilians were in service for RAMSI in 2006. 
RAMSI began on 24 July 2003 with the arrival of its first contingent in 
Honiara. At this time, the national legal conditions for the presence of foreign 
soldiers, police and civilian personnel had only just been created by the Sol-
omon Islands. Just a week before, the parliament of the Solomon Islands had 
enacted a law (Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 of 17 July 
2003), which set a general framework for the implementation of support mis-
sions of foreign governments. It was not limited to RAMSI and required a 
regulation of the Governor-General to extend its operative provisions on 
certain missions – such as RAMSI. In this regulation (Facilitation of Interna-
tional Assistance Notice 2003 of 23 July 2003), the Governor-General re-
ferred to a formal invitation, which had been communicated by Prime Minis-
ter Kemakeza to Australia and via the Forum Chair to other Forum members 
on 4 July 2003. This invitation in turn had been preceded by a written request 
for Australia’s help in the crisis to the Australian Prime Minister John How-
ard in April 2003, but Howard made a support mission conditional upon the 
approval of all Forum members to a joint action8. On 30 June 2003, the for-
eign ministers of the Forum members, which had gathered at the Foreign 
Affairs Ministers Meeting (FFAMM) in Sydney, approved the proposed mis-
sion and paved the way to the formal invitation on 4 July 2003. 
                                                          
8  At the beginning of 2003 Howard had still strictly rejected any Australian intervention in the 
conflict. About this striking change of direction see McDougall (2005:130). Wainwright 
(2003b) is frequently quoted as a key publication on this issue. According to Kabutaulaka 
(2005:287ff), Howard was guided by the idea of a “preemptive strike against terrorists in an-
other country”. 
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On the arrival day of RAMSI in Honiara on 24 July 2003, the Solomon Is-
lands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga 
signed an international treaty for the mission deployment in the Australian 
city of Townsville9. These seven parties initially participated with a personal 
contribution to RAMSI, but other Forum members were also involved from 
day one. In this respect, the RAMSI Treaty is unspecific and in its application 
not limited to these countries. It expressly gives other states the opportunity to 
also provide personnel to the mission. On the occasion of the 34th Forum in 
Auckland in August 2003, the other nine Forum members signed the treaty 
and sent police, military or civilian forces to the Solomon Islands. 
The international legal basis of RAMSI is therefore rooted in the ap-
proval of the Solomon Islands to the mission (Wielders 2008:140), as it stipu-
lated in the invitation of 4 July 2003 and the subsequent RAMSI Treaty of 24 
July 2003. A few doubtful voices about the viability of this basis argued with 
reference to the national situation of the Kemakeza government. Allegedly, 
this government had lost effective control of the country up to 2003 and was 
thus not in the position to set binding international instruments for the Solo-
mon Islands (e.g. Zwanenburg 2006:505). This assessment has to be legally 
conceded insofar, as a government in certain situations of internal conflicts 
over predominance is no longer considered an organ entitled to an external 
representation of the country (Wippman 1996/97:224ff). Whether such a 
conflict situation had applied on the Solomon Islands in mid-2003, will not 
and cannot be discussed here. It should just simply be noted that the corre-
sponding failed state labelling had explicitly been questioned on several 
                                                          
9
  Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and 
Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order 
and Security, signed in Townsville on 24 July 2003 and came into force on the same day. 
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occasions10, that the tensions were limited to the island of Guadalcanal, that 
Guadalcanal’s capital Honiara had largely been under government control 
since 2000 and that the end of 2002 had marked a significant improvement of 
the security situation and that of the government in the country (Fraenkel 
2004:152). Moreover, the Kemakeza government’s action had not been que-
ried by officials; also the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi An-
nan, stressed in August 2003 that the mission was based on an invitation from 
the Solomon Islands. Hence it is not relevant here whether the mission is 
legitimized under international law by its regional character or perhaps by its 
humanitarian character alone and without recourse to this invitation11. 
Given the Forum’s approval of the mission according to the Biketawa 
Declaration as well as the legal nature of RAMSI as a joint action of all Fo-
rum members12 and their subsequent personnel involvement, the regional 
character of RAMSI was from the beginning beyond question on the part of 
the Forum (Richter 2004; Peebles 2005:162). On 22 July 2003 it informed the 
Security Council of the United Nations according to Article 54 of the United 
Nations Charter about the mission’s mandate and about the deployment of 
personnel due two days later (Ponzio 2005:178; Spillane 2008:74). Corre-
spondingly, the then President of the Security Council described the mission 
as an “important regional initiative” (UN 2003). The Australian House of 
Representatives across party lines considered RAMSI as embedded in a re-
gional context under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (Common-
wealth of Australia 2003:18205, 18210). However, numerous commentators 
come to the conclusion that RAMSI was never able to develop its regional 
                                                          
10
  Kefu (2005:26) saw the Solomon Islands merely “close to this scenario”. 
11
  In the same vein is a statement of the then President of the United Nations Security Council, 
wherein the invitation of the government was not mentioned and instead the “restoration of 
normalcy and national harmony” was emphasized (UN 2003). 
12  According to Angelo (2007:292), the RAMSI Treaty does not pose a Forum initiative, but 
does reflect Forum interests. 
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dimension and that the involvement of other states did only serve the regional 
legitimacy of a unilateral Australian action13. Indeed it is undeniable that the 
initial regional character of the mission was only slight. 
Firstly, this relates to the leadership role of Australia. While the RAMSI 
Treaty refers to the Forum, the Biketawa Declaration and the FFAMM deci-
sion of 30 June 2003 in its preamble, it yet does not assign any functional role 
to the Forum. At the top of RAMSI is a person designated by the Australian 
government and the involved police and military forces are managed by their 
respective most senior Australian officials. Just such a leadership role also 
applies in quantitative terms with respect to other staff (Ponzio 2005:179). 
Against the background of the de facto dominance of this country in the re-
gion, that fact is yet unsurprising, especially since with the exception of New 
Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, no other Forum island country was and 
still is not capable to perform a major military or police action, but still can-
not compensate for the lack of involvement of the Forum in particular. 
Secondly, RAMSI’s compatibility with the Biketawa Declaration is 
questionable. The mission was not initiated by the Forum leaders following a 
Forum leaders special meeting convened by the Secretary General of the 
Forum Secretariat, as it is required by paragraph 2 (iv) of the declaration, and 
the elaborated investigation and mediation regime of paragraph 2 (iii) was not 
                                                          
13
  “While regional legitimacy could be claimed in formal terms, the rushed processes only 
reinforced the impression that Australia was using the regional assent as a fig-leaf for unilat-
eral action” (Fry 2008:84). See also Moore (2007:143): “Regardless of its Forum origins, 
RAMSI is open to accusations of neo-colonialism.” Similar Crocombe (2008:545) and Far-
ran (2009:267). Foukona (2005) bases this judgement also on the fact that even the contents 
of the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 had been formulated by Australia and 
New Zealand. O’Keefe (2007:145) views the agreement of the Forum island countries to 
RAMSI as a consequence of their dependence on Australian development aid and therefore 
negates a legitimating effect. In 2009, a commission of the Solomon Island Parliament dealt 
in depth with these allegations (Solomon Islands 2009:85ff). 
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applied14. Furthermore RAMSI was in the early years a purely law-and-order 
mission with the objective of supporting state institutions, so the declaration’s 
requirement to identify and tackle the “underlying causes of tensions and 
conflict” (Wielders 2008:143) has only attracted attention in later years. 
As a consequence of these circumstances RAMSI was initially perceived 
as “a kind of shadow government” (Wielders 2008:141) and the Solomon 
Islands as qualifying for an Australian “latter-day protectorate” (Bennett 
2005:438). The government of the Solomon Islands came under domestic 
pressure in this regard. On its request the Forum in 2005 sent an Eminent 
Persons Group to review the work of RAMSI. One of the group’s key find-
ings was the need for an emphasis on the regional component, which is why it 
recommended a greater involvement of the island states concerning the filling 
of positions within the mission (Eminent Persons Group 2005:91). Given the 
only moderate implementation of the recommendations, the 37th Forum 2006 
decided on the deployment of a task force to conduct a further, more compre-
hensive assessment of RAMSI (PIFS 2006:21). At the same time, the Forum 
leaders agreed on the formation of a contact group between the Solomon 
Islands, RAMSI and the Forum, which started its work in February 2007 as 
the Enhanced Consultative Mechanism. 
The report of the task force was to form the basis for an increased in-
volvement of the Forum in RAMSI. It also recognized the lack of communi-
cation between RAMSI and the government of the Solomon Islands as a cen-
tral problem for the implementation of the mission and recommended the 
formation of a new, three-pronged system of mutual relations of the actors 
involved. At its suggestion, the Forum Ministerial Standing Committee 
                                                          
14
  Henderson (2006:178f) notes that in the Biketawa Declaration “consultations – to be worthy 
of the term, must allow for more than one outcome. This was never the case with Solomon 
Islands. Australia had made up its mind. Others could join in if they wished, but the Austral-
ian intervention would go ahead anyway.” 
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(FMSC) was formed at ministerial level, consisting of the Foreign Ministers 
of the states of the current, past and future Forum Chair and the Solomon 
Islands, Australia and Papua New Guinea, which meets annually “to provide 
oversight and governance to RAMSI”. Below the ministerial level, the En-
hanced Consultative Mechanism continues to prepare for the meetings of the 
FMSC. In between these meetings a triumvirate group of the Solomon Is-
lands Government Permanent Secretary to RAMSI, the Pacific Islands Forum 
Representative to Solomon Islands and the Special Coordinator are in contact 
to regularly update on RAMSI. The first FMSC took place in February 2008. 
It proposed the development of a framework program for further cooperation 
between RAMSI and the government of the Solomon Islands, in order to 
anchor the mission stronger to the interests of the Solomon Islands, to formu-
late concrete objectives and to specify an appropriate time frame for individu-
al projects. In implementing the resulting Partnership Framework, RAMSI 
transformed into a pure support and development mission for the local police. 
By mid-2013, the military component pulled out and the civilian projects of 
the three pillars of Law and Justice, Economic Governance and Growth and 
Machinery of Government were transferred into bilateral or multilateral 
commitments (PIFS 2013:29). 
In view of this strengthening of the regional component, the numerous 
fears on the Solomon Islands side of an Australian domination could be elim-
inated15. Meanwhile, the government of the Solomon Islands closely followed 
the recommendations of the Forum, such as regarding the establishment of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in April 2009, which was originally 
                                                          
15
  See e.g. Solomon Times 2010. Another conducive development was the replacement of the 
RAMSI critical Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare by Derek Sikua in De-
cember 2007 and the simultaneous change of the Australian Prime Minister from John How-
ard to Kevin Rudd. Countless political and diplomatic episodes between the governments 
Sogavare and Howard had put a severe strain on the mutual relationship and thus on the po-
sition of RAMSI before that (Moore 2007:158ff; Hameiri 2009:76ff; Hughes 2007:299ff). 
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inspired by the Eminent Persons Group. At the top of RAMSI next to the 
Special Coordinator and his representative there is now also a (not provided 
for by the RAMSI Treaty) Assistant Special Coordinator, appointed by the 
Pacific Islands Forum (Solomon Islands 2009:24f). With that, the involve-
ment of the Forum had transformed from an initially only supportive role 
(McDougall 2006:111) to a substantial content control (Solomon Times 
2010b). Its influence has eventually not been as marginal as had often been 
assumed, so that in spite of the factual and also significant legal bond of 
RAMSI to Australia, yet one can consider RAMSI a regional action of the 
Forum. However, this influence is limited to the political level. 
Biketawa II: Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru 
The second application of the Biketawa Declaration – the Pacific Regional 
Assistance to Nauru (PRAN) – took place just a year after the initialization of 
RAMSI, yet this was of an entirely different nature. Nauru, which once had 
one of the highest per capita incomes in the world thanks to its phosphate 
deposits, was after the exhaustion of these deposits faced with an unprece-
dented economic decline associated with political instability (Ratuva 
2005:429). By 2004, Nauru had piled foreign liabilities of about 1 billion 
Australian dollars and was thus facing a financial collapse (Connell 2006: 
47ff; Herr/Potter 2006:199ff; Quanchi 2007:249ff). 
In this situation Nauru asked the Forum for help according to the Biket-
awa Declaration. At the 35th Forum 2004, Forum leaders expressed their 
common will to assist Nauru in its reform efforts. In August 2005, the Forum 
sent a senior official of the Samoan Ministry of Finance to Yaren. With this 
help, Nauru could first develop a National Sustainable Development Strategy, 
which should become the basis for an economic recovery of the country. In 
2007, a former Deputy Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat moved to 
the top of the Nauruan Foreign Ministry. More high-level positions were 
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staffed with experts from the Pacific region, such as the Minister of Justice 
and the Resident Magistrate (PIFS 2008:52). A project funded by New Zea-
land for the first time produced a consolidated version of the entire Nauruan 
law, which could then be published. 
Also in 2007, the Forum explicitly called to mind that significant liabili-
ties of Nauru were barring the way to a long-term recovery of the country, 
and announced more yet not specifically named support measures under 
PRAN as well as unilateral actions. The result was, inter alia, a remission of 
various debts of Nauru in relation to the budget of the Forum Secretariat. At 
the 40th Forum 2009 Forum leaders assessed a significant recovery of Nauru’s 
financial situation and PRAN was brought to an end after five years (PIFS 
2009:57). Up until the 41st Forum 2010 pending projects were transferred into 
bilateral or multilateral engagements and PRAN was then removed from the 
agenda of future Forum meetings. 
Unlike the case of the Solomon Islands, the Biketawa Declaration was 
used in 2004 in the context of a conflict prevention (Clements 2008:144), 
before the financial problems of Nauru could have escalated into violence. By 
way of the agreed projects Nauru mainly benefited from external capacities in 
the fields of justice and finance. In retrospect, PRAN represents a bundle of 
concerted development operations of the Pacific States and the Forum Secre-
tariat16, with the Forum having served as a coordinator. 
Biketawa III: Suspension of Fiji’s participation 
The suspension of Fiji’s participation on 2 May 2009 represents the third and 
so far last application of the Biketawa Declaration. Josaia Voreqe Bainima-
rama, Commander of the Fijian army, had for years accused Prime Minister 
                                                          
16
  The resources required for the implementation of the Forum Secretariat projects were largely 
provided by Post Forum Dialogue Partners, particularly Japan and India (see e.g. PIFS 
2007:23). 
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Laisenia Qarase to encourage corruption and to pursue a policy of favouring 
the indigenous majority over the ethnic Indian minority (Ratuva 2007:23; 
Watson 2005:381ff), when he declared on 5 December 2006 a state of emer-
gency and claimed the rights of the President Josefa Iloilovatu Uluivuda for 
himself (Fraenkel 2007:420ff). As Acting President he dismissed Qarase, 
appointed a Caretaker Prime Minister and authorized the government to 
henceforth legislate without the involvement of another constitutional body. 
On 4 January 2007, the Caretaker Prime Minister resigned from his office, 
and on the same day Bainimarama gave his claimed powers back to Iloilo, 
who in turn appointed him Prime Minister the next day. On 18 January 2007 
Iloilo declared all decrees of the military government from 5 December 2006 
to 5 January 2007 to be legal and granted all individuals involved in the coup 
full, unconditional, non-judicial and irrevocable civil immunity in respect of 
any acts or omissions of the military government. He also dismissed all state 
employees in management positions. 
Former Prime Minister Qarase and others took legal proceedings against 
this government reshuffle. After initially failing before the High Court, on 9 
April 2009 the Court of Appeal declared the coup and hence the current Bain-
imarama government unconstitutional (Twomey 2009:319ff). At the same 
time the court recommended to President Iloilo the appointment of a new 
government in which neither Qarase nor Bainimarama would be involved. 
The following day, on 10 April 2009, Bainimarama resigned from his post as 
Prime Minister. This set in motion a series of measures by Iloilo, such as the 
abolition of the 1997 constitution, his own appointment as President, the 
declaration of the continued application of all laws (with the exception of the 
1997 constitution), the release of all judges of the country, as well as the 
declaration of a state of emergency and issuance of special powers and re-
strictions for the maintenance of public order for a period of 30 days. On 12 
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April 2009 and with effect from the day before, he established a new transi-
tional government under Bainimarama. The state of emergency decree was 
henceforth extended for 30 more days. 
When the military coup was already looming in late November 2006, 
some leaders in the region, in particular the New Zealand Prime Minister 
Helen Clark, called for a military intervention on the basis of the Biketawa 
Declaration. In fact, this possibility was later discussed at some special meet-
ings of the Forum leaders, but ultimately discarded. Instead, the Forum ini-
tially reacted with a certain reserve. One of the first official statements was 
the statement of the Forum leaders, that as of 5 December 2006, the ousted 
Prime Minister Qarase was no longer in the situation to perform his role as 
Forum Chair, which he had taken up at the 37th Forum in October 2006 in 
Nadi (PIFS 2006b). 
At the end of January 2007, the Forum sent an Eminent Persons Group to 
Suva to discuss with President Iloilo, the military government under Bain-
imarama, the deposed Prime Minister Qarase and other political groups pos-
sible steps towards overcoming the crisis and the potential role of the Forum. 
A subsequent extraordinary FFAMM in March 2007, which was also attended 
by Fiji, evaluated the coup as manifestly illegal and called on the military 
regime to conduct elections within a maximum of two years. The Pacific 
Islands Forum-Fiji Joint Working Group on the situation in Fiji was de-
ployed to prepare a binding timetable in view of these elections. At the 38th 
Forum in October 2007, Fiji committed to elections in the first quarter of 
2009 (PIFS 2007b:15), but in June 2008, it first announced reservations about 
the temporal expectation and ended the talks shortly after; the military regime 
did not take part in the following 39th Forum in August 2008 either. Still, the 
Forum leaders hung on to the commitment given by Fiji the year before and 
reaffirmed their expectation that the announced parliamentary elections 
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would actually take place in the first quarter of 2009. At the same time they 
reserved for themselves to convene a Special Leaders’ Meeting “to consider 
special measures in relation to Fiji (consistent with paragraph 2 (iv) of the 
Biketawa Declaration) and that measures to be considered included the sus-
pension of particular governments from the Forum (…)” (PIFS 2008b:15). 
While the Joint Working Group later resumed its work – maintaining the 
‘bridge’ with Fiji (Ivarature 2013:189) –, the military government in Decem-
ber 2008 refrained from the original target date for elections. 
Hence the Forum convened the previously announced Special Leaders’ 
Meeting in January 2009 in Port Moresby. With a majority of votes, the Fo-
rum leaders demanded of Fiji the nomination of an election date by 1 May 
2009, the holding of these elections by the end of December 2009, and the 
demonstration of its commitment to various constitutional standards before 1 
May 2009. In case of Fiji not responding to these demands, the imposition of 
‘targeted measures’ under paragraph 2 (iv) of the Biketawa Declaration was 
announced, namely: “(i) suspension of participation by the Leader, Ministers 
and officials of the Fiji Interim Government in all Forum meetings and 
events; and (ii) ineligibility of the Fiji Interim Government to benefit from 
Forum regional cooperation initiatives, and new financial and technical 
assistance, other than assistance toward the restoration of democracy under 
the framework of the Biketawa Declaration” (PIFS 2009b). 
Shortly after, the Fijian constitutional crisis of April 2009 was at least for 
the government of the Solomon Islands a reason to recommend to the other 
Forum members a reconsideration of the decisions of 27 January 2009 (Sol-
omon Times 2009). Shortly before the expiration of the time limit, Bain-
imarama also pointed out the changed circumstances. The Forum remained, 
however, unimpressed and announced by the Forum Chair on 2 May 2009 the 
suspension of Fiji from all Forum events (PIFS 2009c). Immediately after this 
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announcement, Fiji raised the allegation that Australia and New Zealand had 
misused their economic weight to influence the other Forum members and 
thus create a unity towards the suspension, but this was firmly rejected by the 
Forum. 
The 42nd Forum 2011 allowed Fiji to return to specific regional economic 
talks in order to take account of its significant economic role in the region 
(PIFS 2011:34). In August 2013, the new Fijian constitution came into force, 
which the 44th Forum 2013 called an important step towards free and fair 
elections (PIFS 2013:38). At the same time it affirmed – on condition of the 
conduct of the elections in accordance with the principles agreed upon in 
January 2009 – to decide on the full return of Fiji to the Forum process. The 
45th Forum 2014 repeated this affirmation immediately before the first par-
liamentary elections after the coup on 17 September 2014 (PIFS 2014:22). 
After the elections, which confirmed Bainimarama as Prime Minister, Forum 
leaders lifted the suspension of Fiji on 22 October 2014 (PIFS 2014b). 
Climate change 
Climate change issues were put on the agenda of the Forum leaders for the 
first time at the 19th Forum 1988, when they expressed “concern about cli-
matic changes in the South Pacific and their potential for serious social and 
economic disruption in countries of the region” (SPFS 1988:31). On the fol-
low-up meeting in 1989 they named the sea level rise as the so far most ur-
gent problem and decided that in future “Forum members should take deci-
sive action to draw world attention to the way the environmental problem 
affected the South Pacific, and to represent regional views at appropriate 
international gatherings, possibly including by way of a resolution in the 
United Nations General Assembly” (SPFS 1989:20). 
Later, the Forum leaders specified this environmental problem as a threat 
to the physical existence of the island nations and their cultures, identified the 
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responsibility of developed countries as being the main emitters of green-
house gases and set up a corresponding demand for recognition of this re-
sponsibility to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (SPFS 1991:16). After adoption of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
May 1992, the Forum in July 1992 took an unmistakable view on the signifi-
cance of climate change for the island states: “The Forum reaffirmed that 
global warming and sea level rise are the most serious threats to the Pacific 
region and the survival of some island states” (SPFS 1992:7; see also SPFS 
1993:29, 1994:19). 
The UNFCCC was an expression of an increased awareness on the part of 
the industrialized countries for their special responsibility in environmental 
issues; also Australia and New Zealand demonstrated early-stage support of 
the island states’ positions, in particular with regards to the reduction of 
greenhouse gases. Australia, however, changed this attitude, when shortly 
after the inception of the UNFCCC it became apparent, that its declarations of 
intent were not likely to meet the objectives of the convention (Birnie et al. 
2009:360) so there would be need for further action. The Australian govern-
ment under John Howard was not willing to make corresponding concessions 
and generally dismissed international environmental agreements. Repeatedly 
Howard had rated the Australian signature to the UNFCCC as a mistake 
(Yu/Taplin 2000:113ff). 
Thereon, the Forum significantly toned down its extensive demands to 
the industrialized countries. While the 25th Forum 1994 had reaffirmed the 
need to elaborate concrete climate protection targets in the form of a protocol, 
the 26th Forum in following year was already more reserved by merely “rec-
ognising the threat posed to Forum Island Countries” and welcoming the 
inclusion of a draft protocol by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
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for consideration of UNFCCC parties (SPFS 1995:24). On the eve of the third 
UNFCCC conference in December 1997 in Kyoto, the 28th Forum 1997 could 
only agree on a Forum Leaders’ Retreat Statement on Climate Change, rec-
ognising “that participants at the Kyoto Conference can be expected to adopt 
different approaches but all Forum members are unified in their support of 
the principles set out in this statement” (SPFS 1997:18). With it, Forum lead-
ers responded to Howard’s announcement not to agree to any Forum state-
ment formulating specific targets because of fear of disadvantages to the 
Australian economy (Edwards 2000:266; Shibuya 2004:110). His persistence 
on this issue paid off, as the then signed Kyoto Protocol permitted Australia 
as one of only three parties an increase in greenhouse gas emissions17. Yet 
Australia at first did not ratify the protocol (Elliott 2007:223)18. Notwith-
standing this attitude of the Howard government, the Forum after that regular-
ly emphasised the importance of the Kyoto Protocol or called for its ratifica-
tion respectively (see SPFS 1998:35, 1999:21; PIFS 2000:46ff, 2001:31ff, 
2002:26). In 2005, the Forum leaders endorsed the Pacific Islands Frame-
work for Action on Climate Change 2006–2015 (PIFS 2005:26), providing for 
the implementation of national adaptation measures as well as improving the 
understanding of climate change and raising awareness of related concerns. 
The international legal literature these days refer to climate change as the 
“most significant environmental challenge of our time” (Birnie et al. 2009: 
335) and partially classifies it as a possible threat to international peace and 
                                                          
17
  In the year 2012, the admissable greenhouse gas emissions for Iceland were 110 %, for 
Australia 108 % and for Norway 101 % of the 1990 levels by Annex B of the Kyoto Proto-
col. For the developed countries in total, a reduction of 5.2 % was targeted (see Davies 
1998:453). 
18
  Australia’s attitude on climate change did not change until Kevin Rudd became Howard’s 
successor as Prime Minister. On 3 Dezember 2007 – the day he was sworn in – Rudd initiat-
ed the national procedures for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as his first official act and 
also concluded it (see: http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/rudd-signs-kyoto-deal/20 
07/12/03/1196530553203.html). 
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security (Atapattu 2009:608; Malone 1996:526ff; Talmon 2005:181). By 
contrast, the United Nations Security Council has not yet issued a correspond-
ing statement. On the initiative of the United Kingdom, the Council however 
dedicated the whole of its 17 April 2007 session for the very first time to the 
security policy implications of climate change (Sindico 2007:26ff). Also the 
worries of the Forum were heard, when a representative of Papua New Guin-
ea issued a statement on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum: “The dangers 
that small islands and their populations face are no less serious than those 
faced by nations and peoples threatened by guns and bombs. The effects on 
our populations are as likely to cause massive dislocations of people as past 
and present wars. The impacts on social cohesion and identity are as likely to 
cause resentment, hatred and alienation as any current refugee crisis” (UN 
2007:28). Further indications for the classification of climate change as a 
security-related phenomenon can be found in resolution 63/32 of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (UN 2009b), in which it recognized the spe-
cial challenges posed by climate change, especially for island states. 
The 39th Forum 2008, with the Niue Declaration on Climate Change 
(PIFS 2008b:14), reaffirmed all previous positions on the threat to the island 
states and committed its members to use all international fora to continue to 
advocate and support the recognition of the social, economic and security 
aspects of climate change as well as its potential impact on national and inter-
national security. Accordingly, in May 2009 Nauru presented a draft resolu-
tion (UN 2009c) on behalf of the Pacific island states to the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations, which was unanimously adopted the following 
month as resolution 63/281 (UN 2009d). In it the General Assembly showed 
deep concern on the impact of climate change and the potential security 
threats. As a result, the UN Secretary-General was instructed to draw up a 
report on the possible security implications of climate change. This report 
Pacific Islands Forum 211 
 
was compiled in September 2009 and marked the sea-level rise as “perhaps 
the ultimate security threat” for small island states, particularly those in the 
Pacific” (UN 2009e:71). 
 At the 40th Forum in August 2009, the Forum leaders directed a Pacific 
Leaders Call for Action on Climate Change (PIFS 2009:4) to the UNFCCC 
parties and formulated a number of concrete goals approvable at their confer-
ence in Copenhagen in December 2009; two months later a common negotiat-
ing strategy was agreed on. After the outcome of the conference was per-
ceived as a failure, the 41st Forum 2010 decided to continue its corresponding 
efforts at the follow-up conference in Cancun, Mexico in Novem-
ber/December 2010. Yet a breakthrough – as expected – did not happen here 
either. The 44th Forum 2013 adopted the Majuro Declaration for Climate 
Leadership (PIFS 2013:17), in which it described climate change as the 
greatest threat to the existence, safety and welfare of the people in the Pacific 
and as one of the biggest global challenges. The declaration is a letter of in-
tent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; aiming to create the political will for 
an international legally binding climate agreement by 2015. 
 Due to the scientifically sound expectations of a complete flooding of 
individual Forum island country territories – as well as the associated physi-
cal elimination of their existence19 and refugee movements (Atapattu 
2009:610ff; Oliver 2009:211ff)20 –, the direct link between climate change 
and the security interests of the states becomes evident, therefore its treatment 
relates to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
                                                          
19
  Yet it is also argued that the complete loss of territory does not necessarily result in the 
disappearance of the respective legal entity (Yamamoto/Esteban 2010:6ff). Regarding the 
implications on maritime borders see Schofield (2009:405ff). 
20
  Tuvalu had twice already and eventually in vain asked Australia for the admission of its 
nationals in the event of its submergance (Banham 2006). 
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The Forum as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter 
of the United Nations 
According to Article 24 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter, the Secu-
rity Council of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security21. The General Assembly may also 
deal with all matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, Article 11 of the Charter. Regional arrangements make a comple-
mentary and quasi-inductive contribution to this under Chapter VIII of the 
Charter (Abass 2004:40, 59f). They are dealing with matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, Article 52 paragraph 1, 
whereby they are by no means inferior to global affairs with regards to their 
structure and quality; they just operate on a regional-decentralised and not on 
a global-centralised level. 
The aforementioned issues with which the Pacific Islands Forum is con-
cerned, are therefore not only within the area of competence of the United 
Nations under Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Charter, but at the same time with-
in the basic scope of Chapter VIII, so regional arrangements can also deal 
with them22. And dealing with them serves the maintenance of international 
peace and security, just as it has been approved for the prevention of interna-
tional conflicts since the inception of the United Nations. With that the Forum 
                                                          
21
  In the international legal literature, the question of whether the United Nations Security 
Council is at least ultima ratio the proper forum to address climate change appropriately, has 
not yet been finally answered; affirmative are Malone (1996:530ff), Oliver (2009:221), Scott 
(2008:506ff), Wæver (2007:110). More about the different points of view see Sindico 
(2007:32f). According to Häußler (2008:58), the notion of ‘international security’ as a legal 
term and as a concept legitimising intervention, remains linked to direct threats of physical 
violence. 
22
  This result is ultimately identical with the inclusion of situations in the area of competence 
of regional arrangements under Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations, as situations 
are not necessarily characterized by conflicts of interest between states either (Kühne 
1998:59f). 
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is making its own contribution to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
Accordingly, the United Nations General Assembly state its relation to 
the Pacific Islands Forum in the preambles of its resolutions 56/41 of 7 De-
cember 2001 and 57/37 of 21 November 2002 as follows: “Recalling that one 
of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international cooperation 
in addressing international problems of an economic, social, cultural or hu-
manitarian character, Bearing in mind that one of the purposes of the Pacific 
Islands Forum, established in 1971, is to promote regional cooperation 
among its members through trade, investment, economic development and 
political and international affairs, Welcoming the ongoing efforts towards 
closer cooperation between the United Nations and the Pacific Islands Fo-
rum, Bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the 
United Nations on the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for 
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action and other activities con-
sistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (…)” (UN 2002 
and UN 2003b). 
In resolution 59/20 of 8 November 2004, the General Assembly revealed, 
what specific activities of the Forum it had based its classification on: “Wel-
comes the ongoing efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum to promote, primarily 
through the Regional Security Committee, law enforcement cooperation, the 
rule of law and regional peace and security, including combating all types of 
terrorism, in implementing the core United Nations treaties on anti-terrorism, 
anti-money-laundering, transnational crime and the financing of terrorism; 
(…). Welcomes the significant efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum in enhanc-
ing peace and security in the region, including through the Regional Assis-
tance Mission to Solomon Islands (…)” (UN 2005). 
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Certainly, in resolutions 56/41 and 57/37 the linguistic reference to Chapter 
VIII of the Charter is only weak – that chapter is merely ‘borne in mind’. In 
addition, the resolutions of the General Assembly lack the legally binding 
force of those of the Security Council. However, the Forum is hereby brought 
into a qualified proximity to Chapter VIII; the relevant classification by the 
United Nations is pending23. In a joint press release of 7 September 2011, the 
Forum leaders and the United Nations Secretary-General state: “PIF Leaders 
and the Secretary-General: (…) Acknowledged the UN’s key role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the PIF’s leading con-
tribution to addressing regional peace and security challenges. They noted 
the value of enhanced cooperation and experience-sharing between the two 
Organizations on conflict prevention, peace-making, mediation, peace-
keeping and peace-building, building on positive experiences in Bougainville 
and Solomon Islands” (PIFS 2011b). 
Conclusion 
By now, the Pacific Islands Forum has established itself as an independent 
regulatory actor at the regional level. In the preamble to the new Forum 
agreement of 200524, Forum leaders ensured their confidence, that “the Pacif-
ic region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and 
economic prosperity”, thus situating the Forum’s work explicitly in the field 
of peace and security policy. Similar objectives can already be found, e.g., in 
                                                          
23
  According to Clements (2008:143), the Forum is “informally regarded under UN Charter 
provision VIII as a regional organisation”. Angelo (2008:69): “If weak arrangements and 
agencies can qualify, then it may be possible to consider the Biketawa Declaration and the 
Forum Leaders’ Meeting as satisfying the criteria of the UN Charter’s Chapter VIII.” Gra-
ham/Felício (2006:295) regard resolution 57/37 as unequivocally recognizing the Forum as a 
Chapter VIII arrangement. 
24
  Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum, signed in Port Moresby on 27 October 
2005, not yet entered into force. In recent years, the Forum has repeatedly urged a swift rati-
fication of the agreement by the Forum members (PIFS 2011:47, 2012:68). However, in 
view of the political situation in Fiji an entry into force of the agreement in the near future 
seems rather unlikely. 
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the Aitutaki Declaration of 1997 (SPFS 1997:22), the Biketawa Declaration 
of 2000 (PIFS 2000:9), the Nasonini Declaration of 2002 (PIFS 2002:14) and 
the Pacific Plan of 2005 (PIFS 2005:3)25. Advancing these objectives to a 
legal commitment by enshrining them in the Forum’s founding treaty indi-
cates the Forum leaders’ intention to continue if not intensify the Forum’s 
peace and security work in the future. 
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 The Pacific Island Countries and International 
Organizations: Issues, Power and Strategies 
Oliver Hasenkamp 
Abstract: For a long time, the Pacific Small Island Developing States 
(PSIDS) received little attention in international politics. Yet, they constitute 
an important voting bloc that is of relevance for international organiza-
tionssuch as the United Nations. There are indications that some of the Pacif-
ic islands get increasingly active in international organizations, are recog-
nized by a growing number of extra-regional states as potential coalition-
partners and start to challenge traditional preceptions, according to which 
they can exert hardly any influence. Especially Fiji is strategically portraying 
itself as an important global actor, which is underlined by the country’s activ-
ities in Peacekeeping and its chairmanship of the eminent G77 in 2013. This 
article provides an overview about the membership of the Pacific Island 
Countries in international organizations, especially the United Nations, and 
their relationship and contributions to these organizations. The article will 
further elaborate on the issues most actively addressed by the Pacific Island 
Countries in international organizations, their coalition-building with and 
dependency on other actors, and point to the application of strategies that 
help small states to exercise some influence in international politics. 
Keywords: Pacific Island Countries, Pacific Small Island Developing 
States, United Nations, International Organizations, International Rela-
tions, Fiji, G77, Voting Behaviour 
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Introduction 
Political scientists argue for a long time that international organizations are of 
particular relevance to smaller states, because of the common formal equality 
of states within international organizations, the potential security of member-
ship and the capacity of organizations to restrain ‘Great Powers’ (Rothstein 
1968:39 et seq.; Keohane 1969:294). Raimo Väyrynen even stated that “in-
ternational institutions are the best friends of small states” (Väyrynen 
1997:42). Membership in international organizations provides small states 
“with ready access to the services of the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies” and “offers small states a much more cost-effective method of 
maintaining extensive relations with the outside world than bilateral diploma-
cy” (Harden 1985:16). Yet, the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are widely 
ignored in the study of international diplomacy and international organiza-
tions. However, they do not only constitute a significant voting bloc in many 
international organizations, but also increased their activities in international 
diplomacy in the past few years. Some indicators for the rising activities and 
visibility of the PICs in international organizations may be Ban Ki-moons 
first ever visit of a United Nations (UN) Secretary General to the Pacific in 
2011, Fiji’s chairmanship of the eminent G77 in 2013, and the opening of 
Kiribati’s first permanent mission to the UN in 2013. More recently, the UN 
General Assembly has declared 2014 the International Year of Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) and in September 2014 the Third International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States took place place in Samoa, 
accompanied by Ban Ki-moon’s second visit to the region in only three years. 
Both events did not only attach greater attention to small island states and the 
Pacific in particular, but also shed light on their specific challenges and their 
opportunities to influence international politics. While there are in fact many 
examples for the wide-held view that small states only have limited influence 
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in international institutions and are reliant on larger actors, reality shows that 
the performance of the PICs in international politics is far more diverse than a 
limited view of the states as only small, weak and dependent actors suggests 
(see Holtz in this volume). In the last years, especially Fiji has boosted not 
only its own reputation in international diplomacy by a very active foreign 
policy (see Ratuva and Mückler in this volume), but also provoked its Pacific 
Islands neighbours to reshape their activity and policies in international or-
ganizations.  
This article wants to provide an overview about the relationship between 
the PICs and their activities and policies in international organizations to 
shape global politics. It will especially focus on the UN and on its General 
Assembly, the organization’s core decision-making body that comprises all 
members of the organization and provides them with formally equal rights. 
The Pacific Island Countries & International Organizations 
There is a wide variety of different international organizations that fulfil vari-
ous tasks. Only the UN system comprises a large number of specialized and 
associated organizations and programmes. They can help small states to over-
come some of the disadvantages of their smallness, while at the same time, 
membership in international organizations and especially active participation 
requires resources, which often are available to small states only to a limited 
degree. Robert Rothstein states that international organizations by their “mere 
existence” can “provide inexperienced Small Powers” with the possibility of 
developing “some diplomatic sophistication” by widening the “political per-
spective” (Rothstein 1968:40). Some international organizations deliver ser-
vices to their members such as providing expertise on a specific issue or de-
velopment assistance. Others are decision-making bodies or lobbying groups 
that exert influence within other international institutions. 
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Table 1:Year of independence and admission to the United Nations 
 Independence Admission 
Fiji 1970 1970 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 1986 1991 
Kiribati 1979 1999 
Marshall Islands 1986 1991 
Nauru 1968 1999 
Palau 1994 1994 
Papua New Guinea 1975 1975 
Samoa 1962 1976 
Solomon Islands 1978 1978 
Timor-Leste 2002 2002 
Tonga 1970 (never fully depend-
ent) 1999 
Tuvalu 1978 2000 
Vanuatu 1980 1981 
Keeping in mind that most PICs acquired political independence compara-
tively late, it comes to no surprise that they still constitute a relatively young 
group of states in the pivotal international organizations that were founded in 
the aftermath of the 2nd World War. Even though membership in international 
organizations such as the UN “is seen by many as an expression of their in-
ternational legitimacy”1 (Harden 1985:16), some of the smaller PICs (and 
Samoa) waited years until they joined international organizations, most im-
portantly for financial reasons. Next to Australia, New Zealand and Timor-
Leste, which increasingly interacts with the Pacific Islands Region, but basi-
cally is considered as an Asian country, twelve PICs are members of the UN, 
namely Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, the Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, the Solomon Is-
lands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. As the only Pacific Islands representative 
                                                          
1
  One may argue that for many (especially smaller) PICs membership in the regional Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF) rather than UN membership was considered as the final confirmation of 
political independence. 
 231 
 
 
PIC and International Organizations 
in the organization until 1975, Fiji regarded itself as a ‘spokesman’ of the 
entire region and was, to a certain extent, “regarded as such by the outside 
world” (Fry 1980:12). Even though this sparked some suspicion in neighbour-
ing countries, Fiji plays a leading role for the PICs at the UN until today. Like 
all countries, the PSIDS are represented at the headquarters of the UN in New 
York by permanent diplomatic missions, which compared to those of larger 
countries are staffed with only few diplomats (see Table 2). Kiribati only 
opened a permanent representation to the UN in mid-2013 after it was the 
only UN member state without a permanent representation in New York since 
its admittance in 1999 (Islands Business 2013). 
Table 2: Number of diplomats at Permanent Missions to the UN (New York)2 
Australia 30 
Fiji 4 
Federated States of Micronesia 3 
Germany 78 
Kiribati 2 
Marshall Islands 1 
Nauru 4 
New Zealand 13 
Palau 3 
Papua New Guinea 4 
Samoa 3 
Solomon Islands 3 
Timor-Leste 2 
Tonga 3 
Tuvalu 2 
Vanuatu 3 
Within the system of the UN the PICs are considered as so-called Pacific 
Small Island Developing States (PSIDS). The name is also used by the Pacific 
countries as the name of an informal lobbying group of their permanent 
                                                          
2
  As of March 2014; Based on data of the UN’s Protocol and Liaison Service (UN 2014). 
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representations to the UN since 2007. This group is not meant to be a regional 
decision-making body, but a platform for working level cooperation, in order 
to pool resources, to speak with one common voice and issue joint statements 
in international organizations.3 Sometimes also the Cook-Islands and Niue, 
which as associated states enjoy full sovereignty in regional Pacific affairs, 
including membership in der Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), are considered as 
members of the PSIDS group. They are represented within the UN by New 
Zealand, but are sovereign members of other international organizations such 
as the World Health Organization (WHO) and parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Consequently, they 
squeeze the costs of UN membership, but invest their limited resources in 
prioritized areas such as climate change. 
Due to their limited financial capacities the PSIDS only contribute insig-
nificantly to the annual budget of the UN (see Table 3). With the exception of 
Fiji there are also only few PSIDS nationals working at the UN secretariat 
(see Table 4). 
The Asia-Pacific Regional Group at the United Nations 
Most international organizations consider the PSIDS to be Asian countries. 
Hence, they are members of some Asian organizations such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). Within the UN system the five regional groups of 
African States, Latin American & Caribbean States, Western European & 
Other States4, Eastern European States and Asian-Pacific states are of particu-
lar relevance when it comes to equitable geographical distribution and matter 
in terms of the election to bodies within the UN system, e.g. the Security 
Council. 
                                                          
3
  Unlike the South Pacific Missions in New York, the predecessor of today’s PSIDS group, the 
PSIDS do not comprise Australia and New Zealand. 
4
  Australia and New Zealand as well as Canada are considered as Others. 
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Table 3: Assessed Contributions of PSIDS and Selected Countries to UN 
Budget (in percentage)5 
Country 2010 - 2012 
scale 
2013 – 2015 
scale 
2013 – 2015 
GNI Share 
Australia 1.993 2.074 1.678 
Fiji 0.004 0.003 0.005 
Germany 8.018 7.141 5.776 
Kiribati 0.001 0.001 >0.000 
Marshall Islands 0.001 0.001 >0.000 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Nauru 0.001 0.001 >0.000 
New Zealand 0.273 0.253 0.204 
Palau 0.001 0.001 >0.000 
Papua New Guinea 0.002 0.004 0.012 
Russia 1.602 2.438 2.241 
Samoa 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Solomon Islands 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Timor-Leste 0.001 0.002 0.004 
Tonga 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Tuvalu 0.001 0.001 >0.000 
USA 22.000 22.000 24.304 
Vanuatu 0.001 0.001 0.001 
With the exception of Kiribati, which formally belongs to no regional group 
yet, the PSIDS are members of the Asia-Pacific Group. In 2011 they success-
fully campaigned within the Asian regional group to change its official name 
to ‘Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States’ in order to 
increase their visibility and accommodate the fact that the PSIDS constitute 
over a fifth of the group’s membership (Herr/Bergin 2011:22). 
 
                                                          
5
  Based on the Report of the Committee on Contributions of the UN General Assembly 
(A/67/11). GNI refers to Gross National Income; for further information please consult the 
original document (UN 2012a:46 et seq.). 
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Table 4: Distribution of Staff of PSIDS and Selected Countries’ Nationality at 
the UN Headquarters (2013)6 
Country Total Percentage of all staff 
Australia 290 0.70 
Fiji 106 0.26 
Germany 513 1.24 
Kiribati None 
Marshall Islands None 
FSM 1 >0.00 
Nauru None 
New Zealand 119 0.29 
Palau None 
PNG 11 0.03 
Russia 569 1.38 
Samoa 11 0.03 
Solomon Islands 2 >0.00 
Timor-Leste 23 0.06 
Tonga 3 0.01 
Tuvalu None 
USA  2.865 6.51 
Vanuatu 2 >0.00 
Fiji’s ambassador to the UN, Peter Thompson, regarded this move to be in-
dicative that the PSIDS are “wanting to play their full part and assume their 
rights and responsibilities” (Radio New Zealand International 2011). The 
renaming is mainly symbolic, but it may help the PSIDS to legitimize their 
claims for stronger representation in international organizations. 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
All PSIDS, including the Cook Islands and Niue, are members of the Alliance 
of Small Island States (AOSIS), an international lobby-group that consists of 
37 islands countries and like-minded coastal states. AOSIS, which regards 
                                                          
6
  Based on the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Composition of the Secretariat 
2013 (A/68/356). The numbers only comprise staff at the secretariat and no soldiers de-
ployed to UN Peacekeeping Missions. However, most Fijians working for the UN are in the 
secretariat’s Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN 2013). 
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itself as the “negotiating voice for small island developing States (SIDS) 
within the United Nations system” (AOSIS 2014), was founded in 1990 with 
the explicit aim “to bring the issue of climate change to the international 
agenda” by speaking with a “unified voice” (Shibuya 2003:146). It hardly 
addresses any issues not related to climate change or environmental protec-
tion, though (Barnett/Campbell 2010:101f). The alliance is often regarded as 
a moral voice or an international conscience of climate change diplomacy 
(Barnett/Campbell 2010:101; Shibuya 2003:147). AOSIS represents a visible 
force in international climate change conferences and it has been argued that 
it was at least successful in affecting the negotiation process, shaping “the 
negotiations to a remarkable degree, much more so than the a priori power 
distribution would predict” (Betzold 2010:131, 143).  
The G77 and Fiji’s Chairmanship in 2013 
One international alliance that recently came in the focus of the PSIDS is the 
Group of 77 (G77), which was founded in 1964 and consists of currently 133 
developing nations. G77 is the most important international forum for eco-
nomic development policy and attempts to counter-balance the major indus-
trial countries. However, the very diverse membership that includes islands 
countries as well as oil-producing Arab states “make common policy posi-
tions difficult to forge” and frequently results in conflicts of interests within 
the group, especially concerning climate change (Karns/Mingst 2010:106, 
107; see also Barnett/Campbell 2010:101). G77 seemed to be of little rele-
vance to the Pacific until 2013, when Fiji took over the chairmanship of the 
organization. It was the first time that a PSIDS led such a significant interna-
tional negotiation bloc, which comprises about two thirds of the UN mem-
bers. After Fiji’s chairmanship that convinced the Solomon-Islands and Kiri-
bati to join the alliance, all PSIDS expect Palau and Tuvalu are members. 
This is especially remarkable, because the G77 is closely aligned with China 
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and some PSIDS (especially those that joined recently) are recognizing Tai-
wan. Palau was member of G77 from 2002 to 2004, but left the alliance disil-
lusioned by heavily diverging opinions about climate change (Bar-
nett/Campbell 2010:101). Fiji's chairmanship in 2013 resulted in Fiji's 
politicians and diplomats delivering many statements at the UN and other 
international fora on behalf of the group, which significantly increased the 
country’s visibility in international politics. It hosted several international 
meetings and workshops, e.g. on the controversial issue of climate change, for 
G77 members both in Fiji and New York. Fiji was not always enthusiastically 
about the G77, though. In 1989 Fiji’s Permanent Mission to the UN noted in 
its annual report that “it appears more appropriate for us [Fiji] to be part of 
the Group but not to be among its spokesmen”, because of the group’s “often 
anti-western” stance, “the extreme positions which have been pushed” and its 
often confrontational style of diplomacy (Fiji Mission 1989:160f)7. Fiji’s 
commitment to G77 needs to be viewed in the context of its Looking North 
Policy, which attempts to reduce dependency on traditional allies like Aus-
tralia and to strengthen ties with Asian countries like China. The magazine 
Islands Business stated correspondently: “Fiji’s appointment is an endorse-
ment of the country’s rising importance as perceived in international circles 
despite its ongoing political problems that have resulted in many internation-
al organizations like the Commonwealth and regional ones like the Pacific 
Islands Forum suspending its membership. This indeed sets the cat among the 
pigeons and regional and global hawks are unlikely to find this new en-
dorsement palatable” (Taga 2013:9). 
 
 
                                                          
7
  When reference is given to a PSIDS’ ‘Mission’, this refers to the respective country’s per-
manent mission to the UN. 
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Regional Organizations in International Politics 
Next to the alliances on international level, also regional organizations from 
the Pacific are concerned with international politics. The Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF; see Blatt in this volume), the most important regional decision-
making body in Oceania, decides on many issues that are related to interna-
tional organizations at its annual high-level meetings. For instance, endorse-
ment and support was given to Australia's successful candidature for the UN 
Security Council for the term 2013-2014 and for New Zealand's candidature 
for 2015-2016. The PIF’s secretariat holds observer status at the UN since 
2004. While the PIF gained some prominence internationally – e.g. reflected 
by Ban Ki-moon’s participation in the 2011 anniversary Forum meeting, but 
also by other recent high-level visits – the institution seems to have lost rele-
vance to the PSIDS themselves. Especially after Fiji’s suspension from the 
PIF in 2009, the number of joint PIF statements in international forums has 
declined significantly and the PSIDS look for forms of cooperation without 
Australia and New Zealand. Richard Herr and Anthony Bergin write from an 
Australian perspective that especially the recent rise of the informal PSIDS 
lobby group demonstrated Australia’s “alienation from the FICs [Forum Is-
lands Countries]”, because “[t]he increased prominence of PSIDS derives 
from the FICs’ preference for a form of engagement that excludes Australia 
and New Zealand, which would be included in any discussion under the PIF 
banner” (Herr/Bergin 2011:22, 23).  
Prior to the 2014 election in Fiji there was some hope that the relations 
between Fiji on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other 
hand were to improve. The two larger states for instance lowered some of 
their sanctions, including travel bans for Fijian politicians, in the run-up to the 
elections. However, even though the PIF has lifted Fiji’s suspension after the 
election in the country, the Fijian government refused to actively participate 
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in the organization again until reforms to limit Australian and New Zealand 
influence were implemented. Hence, there are currently no signs for a renais-
sance of the PIF in regard to the PICs international political activities. It ra-
ther seems that Fiji continues to prefer new channels of cooperation over the 
established structures of the PIF. This is most likely motivated by the pre-
sumption that Fiji can play a more dominant role in regional settings that 
exclude Australia and New Zealand and that it can better exploit own benefits 
from flexible international alliances. In fact, it is unlikely that Fiji will allow 
its traditional partners to take away its strengthened engagement at the inter-
national level that comes closely related to cooperation with many non-
traditional partners, especially China (see McDougall in this volume).  
Other Groups 
Many PSIDS are members in other international organizations, like the 
Commonwealth of Nations or the World Bank, and in lobby groups, like the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which largely overlaps with G77. The indi-
vidual added value of membership in many different alliances to PSIDS is not 
always obvious, though. The often overlapping responsibilities and some-
times even contradicting positions of some alliances suggest that greater fo-
cus on a smaller number of alliances could lead to greater coherence and the 
spending of fewer resources in the PSIDS’ foreign policies.  
Prioritization 
Due to their limited financial and material capacities, it is even more im-
portant for smaller than for larger states to set priorities in their international 
activities and to define prioritized policy fields. This can result in a focus on 
specific international organizations, as it becomes most evident in the case of 
the Cook Islands and Niue, which are members of a few specialized interna-
tional institutions and regimes only. However, especially the issues that are of 
greatest relevance to the Pacific island states are decisive for their activities in 
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international organizations. With the exception of Fiji, which tries to address 
as many issues as possible to underline the country’s desired image of being 
an influential global actor, the strategy of prioritizations is definitely applied 
by all PICs to varying degrees. Especially the smallest countries concentrate 
most resources on the issue of climate change, the generation of financial 
support and sustainable development. Table 5 on the following page shows 
some other important issues that were addressed by the PSIDS at the annual 
General Debates of the UN General Assembly from 2008 to 2013. The Gen-
eral Debate provides all UN member states with the opportunity to speak on 
those issues most relevant to them. It is also the occasion, when the states are 
usually not represented by diplomats, but by Heads of State or Government. 
Climate Change 
Climate change as the single most important issue is on the top of the PSIDS’ 
agenda in nearly all international organizations. From the their point of view 
climate change is closely related to many other relevant issues, ranging from 
sustainable development to human rights and international security. Even 
though climate change is addressed most explicitly by the annual Conferences 
of the Parties (COPs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC), the PSIDS regard climate change as a cross-cutting 
issue and believe that it should be addressed by all ‘relevant organs of the 
United Nations’, including the General Assembly and the Security Council 
(Kiribati Government 2012:4). They argue that “[t]he security implications of 
climate change pose a direct and very real threat to our sovereignty, survival 
and fundamental freedoms assured by the Charter of the United Nations” 
(UN 2009:8). Hence they for example very actively participated as observers 
in a Security Council debate on climate change, which was initiated by Ger-
many during its presidency over the Council in 2011, but produced no result 
beyond a presidential statement. Still the German initiative was strongly 
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embraced by many PSIDS, which was reflected in an increasing number of 
calls for a permanent German seat on the Security Council (e.g. Nauru 
Mission 2011:3). It is regarded as one of the major successes of the PSIDS 
grouping that the General Assembly after lengthy debate passed a PSIDS’ 
resolution (A/RES/63/281) on ‘Climate change and its possible security im-
plication’ in 2009 by consensus which became the first international docu-
ment explicitly linking climate change and security (UN 2009). 
Table 5: Issues Addressed by PSIDS at the UN, 2008 – 2013 
 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Climate Change All PSIDS All PSIDS All PSIDS All PSIDS All PSIDS All PSIDS 
MDGs & SDGs 
FJ, FSM, KIR, 
RMI, NAU, 
PAL, PNG, SI, 
TON, TV, VAN 
FJ, KIR, RMI, 
NAU, PAL, 
PNG, SI, TON, 
TV, VAN 
FJ, KIR, 
NAU, PNG, 
WS, SI, 
TON, TV, VU 
FJ, FSM, KIR, 
RMI, NAU, 
PAL. PNG, SI, 
TON, TV, VU 
FSM, KIR, 
RMI, NAU, 
PAL, PNG, 
WS, SI, TON, 
TV, VU 
KIR, RMI, 
NAU. PNG, 
WS, SI, TON, 
TV, VU 
Fishing & Ocean 
Preversation 
FJ, FSM, KIR, 
NAU, RMI, 
PAL, SI, TV 
FJ, FSM, KIR, 
RMI, NAU, 
PAL, WS, SI, 
TON, TV, VU 
FJ, FSM, 
RMI, NAU, 
PAL, PNG, 
WS, SI, FJ 
FJ, FSM, KIR, 
RMI, NAU, 
PAL, SI, TV 
FSM, KIR, 
PAL, SI, TON 
FSM, PAL, 
KIR, SI 
Decolonization FJ, SI, VU FJ, SI, TV, VU FJ, SI, VU F, VU - VU 
Nuclear Testing RMI, PNG, WS RMI; PNG RMI, PAL, PNG, VU 
RMI, PAL, 
PNG, WS, SI, 
VU 
WMI, PNG, 
WS, VU - 
Peacekeeping FJ, PNG, WS FJ, PAL, PNG, WS, SI 
FJ, PNG, 
WS, SI, VU 
FJ, PAL, WS, 
VU 
FJ, PAL, PNG, 
WS 
FJ, RMI, WS, 
VU 
Terrorism - FSM, WS FJ, WS, TV, VU 
FJ, PNG, WS, 
VU FJ, RMI RMI, SI 
Inclusion of Taiwan 
in UN System 
KIR, RMI, PAL, 
SI, TV 
KIR, RMI, 
PAL, SI, TV 
KIR, RMI, 
NAU, PAL, 
SI, TV 
KIR, RMI, 
NAU, PAL, SI, 
TV 
KIR, RMI, 
NAU, PAL, SI, 
TV 
KIR, RMI, 
NAU, PAL, SI, 
TV 
Reform of the UN KIR, NAU, PAL, WS, SI 
FSM, KIR, 
NAU, PNG, 
WS, SI, TV 
RMI, NAU, 
PNG, WS, 
SI, TON, TV, 
VU 
FSM, PAL, 
PNG, WS, SI, 
TON, TV, VU 
FSM, NAU, 
PNG, WS, SI, 
TON, TV, VU 
FJ, FSM, RMI, 
NAU, PAL, 
PNG, WS, SI, 
TON, TV 
Non-com-
municable Dise-
ases 
FSM, PAL, 
PNG, TON FSM 
FJ, FSM, 
PNG, WS, 
SI, TON, VU 
NAU, TON - - 
Food Security FSM, RMI, NAU, TON 
FSM, NAU, 
PAL 
KIR, PAL, 
WS, SI, VN FSM, NAU, VU 
FSM, KIR, 
NAU, WS, TV 
FSM, NAU, 
WS, SI, TON, 
TV 
Human Rights, 
Empowerment of 
Women 
PAL, PNG, SI, 
TON, TV, VU 
FJ, RMI, PAL, 
PNG, WS, SI, 
VU 
FJ, FSM, 
PAL, PNG, 
WS, SI, VU 
PAL, PNG, SI, 
TON, TV, VU 
FJ, PAL, PNG, 
SI, TON, VU FJ, PNG 
FJ = Fiji, FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, KIR = Kiribati, RMI = Marshall islands, NAU = Nauru, PAL = Palau, 
PNG = Papua New Guinea, WS = Samoa, SI = Solomon Islands, TON = Tonga, TV = Tuvalu, VU = Vanuatu; MDGs = 
Millenium Development Goals, SDGs = Sustainable Development Goals 
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Development & Sustainability 
Next to climate change development policy, which is very often linked to the 
concept of sustainability, ranks high on the PSIDS’ international agenda. 
Concerning development policy, the implementation of the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) and the drafting of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), the generation of financial support as well as fisheries and the ex-
ploitation and protection of maritime resources play an important role for the 
PSIDS. Especially the smallest PSIDS are frequently calling for the estab-
lishment of specific support measures for island countries within the UN 
system (e.g. Tuvalu Mission 2012:3; Nauru Mission 2012:5) and are smartly 
looking for ways to generate additional funds. This for instance includes 
membership in the UN’s group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which 
grants easier access to development assistance. Currently Kiribati, the Solo-
mon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu belong to the LDCs, with some of the 
states, however, facing graduation from the category for several years. Samoa 
graduated in January 2014, after the UN General Assembly postponed the 
country’s graduation that was originally scheduled for 2010 subsequent to a 
devastating tsunami in 2009 (Committee for Development Policy 2012:19; 
UN 2010). Tuvalu and Vanuatu were recommended for graduation in 2012, 
but struggle with this decision and Tuvalu regarded this recommendation as a 
“grave and untimely mistake” considering the special vulnerabilities of SIDS 
(UNOHRLLS 2012).8 
 
                                                          
8
  The Committee on Development Policy, a subsidiary body of the UN’s Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), reviews the eligibility of countries to be listed as LDCs according to 
three criteria every three years and recommends graduation to the ECOSOC; graduation fi-
nally comes into effect by a respective resolution of the General Assembly. Kiribati was also 
eligible for graduation in 2012, but has not been recommended for graduation yet, as it, un-
like Tuvalu and Vanuatu, did not meet the graduation criteria in the previous review periods; 
Kiribati will be “considered for graduation at the next triennial review, in 2015” (Committee 
for Development Policy 2008, 2012). 
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Niche Policies: The case of Palau’s Shark Protection Diplomacy 
Theory argues that smaller states can establish themselves as champions in 
small policy niches (Henrikson 2005a:67 et seq.). One of the most demonstra-
tive examples, related to maritime sustainability, is Palau’s pioneering effort 
to drive forward the protection of sharks via international organizations. The 
World Future Council, which awarded Palau the Future Policy Award in 2014 
for “outstanding maritime policy”, argued that “Palau continues with its am-
bition to be a leader in shark conservation, by pushing for international regu-
lation banning shark finning and trade of shark products” and serving as an 
example for other countries (World Future Council 2012:7 et seq.). Some 
other Pacific countries like the Federated States of Micronesia already joined 
Palau in establishing Shark Protection Zones and using international institu-
tions like the UN General Assembly to call for international regulations in 
this so far a scantly filled niche (e.g. Palau Mission 2012:2; Radio New Zea-
land 2012).  
Decolonization 
The existence of non-self-governing territories in the Pacific Islands region 
leads most PSIDS to be vocal advocates of decolonization, fuelled by the fact 
that most PSIDS acquired independence comparatively late (Levine 
2012:439). Several PSIDS are active members of the UN General Assembly’s 
Special Committee on Decolonization, which annually sends an observer 
mission to New Caledonia in collaboration with the PIF and the sub-regional 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) (de Decker 2007:122). At the interna-
tional level the case of New Caledonia has lost controversy since the territory 
was re-listed on the UN’s list of non-self-governing territories in 1986, a step 
pushed by Fiji and other PSIDS (Fiji Mission 1989:156 et seq.). French Poly-
nesia was re-listed in May 2013 after the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion (A/RES/67/265) sponsored by Nauru, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands 
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and co-sponsored by further PSIDS. Even though the resolution was formally 
accepted by consensus, it provides an example for PSIDS resisting the oppo-
sition of powerful states, because France issued a letter of protest to its allies 
and boycotted the meeting. Germany, Great Britain, the United States of 
America (USA) and the Netherlands “disassociated themselves” through their 
statements from the consensus vote (Radio New Zealand International 2013a; 
Maclellan 2013).  
Generally Vanuatu is known to be the strongest advocate for decoloniza-
tion, being also the only PSIDS addressing the Indonesian-occupied West 
Papua at the UN (de Decker 2007:115; Hassall 2007:239; Mückler 2010:167). 
Especially in 2013 Vanuatu vocally urged the international community to 
take action to guarantee the rights of the people of West Papua, which accord-
ing to Vanuatu’s former Prime Minister Moana Carcasses Kalosil is neglected 
and ignored by the UN and even most of its Pacific neighbours (Vanuatu 
Mission 2013:4,5). This is about to change significantly, as there is currently 
going on a heated debate in the Pacific about a potential admission of West 
Papua to the sub-regional Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The initia-
tive has sparked broad public solidarity demonstrations in many Pacific coun-
tries, but also motivated Indonesia to start diplomatic efforts to frustrate a 
potential West-Papuan membership in the MSG that would provide a plat-
form for greater international attention. 
Nuclear Testing 
The consequences of nuclear testing still pose the “first foreign policy issue” 
for the Marshall Islands, for which this issue is not only a “historical legacy”, 
but “a contemporary reality for our local communities” (Marshall Islands 
Mission 2012:2). The country uses international fora to voice harsh criticism 
towards the USA and also the international community over this issue. The 
Marshall Islands as well as other PSIDS have sued the USA, France and other 
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nuclear powers in several legal procedures at the International Court of Jus-
tice (Radio New Zealand International 2014; Luck/Doyle 2004:100). The 
criticism of the Marshall Islands or e.g. Palau’s clear anti-nuclear stance since 
independence9 however manifest an antagonism in the policy of the three 
COFA countries that maintain Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) with 
the USA, namely the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands 
and Palau. In fact, they are the only PSIDS that have not signed the Treaty of 
Rarotonga that established a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and usually 
vote closely aligned with the USA (see below). 
International Security Policy, the United Nations Security Council and 
Peacekeeping 
Apart from Timor-Leste, there have been no major traditional security issues 
from the Pacific that were widely discussed in international organizations so 
far (see Schmitz in this volume). International security issues are most promi-
nently discussed by the UN Security Council, the only international decision-
making body that can make legally binding decisions and impose sanctions or 
military interventions to implement them. The Council briefly considered the 
political situations in Fiji after the coup d’états and unrests in 1987, 2000 and 
2006 as well as the conflicts in the Solomon Islands, but agreed on no resolu-
tions. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI, see 
Dinnen in this volume) was mandated by the PIF, but lacks a mandate by the 
Security Council, because no draft resolution was introduced to the body in 
fear of a Chinese veto in face of the Solomon Island’s recognition of Taiwan 
(McDougall 2004:214). So far no PSIDS have been members in the Security 
                                                          
9
  After Palau was granted self-government, it decided to include a ban of any nuclear weap-
ons, technologies or waste from its territory and waters in its constitution. The Palauan nu-
clear ban was a main reason for the late obtainment of full independence, as the people of 
Palau in six separate referenda refused the US-designed Compact of Free Association grant-
ing the USA the right to use Palau for nuclear related military activities (Hassall 2009:171, 
172). 
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Council, which consists of 5 permanent members – the USA, China, Russia, 
Great Britain and France – and another ten members that are elected for two-
year terms by the General Assembly according to geographical distribution 
(Africa: 3, Asia-Pacific: 2, Eastern Europe: 1, Latin American & Caribbean: 
2, Western Europe: 1 + Western Europe or ‘Other’: 1). Papua New Guinea 
campaigned for a Security Council seat in 1975 and Fiji in 1970, 1971 and in 
2011, when it officially still was listed on the ballot, but already withdrew its 
candidature in support of Pakistan prior to the election. In all cases, the two 
countries received only one single vote in favour (Security Council Report 
2011:1, 2012:18, 31). 
International security policy still matters for some PSIDS particularly in 
terms of international Peacekeeping Missions (see Table 6). Especially Fiji 
has a very long record of participation in many UN Peacekeeping Missions, 
which not only provides financial benefits to the country, but also shapes the 
its international reputation (Firth/Fraenkel, 2009:119, 120). In 2013 Fiji 
agreed to send more than 500 soldiers to the Golan Heights (while withdraw-
ing some from less perilous missions) to replace European forces, which have 
been withdrawn due to the ascending risk created by the Syrian civil war (Fiji 
Sun 2013; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014a). In April 2014 
Fiji ranked 32 of all peacekeeping contributors, which is according to the 
country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, “far beyond 
what is expected of a country of our size and level of development” (Fiji 
Mission 2012:3). It seems that participation in peacekeeping missions has 
become a deliberate strategy for Fiji to portray itself as a “good global citi-
zen” that is prepared to carry global responsibilities and thus has a legitimate 
right to claim greater involvement in international politics. 
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Table 6: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions (April 2014)10 
Rank Country Contribution (Military & Police) 
1 India 8132 
32 Fiji 768 
48 Germany 268 
60 USA 140 
64 Russia 112 
81 Australia 49 
91 Samoa 16 
94 New Zealand 12 
101 Vanuatu 5 
110 Palau 2 
107 Timor-Leste 3 
118 PNG 1 
Voting Behaviour 
Most international institutions like the UN General Assembly base on the 
principle ‘one state, one vote’ and provide the PSIDS with formally equal 
voting power compared to larger states. The General Assembly takes most 
votes in consensus and only records the individual voting conduct of its 
member states in controversial votes. Table 8 shows some examples for 
PSIDS voting in controversial General Assembly votes. Looking at the voting 
behaviour of the PSIDS at the UN reveals that some of the Pacific states are 
amongst those countries most often being absent in General Assembly votes 
(see Table 7 on next page). This was especially true for Kiribati before it 
opened a permanent representation to the UN in 2013. The State Department 
of the United States of America annually issues an analysis of the voting 
behaviour of individual UN member states at the UN General Assembly, 
which provides not only information on the affinity of the PSIDS to the USA, 
but also on their general voting patterns. The voting behaviour of the PSIDS 
in international organizations and conferences show that the PSIDS relatively 
often do not vote as a unified bloc on issues that are not prioritized by them. 
                                                          
10
  As of April 2014; based on UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations 2014b. 
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This constitutes an obstacle to even more consistency and influence of the 
PSIDS and like-minded states. It also implies that they seldom vote in line 
with one single alliance of like-minded states such as AOSIS, but rather 
switch between different available alliances. 
Table 7: Absences of PSIDS in Recorded General Assembly Votes, 2010-1311 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total Rec. Votes 71 85 78 84 
Fiji 2 0 1 1 
FSM 15 19 21 17 
Kiribati 67 81 77 8 
Marshall Is. 5 11 18 10 
Nauru 46 63 60 29 
Palau 6 8 10 6 
PNG 4 6 2 0 
Samoa 3 7 0 1 
Solomon Is. 0 3 1 1 
Tonga 5 8 6 12 
Tuvalu 3 25 8 8 
Vanuatu 23 16 6 58 
The COFA countries & the United States of America 
On many issues that are not of high priority to PSIDS, their voting behaviour 
to varying degrees seems to be often even more influenced by larger actors 
than by membership in alliances of like-minded states. This is most striking 
for the three COFA countries, which in 2013 voted in 98.4% (Palau), 99.6% 
(FSM) and 93.6% (Marshall Islands) respectively in line with the USA (Table 
9).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
  Since the data used is provided by the USA State Department (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) the 
table as well as following numbers on recorded votes for data reasons only include those 
recorded votes in which the USA did not abstain. 
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Table 8: Voting by PSIDS on Selected Resolutions of the UN 
Resolution 
(Symbol) Fi
ji 
FS
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rib
at
i 
M
ar
sh
al
l I
s.
 
Na
u
ru
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PN
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Sa
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m
o
n
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To
ng
a 
Tu
va
lu
 
Va
n
u
at
u
 
Arms Trade 
Treaty A 
(A/RES/67/234A) 
+ 0 0 0 0 + + + + + 0 0 
Arms Trade 
Treaty B 
(A/RES/67/234B) 
/ + 0 + + + + + + + + 0 
Status of Pales-
tine in the Unit-
ed Nations 
(A/RES/67/19) 
/ - 0 - - - / / + / + / 
Sovereignty of 
Palestinian 
People 
(A/RES/67/229) 
+ - 0 - - - + + + / + / 
International 
Migration & 
Development 
(A/RES/67/158) 
+ + 0 0 0 - + + + + + + 
Human Rights 
in Iran 
(A/RES/68/184) 
/ + + + + + + + + + + + 
Moratorium on 
Death Penalty 
(A/RES/67/176) 
/ + 0 + + + / + / - + + 
Impact of Glob-
alization on 
Human Rights 
(A/RES/68/168) 
+ - - - + - + + + + + + 
Refuges in 
Abkhazia & 
South Ossetia 
(A/RES/68/274) 
/ + + + - + + + + 0 + + 
Economic & 
other activities 
affecting peo-
ples of Non-
Self-Governing 
Territories 
(A/RES/68/88) 
+ + + + 0 + + + + + + + 
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Table 8, cont. 
Resolution 
(Symbol) Fi
ji 
FS
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Necessity of 
Ending US 
sanctions 
against Cuba 
(A/RES/68/8) 
+ / + / + / + + + + + + 
Human Rights 
in Syria 
(A/RES/68/182) 
/ + + + + + + + + + + + 
+ = in favour; - = against; / = abstention; 0 =absent 
This makes them over the last years next to Israel and Canada the closest 
allies of the USA at the General Assembly, which gets even more obvious in 
those votes considered to be most important by the USA, in which all three 
COFA countries like Israel had 100% coincidence with the USA since 2011 
(US State Department 2012, 2013, 2014). The COFA countries and Nauru 
amount for more than half of all states that opposed a widely-discussed reso-
lution on the status of Palestine (A/RES/67/19) in line with the USA and 
Israel in 2012. All other PSIDS with the exception of the Solomon Islands 
and Tuvalu abstained or were absent, whereas the large majority of the 193 
UN members (138) voted in favour (Australia and Germany also abstained, 
New Zealand voted in favour). At the same time, it cannot be generalized that 
the COFA countries vote with the USA in virtually every vote, especially 
when issues directly affecting the states or moral questions (e.g. death penal-
ty) are concerned. They for example jointly did not vote with the USA against 
a moratorium on death penalty in 2012 (A/RES/67/176) or on the annual 
resolutions on activities affecting peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries (e.g. A/RES/68/88). 
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Table 9: Voting Coincidence with the United States of America12 
Year 
2012 2013 
Consensus + 
Recorded Votes 
Recorded 
Votes Only 
Consensus + 
Recorded Votes 
Recorded 
Votes Only 
Australia 92.6 71.0 95.1 80.9 
Fiji 83.5 38.5 83.5 40.0 
FSM 97.8 92.2 99.6 98.4 
Germany 89.4 60.0 92.2 70.0 
Kiribati 66.9 0.0 89.5 60.6 
Marshall Is. 95.3 83.0 93.6 77.5 
Nauru 90.5 68.8 92.1 72.0 
New Zealand 90.1 55.2 90.4 63.9 
Palau 99.1 96.7 98.4 94.4 
PNG 87.1 47.4 87.7 52.2 
Samoa 85.1 43.8 87.6 52.2 
Solomon Is. 81.7 37.8 83.2 42.7 
Tonga 87.9 50.9 89.6 57.9 
Tuvalu 80.2 33.8 84.8 48.0 
Vanuatu 84.2 40.0 83.8 18.8 
Japan & the International Whaling Commission 
Unlike the relationship between the COFA countries and the USA, which is 
(with a few exceptions) nearly comprehensive, most other influencing actors 
only shape PSIDS’ voting behaviour on specific issues. A popular example 
are Japan’s efforts to use development aid to ‘convince’ the PSIDS members 
of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), namely Kiribati, the Mar-
shall-Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, to regularly 
vote in line with Japan for the lifting of the commercial whaling ban (Baldac-
chino 2009:35). This is particularly delicate as these voting practices seem to 
                                                          
12
  Based on USA State Department 2013, 2014. In 2012 Kiribati participated in only 1 record-
ed vote, in which it voted opposite to the USA. Also the comparatively low coincidence of 
Vanuatu with the USA in 2013 comes partly due to a large number of absences (see Table 
7). 
 251 
 
 
PIC and International Organizations 
be contradictory to their claims for protection of oceans and marine eco-
systems. 
The Diplomatic Rivalry between China and Taiwan 
As many observers have examined, the Pacific Islands region is one of the 
main locations for diplomatic rivalry and competition over diplomatic recog-
nition between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) (Shie 2010:47 et seq.; see McDougall in this volume). Even though 
it has been argued that recognition of one of the Chinese states has been sub-
ject to frequent switching (Shie 2010:148 et seq.; Hassall 2007:225, 240, 
241), the number of PSIDS recognizing Taiwan, namely the Marshall-Islands, 
Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon-Islands and Tuvalu, has remained stable 
over the past years. The pro-Taiwan PSIDS regularly and prominently call for 
Taiwan’s international recognition and membership in international organiza-
tions. However, they never directly criticize China, but rather try to come to 
terms with both actors (see Brady/Henderson 2010:194). Those states recog-
nizing Taiwan sometimes suffer from negative impacts of Chinese influence, 
though. Not only lacks RAMSI, as lined out above, an international mandate, 
but as a permanent Security Council member China was also able to delay the 
vote about the applications of Nauru and Tuvalu to the UN. It however decid-
ed not to veto it, probably to not risk the support of other PSIDS and to avoid 
giving Taiwan an occasion to stirring up resentments against China (Shie 
2010:149; Henderson 2001:151). Next to issues directly affecting the poten-
tial UN membership of Taiwan, the diplomatic rivalry seems hardly to affect 
PSIDS voting behaviour. On human rights issues the majority of the PSIDS, 
including those states aligned with Beijing, is regularly voting opposite to 
China. At the same time pro-Taiwan states entered the pro-China G77, which 
in the long-term may strengthen China’s influence in the Pacific. China is of 
greatest value for Fiji, as cooperation with China is a pivotal element in Fiji’s 
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strategy of disassociation with its traditional partners that goes hand in hand 
with its efforts to increase its global presence. 
Diversification of International Cooperation 
Using the UN as a platform to initiate and further relationships with various 
different actors, the PSIDS have diversified their international relationships 
particularly over the last years. Most of these collaborations are informal, 
flexible and focused only on a few issues, but generate new strategic options 
for the PSIDS. One excellent example is the collaboration with Arab League 
countries that has been introduced by Fiji and the United Arab Emirates, 
which has hosted several PSIDS meetings (Herr/Bergin 2011:21). However, 
the effects on PSIDS’ voting, especially concerning Israel, seem to be limited 
so far. In 2014, also Turkey hosted a PSIDS meeting (Hurriyet 2014). Fiji has 
recently intensified its relations with some G77 members that have an argua-
ble international reputation, including Iran and North Korea (Herr/Bergin 
2011:21; Fiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). A longer history in contrast 
has the cooperation of many PSIDS with Cuba (e.g. Crocombe 2008:608; 
Herr/Bergin 2011:21). The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are regularly join-
ing “the international community in calling for the immediate lifting of the 
US economic and trade embargo against Cuba” (Solomon Islands Mission 
2012:7), which was regarded as “long overdue” and, as the Prime Minister of 
Vanuatu, Sato Kilman Livtuvanu, stated, even “inhumane” (Vanuatu Mission 
2011:10). Cuba hence provides another case of PICs opposition against larger 
countries such as the USA on some issues. 
Confusion over Abkhazia & South Ossetia 
Especially on issues that are far away from the PSIDS and of hardly any di-
rect relevance to them, there sometimes seems to be no concerted region-wide 
policy and occasionally even a lack of national policy coordination. This 
becomes evident in the confusion over PSIDS’ policies on the breakaway 
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regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which formally belong to Georgia, 
but, supported by Russia, claim independence (Herr/Bergin 2011:21). Particu-
larly Nauru surprised the international community by recognizing the two 
territories, urging “a rapid and peaceful settlement to the situation in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia” (Nauru Mission 2012:5) and voting in line with Russia 
and a small number of other states against a resolution on refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons in these regions in subsequent years (e.g. 
A/RES/68/274). According to reports, also Tuvalu and Vanuatu recognized 
Abkhazia in 2011, but never voted in line with Russia on the respective reso-
lutions, but with Georgia and most other PSIDS instead. Several statements 
by Vanuatu confirming or denying the establishment of relations respectively 
suggest that the country was unable to cope with the issue. In 2013 it finally 
admitted confusions and misunderstandings concerning Abkhazia and 
stressed that there were no formal ties, but Vanuatu by now even had plans to 
establish relations with Georgia instead (Radio New Zealand International 
2013b; Herr/Bergin 2011:21). The Solomon Islands in contrast established 
diplomatic ties with Georgia in its 2011, explicitly welcoming aid contribu-
tions by that country (Solomon Islands 2011:3), but was among the few states 
voting in line with Russia opposing the annual resolution in 2011 and only 
abstaining in 2012, before finally voting in favour in 2013. 
Prioritization, Coalition-building & Capacity-building strategies 
The above-mentioned case provides an example for the absence of strategic 
behavior due to limited relevance to PSIDS. However, generally the PSIDS 
like many small states are neat users of strategies that help them to overcome 
some of the weaknesses of smallness and to influence negotiation processes 
and outcomes in international diplomacy. The most important strategies that 
have already been addressed above are the prioritization of the relevant policy 
fields in order to use the limited resources most meaningful and the pooling 
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of resources with other states by the formation of alliances with like-minded 
or dominant states. As aforementioned, the coordination of policies within the 
distinct PSIDS group and with like-minded states sometimes could be more 
focused to further reinforce the influence of the PSIDS on issues not directly 
affecting them. Next to cooperating with other nations small states can also 
increase their expertise and influence by using capacity-building strategies, 
which for example include the cooperation with institutional actors like secre-
tariats or non-governmental organizations (Panke 2012a:315 et seq.; De-
itelhoff/Walbott 2012:349 et seq.). Institutional cooperation has been boosted 
by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, whose visit to the Pacific in 2011 
was described by the former Palauan President Johnson Toribiong as “a tes-
tament to the fact that the countries in our region, even the smallest and most 
vulnerable among us, have something important to contribute to our world” 
(Palau Mission 2011:6). Subsequent to the visit, Ban established annual high-
level meetings with Pacific leaders and started to regularly issue joint state-
ments with them (e.g. UN 2012b). Especially during the annual climate 
change conferences the PSIDS closely cooperate with NGOs, which not only 
provide additional resources, but also help them in raising public awareness 
and creating a positive image of the states (Panke 2012b:390). 
Also the chairmanship over organizations or certain bodies “may increas-
es visibility and multiplies the opportunities to launch arguments and frame 
debates” by “[s]etting the agenda, organizing meetings or distributing posi-
tion papers and reports (Panke 2012b:396). Fiji’s G77 chairmanship can be 
considered as a milestone in in this regard. Furthermore, Nauru currently acts 
as AOSIS chair, while Vanuatu, Samoa and Tuvalu were holding the position 
in the past. Having been absent from many important posts within the UN 
itself, the number of PSIDS serving e.g. as Vice-Presidents of the UN General 
Assembly has also slightly increased in recent years, most recognizably 
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revealed by the activities of Fiji’s Ambassador to the UN Peter Thompson 
and the Palauan Ambassador Stuart Beck, who presided over the final vote on 
the important Arms Trade Treaty that was concluded in 2013. 
Soft Power, Moral Argumentation, Institutionalization & Confrontation 
According to constructivists the perception of a country, e.g. as a ‘good’ 
member of the international community, matters, because they view the inter-
national system not only as governed by physical power, but also by norms, 
beliefs and perceptions. The PSIDS actively use ‘soft power’13 like moral 
arguments to manage and shape the perceptions of others about the own state 
or a certain issue. While Fiji is very eager to be regarded as an influencing 
actor, underlined by frequent references to its peace-building commitment 
and supported by China, many other PSIDS still manifest the perception of 
them as being small for strategic reasons, including the generation of finan-
cial support (Browning 2006:273; Baldacchino 2009:31). This for instance 
becomes evident in the struggles of some PSIDS to preserve LDC status. All 
PSIDS, however, aptly use “discursive power resources” (Deitelhoff/Wallbott 
2012:346) like moral arguments and metaphors to generate sympathy for their 
issues. It is remarkable to note that many PSIDS also employ ‘religious ar-
guments’ and frequently refer to the Holy Bible in their statements in interna-
tional organizations (e.g. Vanuatu Mission 2008:10; Marshall Islands Mission 
2008:4). 
                                                          
13
  The concept of ‘soft power’ has been especially developed by Joseph Nye. It is based on the 
notion that a state cannot only “obtain the outcomes it wants” by using hard power resources 
such as military force or economic pressure, but also “because other countries – admiring its 
values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to fol-
low it”. A state thus can create influence via its culture, its political values and its foreign 
policy that may are regarded as endowed with legitimacy and moral authority. According to 
Nye, “[t]his soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people 
rather than coerces them” by “set[ting] the agenda and attract[ing] others in world politics” 
instead of forcing “them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions” 
(Nye 2004:5). 
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It is argued that small states are particularly supportive of international law, 
because they lack capabilities and ‘hard power’ resources for power driven 
politics in an anarchic international environment that is not governed by insti-
tutional rules and norms (Rothstein 1968). The PSIDS regularly express their 
great support towards the UN, are reluctant to reforms of those organizations 
operating on the ‘one state, one vote’ principle and comparatively often con-
sult the International Court of Justice. However, they are party of only com-
paratively few international treaties, especially in the field of human rights 
protection (Baird 2008:190 et seq.). This signifies that prioritization as a 
strategy seems to be of greater importance to the PSIDS than is their support 
for codification and institutionalization.  
Even though the PSIDS generally tend to avoid embarrassing other actors 
especially when no distinct PSIDS interests are concerned, they sometimes 
strategically resort to confrontation and protest as means of diplomacy. Most 
popular is the case of Tuvalu’s boycott of a session of the Conference of the 
Parties, which at least created significant attention and “was able to provoke a 
suspension of the meeting, seriously affecting the dynamics of the negotiation 
process” (Deitelhoff/Wallbott 2012:357). 
Conclusions 
It can be concluded that after being only that the PSIDS have become increas-
ingly active members in international organizations and especially in the last 
years they have significantly boosted their participation in international di-
plomacy. Of course the PSIDS still do not constitute the most important or 
most powerful group within international organizations. But they are also not 
just powerless actors without any relevance to international decision-making. 
They claim their responsibilities and make clear that they no longer want to 
be ignored in international diplomacy. The PSIDS often remain neutral or 
conform with dominant actors on those issues of limited relevance to them, 
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especially in order to strategically safeguard financial support. But they also 
firmly represent their interests and do not obviate confrontation with powerful 
actors when it comes to prioritized issues. International organizations as well 
as different international actors attach rising attention to the PSIDS, which at 
the same time increase their foreign policy activities in international organiza-
tions. Particularly Fiji has pursuit a very active and sometimes aggressive 
international diplomacy that also affects Fiji’s Pacific islands neighbors (see 
Ratuva in this volume). Chairing the G77 was convenient to Fiji’s policy of 
increasing its visibility and activity at the global level, to its disengagement 
with Australia and New Zealand and its attempts to virtually demonstrate the 
independence of traditional partners by looking for new ways of cooperation. 
There are, obviously, still dependencies and external influences that strongly 
direct the behaviour of many PSIDS in international organizations. However, 
they increasingly diversify and become more flexible, increasing the choices 
of PSIDS and making them less dependent on only a few powerful actors. 
There have been many dynamics in the international diplomacy of the PSIDS 
in recent years, including the establishment of new diplomatic links, the ad-
mission to new organizations and lobby-groups, stronger cooperation on 
PSIDS level and many symbolic gestures that point to their rising prominence 
in international organizations. According to Christopher Browning, being 
regarded as “‘small’ is not an objective given, but a matter of negotiations” 
and of the behaviour of smaller states (Browning 2006:681). As the example 
of Fiji shows, smaller states do not need to stick to small state identity and 
suppliant behaviour towards larger states, but can reshape their image, if they 
decide to put some resources in their international activities and are ready to 
take some risks. 
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 Shared Sovereignty in the South Pacific Region? 
Eike Blitza 
Abstract: Understanding sovereignty as the exclusive authority of a State 
within a given territory, the use of the term “shared sovereignty” may raise 
doubts due to its apparent contradictory nature. Sovereignty however is not a 
static but an evolutionary concept, leading to the consequence that today 
sovereignty should be viewed as having a relative rather than absolute na-
ture. Relative in this regard means that the State is no longer exclusively 
competent to regulate certain matters, but must interact with other States or 
international organizations. This is where the term “shared sovereignty” 
comes into play, as it refers to instances in which sovereign States willingly 
transfer power to other States or international organizations. The concept of 
shared sovereignty is descriptive in nature and aims at providing a better 
understanding of the factual situation at hand, it is – as the following paper 
argues – not necessarily reflective of the legal situation. 
Keywords: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, Pacific Island Forum, 
RAMSI, Associated States 
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Introduction 
Any assessment of the nature of sovereignty in international law must 
acknowledge that it is a difficult concept to grasp (Steinberger 2000:500ff; 
Giegerich 2011:603). Such difficulty can only be exacerbated in the attempt 
to make sense of ‘shared sovereignty’, as it appears a logical contradiction1 to 
what one ordinarily associates with sovereignty: the exclusive authority of a 
State within a given territory (Besson 2012:366-391).  
This definition of sovereignty is, however, insufficient, as it is not nu-
anced enough and neglects the fact that sovereignty is an evolutionary con-
cept and thus subject to constant change (Schrijver 2000:65,70,98; Breuer 
2013:747). In 1576, Jean Bodin refused to understand sovereignty in absolute 
terms, but saw it rather as something of a relative nature.2 Accordingly, it can 
be seen that even at this early juncture the absolute nature of sovereignty was 
perceived by some as conceivably including the notion of shared authority.  
However, in view of the prominence of the definition of sovereignty as 
exclusive authority over a defined territory, it is understandable that the con-
cept of shared sovereignty is found by some to be astonishing or incompre-
hensible. The following paper therefore aims, taking the Pacific Islands States 
(PICs) as an example, to address this conceptual ambiguity by assessing its 
scope of application, as well as any inherent limitations in the use of the 
phrase ‘shared sovereignty’.  
An illustration focusing on PICs seems appropriate not only in view of 
the historic development of this area,3 but also due to the fact that plans to 
                                                          
1
  Compare for this train of thought also Kahl 2000:436 and Schliesky 2004:530. 
2
  Jean Bodin, Les six Livres de la Republique (1981), I 8, III 4. Although it should be noted 
that this early understanding of the relative nature of sovereignty was influenced by consid-
erations related to natural and divine law. 
3
  The New Hebrides (Vanuatu) were governed as a condominium by Britain and France, a 
form of administration under which sovereignty is only reserved with respect to nationals but 
not to the territory. See for further information Morrison 2013 and Kohen 2000:35, 41 et seq. 
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enhance integration4 in the region have been repeatedly, and perhaps in an ill-
considered manner, linked with the catchword ‘shared sovereignty’. 
Moreover, due to the fact that the term has also been used recently to de-
scribe situations of intensified development aid and support, and post-conflict 
constellations (Krasner 2004:1075; Daase 2011:493-522), one might well ask 
if the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) could be 
qualified as an instance of shared sovereignty.5 In addition to the objective 
mentioned, the following text therefore aims to add to the terminological 
clarity of the concept. 
Sovereignty – a concept open for development  
Given the significance of State sovereignty in international law, it appears to 
be rather odd that the term is criticized for being so difficult to grasp and that 
it has been described as “the most glittering and controversial notion in the 
history, doctrine and practice of international law” (Steinberger 2000:500). 
Having said that, it seems to be exactly this formlessness – or put differently: 
its flexibility or openness - which ensures its persistence and rebuts its nu-
merous but ultimately premature dirges (Oeter 2002:259, 275). 
This becomes apparent if one considers that attempts to deny its rele-
vance have mainly been based on a rigid understanding of sovereignty. For 
example, the attempt to apply a sociological understanding of sovereignty 
which defines it as the possibility of unlimited exercise of State authority 
renders it rather unsurprising that sovereignty in this form is nonexistent 
(Hillgruber 2002:1072f). It is obvious that such a conclusion is inadequate 
given how multifaceted the concept of sovereignty is. Moreover, even an 
understanding of sovereignty which builds on the supremacy and unlimited 
                                                          
4
  An example of such integrated efforts can be seen in the 2003 call for “pooled regional 
governance” by the former Australian Prime Minister John Howard which has been imple-
mented in the 2005 Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration. 
5
  See infra, C.2. 
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authority of the State seems disputable. Both etymological and historical 
approaches clarify that sovereignty cannot be equated with “Bin-
dungslosigkeit” or absolute freedom (Breuer 2013:747f) but is of a compara-
tive nature, as it requires supremacy within a certain group, while not pre-
cluding the existence of higher authority outside that group (Dicke 1978:54f; 
Hillgruber 2002:1075). 
Leaving aside the 19th century misconception of absolute sovereignty 
(ibid.), this phenomenon can be found in the consensus-based legal order of 
international law.6 Our modern consensus-based system requires a relative 
understanding of sovereignty, as it is true that “[i]n a society composed of 
sovereign states, the law that regulates their relations is above them” (Kohen 
2000:36).  
When States transfer power to an international or supranational organisa-
tion, or if they oblige themselves to refrain from certain acts, this can be de-
scribed as abstaining from the exercise of sovereignty in a certain field. It 
should not, however, be equated with its loss. This point is emphasised by 
Kohen when he points out: “What is repeatedly called the relinquishment or 
‘abandonment’ of sovereignty should rather be perceived as an exercise of it: 
states are free to limit their jurisdiction, and to transfer part – even substantial 
parts – of their powers to other institutions.”7 
This quotation poses the question as to whether the transfer of authority 
has any substantive limitations: Is there a core of rights which cannot be 
transferred as to do so would risk ‘losing sovereignty’? 
                                                          
6
  Independence “is really no more than the normal condition of states according to internation-
al law; it may also be described as sovereignty (suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, 
by which is meant that the state has over it no other authority than that of international law”, 
Permanent Court of Justice, Customs Régime between Germany and Austria, Advisory 
Opinion, 5 September 1931, Series A/B, No. 41, 57 (dissent Anzilotti). 
7
  Kohen 2000:36, Permanent Court of Justice, SS Wimbledon, PCIJ Series A, No. 1, 25: “the 
right of entering in international engagements is an attribute of state sovereignty”. 
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Building on this question, Seidel assumes a ‘drain’ of sovereignty, if essential 
rights which form the core of a State’s independence, e.g. those related to the 
budget, are transferred without the power receiving entity being equally dem-
ocratically legitimized (Seidel 2013:900; Herdegen 2008:220 MN 5). 
In contrast, Hillgruber (2002:1076) does not focus on the existence of 
certain substantial powers (and whether they are still held by the State in 
question), but rather considers the ‘Kompetenzkompetenz’, i.e. the potential 
omnicompetence, to be decisive. This conclusion is convincing as sovereignty 
as such is not the subject of transfer, but rights that are theoretically retrieva-
ble are being temporarily transferred (Giegerich 2011:610). A State which has 
transferred authority does not forfeit its ability to act – even in the field of law 
in which it has transferred power - but merely risks breaching its obligations 
by nevertheless acting in this given field. A different conclusion can only be 
drawn in cases where a sovereign decides to transfer its sovereignty in order 
to become part of another State. In that case, it becomes part of a federa-
tion/federal State, a situation which is firmly associated with the abandon-
ment of sovereignty.8 
General international law does not make the surrender of sovereignty an 
easy undertaking, and this can be traced back to its wish to guarantee stabil-
ity. National constitutions might, however, set stricter requirements when it 
comes to the transfer of power to another international legal subject. For ex-
ample, the German Basic Law9 contains a provision, Art. 79 (3), which ren-
ders certain powers resistant to any transfer – even in the case of constitution-
al amendments (Dreier 2006:1795, 1803)10. 
 
                                                          
8
  For discussion of the distribution of sovereignty in federal States, see infra, C.1. 
9
  Basic Constutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949, BGBl. 1. 
10
  See also BVerfGE 123, 267, 357. 
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The Notion of Shared Sovereignty 
Previous considerations of this topic suggest that there is nothing like ‘shared 
sovereignty’, as a State, in transferring power, merely obliges itself not to 
exercise its sovereignty in certain given fields. Only in cases in which a peo-
ple decide to become part of another State could one say that sovereignty 
itself (and not specific rights in a given field) is the subject of transfer. Thus, 
if only rights are subject to transfer in such situations, why is it that the term 
‘shared sovereignty’ is nonetheless so often used to describe them?  
Shared Sovereignty as a means to describe multi-layered political systems 
An initial approach in explaining the concept of shared sovereignty may be 
found in considerations regarding relations between a federal State and its 
members. In view of the member States’ participation in authority on the 
federal level and the fact that the federal State does not possess any authority 
independent from that of its member States, it has been assumed that in feder-
al States sovereignty is being shared (Giegerich 2011:604f). 
However, this understanding is problematic, a fact which becomes clear 
when considering a historical example concerning a dispute between a federal 
government and one of its member States. In 1828, the parliament of South 
Carolina rejected the implementation of federal tax law by unilaterally claim-
ing the right to annul it. In so doing, it provoked the threat of military inter-
vention by the then President, Andrew Jackson (see for further information 
Grimm 2009:54ff). Although this conflict was eventually resolved by peace-
ful means, it demonstrates the potential tensions which might arise due to a 
lack of clarity in the distribution of sovereignty. Furthermore, in Germany in 
course of the foundation of the Second Reich in 1871, the allocation of sover-
eignty became a contentious matter. Georg Waitz was of the view that the 
sharing of sovereignty between the federal State and its members was indeed 
possible, and, whilst this thesis was widely approved – particularly because it 
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allowed for the foundation of the empire without limiting the princes’ power 
in a revolutionary manner – it was heavily criticized after the foundation of 
the Reich. For example, Paul Laband was of the view that sovereignty is of an 
absolute character and does not allow for enhancement or reduction. He be-
lieved that there can be no halved, shared, reduced, dependent or relative 
sovereignty, but merely sovereignty or the lack thereof (Laband 1901:68). 
This position became the established position, so that generally, in the case of 
federal States, sovereignty rests with the federation and not with the member 
States.11 
In recent times, the idea of shared sovereignty is enjoying a renaissance 
of sorts, as it is being used to explain the allocation of authority in multi-
layered political unions. Kahl considers such a model of a sovereignty divi-
sion to be helpful, particularly for its ability to acknowledge the variety of 
centralized, layered actors that are equipped with authority in the broader 
sense (Kahl 2000:434). Pernice (2006:438, MN 22) agrees, arguing that in 
multi-layered systems, sovereignty can neither be considered to be merely 
with the transferring States nor with the power receiving entity. Randelzhofer 
(2004:157) and di Fabio12 are of quite the opposite view, with the latter par-
ticularly emphasizing that, even in multi-layer political systems, the issue is 
not about sharing of sovereignty but rather a question of shared responsibility 
(di Fabio 2001:92). In light of the controversy surrounding the legal status of 
the concept of shared sovereignty, it seems preferable to understand it fore-
most as something descriptive, as a model to describe far-reaching transfers 
of power in multi-layer systems, a term which aims to describe a factual sit-
uation but not necessarily a legal one. 
                                                          
11
  In Switzerland, however the situation differs: the cantons are sovereign in so far as their 
sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution (Grimm 2009:59). 
12
  Udo di Fabio 1998:124: “Im Staatenverbund ist souverän, wer das Recht des Austritts be-
sitzt. Und das besitzen immer noch die Mitgliedstaaten“. 
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Shared Sovereignty as a means of describing the distribution of powers 
in post-conflict (or alike) situations? 
As mentioned previously, the ambiguity surrounding the concept of shared 
sovereignty does not merely follow from its lack of precision, but is also due 
to the fact that the term is used to refer to quite different scenarios. For exam-
ple, Krasner proposed the use of the term to explain the distribution of powers 
in certain post-conflict situations. Proceeding from a three part understanding 
of sovereignty (Krasner 2004:1077)13, i.e. international legal sovereignty 
(recognition of independent territorial entities with the freedom to decide 
independently on entering into international agreements), Westphalian sover-
eignty (the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a 
given territory) and domestic sovereignty (supreme authority to regulate all 
matters within a given territory), Krasner (2004:1091) describes shared sov-
ereignty as the use of international legal sovereignty at the expense of West-
phalian sovereignty for the benefit of domestic sovereignty. 
The scope of application of shared sovereignty as proposed by Krasner 
mainly applies to post-conflict (or alike) situations in which States are in need 
of foreign development aid and support in excess of what went before. If the 
assisting States take over authority in fields which are commonly considered 
to be part of the domaine réservé, or a right of veto is granted to them in par-
ticular sensitive areas, e.g. in important financial questions14, States – in 
Krasner’s opinion – then lack an important element of what amounts to sov-
ereignty: Westphalian sovereignty, as other States are exercising elements of 
                                                          
13
  In an earlier paper he identified four different meanings in the usage of the term sovereignty. 
In addition to the three outlined above he also made reference to “interdependence sover-
eignty” and described it as the “ability of states to control movement across their borders” 
(Krasner 2001:17, 19). 
14
  For a recent example of a counter-signature obligation of the foreign expert group in Liberia, 
see Daase 2011:502. 
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it on their behalf. This, in turn, is held to justify referring to such post-conflict 
situations as ones of shared sovereignty. 
However, this seems questionable if one considers that even in post-
conflict missions – when based either on an explicit invitation, or relying on a 
contractual authorization in a founding treaty of an international organiza-
tion15 – the State concerned is agreeing to the help of other States, which 
otherwise would be contrary to the prohibition on intervention enshrined in 
the UN Charter.16 Thus, the State is not giving up sovereignty but quite the 
contrary: in making such an agreement, it is actually exercising it. 
Preliminary conclusion 
In summary, it can be concluded that ‘shared sovereignty’ is better under-
stood as a factual rather than a legal concept; describing the status quo, it 
aims to explain how sovereignty is exercised. On this understanding, the 
remainder of this chapter will assess if shared sovereignty may be used to 
refer to the distribution of power with regard to PICs. 
Oceania: a region of shared sovereignty? 
Shared Sovereignty as a consequence of enhanced integration? 
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (see Blatt in this volume) is the institutional 
framework in the PICs integration process. The PIF came into being follow-
ing a summit of the heads of State of Nauru, Samoa, Tongo, Fiji, the Cook 
Islands, Australia and New Zealand in 1971, in Wellington. Noteworthy is the 
fact that the PIF was not established by an international treaty but, as de-
scribed by Shennia Spillane (2008:72f), “evolved in the ‘Pacific way’, from a 
decision to talk”.  
                                                          
15
  See e.g., Art. 4 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 26 May 2001, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/23.15. 
16
  Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UNTS 892, 119. 
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Accordingly, the PIF, or the South Pacific Forum as it was called until 1999, 
was a forum used to discuss, prepare and implement steps towards integra-
tion, rather than a legal subject equipped with competences deriving from 
powers transferred by the PICs. The reason for not providing the PIF with 
legal personality appears to stem from a deliberate decision of the heads of 
State, as they considered that the ability to enact binding decisions may have 
proved to be detrimental to the forum’s work (Blatt 2011:25). 
This holds true, as the PIF – despite its missing institutionalization – has 
produced a remarkable output. In 1972, the foundation of the South Pacific 
Bureau for Economic Co-Operation was agreed on. Based on a founding 
treaty signed in 1973,17 the Bureau for Economic Co-operation formed the 
institutional framework for trade negotiations between the PIF members 
(ibid:5). Moreover, the Pacific Forum Line, a regional shipping agency, 
commonly owned by the twelve participating States, was established to en-
sure a reliable link between them. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was 
also established.  
The FFA, similar to the Bureau for Economic Co-operation, was based 
on an international agreement and established as an international organization 
with its own – though very limited – competences, transferred to it by the 
founding States (Sutherland 1986:15-28). In essence, the FFA may be – in 
line with the intention of its members – described as a ‘service agency’ (“fo-
rum leaders generally expressed the view that the role of the agency should be 
confined to providing advice to forum governments”18). The FFA does not 
                                                          
17
  Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation, 17 April 
1973. 
18
  Forum Document SPF(78)REP, 24. 
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have extensive rights in the field of fisheries and accordingly only marginally 
affects the sovereign rights of its members.19 
Recently, the PIF Secretariat, the successor organization to the Bureau for 
Economic Co-operation, was founded and has led to an increase of coopera-
tion in the PICs area. Explicitly equipped with legal personality, it was estab-
lished to address a variety of new areas. Pursuant to Art. III of the Agreement 
Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, it is tasked “to facilitate, 
develop and maintain co-operation and consultation between member gov-
ernments on economic development, trade, transport, tourism, energy, tele-
communications, legal, political, security and such other matters as the Fo-
rum may direct”20. Despite this long list of assignments, the actual compe-
tences transferred to the Secretariat remain limited. So far, it only possesses 
independent competence in view of its depositary function21 and is considered 
to be “competent authority” in the field of development aid (Blatt 2011:46, 
52). 
In view of the above considerations, it is clear that intergovernmental co-
operation in the Oceania region does not fit the traditional description of 
shared sovereignty. It is not a political multi-layer system like the European 
Union, for example, in which it might be appropriate to speak of a situation of 
shared sovereignty in order to better grasp the factual situation. Even recent 
integration efforts, including the 2005 Pacific Plan and aim to base the work 
of the organization on four pillars (economic growth, sustainable develop-
ment, good governance and security, Graham 2008:19, 36), do not show such 
                                                          
19
  See Sutherland 1986:18: “member States are obliged to inform the FFA in view certain 
measures taken in the field of fishery”; 23-24: “common register for fishing vessels”. 
20
  Art. III Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 30.10.2000, online: 
www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/about-us/agreement-establishing-forum-secretariat.html. 
21
  For information on what sort of obligations are generally considered to be of a depositary 
nature, see UN OLA, Summary of Practice of Secretary General as Depositary of Multilat-
eral Treaties, UN Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 (1999). 
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kind of enhanced integration which – even from a mere descriptive perspec-
tive – justify the label shared sovereignty. 
Shared sovereignty as a consequence of intervention by invitation 
As previously outlined, the concept of shared sovereignty is not only used as 
a descriptive means to explain the distribution of power in multi-layer politi-
cal systems, but also is referred to in relation to post-conflict (or alike) situa-
tions. Taking Krasner’s model of shared sovereignty as a basis, the following 
aims to assess whether the RAMSI intervention may be understood as an 
instance of shared sovereignty.  
In light of civil unrest and increasing violence on the Solomon Islands 
leading to an overextension of local security forces (see Dinnen in this vol-
ume), in spring 2003 the Solomon government saw itself forced to ask the 
other PIF member states to help to restore law and order. The institutional 
basis for the RAMSI intervention was laid out in the Biketawa declaration.22 
Following negotiations, an agreement23 was drawn up providing for the sup-
port of the Solomon security forces. Pursuant to Art. 2 of this Solomon Is-
lands Assistance Agreement, the supporting States were authorized “[to] 
deploy a Visiting Contingent of police forces, armed forces and other person-
nel to Solomon Islands to assist in the provision of security and safety to 
persons and property; maintain supplies and services essential to the life of 
the Solomon Islands community; prevent and suppress violence, intimidation 
and crime; support and develop Solomon Islands institutions; and generally 
to assist in the maintenance of law and order in Solomon Islands.” 
                                                          
22
  Pacific Islands Forum, Biketawa Declaration, 28.10.2000, online at (retrieved 18.02.2014): 
http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/Biketawa%20Declaratio
n,%2028%20October%2020002.pdf. 
23
  Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa And Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces 
and Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and 
Order and Security [2003] PITSE 12 (Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement, online: 
http://www3.paclii.org/pits/en/treaty_database/2003/12.html (18 February 2014)). 
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If one subsumes these facts under Krasner’s conception of shared sovereign-
ty, then there are good reasons to speak of a situation of shared sovereignty. 
Foreign personnel were authorized to perform the sorts of functions usually 
exclusively carried out by sovereign States. This point is emphasised where 
the functions to be performed concerned sensitive matters that are commonly 
accepted to be part of a State’s domaine réservé. This finding is supported if 
one considers the competences of the supporting forces deriving from the 
definition of the term ‘assistance’ in the Solomon Islands Assistance Agree-
ment.  
According to Art. 5 Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement, members of 
the Participating Police Forces (PPF) are in general only subordinated to the 
commands of the PPF24 and are only obliged to respect their respective na-
tional laws.25 Furthermore, they enjoy immunity in cases of statutory viola-
tions.26 Based on Krasner’s idea of shared sovereignty, this indeed appears to 
justify the description of a ‘shared sovereignty’ between the requesting and 
the supporting States. It is to be emphasized, however, that the model does 
not describe the legal situation but merely functions as a descriptive simplifi-
cation of the situation at hand. By inviting foreign forces to aid them, the 
Solomon Islands exercised their sovereignty and neither shared nor forfeited 
it in any way. 
Free Association as an instance of shared sovereignty? 
Finally, the question of distribution of sovereignty with regard to associated 
States must be assessed, at which point it should be emphasized that a de-
tailed discussion of this matter cannot be provided here, as it would go far 
                                                          
24
  Unless they are official members of the Solomon Islands Police Forces. In such cases they 
are subordinated to the command of the Police Commissioner after consultation with the 
head of the PPF. 
25
  Art. 5 (6) Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement. 
26
  Art. 10 (2) Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement. 
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beyond the scope of the current paper. The reason for providing an overview 
of sovereignty in relation to associated States is the ambiguity that exists 
surrounding their nature, especially in view of the distribution of sovereignty. 
Moreover, they are of particular relevance in a study that assesses sovereignty 
in the Pacific region due to the fact that five States27 in that area are associat-
ed States.  
Free association has been described as “a form of self-government devel-
oped in United Nations practice under which the associated entity has a spe-
cial status short of independence, with certain functions (including interna-
tional representation and defense) carried out by another State” (Crawford 
2006:625). This is in line with a systematic interpretation of General Assem-
bly Resolution 1541 (XV), as ‘free association’ is mentioned – alongside 
emerging as a sovereign independent State and integration with an independ-
ent State – as a separate option for entities to realize their right to self-
determination.  
As an associated entity does not possess all competences usually pos-
sessed by sovereign States, it may well be asked if sovereignty in these in-
stances is indeed shared with another State.  
In contrast to the potential scenarios of shared sovereignty laid out be-
fore, the situation with regard to associated States differs, as they were never 
independent States with ‘Kompetenzkompetenz’ which then decided to trans-
fer certain rights, but were as such only able to regulate certain aspects of 
what amounts to ‘full’ sovereignty. It has sometimes been argued that associ-
ated States do not possess legal personality, as they have no say with regards 
to their own foreign affairs and defense (Broderick 1968:368, 402). However, 
it might be appropriate here to recall the judgment of the International Court 
                                                          
27
  The Cook Islands and Niue are associated with New Zealand and the Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia and Palau with the United States. 
Shared Sovereignty  281 
 
of Justice in the Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of 
America in Morocco, in which it held that a State remains sovereign despite 
having contractually obliged itself not to exercise certain rights, even if it 
amounts to “all of [its] international relations” (ICJ 1952:176, 188). Despite 
the differences, as e.g. the judgment was related to a protectorate and not an 
associated State, it may be concluded that a State, even after transferring such 
important competences as national defense or foreign affairs to another State, 
does not lose its legal personality but remains ‘sovereign’. Thus, there are 
good reasons not to simply reject that an associated State may be sovereign. 
Rather, its status depends on the specific conditions laid down in the agree-
ment which forms the basis for association but equally importantly its imple-
mentation (Crawford 2006:632). Instances in which the association was 
agreed to by the people concerned, and they are provided with substantial 
powers of self-governance without the possibility of interference by the State 
they are associated with, as well as a unilateral right to terminate the status of 
association, can all be seen as evidence for the proposition that associated 
States possess “substantial international personality […] in approximate to 
statehood” (ibid.:632-633).28 
Similar to the conclusions reached with regards to the scenarios assessed 
above, referring to associated States as instances of “shared sovereignty” may 
be appropriate to better understand the factual situation, but does not neces-
sarily reflect the legal situation. 
 
 
                                                          
28
  Due to political developments the Cook Islands may, e.g., “for most purposes […] be con-
sidered as independent” (Crawford 2006:630). See also the Joint Centenary Declaration of 
11 June 2001, in which the prime ministers of the Cook Islands and New Zealand jointly de-
clared: “In the conduct of its foreign affairs, the Cook Islands interact with the international 
community as a sovereign and independent State.” 
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Conclusion 
An essential criterion in regional integration processes is the transfer of rights 
to an international organization that is itself equipped with legal personality. 
However, this process does not, in contrast to what has been frequently stat-
ed29, amount to a sharing of sovereignty. Rather, it is the (temporary) absten-
tion from the exercise of the particular elements of sovereignty required to 
exercise the rights that have been transferred.30 The renunciation of sover-
eignty as a logical prerequisite of an upwards distribution of sovereignty may 
only be assumed if a sovereign State decides to become a member State of a 
federation. Accordingly, statements connecting the transfer of some single 
sovereign rights with the term shared sovereignty are merely of a descriptive 
nature and, while they may hold some political force, do not affect the legal 
status of sovereign nations.  
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 Conflict Transformation, Sovereignty and State 
Building in New Caledonia 
Peter Lindenmann 
Abstract: In New Caledonia, a former French colony in the South Pacific, 
the question of independence has created political strife and a situation of 
conflict in the 1980ies. The French authorities acted a series of statutes trying 
to define the difficult situation of a dependent territory 20,000 kilometres 
away from its European mother country in order to find an issue. Key to find-
ing a political solution was the economic settlement on how to share the rich 
natural resources. The Noumea treaty that finally was signed between pro-
independence parties, loyalists and the central state in 1998 has paved the 
road for an evolving emancipation of New Caledonia. Irreversible transfers 
of competences; joined by the training of adequate administrative personnel 
and the granting of the necessary funding have been among the means agreed 
to by the parties of the treaty to build up New Caledonian statehood. As the 
end of the treaty period draws near the New Caledonians are still divided 
about the question of independence and while the referendum that must be 
held during the legislation ending in 2018 looms, they must find a way to a 
shared and inclusive future. For this new ways to think about sovereignty, 
markers of political identity and citizenship are necessary.  
Keywords: decolonization, overseas territory, statebuilding, conflict 
transformation, statehood, non-self governing territories, fragility, eco-
nomic development, independence, power sharing, sovereignty, identity 
markers 
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Figure 1: New Caledonia 
 
Introduction 
The French overseas territory of New Caledonia, situated in the South Pacific, 
some 2000 kilometres east of Australia is an often cited example for an alter-
native version of decolonisation and successful conflict transformation. In 
some versions of the story, New Caledonia is the luminous example proving 
the claim that a successful way out fragility and violent conflict is possible for 
former colonial territories. In other versions New Caledonia is the prime 
example for the on-going persistence of colonialism, one of the very few non-
self governed territories still under the yoke of a European metropolitan pow-
er some 20,000 kilometres distant.  
Both versions neglect the agency of the local people, who have struggled 
with their situation as colonial subjects, transported convicts, deported rebels, 
internal migrants, invaders, contract workers, officials, officers and oppor-
tunity seekers ever since France took possession of the remote island group 
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161 years ago. Beside the Kanak, the original inhabitants of New Caledonia, 
the island population consists of the descendants of free settlers, transported 
convicts, deported rebels from Algeria and contract workers from former 
French and Dutch colonies in South East Asia. Furthermore there are migrant 
workers from other former and actual French possessions in the Pacific, some 
also present since several generations. Finally a large part of the current popu-
lation consists of migrants from metropolitan France who came to New Cale-
donia in the last decades as teachers, public servants, military personnel and 
pensioners or for the nickel industry and stayed on. Local people largely un-
dertake the lobbying for independence as well as for continuing a close rela-
tionship with France. While up to the 1990s the officials of the French state 
had a clear stance for New Caledonia to remain French, nowadays they are 
more ambivalent. This became clear when President Chirac forced the issue 
of freezing of the electorate for local elections only weeks before passing the 
presidency to his successor Nicolas Sarkozy (Chappell 2008:461). And even 
President Sarkozy, while visiting New Caledonia in 2011, stated that while he 
himself would favour New Caledonia to remain French, the decision for one 
of the possible options would belong to the local population eligible to vote in 
the final referendum (Chappell 2012:394). 
The New Caledonian population on the other side is still much divided on 
the issue of independence. While a majority of the Kanak would probably 
vote for independence, a majority of the other population groups is likely to 
prefer a continuation of some kind of relationship with France. Because the 
non-kanak represent the majority of the inhabitants (around 60%), they are 
likely to tilt the balance against independence (Chappell 2011:476). On this 
condition all parameters of the coming referendum are highly controversial. 
This starts with the registration of voters, but also the timing of the vote, the 
exact formulation of the question to be asked as well as the choices offered to 
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voters. All these factors might be decisive for the outcome, are closely scruti-
nized by the different groups and are widely discussed among the local popu-
lation. 
Some time ago two ‘easy’ solutions where proposed, the one to have a 
“referendum coupere”’, a quick nasty vote on a brutally formulated question 
to ensure a “no to independence” from the majority of voters (Chappell 
2009:354). The other option would have been again to push the referendum 
forward a few years and prolong the period of transition for another decade 
(Chappell 2009:354). Actually, however it looks like the referendum is to 
take place as planned (Le Monde 26.7.2013). New Caledonians will be able 
to vote on the future status of their island group somewhere in between 2014 
and 2018. 
In the meantime, New Caledonia while constitutionally still being a part 
of France has been swept up in the commodity driven Asia-pacific economic 
sphere. Most recent New Caledonian GDP per capita data shows it on pair 
with the declining motherland and ahead of advanced neighbouring countries 
such as New Zealand and Australia. These rapid changes in the economic 
system have also to be taken into consideration while discussing political 
issues (see Kowasch in this volume). 
Conflict transformation 
New Caledonia was torn apart by a violent conflict, verging on a situation of 
civil war from about 1981 (murder of Pierre Declerq) to 1989 (assassination 
of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene) (Kurtovitch/Regnault 
2002:166-168). New Caledonia had been a laboratory of status for overseas 
territories since the end of WW II (15 statuses in 32 years; Angleviel 2006: 
220). A succession of socialist, Gaullist and UDF1 (centrist) administrations 
                                                          
1
  UDF: Union pour la Démocratie Française, French centrist party founded by former French 
president Valérie Giscard-D’Estaing. 
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had struggled with the problem of how to hold on to overseas territories in a 
world where colonialism was to be a thing of the past. When the struggle for 
independence turned violent in the 1980s, François Mitterrand, the first so-
cialist President of the fifth Republic was just about to replace Valérie Gis-
card-d’Estaing as head of state. While still in opposition the socialist party 
had been in favour of New Caledonian independence (Garde 2001:12). But 
once in power their stance became more ambigous and a first try for a peace 
agreement at Nainville les Roches in 1983 (statut Lemoine) did not work out 
(ibid.). A second try, the statut Fabius-Pisani in 1985 was not implemented 
as the socialist government was overturned in 1986 (Leblic 2003:304). The 
incumbent Gaullist government headed by Jacques Chirac tried its hand twice 
in the short period from 1986-1988 (statut Pons I et II) but also to no avail 
(Garde 2001:14-16). The insurrectional situation turned for the worse during 
the presidential election of 1988 when Jacques Chirac, the acting prime min-
ister, tried to wrestle the presidency from François Mitterrand. In between the 
two turns of the election a hostage situation on Ouvea Island became the last 
colonial massacre by the joint efforts of the French police and military. 19 
young Kanak activists were killed, some during the liberation of the hostages 
and some under dubious conditions (Leblic 2003:305; Michalski 2004:15). 
The shockwaves created by this event enabled the newly elected socialist 
government to negotiate a new peace agreement in the aftermath. In May 
1988 delegations of the loyalist RPCR2 and the pro-independence FLNKS3 
where summoned to Paris where Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the charismatic leader 
of the independence movement and Jacques Lafleur, the founder of the main 
loyalist party and mining billionaire shook hands and signed together with 
prime-minister Michel Rocard the Matignon treaty (Leblic 2003:305). The 
                                                          
2
  RPCR: Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la république.  
3
  FLNKS: Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste. 
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primary achievement of the Matignon treaty of 1988 was to put a stop on the 
violent and insurrectional situation in the country. It was decided to suspend 
answering the question on eventual independence for ten years and to dedi-
cate these years to accelerated economic development, especially in the dis-
advantaged regions. Even the assassination of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and 
Yeiwéné Yeiwéné by a disappointed pro-independence hardliner on Ouvéa 
Island a year later was not able to derail the peace process (Angleviel 
2006:225).  
The first treaty also provided a set of new, made to measure, institutions 
and offices for a large part of the political cadres of both of the main political 
factions. The country was divided into provinces and these provinces received 
large competences. Their prerogatives comprised primary level health ser-
vices, social services, land administration and urbanization, parts of the road 
network, agricultural extension services, economic development and tourism 
(Devaux 1997:869). Furthermore they even received so-called common law 
competences, meaning that all competences that were not regulated elsewhere 
were attributed automatically to the provinces (Pontier 2000:262). The prov-
inces where designed in a way that pro-independence parties would probably 
control the northern and the island provinces, while the southern province 
including the capital Noumea would serve as a powerbase for the loyalists 
(Angleviel 2006:221). Furthermore a complex array of economic measures 
was put in place in order to further an equilibration in favour of the less de-
veloped Northern and Island provinces. These dispositions managed to move 
the struggle from the streets and villages of New Caledonia into the arena of 
the provincial and territorial councils.  
Economic settlement 
An important element of the settlement of the New Caledonian conflict was 
the insight that economic issues had to be addressed urgently, preferable even 
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before the definitive political agreement. Already in 1990 a former white-
owned “little”4 mining company, the Société Minière du Pacifique Sud 
(SMSP) was bought by the newly created Northern Province ruled by pro-
independence parties (Carnuccini/Guillaud 1997:94). All of the three prov-
inces created so-called mixed-economy societies, owned by them and a few 
selected shareholders and investing in various ways to further economic de-
velopment (Kowasch 2010:177). The provinces thus became major economic 
actors in their own right, owning casinos, hotels, airlines, ferries, fishing 
vessel, but also aqua farms, a soap factory and a vanilla drying unit. 
The FLNKS blocked discussions on a definitive peace agreement in 1996 
until their conditions with regard to future economic development had been 
met. In the New Caledonian context this meant the future of Nickel mining. 
ERAMET/SLN and the French state agreed in 1997 to transfer mining rights 
of the Koniambo massive to the SMSP mining company. The SLN would 
receive the already operational SMSP mine at Poum in exchange. The so-
called ‘préalable minier’ was then lifted and the way to a definitive peace 
settlement, the Nouméa treaty of 1998, cleared (Garde 2001:158). The deal 
included a paragraph stating that the Koniambo massive would fall back to its 
original owner (Eramet/SLN) if the SMSP had not made a substantial com-
mitment to the development of the resource within 10 years. André Dang, 
SMSP’s general manager was able to strike a deal with the Canadian miner 
Falconbridge, since 2006 part of Glencore/Xstrata. SMSP would retain a 51% 
share in the Koniambo-project for contributing the resource and mining titles 
while Falconbridge got 49% and was to invest several billion dollars in order 
to build a new smelter in the north of New Caledonia (Kowasch 2010:91). 
                                                          
4
  Beside the giant Société Le Nickel with its smelter in Doniambo, right beside Nouméa’s city 
centre, there always existed ‘les petits miniers’, small companies mining nickel ore in remote 
sites and selling the produce to SLN or exporting ore directly to smelters abroad.  
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The so-called ‘Usine du Nord’ started production in 2013 (LNC 12.4.2013). 
Meanwhile the village of Koné, formerly a rural backwater on the west coast 
that became the capital of the Northern Province in 1989, has grown into an 
economic beehive with the advent of the new nickel smelter built in nearby 
Vavouto. 
No security sector reform 
At the end of the conflict independence fighters as well as security forces 
were granted amnesty (Leblic 2003:305). The loosely structured armed 
groups on the pro-independence side all but disappeared. There was no dis-
armament, the (few) weapons literally disappeared into the nature and where 
never recovered. The French police and army remained as the only armed 
actor. There was however no reform of state security forces, only the numbers 
of army personnel present on the island declined slowly over the years after 
the Matignon treaty and the security measures became less strict as the level 
of threat as perceived by the French authorities declined.  
According to French law the security sector is the reserved prerogative of 
the central state (Ventre 2002:31). As New Caledonia is still under French 
sovereignty, the security sector has never been reformed post conflict. Until 
New Caledonia will be independent the French authorities will continue to 
assume the responsibility for the police and the armed forces alone. New 
Caledonia is the primary staging point for the prepositioned French projection 
forces in the Asia-Pacific area (defence.gouv.fr). Military elements stationed 
in New Caledonia have been deployed in disaster relief to various Pacific 
Islands as well as for peace-enforcement to East Timor (troupesdemari-
ne.org). Police functions in rural New Caledonia are still assumed by the 
French Gendarmerie nationale, metropolitan officers are rotated on a four-
year basis to the island. Only Nouméa, the capital, is in ‘zone police’ and 
hosts a contingent of Police nationale, also constituted mainly by French 
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officers. Only some of the gendarmerie and police personnel are hired locally. 
They either belong to the local cadre and cannot raise above a certain level in 
their career or the join the general force and will then serve all over France 
and its overseas possessions. New Caledonia is currently totalling about 3,000 
French security personnel but reinforcements are ferried in and out as needed 
(nouvelle-caledonie.gouv.fr).  
At the provincial as well as on the territorial level local authorities are 
trying to use niches such as environmental regulations, customary law, repos-
session and maritime security to implement embryos of local security forces 
controlling these sectors. The New Caledonian governments thus has installed 
a ‘customary police’ (pidp.org) and deployed a fishery patrol vessel 
(affmar.gouv.nc). The government of the Southern Province also deploys 
patrol boats in coastal waters and an environmental police controlling hunting 
regulations (province-sud.nc). Some municipalities, such as Nouméa, Bourail 
and most recently Canala employ municipal police agents, but under French 
law the ‘Police municipal’ has very limited prerogatives (Ventre 2002:39f)5. 
Actually the also municipal fire brigades are much more effective as a securi-
ty force for local needs From 1 January 2014 the competence for civil securi-
ty has been transferred to New Caledonia. Disaster relief, the fight against 
bushfires and disease prevention will from now on be coordinated by the 
government of New Caledonia, not the High Commissioner anymore (nou-
vellecaledonie.la1ere.fr).  
A second treaty 
At the end of the Matignon treaty’s ten-year period politicians from both side 
of the conflict refrained from holding the promised referendum and sought 
                                                          
5
  In France the Municipal Police is only competent to ensure the respect of the orders given by 
the mayor and the surveillance of public spaces. Law enforcement, judicial investigations 
and response to distress calls are reserved to the Police Nationale within city limits (only 
Nouméa) and the Gendarmerie in rural areas (noumea.nc) 
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another issue. They were wary that the outcome of this vote, likely to be in 
favour of continuing the relationship with France, would not resolve the issue 
and probably lead to further violence by the disappointed pro-independence 
fighters (Garde 2001:154-156). With the exception of Tjibaou and Yeiwéné 
largely the same cast as ten years earlier found a willing partner in the new 
socialist French government under Lionel Jospin that had come to power after 
an advanced election in 1997. Instead of the vote on independence, a second 
treaty, called the Nouméa treaty was signed in May 1998 (Leblic 2003:309). 
At the same time a the referendum was postponed for another fifteen to twen-
ty years another promise of the Matignon treaty was held, as prime minister 
Jospin opened the new Tjibaou Cultural Centre in Nouméa (ibid.). The new 
treaty extended the period of transition for another twenty years. Only during 
the mandate of the local parliament elected in 2014 the first of three possible 
referendums on the question of self determination will be held (Garde 
2001:91). But the new treaty also introduced some new elements. For the first 
time since the loi cadre of 1956 New Caledonia would have its own govern-
ment headed by a President and not the High Commissioner. The New Cale-
donian parliament, the Congrès, would be joined by a second chamber of a 
sort. The already existant consultative customary council was to be upgraded 
to Sénat coutumier, with prerogatives to be consulted in all matters of kanak 
affairs and a competence to make propositions for laws (Garde 2001:236-
238). In the time running up to the coming referendum essentially all non-
regal competences were to be transferred to New Caledonia. 
Transfer of competences 
In order to bring government closer to the people and to prepare the New 
Caledonian authorities for greater autonomy and eventually independence, the 
Nouméa treaty prepared a schedule for the transfer of all non-regal compe-
tences to New Caledonia. Because of bad experiences with competences 
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reclaimed by the central state, especially during the gaullist era in the 60s and 
early 70s, as well during cohabitation between 1986 and 1988, the pro-
independence coalition FLNKS demanded that all competences transferred 
would be so irrevocably (Page 2000:277). This guarantee was a condition that 
had to be negotiated during the series of talks preceding the conclusion of the 
treaty. The Noumea treaty thus states, that the transfer of the new competenc-
es would be irreversible (Pontier 2000:258). 
New Caledonia has never been an incorporated part of France. This 
means that already as a colony and later as an overseas territory, New Cale-
donia always had been administered as a separate entity. All laws decided by 
the French parliament had to be extended by another act of parliament in 
order to be applicable in New Caledonia (Devaux 1997:117). This did not 
happen in all cases; sometimes on purpose and sometimes the territory was 
simply forgotten. As all colonies, New Caledonia always had a separate 
budget. Since 1900 the local assembly had a say in the matter of tax collec-
tion (Garde 2001:7). Taxes collected in New Caledonia had to cover local 
expenses; in the time up to the 1960ies the French state was very reluctant to 
provide monetary support to this very distant colony (ibid.). With the Loi 
cadre of 1956 New Caledonia had received additional competences and alt-
hough some of them had been recalled by the ‘Jacquinot’ (1963) and ‘Bil-
lotte’ (1969) laws, the territory retained for example its own domain of public 
lands, its own social security system, a public works department and a sepa-
rate land administration (Devaux 1997:26).  
Immediately after the Nouméa treaty, further competences started to be 
transferred: Primary education, the ownership and the administration of the 
littoral, as well as natural resources with the exception of those necessary for 
nuclear power generation went to the provinces, whereas postal services and 
telecommunications high sea fisheries and the exclusive economic zone, 
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customs and the import of tobacco were attributed to the territory (trans-
fertsdecompetences.gouv.nc). Other competences, such as police and security 
in maritime and air transport, the land reform agency ADRAF and the cultural 
agency ADCK were transferred at a later stage (ibid.). On 1 January 2014 
civil security was transferred to the local government. Of the competences 
that could possibly be transferred the central state still retains secondary (to 
be transferred 2014) and tertiary education, control of local territorial entities 
(municipalities and provinces), civil law and administration of public funds. 
Power sharing 
The Noumea Treaty of 1998 contains an important element of power sharing. 
Between France and New Caledonia this includes the transfer of competences 
mentioned before. Within New Caledonia, power is shared between the Ka-
nak who detain the original sovereignty and the other communities of the 
local population. Within the political sphere, power is shared between the 
different political blocs. Political parties have to surpass a limit of 5% of 
inscribed voters to be represented in parliament (Garde 2001:220). If they 
gain 5 seats or more, they can form a group and can then claim a seat in the 
local government. The seats in government are shared in proportion to the 
seats of the parliamentary groups. The government hands responsibility for 
sectors to individual members, but it is collectively responsible for decisions. 
All parties that have a group in parliament are thus represented in government 
(Garde 2001:245). The New Caledonian government is thus, very unlike the 
metropolitan French government, a permanent coalition were all citizens are 
represented. Early during the period of application of the Nouméa treaty, 
there where just two blocks, a minority pro-independence and a majority 
loyalist. Both blocs where represented in government but loyalists dominated 
the proceedings and controlled all important positions. Since the elections of 
2004 however, when the loyalist faction started to split up into several 
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components, the setting has become much more complicated. The actual 
government comprises members of no less than seven parties, the UC6, Pali-
ka7 and Parti travailliste8 on the pro-independence side and the Rassemble-
ment UMP9, Avenir ensemble10, Calédonie Ensemble11 and the MPC on the 
loyalist side. Furthermore the blocks are not as fix as they were and various 
parties have sided with others across the original division along the question 
of eventual independence, UC/Parti travailliste with RUMP and PALIKA 
with Calédonie ensemble (Chappell 2011:482). This has opened positions for 
pro-independence leaders; Rock Wamytan of the FLNKS was in this way 
elected to the presidency of the local parliament.  
The power sharing agreement does however not extend to the lower lev-
el; these provisions do not apply to provinces and municipalities. In these 
institutions a mode of “the winner takes it all” still prevails. The winning 
party of an election still tend to retain a policy of excluding the minority party 
from the administration of the political entity. In 2011 however the power 
sharing agreement embodied within the government of New Caledonia col-
lapsed over the issue of identity markers. Calédonie ensemble, one of the 
                                                          
6
  Union Calédonienne: Oldest New Caledonian Party, member of the FLNKS, founded in the 
1950s along the motto ‘two colors – one people’ (Angleviel 2006:33), originally autonomist 
but declared itself pro-independence in 1977 (Mrgudovic 2011:4). Controls the island prov-
ince. 
7
  Parti de libération kanak: Hard-line pro-independence party founded in the 1970s with a 
socialist agenda. Controls the Northern Province. 
8
  Parti travailliste: Left-wing party that emerged out of the union movement. 
9
  Rassemblement-UMP: New name of the former RPCR. 
10
  Avenir ensemble: founded by dissidents of RPCR in 2004. AE managed to wrestle the 
Southern Province and the Government of New Caledonia from the RPCR in that year’s 
election. 
11
  Calédonie ensemble: The former president of the Southern Province and the Government of 
New Caledonia Philippe Gomés left AE in 2008 and founded his own party. Since the par-
lamentary elections of 2012 CE holds both seats of deputies from New Caledonia to the 
French parliament. 
 MPC: Latest addition to the plethora of local parties, Sonia Backes and Gaël Yanno created 
the Mouvement populaire calédonien in April 2013, after they split from the Rassemble-
ment-UMP. 
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loyalist parties, used an instrument originally put in place to protect minority 
interest and pushed their members to resign repeatedly from their positions, 
Figure 2: Political Parties in the New Caledonian Parliament 
Party Bloc of Parties Congress Government 
Avenir Ensemble Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France 2 1 
Rassemblement-UMP Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France 11 1 
Calédonie Ensemble Calédonie Ensemble 12 2 
Union Calédonienne 
Front Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS) 
12 1 
Parti travailliste 
 4 0 
LMD Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France 2  
UNI-Palika UNI (Union nationale pour l'indépendance) 6 1 
LKS 
 1  
Dynamik unitaire sud FLNKS 1  
MPC 
 2 1 
RDO 
   
MODEM Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France 1  
Non-inscrits (not regis-
tered)  1  
UDC Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France 1  
thus forcing the demission of the entire government each time. The declared 
aim was to provoke advanced territorial elections with the issue of the two 
flags looming in the background (Mrgudovic 2011:13). Finally the local par-
liament had to ask the French national assembly to amend the organic law 
regulating the implementation of the Nouméa treaty in order to limit use of 
this strategy to once every 18 month to ensure some kind of continuity in 
government and to prevent it become hostage to party interest (Chappell 
2012:392). 
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A recent paper of the committee instated to analyse the political future of the 
territory thus utters some doubts if the government in this form will be able to 
master the competences to be transferred in the future (Courtial et al. 
2013:60). 
The price to pay 
Conflict transformation, however, came at a price. France invested huge sums 
in economic development and social welfare schemes in New Caledonia. 
Financial transfers from France to the island group were at 0.5 billion Euros 
annually in 1990 (TEC 2006) and have risen to 1.5 billion Euros in 2011 (not 
including the cost of security, pensions of French personnel and tax benefits) 
(TEC 2012:82). Furthermore France had to cede on quite a few of the core 
issues of French Republicanism, not the least equality. New Caledonians 
remain French citizens, French citizens who come to New Caledonia, howev-
er, are deprived of voting rights in local affairs, the body of electors for the 
local parliament has been ‘frozen’ to those present before 1998 and their 
descendants. In the case of the coming referendum on self-determination, the 
electorate is even limited to those present in 1988 and their descendants 
(Gohin 2000:390). The Kanak, the original inhabitants of these islands retain 
their separate civil law status (Demmer/Salomon 2013:63,64) and maintain 
system of chiefs and high-chiefs that has roots in tradition as well as in colo-
nial policy. The new institutional framework included the creation of custom-
ary spheres created on mostly linguistically bases the where given a local 
customary council. Each customary sphere furthermore delegates two sena-
tors to the Customary Senate that enjoys some of the privileges of a second 
chamber of parliament12 while being limited to the male composite of the 
Kanak part of the population. 
                                                          
12
  The customary senate must be consulted on all decisions with regard to kanak identity. It can 
also submit proposals on matters of kanak identity (Garde 2001:237,238). 
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Foreign relations 
Part of the transfer of competences was also, that New Caledonia could be-
come member in a regional organization in its own name, could conclude 
regional treaties and agreements on its own and even build up its own foreign 
affairs department.  
New Caledonia is thus a full member of the South Pacific Community 
(SPC) and has become an associated member of the Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF) in 2006. Full membership in the Forum is under evaluation, but it is not 
France who is slowing the process but rather the other island states that are 
reluctant to accept a member that is not fully independent (Ministère des 
Outre-mers 2013:7). The case of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is 
special, in the case of that regional organization the FLNKS is a member and 
represents New Caledonia. But the New Caledonian government is working 
toward a transfer of membership from the pro-independence movement to the 
territorial government (Chappell 2011:481). 
The competence for external trade was among the first competences 
transferred to New Caledonia after conclusion of the Nouméa treaty in Janu-
ary 2000 (gouv.nc). In 2004 only an embryo of foreign affairs existed, a sin-
gle counsellor preoccupied mainly by questions of trade policy. Today how-
ever, international relations have become an important portfolio within the 
local administration. New Caledonia has signed a convention with France in 
2012 that defines the modalities of the stationing of representatives of the 
government of New Caledonia within French embassies and consular agen-
cies in the region. A first ‘delegate of New Caledonia’ has taken up his posi-
tion in the French embassy in New Zealand in 2012 and four other postings 
will be purveyed soon, in Australia, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Fiji 
(Ministère des Outre-mers 2013:9). 
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Identity markers 
The issue of the so-called identity markers that could be adopted by New 
Caledonia as a concession of the Nouméa treaty proved to be thorny. Only the 
first three of them were relatively easy to agree on. A hymn, and a motto were 
chosen and the newly designed banking notes have recently been introduced 
(LNC 22.1.2014). Although the new hymn is far from a popular tune and 
most people would probably not be able to recite a single line, these topics 
where not utterly controversial. The name of the country and the flag however 
were a different matter. The issue of the flag is still unresolved sixteen years 
after signing the Nouméa treaty. While French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna 
and other French overseas territories have their own flags, some of them since 
quite a long time, there is still no agreement about the flag of New Caledonia. 
For the pro-independence parties, the issue was clear. They had created a flag 
for the future independent kanak state in the 1980ies already, the so-called 
‘drapeau kanaky’. This flag was widely used during the fight for independ-
ence and the northern province as well as all municipalities headed by pro-
independence mayors, used to deploy this flag beside their official buildings 
(Mclellan 2010:17). In 2011 the Pacific Games, a major sport event were to 
take place in New Caledonia. The unresolved issue of the flag became embar-
rassing as it was deemed inappropriate to welcome the fellow pacific is-
landers under the French republics tricolore (Mclellan 2010:17). Thus it was 
decided in Paris by then Prime Minister François Fillon to hoist the two flags, 
the tricolore and the drapeau kanaky side by side for the time being. Fillon, 
when visiting New Caledonia in 2010 assisted the hoisting of the drapeau 
kanaky in the precinct of the residence of the French High Commissioner in 
Nouméa (Mrgudovic 2011:12). For the pro-independence kanak, this looked 
very much like victory, that was exactly what they had fought for so long, 
seeing their flag flying in the garden of the governors mansion. The only 
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important question to remain was, according to them, when the other flag still 
flying beside theirs, would be taken down and put on a ship home. For the 
time being, that was exactly what shared sovereignty looked like, the two 
flags flying side by side (LNC 7.8.2010).  
The loyalist’s foot soldiers on the other side were fuming. But as the idea 
had originated with Pierre Frogier, a leading loyalist (Mrgudovic 2011:12), 
they could however not be too outspoken against it. The question gained 
momentum during July and August 2010 when first the southern province and 
then the New Caledonian government also hoisted the drapeau kanaky on 
their buildings in central Nouméa. At last also the municipalities had to con-
form to the new code and after a few suburbs had caved in, the flag of the 
independence movement was hoisted on Nouméa town hall. The mayor, a 
loyalist stalwart, refused to assist the ceremony and forced his deputy to con-
duct it. The municipality of Ouvéa island, a pro-independence fief, followed 
suit by declaring that out of solidarity they would hoist the French tricolore 
on their ‘mairie’ (town hall) for the first time in thirty years (LNC 28.7.2010). 
Only three loyalist municipalities in southern province remained steadfast and 
refused to fly the ‘drapeau kanaky’. These west coast communities, Bourail, 
Moindou and La Foa argued that the Nouméa treaty called for a ‘common 
flag’ and as for them the ‘drapeau kanaky’ was a partisan flag connected with 
memories of civic unrest, violence and open defiance of republicanism it was 
unacceptable. The issue, apparently too connected with that of sovereignty 
and independence has so far eluded any resolution. 
An important reason, why identity markers are difficult to agree on is the 
lack of a ‘national’ identity. Although a “New Caledonian-citizenship has 
been created by the Nouméa treaty” (Garde 2001:281), its definition is still 
incomplete. For the time, being a New Caledonian would comprise the right 
to vote in local (provincial) elections as well a preference for local people to 
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be considered in hiring. The differences however are also huge and continu-
ously used to create divergence. The Kanak, due to the struggle against colo-
nisation and for independence, are remarkably unified. There are disputes and 
disagreements, but across religions, languages and lifestyles there is some 
agreements what being Kanak means and that common traits are more im-
portant than differences. This is however not true for the other ethnic groups 
living in New Caledonia. The certainly is a Kanak nationalism and on the 
loyalist side especially the party Calédonie ensemble is trying to promote a 
Caledonian (settler?) nationalism, but loyalists are still too torn apart by alle-
giances toward France and New Caledonia that are not reconcilable in the end 
(see Carteron 2008).  
Sovereignty 
Another important trade-off was the notion off indivisible national sovereign-
ty, very dear to the French conception of statehood. In classic French think-
ing, sovereignty was either absolute or not at all. Thus while the preamble of 
the French constitution of 1958 stated a right for ‘free-determination’ for 
overseas territories (TOM) (Mrgudovic 2012:87) and one African colony 
(Guinea-Conakry) attained independence by voting no on the referendum 
(Devaux 1997:19), all others, including New Caledonia had voted yes and 
thereby confirmed their status as a TOM an at the same time forfeiting sover-
eignty. There was no in-between. This perception had somewhat changed by 
the end of the 1990s as European integration progressed. In order to justify 
the forfeit of some elements of sovereignty to the common administration in 
Brussels (e.g. introduction of the Euro), constitutional jurists began to admit 
that sovereignty could also resume itself to a collection of competences (Ha-
quet 2000:142).  
It was within these wider discussions that issues for New Caledonia com-
patible with the French constitution where discussed at the end of the 
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application period of the Matignon treaties. As the new treaty should provide 
for and for and guarantee the best conditions to organise a referendum on 
self-determination (with the possibility of independence) between 2014 and 
2018 (Mrgudovic 2012:91), the new dispositive had to come up with some 
creative solutions that finally made necessary changes to the French constitu-
tion. In the preparation for the constitutional amendments made necessary by 
the Nouméa treaty in 1998 the notion of undivided sovereignty had to be 
abandoned in order to proceed in a meaningful way (Haquet 2000:142). From 
then on, sovereignty became a divisible power to be shared by France and 
New Caledonia at least for the period of transition (Haquet 2000:145,147). 
Based on the acceptance that Kanak sovereignty preceded French sovereignty 
in New Caledonia sovereignty would be shared during the period of applica-
tion of said treaty. However, France would share sovereignty in New 
Caledonia not only with the Kanak but also with the “other communities” 
(Mokkadem 2013:3). For the constitutional jurist Haquet, the guarantees of 
the Nouméa treaty were equivalent of a process of relinquishing sovereignty 
and have required the French constitutional bodies (Congrès and Conseil 
constitutionnel) to accept some remarkable exceptions to elementary princi-
ples of the French constitution (Haquet 2000:148). But in order for sovereign-
ty to retain any value in today’s world, it was considered necessary to per-
ceive it from nowadays as the common wielding of competences by the cen-
tral state and the emancipating territory (Haquet 2000:143). 
An important part of the principle of shared sovereignty was thus the new 
repartition of competences (Page 2000:275). But this shared community man-
ifests itself also in several other instances, among them the possibility of New 
Caledonia to adopt its own ‘identity markers’ (Mrgudovic 2012:98).  
The fact that the New Caledonian parliament gained a normative power 
and is entitled to vote local laws within the bounds of its competences is also 
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perceived as marker of a shared sovereignty by some observers. Haquet 
(2000:148) insists that such an arrangement is only permissible within a fed-
eral conception of statehood and not compatible with the unitarian conception 
of France prevalent before 1998.  
Conclusion 
New Caledonia has not yet achieved full sovereignty from an international 
point of view. Its repeated applications for full member status in the Pacific 
Island Forum have thus been downturned again and again (see Chappell 
2011:481, 2012:395). From the French perspective New Caledonia is a terri-
torial entity of the Republic sui generis, with a unique status. However with 
this it does not stand alone, it was first in line, but because of reforms ongoing 
since 1998, there seem currently to exist as many different status as overseas 
territories under French sovereignty (Mrgudovic 2012:95) 
It is important to state that not all the possibilities opened up by the 
Nouméa treaty have been exploited (c.f. Mrgudovic 2011:9). On the eve of a 
decision about the future status of the territory, the current arrangement of a 
large autonomy has not been pushed to its legal limit. Because of disagree-
ment, infighting, jealousy and conservative opposition to change, the political 
actors in New Caledonia let some options of the shared sovereignty agree-
ment pass by. Some of the planned transfers of competences have still not 
taken place. The personnel employed by the French state in New Caledonia 
has only diminished for about 300 personnel between 2005 and 2010 and has 
been on the rise in recent years. There is still no agreement on the flag and the 
name of the country.  
On the other hand, and this is also important, New Caledonia has been 
put on its own trajectory with the Nouméa treaty and has constantly evolved 
in this direction. France has so far held true to its word and has encouraged 
and facilitated the territory’s way towards emancipation. For a democratic 
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country with parliamentary elections every four years and presidential elec-
tions every five years, sticking to a (costly) policy for more than 16 years is a 
remarkable feat. Parliamentary majorities have changed twice in the mean-
time and it is the third president in power since the treaty has been signed. 
Inegality is however still rampant (Courtial 2013:11) and the economic equi-
libration between the different parts of the country is difficult to achieve. 
For the future, the recent report of the parliamentary commission delegat-
ed to New Caledonia to investigate the possibilities draws four different sce-
narii. The first would be the classical independence similar to other former 
colonies (Courtial et al. 2013:22). In this case all ties to France would have to 
be cut and the new state would establish its own ties. New Caledonians would 
lose French citizenship and access to the metropolitan education system, the 
transfer of funds would stop and New Caledonia would have to create its own 
police corps. It would become a small pacific island state. 
The second scenario depicts an ‘independence-association’ although the 
authors prefer the notion ‘partnership’ (Courtial et al. 2013:36). Some ties 
with France would be maintained, especially in the sectors of foreign affairs, 
defence, currency, etc. while New Caledonia would still become an inde-
pendent country with the possibility to join regional organisation (Pacific 
Islands Forum) as well as the UN. A similar model was already proposed by 
the Pisani project in 1983 (Kurtovitch/Regnault 2002:167). However it is 
unclear under which circumstances New Caledonia would be perceived as 
independent by the UN and other Pacific Island states. The status of the Cook 
Islands is often cited as an example (Courtial et al. 2013:59).  
A third variant would be an extended autonomy for New Caledonia, all 
non-regal competences transferred to the territory and only a part of foreign 
affairs, defence, justice and monetary policy remaining under French control 
(Courtial et al. 2013:50). This extended autonomy would however on the one 
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side not satisfy the demands of the pro-independence parties and on the other 
hand also engender a perpetuation of the financial transfers from France to 
New Caledonia while France would cede almost all control about how these 
moneys are to be used. 
The last variant envisaged by the French commission was the maintaining 
of the status quo beyond the current treaty period (Courtial et al. 2013:61). 
Many current politicians in New Caledonia could probably live with such a 
scenario. But as several dispositions of the Nouméa treaty are strictly transito-
ry in nature and where designed for furthering the emancipation of New Cal-
edonia, it would difficult to maintain these within the framework of French 
constitutionality. Especially the dispositions concerning citizenship and vot-
ing rights where only considered acceptable because they were limited in time 
and were supposed to be replaced by the more equal definitive internal organ-
isation of the new state being created (Courtial et al. 2013:55). Immigrants 
from France who have arrived after 1998 will have been deprived of voting 
rights in local affairs for up to twenty years by the end of the treaty period. 
While it is not imaginable to keep them disenfranchised for eternity, admit-
ting them at once would marginalise the Kanak as well as the pro-
independence vote.  
Which of the four scenarios will come true is still unclear. But it is evi-
dent that ordinary solutions will never fit New Caledonia and that similar to 
the Matignon and the Nouméa treaty also the definitive solutions will have to 
be tailored to fit (Courtial et al. 2013:10). Or as Chappell (2011:41) puts it: 
“Double legitimacy plus common destiny may yet produce dignity for all.” 
The next steps with regard to New Caledonian sovereignty are approach-
ing fast: local elections were held in May 2014. The new local parliament will 
have to decide on the conditions with the first referendum to take place be-
tween 2014 and November 2018 (Courtial et al. 2013:82; Le Monde 26.7.13). 
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In the case that the New Caledonian population rejects the proposition of the 
referendum, a second and even a third vote could be demanded by a third of 
the members of the local parliament. The question of the future status of New 
Caledonia and the conclusion of the saga of the longest ever procedure of 
decolonisation is thus still some time away. 
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 Democracy in the Pacific: TeŶsioŶs ďetweeŶ ͞“ysteŵ 
and Life-world͟ 
Graham Hassall1 
Abstract: This chapter draws on Habermas’ concept of system and life-world 
(Habermas 1984) to understand the tensions in Pacific Island societies be-
tween culture and contemporary systems of constitutional democracy that 
have arisen as a consequence of the manner in which they were “introduced” 
and “received”. It explores the view that the “systems” in place in Pacific 
states draw too little on the life-worlds of Pacific peoples, and are conse-
quently unable to cope with the many conflicts manifest in these societies in 
recent decades. New approaches to public and political discourse and deci-
sion making will have to be crafted if more divisive confrontations are to be 
avoided. 
Keywords: System and Lifeworld, Democracy, Pacific Islands 
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This chapter draws on Habermas’ concept of system and life-world (Haber-
mas 1984) to understand the tensions in Pacific Island societies between cul-
ture and contemporary systems of constitutional democracy that have arisen 
as a consequence of the manner in which they were ‘introduced’ and ‘re-
ceived’. Habermas employs the terms ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ to describe the 
interrelated spheres within which human beings interact individually and 
collectively to achieve their strategic and collective interests through shared 
language and reasoning. By ‘life-world’ Habermas means the “intuitively 
present”, the “unquestionable” or “unproblematic character” of everyday life, 
which has this quality when all actors within it are embedded in shared under-
standings that render explanations superfluous (ibid.:128f). By ‘system’ he 
means the rationalization or “structural differentiation” that brings order to 
events but consequently limits pure freedom to some extent or other. A socie-
ty may value health care, for instance, but its decision to allow into formal 
schooling only those children who have been immunized, brings order and 
control to a realm of action formerly unrestrained: each such new imposition 
of a rule by the ‘system’ – no matter how solidly reasoned as being in the 
public interest – reduces the scope of the autonomous ‘taken for granted’ life-
world. 
Existing scholarship on democracy in the Pacific explores a similar no-
tion, but without reference to Habermas’ eloquent diagnostic frame (Haber-
mas 1989). In describing the transfer of the Westminster form of constitution-
al democracy to the Pacific Islands as a “foreign flower” (Larmour 2005), for 
instance, Larmour suggests that ‘systems’ in Pacific context have emerged 
less from shared reasoning within the life-world, than they have been im-
posed from somewhere outside or beyond it. Rather than system encroaching 
on the life-world, as in Habermas’ original formulation, the Pacific ‘life-
world(s)’ (communal, local, and linguistically complete) had their ‘systems’ 
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displaced through colonial intervention and the influences of later modernity 
(individual, national, linguistically diverse). Indeed, Dinnen (2001) suggests 
that in the Pacific context, the impact has been so great as to “invert” the 
relation between ‘system’ and ’life-world’. Political and administrative sys-
tems, far from growing out of / in relation to Pacific lifeworlds, dominate 
them to the extent that they mediate the experience of everyday life.  
This chapter therefore explores the view that the ‘systems’ in place in 
Pacific states – particularly those pertaining to the allocation and use of dem-
ocratic power and authority – draw too little on the life-worlds of Pacific 
peoples, and are consequently unable to cope with the many conflicts mani-
fest in these societies in recent decades. New approaches to public and politi-
cal discourse and decision making will have to be crafted if more divisive 
confrontations are to be avoided.  
In global context, conflict in the Pacific has not reached levels of signifi-
cant concern2. Furthermore, since neither communism nor socialism took 
hold in the Pacific, the problems of democracy are not the same as those fac-
ing the ‘new’ and ‘restored’ democracies as discussed by Kanninen and Po-
tomaki (Kanninen/Potomaki 2005). Nonetheless, political conflict in the 
region has cost lives, disrupted economies, and retarded human and social 
development, all of which have provoked debate concerning the suitability of 
modes of democracy in operation and the extent to which these have been 
accepted by Pacific peoples. There is much, indeed, given this formulation, to 
explore about the condition of democracy in Pacific Island countries, and 
                                                          
2
  The World Public Sector report for 2010 (UN 2010): Reconstructing Public Administration 
after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned, figure on ‘violent conflicts of 
high intensity in 2007’ (p. 4) includes no Pacific states. 
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about the prospects that introduced systems have to assist these societies work 
through their conflicts and realize their aspirations3.  
There are some twenty independent and dependent states4 in the Pacific 
Islands region, and a sizeable literature on conflict and post-conflict Pacific 
Island states has focused on the origins/causes of conflict, methods/prospects 
for resolution, and programs for post-conflict rehabilitation, and naturally 
considers the roles of history, culture, politics, law, economics, and environ-
ment as factors triggering conflict, or responding to it5. Although commonly 
identified with the three broad cultural groupings of Melanesia, Polynesia, 
and Micronesia, a broader survey than the current chapter would include 
conflict over political status experienced in the French Territories (New Cale-
donia and French Polynesia) and the Strategic Trust territories in the North 
Pacific (Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall 
Islands). It would note, too, intra-island conflicts in the Marquesas, Wallis 
and Futuna, Tuvalu, and Kiribati. 
The islands of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tonga 
share some common characteristics, and the next section of this chapter ex-
amines their recent experience with democracy, conflict, system and life-
world6. In an earlier period, each of these four countries experienced coloni-
zation or the spectre of it: Fiji’s chiefs ceded the islands to Great Britain 
(1876); Solomon Islands was annexed by Britain as a protectorate (1893); 
                                                          
3
  Reilly has asserted that the Pacific’s troubles herald the “Africanization” of the Pacific 
(Reilly 2000) – a charge rebutted by Fraenkel (2004).  
4
  The Pacific Islands region includes some twelve ‘independent states’ as well as a number of 
additional states and territories with either voluntary or involuntary dependency on another 
political authority. The Pacific Islands Forum comprises 14 Island state members (plus Aus-
tralia and New Zealand). The South Pacific Community, in contrast, includes 22 member 
‘countries’. 
5
  An overview of Peace and conflict in the Pacific region is provided in Henderson/Watson 
(2005); see also Brown (2007). 
6
  Vanuatu is not considered in this chapter, as it has been written about elsewhere: see Hassall 
(2007). 
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Papua New Guinea experienced Australian and German colonial occupation 
and subsequently trusteeship status under the League of Nations (to 1946) and 
then the United Nations (1946-1975); whilst Tonga warded off British or 
German annexation through promulgation in 1875 of a Constitutional Monar-
chy and in 1900 acquiescing to British protectorate status. Sovereign inde-
pendence came to these countries in 1970 (Fiji and Tonga); 1975 (Papua New 
Guinea) and 1978 (Solomon Islands).  
All four countries are archipelagos, requiring intricate geo-governance of 
small islands with varying degrees of linguistic and ethnic diversity: the sig-
nificant variations of the Melanesian peoples of Papua New Guinea and Sol-
omon Islands; the blended Melanesian and Polynesian traditions of Fiji; and 
the less ethnically diverse but more socially stratified Polynesian and chiefly 
culture of Tonga.  
Each of the four states has experienced significant division in recent 
times. Fiji has experienced four coups, the first two in 1987 seeking to further 
entrench the interests of the Fijian community at the cost of the interests of 
Indo-Fijians whose forebears were brought to work the cane-fields during the 
colonial era, and the most recent in 2006 purportedly to end such Fijian ethnic 
nationalism (see Ratuva and Ernst in this volume). Papua New Guinea has 
faced a number of separatist and secessionist movements, the most destruc-
tive being a civil war on Bougainville (see Böge in this volume) that conclud-
ed with constitutional change but no resolution of fundamental grievances, 
but others also, fuelled by grievances and claims in Papua, Manus, New Brit-
ain, and various highlands provinces. Solomon Islands experienced the virtual 
collapse of civilian government in 1998-2000 when the people of Guadalca-
nal vented long-standing frustrations focused on migrants from outer islands, 
notably Malaita (see Dinnen in this volume). Lastly, Tonga’s seat of govern-
ment in Nuku’alofa was razed in 2006 by rioting pro-democracy protesters 
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angered by parliament’s failure to approve constitutional changes before 
concluding that year’s final session. 
These commonalities of unrest aside, the four states differ in significant 
ways. Most notably, the mode of hereditary chiefly authority in the Polyne-
sian societies of Fiji and Tonga creates a markedly different context for dem-
ocratic processes and for the resolution of conflict than those of Melanesian 
Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands – where continuing (patriarchal) 
“big-man” cultures have impact not only on democratic politics and conflict 
resolution but also on issues of gender. The recent experience of democracy 
in each of these countries will now be examined in brief. 
Fiji 
This chapter need not rehearse the story of Fiji-Indo-Fijian rivalry in the lead-
up to and following independence7. Suffice say both the independence consti-
tution of 1970 and the constitution as revised in 1990 entrenched Fijian 
interests in both houses of parliament and other constitutional offices and 
institutions as well as through perpetual ownership of land. Of immediate 
relevance is the apparent failure of these arrangements to satisfy all classes of 
Fijian society, such that the dissent that fuelled a civilian coup of 2000 and 
the military coup of 2006 grew within the ranks of Fijians, who were willing 
to back radical elements in their quest for what they regarded as social and 
economic justice (Hassall 2009:73-93). Grievances concerned access to land 
and rents more than they concerned political and civil rights -since all Fijian 
                                                          
7
  Both prior to and following independence the main political contest in Fiji appeared to 
concern the rights of the ethnic Fijians, as owners of the land original inhabitants of the Fiji-
an archipelago, and the immigrant Indians, who had entered the colony as indentured labour-
ers but who had emerged within several decades as the drivers of commerce and as a popula-
tion equal in number to the indigenous community. Although a political understanding 
always existed between leaders of the two communities that the Indians accepted political 
subjugation in exchange for economic dominance, the perceived emergence of ‘Indian-
dominated’ governments in 1987 and 2000 were used effectively by Fijian nationalists to re-
assert Fijian hegemony. The literature is immense, but an excellent overview of the constitu-
tional arrangements is provided by Ghai/Cottrell (2007:639-669) 
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land is owned communally and has for the most part been exploited by tenant 
farmers under contracts mediated on behalf of landowners by the Native 
Lands Trust Board (NLTB – renamed after 2006 the i-Taukei Land Trust 
Board) in a manner that increasing numbers of ordinary Fijians resented. In 
brief, the Board persisted with a patronising approach to land-owners: in-
structing them who to lease their land to, for how long, and for which purpos-
es; determining the profit allocations due to both the land-owning groups and 
the tenants; distributing proceeds through each clan’s chief in accordance 
with a formula dating to the 1940s; and apparently keeping considerable prof-
it for its own use8. Thus whilst the Indo-Fijian farmer was often made the 
target of resentment, other targets also emerged.  
Rapid urbanization has brought approximately 50% of Fijians out of their 
villages into urban and peri-urban areas, where many prefer life as unem-
ployed or under-employed squatters (an even greater proportion of all Indo-
Fijians are urban-dwellers, some in the upper and middle classes, but all too 
many in settlements). Failure by successive democratically elected govern-
ments to address complex matters of land ownership and use, to establish 
minimum wage rates, or to develop urban infrastructure; the multiplying 
number of scandals involving abuse of public money; allegations of electoral 
fraud; allocation of contracts and projects to favoured partners and provincial 
councils; and political in-fighting at the expense of parliamentary perfor-
mance – appear to have dented the average Fijian’s commitment to parlia-
mentary democracy (scheduled for restoration by the military regime in 
2014).  
                                                          
8
  The board is required to collect rent and distribute them to landowning units according to a 
formula: NLTB 25%; Head of vanua (Turaga ni Taukei) 3.75%; Head of yavusa (Turaga ni 
Qali) 7.5%; Head of mataqali (Turaga ni Mataqali) 11.25%; and Members of mataqali 
52.5%. 
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The Indo-Fijian community, for its part, voted with its feet and emigrated in 
ever-larger numbers to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and elsewhere, thus 
ever-reducing the threat (real or imagined) to Fijian sovereignty. In 2006 the 
Fijian military, sensing a crisis of confidence in Fiji’s democratic system and 
opposed to the Qarase government’s overtly pro-Fijian policies and draft 
legislation (and driven additionally by factors not addressed here), usurped 
power on the pretext of protecting the integrity of the nation and with a view 
to engineering change to the social, political and economic order. In the face 
of political opposition from within the country, the Pacific Islands Forum, and 
particular sections of the international community, the ‘interim government’ 
mapped out a new political order for ‘post-ethnic’ Fiji through a combined 
strategy of suppression of all sentiment of opposition and orchestrated public 
dialogue with cooperative individuals and organizations. Opposing views put 
by NGOs, human rights advocates, the media, prominent chiefs, the Method-
ist Church, academia, and the legal community, were suppressed through 
public emergency regulations backed up as necessary by physical and verbal 
intimidation. Public servants and politicians were silenced in part through the 
establishment of an ‘Independent Commission Against Corruption’ which 
commenced a review of citizens’ grievances against the public sector, as well 
as through appointment of a ‘Public Accounts Committee’ to review reports 
from the Office of the Auditor General which a lackadaisical parliament had 
failed to read.  
Public servants were tasked to write a ‘state of the nation’ report for ta-
bling before a regime-appointed National Council for Building a Better Fiji, 
which produced in December 2008 a ‘People’s Charter for Change, Peace and 
Progress’9. A 2008 legal challenge in the High Court by ousted Prime 
                                                          
9
  See http://www.fijipeoplescharter.com.fj/finalcharter.pdf  
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Minister Laisenia Qarase, originally dismissed but upheld by the Court of 
Appeal’s judgement of April 2009, resulted in immediate abrogation of the 
1990 constitution and reversion to rule by military decree10. Bainimarama 
allowed a ‘President’s Political Dialogue Forum’ with ousted political party 
leaders to proceed in March 2009 before announcing the suspension of further 
talks in favour of a dialogue process excluding all former members of parlia-
ment and a ‘roadmap’ that would see a new constitution written in 2012 and 
general elections held in 2014.  
In 2012 a Constitutional Commission chaired by Professor Yash Ghai 
completed its work and submitted a draft constitution to the administration, 
which promptly dismissed the Commission, rejected its draft, cancelled a 
scheduled constituent assembly, and promulgated its preferred version.  
Despite the regime’s appeal to the international community to understand 
the Fijian context and the need for change, no solution to the decline of the 
sugar industry and therefore the economy as a whole, and human rights abus-
es have persisted. Furthermore, Fiji’s situation has split the unity of the Pacif-
ic states and slowed the evolution of Pacific regionalism.  
Solomon Islands 
Solomon Islands’ independence in 1978 was accompanied by a threat from its 
Western Division to ‘break away’ (Larmour 1982; Premdas et al. 1984). The 
critical issue then, as later, was a concern in remote provinces at being left out 
of development planning and flow of resources. The parliament struggled for 
two decades to find an acceptable balance between national and provincial 
powers, and the people of Guadalcanal province (site of the nation’s capital 
city Honiara), became increasingly vocal about the impact of migration and 
other developments on their land. What followed was a complete breakdown 
                                                          
10
  Decrees are online at http://www.fiji.gov.fj  
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of the national government’s authority, violent confrontation between militant 
groups from Guadalcanal and Malaita, a regional quasi-military intervention 
and establishment of a ‘parallel machinery of government’, restoration of rule 
of law, and a drawn-out constitutional exercise yet to provide the country 
with an enduring constitutional solution.  
The country has deliberated the merits of switching to a federal model 
since independence. Whereas the Mamaloni review of 1987 did not result in 
any change (Solomon Islands 1987), the review exercise started by the Ke-
makeza government in 2002 and which continued through the Sogavare and 
Sikua governments produced a draft federal constitution, fully deliberated on 
in 2007-08 by a 32-member Constitutional Congress – but which again re-
sulted in no change, having been halted toward the end of 2009 through lack 
of operational funds and due to the onset of preparations for parliamentary 
elections in 2010.  
In the absence of effective constitutional review, the heads of the Solo-
mon Islands' nine provinces recommended in 1999 that the national constitu-
tion and the Provincial Government Act 1996 be reviewed. The Malaita and 
Guadalcanal Provincial Governments had threatened secession at the time of 
its passage, and in 1997 the Guadalcanal government had made a successful 
legal challenge. It now sought compensation for the national government’s 
use of land in and near Honiara but tensions between landowners and settlers 
from outer islands became violent, and in June 1999 the government invoked 
a state of emergency11. At the height of the anarchy the courts continued to 
operate, although members of the judiciary were intimidated and in some 
cases physically attacked (ICJ 2002:328-335). The treasury was plundered. 
                                                          
11
  The military activities of the Isatabu Freedom Fighters (IFF) resulted in the departure of at 
least 10,000 Malaitans – although they also disrupted the economic and political stability of 
the entire country. 
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Numerous atrocities were committed. Although Commonwealth special en-
voy to Solomon Islands, former Prime Minister of Fiji Sitiveni Rabuka, nego-
tiated a peace accord, violence continued and the factors underlying the con-
flict remained unaddressed. On 5 June 2000 members of the Malaita Eagle 
Force, along with a faction of police officers, detained Prime Minister 
Ulufa’alu and demanded his resignation, which was submitted on 13 June. 
Twenty-three days later a new government was formed under Prime Minister 
Manasseh Sogavare.  
The 15 October 2000 ‘Townsville Peace Agreement’ (TPA) brokered 
with Australian assistance addressed issues of amnesties, weapons disposals, 
compensation, constitutional amendment, economic development, reconcilia-
tion, peace monitoring; and implementation12. More than one decade on, 
however, there remains a widespread perception amongst Solomon Islanders 
that the Peace Agreement was far from comprehensive and that much remains 
to be done to ensure justice is administered to those involved in unlawful 
activities during 1999-2003 (i.e. activities not covered by the amnesty provi-
sions of the TPA). Following restoration of rule of law, successive govern-
ments focused on national reconciliation at both grass-roots and elite levels, 
on compensation rituals and payments, on constitutional reform, on improv-
ing the institutions of government, and reinvigorating the economy and civil 
society13. Under the watchful eye of the Regional Assistance Mission to Sol-
omon Islands (RAMSI), the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, and such 
                                                          
12
  It should be noted that ousted Prime Minister Bart Ulufa’alu promoted a different view of the 
conflict, acknowledging the deep-felt frustrations on Guadalcanal, but regarded these as the 
channel used by his political opponents to remove him from power in an operation that esca-
lated out of their control. Good summaries of the conflict to 2001 are presented by Böge 
(2001) and Hegarty (2001). In 2004 the UNDP commissioned a “peace and conflict devel-
opment analysis” for Solomon Islands United Nations Development Programme (2004): 
‘Solomon Islands Peace and Conflict Development Analysis: Emerging Priorities in 
Preventing Future Violent Conflict’. Other studies focus on the economic impacts of the con-
flict (Friesen 2002). 
13
  Comparative lessons on intervention are discussed by Chopra/Hohe 2004:289-305. 
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international agencies as UNDP and IMF, government revenues increased, 
parliamentary performance strengthened, and accountability increased. Fol-
lowing close consideration of international experience, the government estab-
lished in 2009 a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to assist the country’s 
population deal with the traumas inflicted on it during the period of ethnic 
conflict. The Commission’s 2012 report was not made public until its chair, 
frustrated at such lack of transparency, unofficially released in 2013. 
Papua New Guinea 
Of the four countries under consideration in this chapter, Papua New Guinea 
is the most violent, volatile …and democratic. It is also distinguished from its 
neighbours by the extent of its natural resources – gold, copper, zinc, oil, 
timber, fisheries, and most recently, natural gas. Prior to the imposition of 
state law, individual communities bore responsibility for enforcement of their 
interests and rights and many continue to do so regardless of legality. Vola-
tility and violence are thus endemic to the young nation’s numerous life-
worlds, and a constant occurrence, whether in the activities of ‘raskol gangs’ 
in urban areas and settlements, or in the ‘tribal-fights’ that continue in high-
lands provinces (Rumsey 2009:1-14). 
Papua New Guinea’s volatility includes struggle between central and 
provincial leaders for control of the state power and resources, as expressed in 
constant legislative change, legal challenge, and constitutional debate. Strug-
gle over the status of Bougainville, where the large Panguna open-cut copper 
mine is located, is a case in point. In 1976, one year after independence, Bou-
gainville’s threat to secede from the young nation resulted in a constitutional 
amendment that introduced a system of provincial government. Over the 
ensuing two decades, however, provincial leaders and some land-owning 
groups continued to nurse grievances about self-determination, revenue shar-
ing, and environmental degradation. 
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Conflict erupted in November 1988, the PNGDF landed on the island in 
March 1989 and the central government declared a state of emergency in 
June14. Some thirty written agreements were signed by the warring parties 
between 1989 and 2001 in an effort to end the conflict15. Finally, in the Bou-
gainville Peace Agreement the parties agreed to peace terms: (1) a high level 
of autonomy for Bougainville; (2) the holding of a referendum on independ-
ence; (3) constitutional changes required to recognize these decisions and 
arrangements; (4) weapons disposal; (5) security personnel dispersal; and (6) 
arrangements for peace monitoring.  
A Constitutional Commission worked 2002-04 (Carl/Garasu 2002) to 
draft a constitution for the Autonomous Province of Bougainville (Bougain-
ville Constitutional Commission 2004), and changes to the Constitution of 
Papua New Guinea were agreed to by the National Parliament in December 
2004, in time for elections on Bougainville the following year16. The resulting 
Bougainville constitution allocates three parliamentary seats for women (one 
each for north, south and central Bougainville) – a figure significantly lower 
than the ten originally proposed – but an allocation that nonetheless recogniz-
es the significant role women played in the peace process as a whole. The 
constitution also provides three seats for ex-combatants – a provision that 
expires at such time as a vote on independence takes place.  
A comparative note can be made about similarities in the circumstances 
of Bougainville and Solomon Islands – two Pacific contexts in which 
                                                          
14
  A state of emergency was declared in North Solomons Province on 26 June 1989, and rec-
ommended a continuation of the state of emergency: National Parliament, Statement No. 2 of 
the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on National Emergency relating to the declaration 
of a state of emergency on Monday, 26 June 1989 in the Bougainville Province, 1989. 
15
  The handling of the Bougainville crisis by the Chan and Wingti governments is assessed by 
May 1997. A good overview of the period 1997 to 2002 is in Regan 2002:114-129. 
16
  In writing this section the author is grateful to the following informants for interviews on 
Buka in 2005: Joseph Watawi, Nick Peniah, Buka (7 April); Joel Banam, the late Sir James 
Fraser, Peter Sohia, Chris Siriosi, interviewed in Buka (8 April). 
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constitutional exercises have followed violent conflict. Whereas in the case of 
Bougainville, the Bougainville Peace Agreement became embedded in Papua 
New Law and provided a legal framework for the establishment of the Con-
stitution of the Autonomous Province of Bougainville, the peace agreements 
that concluded conflict in Solomon Islands did not create law, and on-going 
efforts toward reconciliation appear to be parallel to, rather than part of, con-
stitutional reform.  
At the same time that a particular solution was being sought for Bougain-
ville, sweeping reforms were also being made to the structure of provincial 
and local-level governments in the rest of the country. A National Executive 
Council (NEC) 2007 taskforce on Government and administration outlined 
three options for reform at sub-national level: (1) retain the existing three-
tiered legislative system and making only incremental change; (2) change to a 
two-tiered legislative system that includes a Provincial Governor but removed 
from the National Parliament; and (3) change to a two-tiered legislative sys-
tem that retains provincial electorates, removes the provincial members from 
the existing parliament and creates a senate comprising male and female rep-
resentatives from each province (Hollaway 2008) – with a modified option 
two prevailing. 
Papua New Guinea’s electoral system and parliamentary practice have al-
so undergone reform. There are now 111 Members of Parliament, including 
91 in open constituencies and 20 whose occupancy of regional seats renders 
them simultaneously members of the national parliament and Governors of 
their province. In the lead up to independence, the formation of political par-
ties was encouraged as a means of activating democratic culture in the politi-
cal institutions of the new state. Yet despite considerable efforts at political 
engineering, parties are more often associated with the business aspirations 
and interests of political personalities and regional groupings than with the 
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concerns of political publics. Very few women have been elected as Members 
of Parliament, and UNIFEM’s 2009 advocacy for temporary special 
measures to provide dedicated seats for women provoked considerable public 
and parliamentary debate but failed to achieve the necessary legislative 
change.  
The parliament is based on Westminster but its proceedings are much in-
fluenced by the volatility of the nation’s politics and political parties. Many 
governments have been removed by votes of no confidence, which have 
demonstrated the fragility of party loyalties and hindered the executive’s 
desire to call sessions. Laws were passed limiting use of a no-confidence vote 
to after the first 18 months of a new parliament and no later than 12 months 
prior to the next national election, locking members of parliament into their 
membership of one or other political party, and placing sanctions on resigna-
tion from a party or voting across party lines in an effort to keep MPs loyal to 
party in matters of budget approval, confidence, and election of the Prime 
Minister. However whilst this law was credited with providing political sta-
bility it also received considerable scrutiny (Kalinoe 2009:160-168) and was 
challenged in Supreme Court reference No 11 of 2008.  
In a judgement of July 2010 the Court struck down ten of the Organic 
Law’s major provisions, which in effect restored to the individual MP free-
dom in matters of thought, expression, and association. The impact of this 
decision was felt immediately, with three members of Cabinet, including the 
Deputy Prime Minister, defecting to the opposition and instigating a confi-
dence motion which, although put on the floor of parliament on 21 July, was 
thwarted when the speaker abruptly adjourned parliament until 16 November, 
leaving incomplete such important matters as installation of a new head of 
state and considerable uncertainty about the adequacy of parliamentary 
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procedures17. To a certain degree, government business continued in the midst 
of this political jousting. The Government launched the PNG Development 
Strategy Plan 2010-2030 which set 20-year targets for economic growth, job 
creation, crime reduction, land development, and tax revenue.  
Most significantly, a concerted effort was made to develop the plan inter-
nally, without reliance on international agencies or experts, so as to signal the 
maturation of Papua New Guinea’s development planning capabilities. How-
ever, the government’s attention was once again diverted, by a recommenda-
tion made by the Ombudsman Commission to the Public Prosecutor in late 
2010 that Prime Minister Michael Somare faces a Leadership Tribunal for 
failure over many years to lodge statements of income as constitutionally 
required. The Public Prosecutor’s decision that the Tribunal proceed caused 
the Prime Minister to temporarily step down and stimulated public discussion 
of rumoured and proven instances of favouritism and corruption to increase18. 
At a time when a Liquid Natural Gas project implemented by ExxonMobil 
has commenced pumping billions of kina into government revenues, Papua 
New Guinea remains off track in efforts to meet its Millennium Development 
Goals commitments (Banks 2008:23-34). 
Tonga 
Events have been equally eventful in Tonga. A pro-democracy movement 
emerged in the 1980s seeking change to political arrangements established in 
the Tongan constitution of 1875. King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV reigned from 
1965 until his death in September 2006 and the process of constitutional 
change was no doubt made easier by the clear statements of Tonga’s new 
                                                          
17
  On 10 December the Supreme Court ruled the Governor General’s election invalid and 
called on Parliament to meet within 40 days to elect a head of state by constitutionally cor-
rect procedures. 
18
  At the time of writing a Leadership Tribunal has been appointed but is yet to meet, and the 
Public Prosecutor responsible for authorising the referral removed from Office. 
Democracy in the Pacific  329 
 
king, Siaosi Tupou V, approving a shift toward more democratic rule. In 2006 
a National Committee of the Kingdom of Tonga on Political Reform reported 
to parliament its findings on consultation with Tongans domestically and 
abroad but the parliament failed to endorse proposed changes before rising in 
late November - a decision that provoked unrest and resulted in the capital of 
Nuku’alofa being razed in four hours of mayhem. Despite the loss of life, 
buildings, and reputation as a peaceful tourist destination, Tonga’s evolution 
toward more democratic government continued on the slow and deliberative 
path that had been agreed by all parties in broad. In 2008 a Constitutional and 
Electoral Commission was established and in 2009 a five-person Political 
Reform Commission was appointed by the Privy Council which by year’s end 
had made 82 recommendations for change. Most significant among these 
were that the King and Privy Council would no longer be part of the Execu-
tive Government; that the King would no longer have power to appoint the 
Prime Minister or ministers to office; and that the King could only appoint the 
Prime Minister on the advice of the Legislative Assembly. 
The Parliament agreed to the Commission’s major changes which includ-
ed removal of multi-member seats and of seats appointed by the monarch, an 
increase in the number of people's representatives from nine to seventeen, and 
continuation of the election of nine noble representatives. Although the 
Friendly Islands Democracy Party (FIDP) won 12 of the 17 popularly elected 
seats in the November 2010 under the revised voting system,19 this was two 
short of a majority in the 26-member parliament, and since all five ‘independ-
ents’ sided with the nobles, Lord Tu'ivakano was elected Prime Minister. 
When Tu’ivakano awarded just two of the government’s eleven ministries to 
                                                          
19
  Constitutional and Electoral Reform in 2010 increased the number of popularly elected 
members of parliament from 9 to 17, whilst the number of nobles elected by their peers re-
mained at 9. 
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the democratic party, and appointed two ministers from outside parliament20, 
FIDP leader Akilisi Pohiva, who had been appointed health minister, resigned 
in protest, leaving in cabinet just one member of the party, Isileli Pulu (as 
Minister for Tourism). The democratic system has been reformed, the people 
have voted at general elections (albeit with a minority of seats reserved for 
the aristocracy) – and the nobles have retained their hold on government.  
Parallel to this transformation of political process has been legal process 
to deliver justice in the aftermath of the nation’s works man-made disaster. 
On 5 August 2009 a ferry named Princess Ashika sank in Tongan waters with 
the loss of 74 lives, all women and children. In the face of public outcry, an 
embattled Tongan government had little choice but to establish a commission 
of inquiry into the tragedy. The commission’s report, tabled with the king and 
parliament on 31 March 2010 and freely available on the internet before its 
formal release to the Tongan public, found Princess Ashika to be a "scandal-
ous maritime disaster" that was avoidable because the ship was "unquestiona-
bly unseaworthy and in an appalling condition" and should never have been 
allowed to sail. It further found that the chief executive of the shipping com-
pany had no experience with maritime safety but did have a vested interest in 
the SCP acquiring another vessel and recommenced that he face manslaughter 
charges. Although the executive argued that he was acting under political 
pressure from the Sevele government, no politicians were charged (although 
Lord Dalgety avoided indictments on a technicality, when the court ruled that 
the instruments had not been properly signed and dated by the prosecutor). 
                                                          
20
  Dr Ana Taufe'ulungaki, former academic and member of the Political Reform Commission, 
was appointed Minister of Education, Women’s Affairs and Culture; and William Clive Ed-
wards, who had served in a number of previous cabinets, was appointed Minister for Public 
Enterprises and Revenue Collection. 
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The Princess Ashika’s purchase, sinking, inquiry, and public response21, pro-
vide an instructive entry-point to consideration of democracy not only in 
Tonga but in nearby Pacific Island countries. It coincided with the concluding 
phases of a 20 year struggle for constitutional change, involving the delibera-
tion of a constitutional review panel on proposals for Tonga’s future political 
arrangements. It symbolizes the complacency about public interest that can 
accompany entrenchment in power. The boat was not seaworthy and should 
not have been purchased let alone used: these facts eluded a system in which 
few levels of accountability or due diligence were observed. For several dec-
ades an elite group of nobles and the monarchy resisted the demands of a pro-
democracy grouping that seeks their curtailment if not complete abandon-
ment. The constitutional reforms and the abrupt public management lessons 
provided by the Ashika sinking will presumably have some impact on how 
Tonga’s leaders plan for its future22. 
Democracy, Constitutionalism and Deliberative Democracy  
The first section of this paper reviewed some recent issues facing four Pacific 
island countries. It now turns to consideration of how their democratic and 
constitutional foundations were established, together with observations on 
prospects for change. 
Democracy exists when a society freely constitutes itself, not merely in 
accordance with a set of rules, but with intent to converse with itself and 
others on issues that matter collectively, and in a manner that results in learn-
ing and some sense of forward progress. This conception of democracy thus 
has formative, discursive and purposeful aspects, and may be constituted at 
                                                          
21
  Expatriate Tongans in New Zealand stated they are ready to ‘bear arms’ to fight for the 
establishment of democracy in Tonga (TVNZ 2010). 
22
  Letter to the editor, Matangi Tonga: “Tonga is getting to be the capital of corrupted officials 
that never learn. From selling of Tongan passports, Tongan Jester disappears with Tonga's 
Million Dollar Investments, Civil Servant strikes, Burning of Nuku'alofa and now the MV 
Ashika. What is next?” 
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various geo-political levels: from local, through to provincial, national, re-
gional, and global. Steiner et al have drawn on Habermas to explain “(…) 
deliberative politics means that the actions of the participating actors are not 
coordinated via egocentric calculations of success, but through acts of com-
mon understanding and agreement. Actors pursue their individual goals with 
the expectation that they are able to share the definition of the situation and 
thus can coordinate their actions. This process may need much time, and 
ideally deliberation should have no fixed end point but should be allowed to 
continue for as long as it takes to find agreement. Furthermore, when agree-
ment is found it has to be considered as fallible and can therefore always be 
put in question by new and better arguments” (Steiner et al. 2004:27) 23 24. 
In considering the development of democracy in the Pacific Islands, es-
pecially as this relates to constitutionalism and the prospects of deliberative 
democracy, significant issues include the key role of constitutional dialogue 
in the resolution of conflict and the strengthening of democratic culture, the 
significance of electoral processes in determining voter preferences; the need 
for caution in positioning political parties as aggregators of voter preferences; 
the importance of parliaments as the home of democratic discourse; and the 
significance of continuing development assistance to both civil society and 
government entities.  
It was noted at the outset that most systems of democracy were intro-
duced to the Pacific Islands at the time of independence, on the basis of min-
imal public discussion amongst either society at large or its intelligentsia. The 
origins of some constraints were historically determined. Traditionally, 
                                                          
23
  Habermas (1996) would call these the ‘illocutionary obligations’ of communicative freedom. 
24
  Habermas has proposed that discourse that establishes ‘general validity’ must fulfil three 
conditions: 1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse; 2) everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever; 3) everyone is allowed 
to express his attitudes, desires, and needs, no speaker may be prevented, by internal or ex-
ternal coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2) (Weinshall 2003:28). 
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villages were constituted to meet the needs of communities as a whole; the 
interests of individuals were constrained by the interests of the collective 
(Narokobi 1980). The social and political constitution was focused on rela-
tively small-scale communities. The sphere of political authority correspond-
ed with the sphere of the moral universe. The shift away from small scale, 
local communities, toward larger political, social and economic formations 
occurred through compulsion rather than consent – but ironically, as Larmour 
points out, with a touch of reluctance on the part of the colonizers: “The colo-
nial process of transfer was not a simple one of imposition. Writing about 
British policy for decolonization, Lee found ‘little genuine enthusiasm for 
exporting ‘the Westminster model’ to countries which lacked the presence of 
British settlers.’”25 British colonies tended to be governed by a flexible ver-
sion of royal prerogative. ‘Westminster’ took place far away. The system of 
government that was imposed by colonial rule was that of the District Com-
missioner, and later, the functional department. Legislatures were established, 
with narrow franchises, but a defining feature of ‘Westminster’ – an execu-
tive chosen from the legislature – was an imposition of decolonization rather 
than colonization. Some of the pressure for it came from the international 
community into which the former colony emerged” (Larmour 2001:3; see 
also Larmour 2002:39-54). 
In the case of Pacific Islands’ jurisdictions, a majority of the constitution-
al exercises have sought devolution and better regulation of politics, while 
others were related to self-determination, conflict prevention, and post-
conflict peace-building. But, for all the references to “we the people” in Pacif-
ic Islands’ constitutions, there are but a few jurisdictions in the region in 
which constitutional change occurs through popular vote. Whilst much has 
                                                          
25
  Lee (1967:1) quoted in Larmour (2001:3). 
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been made, for instance, of the extensive public consultations held by the 
Constitutional Drafting Committee in Papua New Guinea, chaired by John 
Momis in preparation for independence, the proposals of that Committee 
were considered not by “the people” but by the members of the 1972 House 
of Assembly, which sat for three weeks as a Constituent Assembly. 
No subsequent constitutional exercise in Papua New Guinea has had such 
a wide audience. The Constitutional Development Committee’s reform agen-
da in the mid-1990s, which resulted in passage of the Organic Law on Pro-
vincial and Local Level Government, whilst aimed at establishing more effi-
cient and effective government at provincial and local levels, was at the same 
time an effective move by national-level politicians to crush their political 
opponents at the two lower levels (current feeling is that local level govern-
ment has been insufficiently cultivated, and that the influence of national MPs 
over executive branches of government, and into lower levels of government, 
is too great). 
Constraints on ‘constitutive dialogue’ in Pacific states in the colonial and 
post-colonial periods have created serious limitations in their epistemological 
foundations, their ideological inventiveness, their legitimacy and their effec-
tiveness. Such constraints, in other words, have yielded significant barriers to 
state functioning, and to the possibilities of full participation by citizens. Ghai 
argues of the Solomon Islands constitution that despite consultation with the 
people and active involvement of their leaders, the constitution cannot be said 
to be rooted in indigenous concepts of power, authority and decision-making. 
Some politicians were given a chance to consider alternatives to Westminster, 
but generally chose against it.  
Ghai describes how, as consultant to the Constitutional Planning Com-
mittee (CPC) in Papua New Guinea, he canvassed alternatives to ‘Westmin-
ster’. Although he found some support for a presidential system the CPC saw 
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a parliamentary executive as more participatory and under the control of the 
elected legislature. The alternatives, he said, were also abstract, and difficult 
to imagine (Larmour 2002). In the Cook Islands, Ghai suggested to a 1998 
review the use of a “government by committee” in order to “significantly 
reduce the role of parties, and to provide for the role of all MPs in policymak-
ing and administration” (Cook Islands 1998:102f).  
Another example of reluctance to consider ‘alternatives to Westminster’ 
is provided by Fijian leader Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who in his memoir The 
Pacific Way refers to his attempt, in the lead up to general elections in Fiji in 
1982, to establish a “government of national unity”: 
“To me, with the two main parties fairly well balanced and on reasona-
ble terms (which were likely to degenerate in the heat of the election atmos-
phere), it seemed an opportune time to promote once more my continuing 
dream of a government of national unity. I first floated this alternative to the 
Westminster system in December 1969, during the preparatory talks for the 
1970 Constitutional Conference, and I had found that the membership system 
worked along those lines, though it did not fully recognize it at that the time. 
I proposed it to a meeting of the Alliance Council at Sabeto in 1980, only 
to find that it was strongly opposed by some of my colleagues. I was disap-
pointed, for they were people who were happy to use my name, and indeed my 
presence at their meetings, but they were unwilling to support this initiative. 
Were some of them fearful they would lose their ministerial positions? Per-
haps that was the reason, for a unity government would certainly have had 
that effect” (Mara 1997). 
Post-independence exercises in constitutional revision have generally fol-
lowed this pattern, whether due to considerations of cost or the limits of 
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expertise26. The costs of effective public awareness campaigns – on any topic 
– are high. In such contexts, broad understanding of national affairs rests with 
the urban, educated elites, and the challenges of civic education are more 
commonly taken up by NGOs than by the state. This is problematic for any 
call for greater recognition of the constitutive role of ‘the people’. But if it is 
argued that constitutions are too complex to lay before ‘the people’ for deci-
sion, how is it that these same people are entrusted with electing representa-
tives to oversee government on their behalf?  
The extent to which constitutional exercises genuinely involve ‘the peo-
ple’ depends on whether republican or monarchical system was adopted at 
independence. In general, therefore, Micronesian constitutions allow for peri-
odic peoples’ constituent assemblies, and change through an act of popular 
will. For the remainder, final say rests with elected representatives and the 
Crown. The review of Fiji’s 1997 Constitution is a case in point. The review 
was conducted by a three-person panel, whose recommendations were modi-
fied by committees of the Fiji parliament (Reeves et al. 1996). Prasad ob-
served (presciently in 1996) that the report was to be presented to the Prime 
Minister and via him to the Parliament: “A parliamentary subcommittee com-
prising ten representatives each from the Fijian and other groups in parlia-
ment will then be charged with working out a consensus for consideration by 
the whole parliament. It in effect means that the CRC report will form the 
basis for a race-based political bargaining; albeit by elected representatives 
of the different racial communities. There are no further requirements for 
public consultation during this phase, nor indeed is there any prior role set 
for the CRC itself. (…) One remarkable absence has also to be noted about 
                                                          
26
  The example to be used here is the current constitutional exercise in Solomon Islands, which 
has spanned several years but has studiously avoided free choice of constitution by all citi-
zens. 
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the official review process. There are no procedures or requirements for 
consultation with civic organizations that have some direct stake in the con-
stitution review process or the people more generally after the report of the 
CRC is submitted to the President and eventually the Parliament. Racially 
elected MP’s are assumed to have the mandate and authority to debate and 
agree on a future constitutional settlement for all of Fiji” (Prasad 
1996:17,18). 
As it turned out, Fiji’s parliamentary committees (there were three that 
examined the constitutional proposals) reversed some of the Reeves’ Report’s 
main recommendations. Whereas more ‘open seats’ and fewer ‘communal 
seats’ were recommended, for example, the parliament established the re-
verse. Regarding the situation in Tonga, Powles observed in 2006: “The con-
stitutional debate has been one-sided. Government has declined to consider 
any of the suggestions put forward over the years. Why this is so cannot be 
said with certainty: it might be the self-interested conservatism of an anach-
ronistic elite reluctant to hasten its own demise; it might be a matter of proto-
col, the reformists having gone about their task in ways that offended the 
aristocratic sense of propriety and respect; it might also be a matter of per-
sonalities, of individuals having taken such offence at the style of others that 
they refuse to listen to the message” (Powles 2007:136). 
These examples point to a fundamental weakness in the spirit of constitu-
tionalism in the region – in strategic terms, the will of the people counts for 
less than the calculations of their representatives, who hold public office on 
their behalf. There is little of what Katz calls “constitutional respect” (Katz 
2002:302) – and this has resulted from the realities of civil society formation 
in the island states, where approximately half of the population in each island 
group is rural-based, and where there are still high rates of illiteracy.  
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Constitutional exercises focused on devolution and better regulation of poli-
tics have taken place in, amongst other Pacific jurisdictions, Papua New 
Guinea, Vanuatu,27 Tuvalu (Tuvalu 2000, 2004), Tokelau28 and Niue29. There 
are also important but little known campaigns for constitutional change such 
as that conducted for a half century by the Fai Chuuk in the Federated States 
of Micronesia (Hezel 2004). However, despite the extent of constitutional 
review activity in the Pacific, there are very few purpose-build institutions in 
the region devoted to this important activity. In Papua New Guinea, the Con-
stitutional Development Commission established in 1997 (and amalgamated 
with the law reform Commission in 2004) is possibly the lone exemplar. The 
Constitutional Reform Unit in Solomon Islands emerged from the Department 
of Provincial Government, but has always been closely associated with the 
Office of the Prime Minister (Solomon Islands 2005; Woods 2005). 
The role of Constitutional dialogue in peace-building 
Constitutional review exercises in Pacific Island countries have been subject 
to considerable communicative constraints from the pre-independence period 
up till recent times. Constraints took such forms as limited time frames for 
public education, public consultation, delegation deliberation, and final deci-
sion. They also took the form of limits on material resources required to facil-
itate consultation, and narrow decision-making bodies. These limitations 
aside, constitutional review in Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia, and Sol-
omon Islands (Solomon Islands 2005) has had a conflict-resolving role30. The 
Constitutional exercise in Nauru came in response to a unique form of state-
                                                          
27
  Official Reports of Review Exercises have not been released.  
28
  Tokelauans failed at votes on self-determination in 2006 and again in 2007 to obtain 2/3 
majority consent for self-determination.  
29
  Niuean Prime minister Sani Lakatani in March 1999 announced a possible referendum to 
make changes to the Constitution.  
30
  In the wake of ethnic violence concerning principally Malaitans and the people of Gaudalca-
nal (Nanau 2002:17-20). 
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building to follow a financial as much as political crisis (Nauru 2007; Le Roy 
2006; Balm/Le Roy 2006). Constitutional review in Fiji is motivated by the 
need for conflict-prevention, and much remains to be considered concerning 
prospects for success in that venture (Ghai/Cottrell 2007). The issue of consti-
tutional reform in Tonga has been a focus of conflict, whichever way the 
politics in that country are interpreted (Powles 2006). 
Bougainville 
Bougainville’s constitutional exercise was more complex and comprehensive 
than any other in the Pacific Islands in the post-independence period. The 
context was an inclusive civil war that commenced in 1989, was quelled by a 
truce and ceasefire in 1997-98, and concluded by the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement of 2001 – which provided for “arrangements for an autonomous 
Bougainville Government operating under a home-grown Bougainville Con-
stitution (…)”31. 
The constitution was to be made in three stages: formation of a repre-
sentative Constitutional Commission; adoption of the Constitution by a Con-
stituent Assembly; and endorsement by the National Government (Bougain-
ville 2001). This Bougainville-wide exercise, however, was not to be regard-
ed as a Papua New Guinea-wide constitutional reform exercise (Ghai/Regan 
2002:12-16). The Bougainville Interim Provincial Government commenced 
discussions about the establishment of a Commission in June 2002, its 24 
members “’broadly representative of the people of Bougainville’ but also kept 
small enough to ensure that it could operate effectively” (Bougainville Con-
stitutional Commission 2004:65) were agreed on 10 September, and a first 
round of public consultations commenced before the end of that month. The 
late Sir James Frazer was engaged as constitutional drafter, and the first draft 
                                                          
31
  Clause 1. 
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was ready by the end of December the third and final draft was completed in 
July 2004. 
Much can be learnt from the peace processes and subsequent constitu-
tional exercise conducted by the Autonomous Province of Bougainville: 
whereas the process may have appeared overly long and drawn out, it was of 
sufficient duration and depth to engage a significant portion of the population 
(Regan 2002:114-129). Whatever weaknesses emerge in the new arrange-
ments, they are more adequately ‘owned’ by the provincial population than 
are constitutional arrangements elsewhere in the region. 
Fiji  
Fiji, for example, has implemented a number of constitution writing exercises 
(leading to the 1990 and 1997 constitutions; Reeves et al. 1996) but, the ef-
forts of an expert commission 1995-97 ultimately failed to deliver a robust 
constitutional framework. For a fourth time, in December 2006, the country 
experienced a military coup. During 2007-8 a regime-appointed ‘National 
Council for Building a Better Fiji’ elaborated the directions for establishing 
equality of all Fijians (the principal point being abolition of race-based con-
stituencies and establishment of a common roll) but not altering the basis of 
land ownership. Major issues in Fiji have been, and remain, the constitutional 
status of land, and traditional leaders. Control over land has been at the heart 
of the conflict in Fiji, and the search for effective land policy is on-going 
(Boydell 2000; Citizens' Constitutional Forum 2002). In April 2009, after an 
unfavourable court decision, the regime abrogated the constitution, and dis-
missed the judiciary. It then established a constitutional review commission, 
headed by Professor Yash Ghai, whilst simultaneously continuing to enforce 
a series of decrees limiting media freedom and the association of people in 
public spaces (Bhim 2013). 
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The regime had indicated that the CRC’s draft would be put to an appointed 
Constituent Assembly, which would make final decisions on the new consti-
tution. Such a pathway was not followed, however, as the regime disowned 
the draft, cancelled plans for a Constituent Assembly, and tasked the office of 
the Attorney General to provide a charter that it found more appealing. This 
made public in August, and promulgated in September 2013. Despite public 
discussion about Fiji’s constitutional future since 2006 and even before, the 
2013 Constitution immediately drew criticism from within and outside the 
country. Fijian Chiefs lamented that it failed to entrench land rights, and Am-
nesty International criticised its limited protection of human rights.  
Parliaments, Political Parties, and Elections 
The notion of ‘representative democracy’ associated with the Westminster 
parliamentary tradition is premised on notions of the individual citizen as 
actor, as voter, and as potential democratic leader. Locke, for instance, speaks 
of natural duty to obey the state: individuals delegate sovereignty to the state 
to rule on their behalf, to protect their rights, and to bring social order. In this 
view the individual has consciousness to obey the laws of a society that exists 
‘outside’ or beyond it. Individuals, personhood, are independent and self-
contained persons. The citizen of the liberal democratic society is a rational 
independent self-contained individual with interests and a conscience, and 
there is an assumption that if individual behaviour is regulated then Society is 
ordered. 
But traditional Pacific societies didn’t separate the individual from socie-
ty in this way (see Mückler in this volume). They were constituted commu-
nally – in contrast with the received/imposed constitutions which the individ-
ual person as the constitutive unit. This is why Habermas’ articulation of 
‘system’ and ‘life-world’ holds promise as an analytic tool in Pacific Islands’ 
context. Persons were viewed as social beings for whom duty was not 
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imposed through conscience nor by the imposition of legal rules but through 
socially defined, approved, and enforced sanction generated through the ‘or-
ganic solidarity’ of continuing kinship and ethnic ties. The Pacific is a region 
in which the ‘division of labour’ experienced by European societies is incom-
plete and where ‘lifeworlds’ remain strong32.  
Strathern reports that in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea, 
for instance, the person is not an isolated individual but a person in relation to 
others (Strathern 1985), and Lawrence has pointed out that where morality is 
not constructed universally, but has a restricted social range, social ties are 
weak beyond those between members of kin groups (Lawrence 1969). If the 
purpose of government is viewed as bringing ‘asocial’ individuals into rela-
tion, this does not apply to many parts of the Pacific, as people already have 
relations, and governments in fact seek to sever these relations in order to 
rebuild social relations according to a different set of norms.  
Clearly, notions of democracy have transformed within the Western tradi-
tion, in terms of suffrage, and in terms of legal and constitutional form. Inno-
vations are similarly required in the Pacific context. Key questions include 
the possibilities for expanding the scope of constitutive communities to be 
more inclusive of heterogeneity; of somehow ‘freezing’ in place the charac-
teristics of ‘benevolent’ use of chiefly powers while avoiding despotism and 
arbitrary rule, and of deepening the ‘public sphere’ in order to deepen capaci-
ty for reflection on the ‘public interest’ (Habermas 1984). An example of re-
moulding legal institutions in light of cultural norms comes from Bougain-
ville, where the Bougainville Constitutional Commission set out clearly in its 
2004 report the attitudes toward political parties held by a broad cross-section 
of Bougainvillean society: 
                                                          
32
  In this respect it appears appropriate to refer to Ferdinand Tönnies and his differentiation 
between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) (see Tönnies 2001). 
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“1. People do not want political parties because:  
They will cause division in Bougainville 
• that division will come from different people and groups in Bougain-
ville supporting different parties 
• we need to maintain the unity developed during the peace process 
• the activities of political parties in PNG work against the interests of 
the people – we do not want that in Bougainville 
• political parties do not operate on the basis of principle or policy. 
All they are seeking is power. They are not looking after the people. 
2. political parties can come later: 
• after the systems of government are tried and tested 
• after the referendum 
3. What’s wrong with Melanesian consensus? Political Parties are not con-
sistent with consensus politics because they highlight division not unity. They 
are by their nature looking for an opportunity to criticise their opponents not 
at how they can work together to find consensus” (Bougainville Constitution-
al Commission 2004:226). 
Other projects in Pacific context have sought to re-introduce traditional 
norms of discourse (Efi et al. 2007). Halapua implemented a ‘talanoa’ process 
to re-engage contending political actors in Fiji and Tonga (Pacific Islands 
Development Program 2001; Halapua n.d.; see also Ernst in this volume). 
The Talanoa approach has been described as ‘less formalised’ and possibly 
more ‘intuitive’ than formal mediation. When Fijian Prime Minister Qarase 
announced that a Talanoa Session had led to agreement on the Parliamentary 
Sugar Select Committee and on other important issues concerning the sugar 
industry reforms, ANU academic Professor Brij Lal questioned the suitability 
of costly, private sessions, between public leaders, as compared to having 
them discuss the same matters publicly, in the context of parliament. These 
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were, indeed, discussions about the constitution more than constitutional 
dialogue. Five Talanoa sessions were between November 2000 and June 
2002. The outcome of Talanoa IV was agreement on the need to examine four 
areas: building trust and reducing suspicion and fear among leaders and 
communities; fostering wide acceptance of the rule of law; ensuring all com-
munities feel secure in Fiji as their home; and examining the constitution. 
Although little subsequent progress was made with this process (and although 
Halepua re-engaged some of the main parties during a visit to Suva in June 
2008), the Talanoa sessions explore a form of multi-party dialogue that seeks 
communicative action. This ‘Pacific’ approach to dialogue requires more 
analysis, particularly in regard to a quest for alternative approaches to demo-
cratic dialogue. In the context of the Federated States of Micronesia, a mem-
ber of the legislature has explained:  
Traditionally and by nature, Micronesians prefer not to resolve issues in 
such a way as to produce gloating winners and disgruntled losers. This does 
not mean that we never have strong disagreements – we do. It does not mean 
that we won’t work hard to convince others to see things our way – we also 
do that. Nor does it mean that members will never use the supermajority vot-
ing rules as a means thwart the will of the majority – that happens, too. But 
we approach disagreements with the understanding that we must continue to 
live and work closely together for years to come. Recognition of the benefits 
of consensus has a moderating influence on both the proponents of legislation 
and those who may be in opposition (Sipenuk 2005). This MP goes on to say: 
Parties are not necessary to the vitality of the political process. Unquestiona-
bly, the political process thrives on the tension between competing ideas and 
derives much of its energy from policy disagreements between elected offi-
cials. We find, though, that these forces can and inevitably do exist even in 
the absence of political parties. In any group of politicians – or any group of 
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people for that matter – some are more likely to favor stability and security, 
others are more likely to seek change and reform. Geographic, economic and 
cultural differences will also cause them to see policy questions differently. 
Virtually without fail, ideas that merit examination and testing will find their 
proponents and opponents. Parties do not seem essential to the formation of 
leadership or healthy dialogue around individual issues.  
The question as to what role political parties play in the political systems 
of Pacific Island countries has thus generated a range of views. A develop-
mental approach presumes that representative democracy requires parties and 
that where these do not currently exist, or are not fully functioning, they will 
mature in the course of time. It could be asked, on the other hand, whether 
alternative forms of interest articulation may better suit Pacific contexts.  
Most political parties active in Pacific Island states are fluid, populist, le-
gally unrestrained, clientalistic, policy-poor and administratively bare (Dun-
can/Hassall 2010:265-276). Whereas a few parties have developed from a 
clear ideological stance, Ratuva and others have pointed to the distinctly non-
ideological impetus to party formation (Rich 2006). Much of the concern 
about the operation of party systems in Pacific Island context concerns the 
fluidity of political parties, and the movement of MPs between them. Such 
floor-crossing tactics have had considerable impact on the formation and 
exercise of legislative and executive power. The most direct impact of party 
fluidity is executive instability, which is manifest in no-confidence votes, 
shifts of allegiance, pre-occupation by successive heads of government with 
maintaining loyalties, and the performance of legislatures (numbers of sitting 
days, performance of parliamentary committees, progress with passage of 
legislative programs etc.) (Hassall 2012:213-237). Responses to these prob-
lems have focused on reforms to mandate stability: party registration, dis-
couragement of independent MPs, restraints on party-hopping, automatic 
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triggering of dissolution through no-confidence votes, power of constituen-
cies to exercise recall, and enlargement of cabinet size to accommodate more 
sectional interests.  
Of all the Pacific countries, only Papua New Guinea has enacted legisla-
tion regulating the conduct of political parties, and much of that legislation 
was struck down by the courts in a ruling of 2010 as described above. The 
2003 Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates re-
quired political parties to have a minimum of 500 subscribed members and to 
hold incorporation under the Associations Incorporation Act 1966 if it sought 
to field candidates in general elections. By 2007, 34 political parties had ob-
tained the necessary registration with the Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates Commission, although the information was only as accurate as 
assured by each party, and was not validated by the Commission prior to its 
acceptance. Consequently, phone numbers, names of officials, and records of 
party donations, are unreliable. As with party loyalties in Solomon Islands, 
membership was much influenced by wantokism,33 with active party support-
ers mostly comprising relatives of candidates. 
In the case of Solomon Islands, 12 of 17 ‘parties’ active as at 2009 had 
legal personality under the Charitable Trust Act of 1964. The five without 
such registration include the Solomon Islands Party for Rural Advancement, 
which claims a membership of between 7000 – 8000 but which like the Na-
tional Party, the People’s Alliance Party, the Solomon Islands Liberal Party, 
and the Solomon Islands Democratic Party, maintains no official records of 
party membership or meetings. Of the 17 parties the Solomon Islands Social 
                                                          
33
  ‘wantok’ is a tok pisin term from the English words ‘one-talk’ i.e., a common language 
group. The ‘wantok system’ refers to systematically giving preferential treatment to one’s 
own kin-group over all other groups. Rather than being seen as a form of corruption, it is 
viewed subjectively as ethically correct; however, it is in marked contrast to systems of eth-
ics that call for equal treatment of all, irrespective of place of origin. It is, in other words, a 
relational/situated view of ethics rather than a universal one. 
Democracy in the Pacific  347 
 
Credit party led by Manasseh Sogovare was alone in claiming to maintain 
official record of some 10,000 members. The National Party, with a support 
base of approximately 500 holds an annual convention in addition to a month-
ly executive meeting, raises funds through fundraising activities and sponsor-
ship from business interests including logging countries, but is under no legal 
obligation to report the size or origins of donations. 
Because parliamentary discourse is controlled by the strategic interests of 
political parties and these strategic interests determine the rate at which par-
liamentary business is processed, Pacific Parliaments are not the bastions of 
democracy they were established to be. A partial assessment shows that the 
average number of sitting days per annum in Pacific Parliaments in recent 
years ranges from 21 to 51, although actual reasons for the low number of 
sitting days can only be surmised at present, for want of detailed research on 
the matter (ibid.).  
Whereas formal systems of democracy such as elections, parliaments, 
and representative government have been introduced to the four countries 
under consideration, there is still a prevalent view of democracy as something 
foreign, that leaders do not represent the people, and that the laws they pass 
do not necessarily seek to promote the public interest. Leaders are commonly 
viewed as the source of conflicts rather than as the source of solutions to 
them. Perceived inadequacies of formal systems of government in the Con-
temporary Pacific have resulted from limitations in ‘constitutive dialogue’ at 
epistemic and ideological levels in the colonial and post-colonial era. Prob-
lems manifest in citizens’ behaviour in the Pacific, whether in voting and 
leadership selection or in shaping civil society, have often been attributed to 
the novelty of the introduced system rather than to epistemological issues of 
constitutive consent and engagement. There is concern about apathetic civil 
culture, the non-creation of conditions conducive to deliberative practice, and 
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the need to link together civil society, tradition and governance in some form 
of reflexive political praxis. Concerted efforts being made at regional level, at 
least, though such coordinating instruments as the Pacific Plan (see Holtz in 
this volume), to consolidate democratic norms, institutions, processes, in 
ways that respect the diversity of the Pacific and complement continuing 
traditional institutions. 
Conclusion 
This paper has suggested that Habermas’ distinction between system and life-
world is useful in interpreting prospects for successful application of demo-
cratic values and processes to conflict resolution in Pacific Island countries. If 
democracy is to become a more effective tool with which Pacific societies 
address the issues that most divide them, they must first determine the modes 
of democracy they prefer, and the values of democracy they hold most dear. 
Whereas constitutional and electoral reform, parliamentary strengthening, and 
capacity building for media and civil society are all valuable policy responses 
to post-conflict reconstruction agendas, I argue that in keeping with Haber-
mas’ insights concerning the value of communicative action, the success of 
any and all such policy responses is dependent on the extent to which they 
reflect discourse in the life-world. Ironically, the introduction of democratic 
practices, if perceived as originating from beyond the community’s lived-
experience, may be treated as unreasonable impositions regardless of the 
intrinsic value they offer. Thus human rights regimes, constitutionalism and 
the rule of law, public sector reforms, and the discourse of civil society – all 
offered as solutions to tyranny, disorder, insularism and nepotism – are un-
reasonably rejected rather than embraced as a pathway to economic and so-
cial development. The solution to this seeming unreasonableness – one which 
is not impossible but which calls for greater effort - is for Pacific societies to 
deepen and broaden their engagement with resolution of the contradictions 
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they face, at the same time that they engage with regional and international 
partners eager to propose solutions that have been considered useful else-
where. 
For Habermas, the quality of democracy is determined by the procedural 
fairness by which the rules were created, any by the quality of deliberation 
that such rules subsequently generated (see generally Habermas 1996). Ha-
bermas’ ‘Discourse Principle’ posits: “Only those norms can claim to be valid 
that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
participants in a practical discourse” (ibid.:26). By this standard, “(I)t is only 
their claim to general validity that gives an interest, a volition, or a norm the 
dignity of moral authority” (ibid.). Political realists may find such standards 
for democratic discourse far too idealistic. Indeed, even those who propose 
them do not suggest they are easily attainable, if at all. However, if the elabo-
ration of theoretical standards for full deliberation can improve actual practice 
to even a small degree, the effort will be worthwhile34. Such an approach may 
be embedded in traditional forms of dialogue in some parts of the Pacific.  
Whereas constitutional and electoral reform, parliamentary strengthening, 
and capacity building for media and civil society are all valuable policy re-
sponses to post-conflict reconstruction agendas, this paper suggests that in 
keeping with Habermas’ insights concerning the value of communicative 
action, the success of any and all such policy responses is dependent on the 
extent to which they are understood by discourse in the life-world (i.e.: in the 
subjective values, norms, and traditions, of the society in question).  
                                                          
34
  Following Habermas, the authors suggest six conditions necessary for any form of public 
consultation: 1: Participation; 2: truthfulness; 3: logical justification; 4: expressed in terms of 
the common good; 5: willingness to listen to the arguments of others and treat them with re-
spect; 6: willingness of all participants to yield to the force of the better argument (Steiner et 
al. 2004). 
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Contemporary democratic systems and values weave an unsteady path in 
Pacific societies between individual and collective worldviews and interests, 
with the rights, interests, and indeed responsibilities, of individuals, frequent-
ly deferring to the continuing rights, interests, and responsibilities of the eth-
nic/linguistic/lineage group of which that individual continues to be a mem-
ber. The modern state introduced rule of law to remove arbitrary use of power 
– a value diametrically opposed to the highly contextualised application of 
law that has applied in the Pacific. In extending its sphere of authority to all 
individuals, the rule of law breaks the special ties that otherwise existed be-
tween individuals. It removed an elasticity that the rule of law classified as 
arbitrariness. The rule of law handles heterogeneity in a way that custom 
cannot (Hassall 2000). Rule of law is viewed as separate from society, and it 
separates. It is law that rules, rather than the ruler using law. Whereas the 
authority of law is absolute and universal, the authority of custom is relative, 
contextual and contained in bounded communities.  
Few Pacific constitutions reached the goal of autochthony in either a le-
gal or philosophic sense; most were highly directed by colonial experience, 
and colonial powers. Crucially, at the time of independence, constitutional 
discourse was generally constrained in terms of duration and reach, such that 
constitutional frameworks which purport to provide the social contract for the 
new sovereign Pacific Island nations were in actuality assented to by the few 
rather than the many, and as a consequence have struggled to gain full popu-
lar recognition. There have been calls for home-grown constitutionalism in 
the Pacific (Malifa 1988) but not much further work has been undertaken. By 
simply transferring in the Westminster system the Pacific states missed an 
opportunity to establish truly home-grown, culturally grounded systems.  
Although the Pacific states have very few mutual legally binding obliga-
tions, and pressures are currently being experienced over such matters as 
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regional trade agreements, and ownership of deep-sea natural resources, ‘mul-
ti-level’ governance (Bache/Flinders 2004), and supra-national arrangements 
are being developed to improve governance at the regional level. Protocols 
for conflict resolution are set out in the Biketawa Declaration and for im-
proved governance in the Pacific Plan, which seeks to strengthen shared 
institutional arrangements. References to future deeper integration open pos-
sibilities ranging from enhanced cooperation to some form of political union, 
with the EU, African Union, East African Community, and other regional 
inter-governmental bodies including ASEAN as reference points (Longo 
2006; Graham 2008).  
Development assistance will continue to play a crucial role in strengthen-
ing democratic capacities in both civil society and the institutions of state. 
This assistance occurs in numerous spheres: parliamentary strengthening; 
leadership development; access to information and rights to information; 
expansion of digital capacity; support for judicial independence and the rule 
of law; human rights education and advocacy; capacity building in the public 
sector; education for the security sector; strengthening of accountability insti-
tutions and mechanisms. Support in all these fields is required at local level as 
well as national, and indeed at regional level.  
Deliberative democracy can strive toward finding public interest, and 
transformation of interests comes through deliberation. At the current time 
much expectation is being placed on civil society actors, particularly NGOs, 
to establish the dialogic spaces and capacities through which the public inter-
est might be articulated. State agencies, particularly parliaments and their 
committees, also have role to play in this. Cultivation of civil society is an 
essential component in the strengthening of democratic capacity, but the chal-
lenge lies in doing so without creating dependency on international financing 
or intellectual preferences. In addition to taking part in global issues, civil 
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society must emerge from domestic felt needs and dispositions if it is to ade-
quately respond to the requirements of time and place.  
The introduction of a system of democracy can be regarded as imposition 
of a system on the life-world. But whereas in Habermas’ normative theory 
each life-world generates systems on the basis of its shared and agreed values 
and aspirations, systems in the Pacific Islands – particularly those pertaining 
to politics, administration, and economic activity – were introduced under 
conditions of colonial role.  
Most fundamentally, therefore, Pacific societies must review some fun-
damental questions which ask whether the systems of democracy received at 
independence are sufficient for their future constitutional evolution. If not, 
what more appropriate system would give greater expression to the life-
world? Human rights regimes, constitutionalism and the rule of law, public 
sector reforms, and the discourse of civil society – all offered as solutions to 
tyranny, disorder, insularism and nepotism – are ‘unreasonably’ rejected 
rather than embraced as a pathway to economic and social development. The 
solution to this seeming unreasonableness – one which is not impossible but 
which calls for greater effort – is for Pacific societies to deepen and broaden 
their engagement with resolution of the contradictions they face, at the same 
time that they engage with regional and international partners eager to pro-
pose solutions that have been considered useful elsewhere. There is need to 
encourage a flourishing of the public sphere in Pacific societies, in the village 
fono, the market place, community halls, and religious communities, and 
through the mass media.  
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 Self-confidence and a New Self-understanding as 
Opportunities and Challenges for the Future 
Development of Pacific Island Countries 
Hermann Mückler 
Abstract: This article focuses on concepts of self-understanding and tradi-
tional modes of orientation of the Pacific Islanders in a fast changing world. 
Some Pacific Island populations face the increased problem of predicted and 
already visible loss of land. The traditional role of the sea as a territory itself 
is sketched for its use to create a new understanding about the land-sea rela-
tionship and its impact on statehood. It peaks in the question ‘Tu valu or not 
Tu valu?’ Also the significance of ‘kastom’ and ‘wantok’ are highlighted 
regarding their capacity as concepts to create identity and provide orienta-
tion in a challenging globalized world. 
Keywords: tradition, revival of tradition, identity, the sea, loss of land, 
climate change, kastom, wantok 
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During the annual conference of the New Zealand Studies Association 
(NZSA) at the Norwegian Maritime Museum and the Kon-Tiki Museum in 
Oslo in June 2014, the keynote speaker, New Zealand anthropologist Dame 
Ann Salmond, addressed old and new meanings of the sea as space and place 
of orientation and identification for the Pacific islanders. She mentioned this 
in the light of the changing ecological and climatic conditions in Oceania, 
which increasingly lead to uninhabitable island. Thus, the future of Pacific 
Islanders will be characterized by unprecedented and existential challenges, 
and survival strategies need to be found for coping with these challenges in an 
environment under threat. The loss of land in the form of island territory will 
have serious consequences for the understanding and the localization of the 
islanders themselves with it and in it. Salmond said that a ‘loss of territory’ 
might not necessarily be accompanied by a ‘loss of identity’. Rather, it is 
important to define the identity creating spatial frameworks in new ways. One 
option could be, that Pacific Islanders build on forms of traditional self-
understanding and focus on perspectives that were decisive for the Pacific 
Islanders for centuries and which might today await their reactivation or re-
discovery. 
“Why can not the sea be a territory?” asked Salmond, facing the immi-
nent loss of islands due to rising sea levels (Salmond 2014). The fact that in 
the current international legal understanding the loss of land directly leads to 
a loss of sovereignty, and the question of whether there can exist, for exam-
ple, a nation of Kiribati even when there is in fact no longer the territory of 
this state existing, provides challenges for the relevant discussions in interna-
tional politics, the Law of the Sea institutions and of international law. The 
imminent emergence of the term ‘climate refugees’ or ‘environmental refu-
gees’, a term that is not recognized so far by the international bodies (alt-
hough one precedent recently occurred in New Zealand, where a family of 
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Tuvalu successfully sought asylum on grounds of environmental causes) will 
dominate future negotiations about strategies and practical policy for dealing 
with such cases. It culminated in the pithy slogan ‘To valu or not Tu valu, that 
is the Question’ regarding the future Tuvalu has to face. The visibility of the 
issue begins to slowly open up to a broader audience; but discussions about 
the handling and possible adaptations of regulatory mechanisms are still held 
mainly behind closed doors. The question is, whether the internationally rec-
ognized and through colonialism spread western-occidental concept of a 
‘mare nullius’, which means the general availability and usability of the sea 
for everybody (excluding those regulations which relate to the direct and 
indirect coastal area, the so-called foreshore and the seabed), is conflicting 
and opposing with traditional understandings of the role, function and im-
portance of the sea for the Pacific islanders. In other words: for the inhabit-
ants of Oceania, the sea has always been much more than just a hurdle that 
had to be overcome in order to get from island to island. 
In Europe, the over the centuries slowly growing understanding and im-
portance of the sea, preceded by many a continental oriented centuries in 
European history, has determined the legal concepts for dealing with this 
element, which after all, covers by far the greatest part of the globe. The own-
ership and control of land, therefore, had priority for a long time and was 
dominant in order to justify claims of power, even when Europe reached for 
the overseas territories and gained the sea as a transportation route of growing 
importance. Finally, in the context of geopolitical conceptions, the role of the 
sea was defined in a way that favoured European needs and ignored other 
potentially existing concepts. For instance, ‘classic’ geopolitical experts like 
Alfred Theyer Mahan - who found recognition in the geopolitical analyses of 
the 19th century focusing on US-American interests – showed interest in the 
sea, but for the sake of creating concepts providing free and unlimited access 
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to land territory, which means controlling the sea in order to control land. 
Based on the understanding of the importance of land, the Western definition 
of statehood, originally developed by George Jelinek and his three-element 
theory as constituent feature, was based on territory, a (state) people, and a 
state authority. Although this was later enriched with several other elements, 
an essential basic feature is still recognized: the fact that there must be a land 
on which a state manifests itself (see Crawford 2007; Katz 2010). If this con-
dition is not applicable, there cannot be any statehood, and therefore no ‘citi-
zens’; statelessness would result. 
However, if one is open-minded for a different understanding as a basis 
for interpreting the role and importance of the sea, including traditional rela-
tionships with the Pacific Ocean which have grown over centuries, the 
situation could be different. The Pacific Islanders (and I here leave aside the 
highlanders of Papua New Guinea) have had and partly still have an under-
standing which gives much greater notion to the sea as a central element of 
identity. This means the sea is an integral part of an environmentally based 
self-understanding and therefore an inherent part of the orientation and 
movement in space. The Islands of Oceania were not just isolated, as they are 
often portrayed in the Western worlds ‘island jokes’, viewed as an endpoint 
for dropout fantasies and as inescapable whereabouts for castaways. Rather, 
they were network nodes in a dense network of trade, barter, tribute, marriage 
and religious relations. The islands embodied, figuratively speaking, oases 
and bases, and the sea provided the roads on which the inhabitants of Oceania 
were able to move between the different network nodes – their places of in-
terest. All this was accompanied by a very sophisticated, specialized and 
customized technology. The possibilities and opportunities for getting and 
remaining in contact by using the sea as a road were used intensively, as it is 
evident if we look at the complex maritime technology as well as the precise 
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knowledge of oceanic navigation of the Pacific islanders. Hegemonic aspira-
tions, claims to power and mutual boundaries marked the political sphere in 
Oceania in the pre-colonial era. In the centre of Oceania, for example, be-
tween the island groups of Fiji, Samoa and Tonga – and thus over relatively 
large distances – rivalries and struggles took place over centuries that led to 
Tonga’s temporary rule over Samoa and the eastern part of Fiji. Trade rela-
tions evolved over centuries and dissolved a locally limited availability of 
resources through exchange and distribution over large distances. Trade 
goods such as pottery products, hardwood, textiles and shells, to merely name 
a few, were traded from Melanesia and West-Polynesia (Vanuatu, Fiji, Sa-
moa) to Central- and East-Polynesia (Marquesas and Tuamotus). An entire 
historical epoch marked by a specific and identifiable style of clay pottery, 
the so-called Lapita-period, was spread from Melanesia via the triangle Fiji, 
Samoa, Tonga to the Central-Polynesian islands and beyond; this period and 
its main barter goods figure as a typical and easily comprehensible example 
of the range and therefore the mobility of the Pacific residents over long dis-
tances (see Mückler 2009:31ff). 
Let us create a vision: Following such historical facts dealing with the 
ocean in the framework of international and constitutional law, law of the sea 
negotiations could be different – and lead to different conclusions and results, 
if one starts from the existing concepts. Thus it could be that statehood mani-
fests even without the presence of "land". With a historically verifiable close 
relationship and intensive use of the sea as a habitat for mobility and resi-
dence of marine-oriented peoples, the sea – the ocean as such – could be 
interpreted as a habitat for Pacific Islanders. It could be defined as ‘their’ 
territory and specific rights of sovereignty could be derived which then must 
be respected internationally. “We have to reimagine the nature of the state” 
proclaimed Roy Smith, an expert on International Development of the British 
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Trent University, in his keynote speech at the conference in Oslo (Smith 
2014). And Ann Salmond added on the following day that “we have to re-
evaluate and redefine the law of the sea, (...) revision of the framework is only 
possible in a pan-oceanic way, it should recast our imagination of the sea” 
(Salmond 2014). In this sense ‘reimagination of the State’ is equivalent to 
Benedict Andersons concept of ‘Imagined Communities’ (Anderson 1991). 
Since the modern nation-state can be seen as such an imagined community, a 
re-evaluation and an appreciation of the marine space – in an admittedly un-
realistic equality between land and sea as territory – lead to a reassessment of 
the fate of the thus affected island populations. In this case, however, relevant 
initiatives of existing and over a long period of time established historical 
modes of (self-)understanding of Pacific Islands populations as well as tradi-
tional relationships between man and the sea have to be made more visible 
and transparent. Here, the re-reflection on their own cultural traditions might 
not have only a folkloric function, but can create a basis for tangible existence 
and ultimately securing changes in international Law of the Sea. Salmond 
rightly observes that these things can only be achieved in close cooperation of 
all Pacific Island nations and peoples and she is aware of the expected re-
sistance of many continentally oriented nations. Nevertheless, a unified action 
of the Pacific island countries and a reasonable reflection about their own 
cultural traditions that grant the sea a central position in the thinking and 
actions of people, could initiate a global shift in thinking about the relation-
ship between man and the sea. This would mean a splitting up of those regu-
lations that have been adopted in 1982 by signing the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, which provided the most comprehensive global determination of rights 
and opportunities with respect to the use of the oceans. By some commenta-
tors the re-evaluation of the ‘mare nullius’ concept is placed in a row with the 
‘Mabo case’, that legendary legal dispute in Australia, which led to a 
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reassessment of the colonial understanding of a ‘terra nullius’ and the Aus-
tralian Aborigines and Torres Strait islanders ownership of land based on 
proven traditional use (see Gray 1997; Mulrennan/Scott 2000; Balint 2005; 
Perera 2009). 
The background of an increased devotion to this issue is not only due to 
the time pressure, fed by the increasing timeliness and thereby increasing 
urgency to act, but also the fact that the United Nations declared in 2014 the 
‘International Year of Small Island Developing States’ to stimulate raising 
awareness about the concerns of the fragile and sometimes threatened islands 
and island states. The so-called Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have 
in the advocacy of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) an ad hoc 
lobby and negotiating voice, which helps the small island states and low-lying 
coastal countries in the international arena, particularly at the United Nations 
and its sub-organizations. The strategies to raise awareness for the concerns 
of island nations, thereby differ significantly (see Hasenkamp in this volume). 
In relation to sea level rise and its causes, individual island states are blaming 
developed countries for not acting properly and demand a commitment for the 
island states and their problems. There are discussions going on about ways to 
absorb already visible effects of the creeping disaster and about strategies to 
deal with future developments. Two storylines can be distinguished concern-
ing the central Pacific: the Government of Tuvalu currently favours a policy 
of downsizing and partial trivialization of climate-related and oceanographic 
evidence that points to a change, and calls for an involvement of the ‘rich’ 
industrialized countries in the search for solutions regarding the challenges 
ahead, while the government of Kiribati has a politician in the person of the 
president Anote Tong, now acting on his third term, who announced on inter-
national stage: ”Let me make the point that whatever is agreed within the 
United States today, with China, it will not have a bearing on our future, 
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because already, it’s too late for us. And so we are that canary. But hopefully, 
that experience will send a very strong message that we might be on the front 
line today, but others will be on the front line next – and the next and the 
next” (Tong 2014). Tong relies on an intensive examination of the impending 
problems in his own country. He discusses options and possibilities, how the 
island population of Kiribati could deal with the challenges. This includes the 
idea of relocation of parts or the entire population from the exterior to the 
central islands and from the islands to continental countries of the Pacific 
Rim – provided the latter agree to mass immigration from i-Kiribati, as the 
local people call themselves. Tuvalu in turn still hopes that less drastic 
measures might be needed and hopes to benefit from support of the large 
CO2-polluters, the industrialized countries. Evidently the two pursued strate-
gies are mitigation on one side versus adaptation and handling on the other.  
Many issues are raised and discussed for the first time. What does it mean 
for such affected countries in terms of international law, if a mainstay of what 
international law represents – namely the territory – disappears? Will these 
countries cease to exist? What will happen especially to the EEZs, the exclu-
sive economic zones of the island states, when the islands have vanished? 
These are measured exactly in a 200 nautical mile radius around the islands, 
and are important because of their fish stocks and the proven or suspected 
seabed mineral resources. If they disappear, are these areas then going to 
become international waters? Which conflicts over the control and distribu-
tion of that booty will emerge and by which powers? Even if a long-term total 
depopulation of the region will not take place, the future of the affected is-
lands seems to be largely determined by the major external powers operating 
in the region. 
The writer, anthropologist and artist Epeli Hau'ofa, born in Papua New 
Guinea who lived in Fiji until his death in 2009, had stressed regional identity 
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creating similarities between the island nations in his programmatic essay 
‘Our Sea of Islands’ (Hau'ofa 1993). In his opinion, the special geographical 
and topographical conditions faced by all islanders play a crucial role. He 
stressed the sea as a unifying element just as the common formative experi-
ence of outside influence like colonialism, the Christian mission and hege-
monic claims of outside powers who imposed various limitations to the is-
landers sovereignty. Hau'ofa’s article has been published in response to 
doubts about the existence of a regional identity. It was not about a nonreflec-
tive return to passed on and/or lost traditions, but rather he looked ahead. 
Hau'ofa called upon – in the metaphorical and real sense – the ability to over-
come barriers, and to use the freedom to counteract interpretations that had 
been imposed from the outside on the societies of Oceania, and get rid of 
them. Every individual person should demonstrate its personal responsibility 
and initiative for action, so Hau'ofa, and not rely on politicians and govern-
ment institutions. To deal with some necessary changes maybe only general 
directional changes, new strategies and completely different approaches can 
open new doors that have yet to be found. Hau’ofa explains that to meet the 
challenges of the future also means to incorporate new aspects in a way that 
they fuse with approved programs, and something new is created from it. The 
Solomon Islands lawyer Transform Aqorau also argued for this direction and 
appealed to his compatriots to recognize the potentials of the future. “As we 
stand at the beginning of the 21st century, we have an opportunity to do things 
differently, to learn from the mistakes of the past, and to chart a course for a 
bright and hopeful future” (Aqorau 2006:239). Another question is whether 
one can apply the term ‘revival of tradition’ considering the example outlined 
above about an altered understanding of the element of the sea and thereby 
potentially seeing it as a model for a new pacific self-understanding. The term 
‘revival of tradition’ has been used in the past fifteen years as a collective 
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term for all custom-based concepts and for building on traditional responses 
to grievances against and shortcomings of public systems in the Pacific island 
countries in general, but especially in Melanesia. The fact is that in recent 
decades the reference to real and fictional traditions has experienced a renais-
sance, that has grown steadily since independence and which has increased 
with the time since the discharge from the colonial yoke. 
The relatively short period of transition from foreign rule to sovereignty 
in many parts of Oceania in the decades from the 1960s to the 1980s must be 
viewed in the context of chronologically preceding and subsequent develop-
ments. The euphoria and the expectations at the time of change in the newly 
independent island states have been great. This was particularly the case in 
those countries which had a solid base of resources and hence could hope for 
a steady income cash flow for investment in infrastructure. This was the case, 
for example, in Papua New Guinea, and gave rise to high expectations in the 
years before and after 1975. “There was a political consensus in the clear 
demarcation from the colonial modernization through the takeover of the 
state apparatus and the economy by locals and the reduction of foreign de-
pendence. Central monetary and fiscal policy measures were taken such as 
the establishment of the Kina, the national currency that was stable in its 
performance for a period of two decades. The National Development Strate-
gy, published in 1976, envisaged a development process that should avoid 
major social disparities and maintain the hitherto largely intact social fabric” 
(Seib 2007:2). The agriculture of Papua New Guinea then was assigned de-
velopmental priority. A few large mining projects of transnational corpora-
tions should serve to finance the efforts. Increasing environmental issues with 
these mines, and also the inefficiency of public institutions, economic stagna-
tion and a high level of violence within the society, prevented a successful 
‘take off’-phase of this rich island state per se. The same situation occurred in 
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the Solomon Islands and in Vanuatu, the former New Hebrides. They were all 
confronted with the fundamental challenge of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
heterogeneity – summarized as cultural diversity – and the lack of awareness 
about togetherness in a nation-state that had no historical precursors from pre-
colonial times. This required exertion to guarantee economic social peace and 
prosperity. The identification with the new, young nation state, which consists 
usually of many former autonomously organized islands and island groups, 
was and is for the people, especially the larger Melanesian countries, a hurdle 
and the source of many conflicts of interests and distribution. A variety of 
particularisms are the result of the historically grown and not yet overcome 
fragmentation of states. Disappointment and a lack of faith into the problem-
solving capacities of national governments and bureaucracies replaced the 
euphoria of the early years. The particular interests of the politicians resulted 
in the majority of countries, especially in Melanesia, in escalating corruption, 
nepotism, collusion and nepotism. 
The difficulties of island nations to create a national identity in broad sec-
tors of the population and thus identification with the respective nation-states, 
led at the latest at the end of the 1980s to disillusion and a search for a way 
out. These also included the return to traditional forms of political representa-
tion, but also the promotion of regional cooperation to establish identity 
through the articulation of regional similarities on the inside and the devel-
opment of visibility on the international stage to the outside. Challenges, 
identity crises and a redefinition of the self-understanding of the islanders are 
the defining elements, which are now of relevance in the Pacific island na-
tions. All peoples of Oceania are gradually affected by these aspects although 
possibly in different ways. 
Presumably, the question of identity is in the rapidly changing world of 
the 21st century – besides environmental problems – the biggest challenge for 
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the designing capacities of the islanders. Migration from the home islands, 
and the long-term and often permanent change of residence to Pacific Rim 
territories in the course of labour migration change the bindings of the former 
islanders to their original home. Such reduced populations will – on some of 
the more remote islands – fall back into isolation due to unprofitable transport 
and travel routes; therefore especially on some Polynesian and Micronesian 
islands a permanent settlement or a resettlement is up for discussion. It can be 
predicted that at the end of the 21st century, more islands, particularly in Mi-
cronesia and Polynesia, will be inhabited than now. The peripheral location 
and the involvement of the islands in the globally neoliberal organized market 
with simultaneous existence of immutable adverse factors such as too long 
transport routes to potential markets, reduce optimistic forecasts drastically. 
In fact, all small states could not survive without foreign help. This finding, 
reflected in the acronym MIRAB (see Tisdell and Bertram in this volume) – 
migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy –, shows the fundamental di-
lemma of the island states of Oceania: by themselves and insisting on self-
sufficiency the island states cannot survive. The vital linkages of labour mi-
gration, money remittances and long-term international development aid 
mean in turn external influence and a partial give-up of self-determination. 
By tendency, the external influence will not be reduced, but is going to shift. 
China's involvement in the islands will increase in those places, where Aus-
tralian and New Zealand or generally Western investment and development 
aid was linked to democratic political demands of ‘good governance’ and 
where the island states do not want to bow to such restrictions that are per-
ceived as patronizing. 
The best example regarding this aspect is the island nation of Fiji, which 
was since 2006 isolated by Australia and New Zealand and treated as a pariah 
country. Fijis transitional Prime Minister Commodore Voreque Bainimarama 
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has emancipated most clearly in the years 2006-2014 from Australian and 
New Zealand interference in Fijian affairs. The conditions of dependence 
changed after Bainimarama’s seizure of power that was a result of a coup in 
2006 and wiped away a corrupt, racist and unconstitutionally acting govern-
ment. Australia and New Zealand immediately imposed massive sanctions 
against Fiji and pursued a strategy of isolation of the island nation (about 
recent political developments in Fiji see Schieder 2012). Australia tried to 
force Bainimarama to return as soon as possible to a democratic western style 
political system through the announcement of elections, but with regard to the 
specific situation in Fiji the Fijian politician refused to do so. He pointed out 
that he first had to solve the basic structural problems of the country before 
working out a new constitution, which could act as a basis for general elec-
tions that he scheduled for September 2014. At the beginning the economic 
situation in Fiji deteriorated dramatically, because Australian tourists, which 
are an important source of revenue for Fiji, and Australian investment came 
to a halt. In spite of this and contrary to the opinions of many political ob-
servers, Bainimarama succeeded in providing inward stability, easing the 
fragile ethnic situation between Fijians of indigenous Melanesian-Polynesian 
ancestry and Indo-Fijians of Indian descent, and – if only with limited success 
– he even succeeded in his fight against corruption and mismanagement. The 
military always has been and still has a strong position in Fiji and soldiers 
find high recognition in the population, especially on the side of the indige-
nous Fijians. The return to local traditions, a ‘revival of traditions’, was visi-
ble in two directions: on the one hand, the soldiers of the Fijian army were 
regarded as a direct extension of the historical role of the Fijians, and consid-
ered as skilful and admired warriors, to draw a direct continuity line from 
famous ‘old times’ to a present that generates proudness On the other hand, 
institutionalized traditions have been overturned and discredited as ‘invented 
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traditions’, such as the existence of a Great Council of Chiefs, an assembly of 
the chiefs, which – implemented by the British colonial power as an instru-
ment of colonial ‘indirect rule’ – was deemed unnecessary by the transitional 
government. It is beyond doubt that all this served to maintain Bainimarama’s 
power, and it emphasizes that when analysing traditions one must pay atten-
tion on which groups with what sort of intentions claim interpretational sov-
ereignity over certain traditional practices in order to pursue their own inter-
ests; in other words: an instrumentalization of tradition in the sense of tradi-
tionalist practices (Mückler 2012:141ff). 
Within a few years, Bainimarama had been able to increase Fiji’s prestige 
at the international level through active participation in several international 
organizations. He even obtained the chair in some institutions and committed 
himself to the Pacific micro-states, instead of only acting on a regional level. 
Due to the suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Fiji no longer 
saw itself bound to the agreements made in that institution. In 2010, Fiji 
caused a stirr with the ‘Engaging the Pacific’-Meeting (and two more meet-
ings of this kind followed since) and received benevolent consent by the other 
Pacific island countries. Some of them interpreted these events as counter-
events to the Australian-dominated PIF annual meetings. After the Fijian 
elections in September 2014 and by now acknowledging Bainimarama as a 
democratically legitimated prime minister, Fiji was invited to rejoin the PIF. 
But Bainimarama refused by criticising Australia’s and New Zealand’s sub-
stantial influence in this institution. Fiji only will agree to rejoin the institu-
tion if Australia and New Zealand leave the PIF. Although this is very unlike-
ly to happen, it shows the new self-confidence that Fiji exercises. In 2011, 
Fiji succeeded to host the annual meeting of the inter-regional governmental 
organization Melanesian Spearhead Group in the Fijian capital Suva, where 
many Melanesian island States expressed their deep sympathy for Fiji. The 
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Polynesian counterpart which was founded in 2011, the Polynesian Leaders 
Group, then invited Fiji in the same year to become a member and thus also 
supported the Fijian interests. All these activities were not pronounced but 
indirectly directed against Australia's attitude on Fiji. 
The merger of the Pacific island countries at the United Nations to the 
group of Pacific Small Islands Developing States (PSIDS), which replaced 
the previous informal agreements on the level of the PIF, was finally a visible 
sign that Fiji as the most influential islands country in the region is still will-
ing to go ahead for the benefit of all other Pacific island States; Fiji success-
fully did and does follow this strategy. Within the regional groups at the 
United Nations Fiji inspired and successfully implemented that the regional 
group, which also subsumes all the small island countries, has been renamed 
from ‘Asia Group" into "Asia and the Pacific Group of Small Islands Devel-
oping States’ (short: ‘Asia-Pacific Group’). It is obvious that such actions 
cause the goodwill of the neighbours. Fiji's candidacy for the UN Security 
Council in 2011 was finally ‘the icing on the cake’. It is unusual that a small 
country of this size requests to be included in the Security Council of the 
United Nations – as Oliver Hasenkamp noted and critically questioned in an 
excellent analysis about Fijian policy (see Hasenkamp 2012:5-10). Even if 
later, Fiji tactically withdrew its realistically hopeless candidate status, this 
step caused a stir not only regionally and internationally, but also made clear 
that Fiji's new self-confidence could be a model for actions of other small 
states, not least in the Pacific. The latest coup was that since the beginning of 
October 2012, Fiji – based on its nomination by the Asia-Pacific Group of the 
United Nations – led the board of the influential ‘Group of 77’, consisting of 
77 developing countries plus China. Thus Fiji left behind any form of isola-
tion imposed by Australia and New Zealand. Although some persons rightly 
criticize the foreign policy executed by Bainimarama for a diversion from 
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domestic politics and accuse him of megalomania, the tactic worked: Fiji 
broke out of the prescribed solitary confinement primarily imposed by Aus-
tralia and New Zealand and is now more active and visible than ever before 
(see Hasenkamp 2012; see also Hasenkamp and Ratuva in this volume). Fiji 
frankly questioned (and questions) Australia's hegemonic role in the region, 
which is observed by other micro and small Pacific Islands states with mali-
cious joy. Many Pacific Island countries, with Papua New Guinea leading the 
way, explicitly appreciated Fijis approach. Sir Michael Somare, prime minis-
ter of Papua New Guinea until 2012, expressed several times his sympathy 
for Fiji and his critique of Australia in various regional media. 
The opening of several new embassies in Fiji shows that the island nation 
moves forward. Rather, Australia manoeuvred itself with its policy towards 
Fiji into a regional political impasse, and therefore has been even reprimand-
ed by the United States. The Americans pursue a different strategy and inau-
gurated in 2012 their biggest new embassy in Oceania in Fiji's capital Suva. 
The new US-ambassador to Fiji immediately paid a visit to Fiji’s prime min-
ister Bainimarama after his arrival in Suva in 2011; a step which the Australi-
an and New Zealand ambassadors had avoided since 2006 (Mückler 
2013:105-107). The Fijian government knew how to call China into the play 
as new donor and therefore fuelled Australian fears of increasing Asian and 
especially Chinese influence in the Pacific Island region. Thus, Fiji acts vicar-
iously as a representative of a growing Chinese influence in the region, which 
is accepted by the island states and observed with suspicion by the traditional 
partners such as Australia, New Zealand, the European Union and the United 
States. Fiji’s action proves that small island states have space to move and 
that they can pursue unusual and unorthodox ways, which can cause regional 
power shifts and ultimately can eventually lead to geopolitical consequences. 
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In Fiji’s wake, the self-confidence of other island states was rising against 
external influences, and own strengths grew in the context of self-discovery. 
The future of the Pacific Islands societies probably will be a sensitive 
symbiosis of Western and proven traditional ideas. Not everything that is old 
automatically has to be good; not every tradition or traditional practise actual-
ly is one and for some people, the question arises whether and how it should 
be continued or adapted in order to meet the present needs of the populations. 
It might be noted that the instrumentalization of tradition in the sense of tradi-
tionalism with the lack of independent control mechanisms may also be coun-
terproductive for the successful development of the island states. Usurped 
interpretations must be scrutinized self-critically by the affected members of 
the respective societies. In Melanesian societies, the term ‘kastom’ played 
and plays a decisive role. The two Australian anthropologists Robert Ton-
kinson and Roger Keesing already dealt in the early 1980s with ‘kastom’ and 
its relevant use (Keesing/Tonkinson 1982). Since then, the concept of 
‘kastom’ has been used to describe cultural self-representations of the inhab-
itants of Oceania by themselves at all levels of society. It serves the residents 
as an identifier for various forms of self-representation against a foreign 
group. With this form of self-representation mainly Melanesians affirm their 
own distinct identity or, conversely, they try – for example in the context of 
the inclusion of Christianity – to distance themselves from it (Jebens 
2007:144-145). The anthropologist Holger Jebens has examined the meaning 
of ‘kastom’ in the context of anthropological external- and self-perception 
and outlined the relevant research on and about ‘kastom’ – a word derived 
from the Melanesian pidgin word for ‘custom’. This includes in a narrow 
sense the works of Lamont Lindstrom and Geoffrey White (1994), in which 
traditional Melanesian concepts of culture and the corresponding ‘cultural 
policies’ are discussed. In this instance, it makes a difference whether the 
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resulting patterns of interpretation come from ‘above’, for instance from a 
ruling elite or leaders who claim these competences for themselves, or from 
the ‘bottom’ of individuals or groups in the context of self-assertion, the need 
for manifestation and/or as a strategy of differentiation. 
Especially in the Melanesian island states, the attachment to the own lo-
cal group is still much closer than to the state and its institutions; the latter are 
often perceived as relatively abstract, distant and complex. Since the range of 
the modern state is limited in most island nations and its services, especially 
in peripheral areas, are therefore insufficient, the reputation and the loyalty of 
the citizens and local leaders to the state is usually lower than against the 
obligations to the own group. An example from Papua New Guinea may 
illustrate this. The so-called ‘wantok’-system, a concept of social reciprocity 
and loyalty, shows this clearly. The Tok Pisin term ‘wantok’ (‘one talk’) 
signifies a person who ‘speaks’ the same ethnicity, values, norms and lan-
guage, and a similar socialized person as a brother or a sister is thus emotion-
ally close. The people I share a language with, I am obliged to help. They are 
close to me and for this very reason they accept social obligation for me. The 
‘wantok’ system can thus be seen as a Melanesian social security insurance as 
it implies reciprocity, and therefore creates a social network for an individual 
which gives him security, but is also demanding. A Papuan is doing really 
well if his tribe, clan or extended family – the ‘wantok’ – feels well. Such an 
‘embedded’ Papuan must do everything to maintain the harmony among all 
the ‘wantoks’. In the traditional context, this system so far has worked well, 
but in a modern world it collides with other obligations and liabilities to 
which people are increasingly subjected. So-called ‘wantoks’ can come into 
serious and to them almost insoluble conflicts of conscience, as an example 
illustrates: A Papuan, employed in a store as a shopkeeper might not be able 
to sell the products to a customer who is at the same time a ‘wantok’ to him. 
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On the one hand, the request of the ‘wantok’ to give him the products without 
payment and on the other hand, the need as a shopkeeper to ask to pay the bill 
can cause significant troubles for the person being torn between the modern 
concept of market-,oriented sanctity of contracts and his duties as a ‘wantok’. 
Modern contracts, market-based trust policies in terms of contract compli-
ance, accounting rules and governmental laws lose their prime importance or 
do not develop any meaning at all and might be in such cases of lower priori-
ty. This dichotomy creates fundamental problems, wherever a modern world 
relies on the compliance of a contract.  
Therefore, today ‘wantok’ is decreasingly interpreted by outsiders with 
its positive connotation as a social bond structure, but increasingly with its 
negative effect as an obstacle that penetrates all levels of society within the 
meaning of favouritism, which culminates in the political level as nepotism. 
As an example can be mentioned the practice of awarding government office 
jobs and other advantages in the public sector to ‘wantoks’. Here, the key 
aspect is status, not achievement. For this reason, the people's confidence in 
their representatives and generally in the democratic system in Papua New 
Guinea is low (see Gelu 2003). The political-bureaucratic sphere in Papua 
New Guinea is interwoven with lifeworld practices that are based on the 
power of social interrelationships. The dominant meaning of ‘wantok’ could 
be reduced only if there were social safety nets that can unfold similar logisti-
cal functions. Since this will not be the case in the foreseeable future, the 
‘wantok’ system will continue to have its significance and function – and thus 
remain important for the indigenous population. If one asks locals, they see 
this concept quite positive and as an essential system that is integrative and 
functional in its use as a cushion and as a distribution system in a society that 
otherwise hardly receives state-imposed social security measurements. This 
has been confirmed by Anastasia Sai from the Department of Papua New 
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Guinea Studies and International Relations of the Divine Word University in 
Madang, who spoke about these aspects in 2014 at the University of Vienna 
(Sai 2014). The conclusion is that the traditional concepts that are known and 
proven, must continue to exist, as there is no alternative in sight. 
Therefore, seen from an outside position, the value and importance of 
traditions and traditional practices for the future development in the Pacific 
island states is, considered ambivalent. Those who arrogate interpretation in 
this regard – at all political levels – in fact reinterpret: they select, systematize 
and create ideological systems in which heterogeneous cultural traditions are 
transformed, in the ideal case to form a homogeneous national ideology. The 
purpose of these practices is part of a process of identity-finding, envisaged to 
create a national solidarity. Therefore, continuity is used to draw legitimacy 
from the past for the present. These are processes that are still far from com-
ing to a final end. The previously mentioned discussion about the traditional 
importance of the sea for the inhabitants of Oceania shows that observance of 
traditional self-understanding can also have an avant-garde aspect. Here, a re-
evaluation and modification of traditional ways of Pacific Islanders could be 
an inspiration for an altered view at a global level. 
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 Sovereignty and Material Welfare 
in Small Island Jurisdictions 
Geoff Bertram 
Abstract: Across the world’s small island economies, sovereign independent 
political status is negatively associated with present-day per capita income. 
Does this reflect a causal link whereby political sovereignty has held devel-
opment back since decolonisation, or does it indicate the persistence of pre-
decolonisation differentials? If the latter, is there any reason why poorer 
colonies might have tended to end up independent while richer ones tended to 
remain non-sovereign? These issues are explored in this paper by inspecting 
time-series data on income, life expectancy, and imports for small islands that 
identified by the UN General Assembly in the 1940s as candidates for decol-
onisation. Data at this stage of the research programme are still very incom-
plete and the results are inconclusive, but suggest three hypotheses for future 
work. First, sovereign and non-sovereign island economies appear to have 
had the same growth rates of income since 1970. Second, there may have 
been a period up to 2000 when non-sovereigns outperformed sovereigns, 
followed by a period in which the pattern was reversed. Third, longer-run 
data back to the 1940s seems to indicate persistent differentials of income 
and imports but convergence of life expectancy (and potentially, therefore, 
other social and health indicators). No generalised development-related rea-
sons to change the political status quo have been identified at this stage of 
what is an ongoing research programme, leaving political status a matter to 
be determined by the non-economic specifics of particular cases. 
Keywords: non/sovereign jusridictions, decolonisation, per-capita income 
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Introduction 
Small islands have special interest for social scientists because of the way 
they throw up surprises that remind us of the limitations of common assump-
tions and theories. My own initial encounter with small-island reality was in 
1979 in Tuvalu, then a newly-independent country of 8,000 people, with 
effectively no export earnings other than philatelic revenue from the sale of 
stamps issued by the new government to collectors around the world. Before 
arriving there I was inclined to think of both the enterprise of sovereign inde-
pendence, and the prospect of achieving any standard of living above the 
subsistence provided by local village agriculture and fishing, as ‘unsustaina-
ble’ – a favourite economists’ term for things that seem to defy gravity but 
nonetheless manage to continue. 
Within an hour of stepping off the plane I had abandoned those precon-
ceptions and had begun to appreciate how a very small - but ethnically and 
culturally close-knit – community could achieve things that much larger 
countries around the developing world were struggling to manage. With a 
seat in the UN General Assembly, and a diplomatic presence that was obvious 
to anyone watching the 2009 world climate-change summit in Copenhagen, 
Tuvalu confounds conventional wisdom in both its politics and its economy. 
Three pillars of development ‘conventional wisdom’ have come under threat 
from the empirical record in small island economies. The three are: 
 The view that developmental success in a small open economy (that 
is, an economy that is exposed to global markets) requires strong ex-
port performance to sustain material standards of living  
 The presumption that there are crucial economies of scope and scale 
in economic development (implying that very small economic units 
are at a developmental disadvantage) 
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 The proposition that sovereign independent statehood is positively 
related to the achievement of gains in material welfare for the popu-
lation 
In research over the past three decades I and a number of other scholars 
around the world have worked our way down that list, using data on a widen-
ing set of small islands. At each stage the key insights have come from con-
fronting conventional wisdom with the empirical evidence, and finding the 
former wanting. Export-led growth is not necessary for achieving prosperity; 
smallness is not inherently a drag on prosperity; and sovereign independence, 
which potentially limits development options and imposes large cost burdens 
not faced by sub-national island jurisdictions, is not associated with any clear 
economic advantage – rather the opposite. This paper summarises these re-
search findings before reporting some new data on the relationship between 
decolonisation and material welfare. 
Growth need not be export led 
The first pillar to fall was the supposed importance of exporting success. The 
MIRAB model1 (Bertram and Watters 1985; Bertram 1986, 1993, 1998) was 
developed to explain the obvious dominance of import-led development 
across much of the small-island Pacific, with balance-of-payments figures 
showing very large trade deficits which persisted for decades without trigger-
ing signs of economic stress such as rising indebtedness. In an earlier publica-
tion I demonstrated the goods and services balances of seventeen Pacific 
economies over the period 1975-2004 (see Bertram 2013:329; Figure 27.1). 
In MIRAB economies, the imports that sustain islanders’ standards of liv-
ing are financed from a combination of migrant remittances and official aid 
transfers. Since the original MIRAB work was published, two other general 
                                                          
1
  The initials stand for MIgration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy (see also Tisdell in this 
volume). 
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small-island development strategies have been recognised as enabling trade 
deficits to be sustainably financed. One of these is tourism, whose rapid rise 
in both tropical and cold-water island destinations has been documented and 
analysed by Baldacchino (2006), McElroy (2006), McElroy and Parry (2010), 
McElroy and Hamma (2010), and Milne (1992). The other is the exploitation 
of niches of jurisdictional opportunity in a globalising world – what Baldac-
chino (2004) has labelled the ‘PROFIT’ strategy based on “the resourceful-
ness of jurisdiction” (Baldacchino/Milne 2000) – involving a wide range of 
leading sectors: offshore financial centres and tax havens (Shaxson 2011), 
rentals from foreign-controlled fishery and mineral activities in expanded 
exclusive economic zones, provision of strategic geopolitical services includ-
ing military bases and weapons testing (see Poirine 1995; Drezner 2001; 
Baldacchino 2006b). The resulting three-way classification of development 
paths into MIRAB, SITE and PROFIT models, with export-led growth mere-
ly a subset of the PROFIT group, is summarised in Bertram (2006) and Bal-
dacchino and Bertram (2009, from which figure 1 has been reproduced). A 
more detailed classification by Bertram and Poirine (2007: Table 8 and Figure 
12, 353-364) identified nine developmental paths across 80 small island 
economies, with export-led growth being only one of the nine. 
Smallness is not a handicap 
There is a strong school of thought that regards small countries as inherently 
vulnerable simply on account of their size (Briguglio 1995; Streeten 1993) 
but this “vulnerability paradigm” does not perform well empirically (Baldac-
chino/Bertram 2009:146-148). Vulnerability as measured by its proponents 
has turned out to be positively, not negatively, related to income per capita 
(Armstrong et al 1998; Easterly/Kraay 2002; Sampson 2005). Small islands, 
rather, seem characterised by strategic flexibility, with non-sovereign island 
jurisdictions leading the way (Baldacchino/Bertram 2009).  
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Figure 1: A three-fold taxonomy of small-island economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baldacchino and Bertram (2009:152, figure 1) 
Work by numerous researchers since 1990 has focused on the relatively 
strong development performance of very small, often island, economies rela-
tive to larger entities – a finding that throws doubt on the extent to which 
diseconomies of scale and scope necessarily constrain material welfare. Table 
1 on next page shows the top fifteen economies in the world on the basis of 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2007, according to the World 
Bank’s development indicators. The list includes five very small countries 
(less than 100,000 population), and three island economies, two of them very  
 
MIRAB: 
 
Cape Verde 
Comoros 
Dominica 
Haiti 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Mayotte 
Micronesia 
Montserrat 
Samoa 
Sao Tome & 
Prinicipe 
St Pierre et 
Miquelon 
Tokelau 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Wallis & Futuna 
MIRAB/SITE: 
 
French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique,  
Palau, Pitcairn, Reunion 
SITE: 
 
Bali, Bonaire, Canary 
Islands, Cook Islands, 
Curacao, Guam, 
Hawaii, St Maarten, 
Turks & Caicos 
SITE/PROFIT: 
 
Anguilla 
Antigua & Barbados 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Cyprus 
Fiji, 
Grenada 
Maledives 
Malta 
Marianas 
Seychelles 
St Kitts & Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent & Grena-
dines 
US Virgin Islands 
Vanuatu 
PROFIT: 
 
America Samoa, Bahrain, Falklands, Faroes, Guernsey, 
Iceland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Mauritius 
MIRAB/ 
PROFIT: 
 
Greenland, Nauru, 
New Caledonia, 
Solomon Islands, St 
Helena 
MIRABs SITEs 
PROFITs 
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Table 1: World Bank Development Indicators Top Fifteen 
 
GNI per capita Population 
Monaco 161,470 35,013 
Bermuda 117,640 64,888 
Liechtenstein 111,790 35,308 
Luxembourg 79,670 479,993 
Norway 76,950 4,709,153 
Qatar 63,440 1,152,459 
Switzerland 59,040 7,551,117 
Iceland 58,780 311,566 
Denmark 54,700 5,461,438 
Ireland 49,150 4,356,931 
Sweden 48,900 9,148,092 
United States 48,640 301,231,207 
Isle of Man 48,550 81,812 
San Marino 46,880 30,377 
Netherlands 46,310 16,381,696 
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries?page=1&display=default and 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=1 (23 January 2014). 
small ones. The World Development Indicators lack data on many of the 
smallest island economies of which several (such as Aruba, Sint Maarten, 
Cayman Islands, US Virgin Islands) belong among the world’s highest-
income economies. In short, at the very small end of the size spectrum we 
encounter the world’s richest economies in terms of GNI per capita. As East-
erly and Kraay conclude (2002:2015), “if we control for the location by con-
tinent of all countries, whether they are oil producers, and whether they be-
long to the OECD, then small states are actually significantly richer than 
other states”. Diseconomies of scale and scope due to small size have not 
proved crippling. 
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Sovereign independence has not been a developmental advantage 
A by-product of the statistical work on size and income was the explanatory 
power of political status in relation to modern income levels. Many small 
island jurisdictions are sub-national jurisdictions within larger metropolitan 
economies, rather than sovereign independent nation states. Intuitively it 
seems quite probable that in very small units, there would be diseconomies of 
scope and scale in running a full-service government, and that this might be 
expected to be a drag on economic performance. In other words, non-
sovereign jurisdictions are able to ‘travel light’ in terms of the resources that 
have to be allocated to operating the public sector. This intuition runs counter 
to the strong belief among world opinion leaders in the second half of the 
twentieth century that liberation of a people from ‘colonial rule’ should un-
leash creative and productive potential, and enable a greater share of the eco-
nomic surplus to be retained to finance development. Given that some trade-
offs can be expected, the issue is ultimately an empirical one. 
Strong statistical evidence that, among small economies at least, non-
sovereign status is positively related to the level of per capita GDP, was 
found by Armstrong et al. (1998), Armstrong and Read (2000, 2002), Bertram 
(2004), McElroy and Pearce (2006), McElroy and Parry (2012) and Sampson 
(2005:7). Sampson found, however, no significant effect of sovereignty status 
on the growth rate, and a negative effect on growth of being a small state after 
controlling for sovereignty. Higher incomes today, in other words, may be 
explained by past, not current, economic prosperity. If so, it may be that dur-
ing the decolonisation era there was a tendency for poorer colonies to become 
independent and for richer ones to remain non-sovereign; if that were to be 
the case, then causality could run from relative wealth to political status, not 
from political status to relative wealth. This question is central to the present 
paper. 
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Bertram (1986) reviewed the various options for decolonisation - sovereign 
independence, integration with another state, self-government in free associa-
tion, and possible unspecified other options – and argued that sovereign inde-
pendence was likely to be an inferior option for very small islands. In later 
statistical work on small islands Bertram (2004) estimated that integrated 
political status added between $5,600 and $7,500 in US dollars to per capita 
income, relative to sovereign independence. He concluded that sovereignty 
operates as a tax on material welfare, and hypothesised that non-sovereign 
political status confers advantages in political-economy terms because by 
being integrated with a larger, usually richer, economy, a small island com-
munity can secure more favourable treatment in terms of financial aid, migra-
tion access, other market access, and ability to leverage off some functions of 
large-country government services such as education and health. 
Poirine (1999) demonstrated that in the 1990s not only did island econo-
mies in general receive more aid per capita than larger, non-island countries, 
but that non-sovereign islands secured 36 times more bilateral aid than com-
parable sovereign independent island states.  
All of these studies essentially used modern-day cross-section compari-
sons of income levels across countries, with regression analysis based on 
panel data, to draw the conclusion that non-sovereignty seemed to pay off. 
What was lacking in that first generation of research was engagement with 
the long-run historical determinants of modern political and economic out-
comes. As the wider development literature is giving increasing attention to 
economic history and especially to the long-run impacts of colonialism and 
biogeography on the modern world, it is time to gather more historical mate-
rial together. 
A 2009 statistical exercise by Feyer and Sacerdote investigated the long-
term effects of colonialism across a sample of 81 islands. Most of their paper 
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was concerned with finding an instrumental variable for date of colonisation, 
which they hypothesised was an important determinant of modern income 
levels (they used wind direction because most European colonisation of small 
islands took place in the age of sailing ships, which meant that the geograph-
ical intensity of search and discovery was influenced by prevailing winds). 
But their data set showed a pattern that ran against the conventional wisdom 
on decolonisation: the number of centuries an island economy had been a 
colony was positively, not negatively, related to modern per capita income 
(Feyrer/Sacerdote 2009: Figure 1, 251). They commented (ibid.:248) that 
“there is a robust positive relationship between colonial tenure and modern 
outcomes. The obvious question is why? More intensive involvement with 
Europeans or longer colonial rule might have left islands with a more stable 
or better structured government. This theory is most associated with Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson… Unfortunately, it is not easy to identify 
which governmental institutions are the most critical, and measuring institu-
tional quality is extremely difficult. Furthermore, even if we had a modern 
index of say, expropriation risk or corruption for these islands, one might 
worry that good modern institutions were caused by high incomes rather than 
the other way around. We offer two partial (and admittedly imperfect) solu-
tions to this conundrum.” 
The answers tested were who was the coloniser, and when did colonisa-
tion occur? Along the way, their econometric work included the end date of 
colonialism in each case as well as the initial date, which meant that they had 
a set of cases in their sample (the modern non-sovereigns) with no end date. 
Their regression that included this information threw up the finding that 
“(b)eing a colony at the end of the twentieth century remains very positively 
associated with income [even though] [c]onditional on making it to the end of 
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the century as a colony, years as a colony in the twentieth century are nega-
tively associated with income” (ibid.). 
Decolonisation options 
By “remaining a colony”, Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) meant being subordi-
nated to a larger metropolitan power. But this misconstrues the issue. Decolo-
nisation does not necessarily have to consist of moving to a sovereign inde-
pendent nation state, and sub-national status is not synonymous with colonial 
status. On the contrary, small islands have been the laboratory for exploring 
various ways of exiting from the colonial era, and sub-national status in the 
early twenty-first century is fully compatible with the genuine exercise of 
autonomous local agency in economic and social development, as Godfrey 
Baldacchino and I have been arguing (Baldacchino/Bertram 2009). The con-
fusion of sub-national jurisdictions with ‘colonies’ may be understandable 
given the pro-independence rhetoric of the United Nations Committee on 
Decolonisation over the past half-century, but misses the point that the test of 
decolonisation laid down by UN Resolution 1514 (December 1960) was not 
sovereign independence but simply “a full measure of self-government”, 
which could be consistent with “integration with an independent State” or 
“free association with an independent state”, as viable post-colonial alterna-
tives to sovereign independence. The real issue is the extent of local autono-
my, agency and initiative. Decolonisation in a sub-national context is a 
change in degree rather than in kind on these dimensions. 
Decolonisation was one of the great historical transformations of the mid-
twentieth century in Asia and Africa, but it is often overlooked that in the 
Americas there was a similar political upheaval in the years 1775 to 1825, as 
a colonial order established on the North and South American continents by 
Britain, Spain, Portugal and France was supplanted by a swarm of new sover-
eign nation states. The dominant process then, as in twentieth century 
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decolonisation, was the installation of sovereign national governments in 
place of the colonial administrators among the large nations of the two conti-
nents. But foreshadowing twentieth-century experience, the sovereign-
independence model ran aground in the small islands of the Caribbean. There 
is a striking contrast between the continental American drive to sovereign 
national independence and the survival of colonial rule in the islands of the 
Caribbean. 
Only in relatively-large Haiti did an independent nation state emerge, fol-
lowing a slave revolt (related to the Revolution in the metropolitan power, 
France) that displaced the previous ruling groups. In much of the Caribbean 
the continuation of colonial rule was favoured by the ruling slave-owning 
elites, reinforced by the superior military power the colonial powers could 
wield against small territories. No genuinely indigenous population or culture 
had survived from pre-colonial times to provide a basis for self-conscious 
national identity, and the transition out of slavery helped to defuse political 
activism amongst the black populations.  
Effectively, the social contract that developed was one in which the elites 
controlling the Caribbean islands threw in their lot with the metropolitan 
colonial powers as a matter of straightforward self-interest. Over time the 
range of groups that benefited from holding onto the colonial relationship 
encompassed a growing proportion of the islander population, especially in 
the British, French and Dutch Caribbean. Eventually this provided the basis 
for the great post-World War II burst of West Indian migration to Britain: 
between 1948 and 1970 about half a million people moved, out of a popula-
tion in the British West Indies of 3-4 million – about 15% out-migration. 
When decolonisation finally got underway in the Caribbean in the 1950s and 
1960s, a substantial number of the island territories turned down the option of 
sovereign nationhood and opted instead for sub-national status. Bermuda, 
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Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Netherland 
Antilles including Aruba, joined Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands (see 
below) as post-colonial sub-national jurisdictions in the region. 
Meantime Spanish colonial rule in the Caribbean had been broken not by 
popular resistance but by the USA in its 1898 war with Spain, the outcome of 
which was one nation state (Cuba) and one sub-national jurisdiction (Puerto 
Rico) which has remained non-sovereign since and has become increasingly 
closely linked into the US economy. The USA subsequently moved on to buy 
the US Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917; these are still an ‘unincorpo-
rated organized territory’ of the USA. Table 2 lists the inhabited island terri-
tories that have sub-national status within the USA2. None of these think of 
themselves as ‘colonies’ any longer (if they ever did). 
Table 2: Inhabited US Island Territories 
Since Other history 
US State 
Hawai'i 1959 Annexed by US 1898 
Commonwealths of the United States 
Puerto Rico 1952 US colony 1898-1952 
Northern Mariana Islands 1978 UN Trust Territory 1946-78 
Unincorporated organized territories 
Guam 1898 Conquered from Spain 
US Virgin Islands 1917 Purchased from Denmark 
Unincorporated unorganized territory 
Guantanamo Bay 1903 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territories_of_the_United_States (19 March 2014). 
As the worldwide era of decolonisation got underway after the end of Second 
World War, it became conventional wisdom that the correct path for former 
                                                          
2
  Detailed definitions of the different jurisdictional arrangements are online available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territories_of_the_United_States.  
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colonies to follow was the same as that of the continental American colonies 
before them, leading to the establishment of sovereign nation states on the 
Westphalian model. In the metropolitan countries themselves, governments 
accepted this as inevitable and encouraged the United Nations to evolve into a 
major driving force for decolonisation, with newly independent states in Afri-
ca and Asia gaining General Assembly seats and pushing with increasing 
determination for the elimination of all remaining ‘colonies’. 
Two fundamental issues were apparent from the outset of this process. 
One was the difficulty of matching the concept of ‘nation’ (a matter of cultur-
al and ethnic identity and self-identification) with the concept of ‘state’ (a 
matter of political control over a defined territory and the ability to act in a 
sovereign fashion in asserting that control in a global community of nations). 
Many post-colonial states, especially in Africa, were patchworks of tribal 
identities and ancient loyalties that did not fit the colonial borders imposed in 
the nineteenth century. Others, such as India and Pakistan, were deliberately 
constructed to separate conflicting religious domains, but struggled to encap-
sulate this in the form of territorial borders. The attempt by the British in the 
Caribbean to usher a large group of colonies through to independence under 
the title of ‘West Indies Federation’ (1958-1962) failed because of the obvi-
ous diversity of the communities involved and the strength of popular re-
sistance to being thus shoehorned into a new nation state big enough to fit 
metropolitan aspirations. 
The second fundamental issue for decolonisation was the general situa-
tion of small island territories around the world, where the economic basis for 
full sovereign statehood seemed shaky and where the tide of decolonisation 
ideology often ran out of momentum, given the absence or weakness of popu-
lar anti-colonial movements. It is true that in some small islands the local elite 
saw benefit to themselves in establishing and staffing a sovereign national 
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government, and therefore acted as a local vested interest group supporting a 
full-sovereignty decolonisation bargain with the colonial power; examples 
were Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, in the Caribbean; Iceland (1944) in 
the North Atlantic; Malta (1964) and Cyprus (1960) in the Mediterranean; 
Nauru (1968), Vanuatu (1980) and Western Samoa (1962) in the Pacific.  
Other small islands were effectively dropped overboard by the colonial 
power and left to fend for themselves, with varying degrees of ongoing sup-
port from the metropole. In the Pacific the outstanding cases were the Gilbert 
and Ellice Islands (1978-79) (now Kiribati and Tuvalu) and the Solomon 
Islands (1976); in the Indian Ocean Mauritius (1968) and the Seychelles 
(1976); in the Caribbean the Windward Islands (Grenada (1974), St Vincent 
(1979), Dominica (1978), Antigua (1981), St Kitts and Nevis (1983), and St 
Lucia (1979).  
This left many small island territories where local enthusiasm for full 
sovereign statehood was muted or absent, support for continuing integration 
with the colonial power was strong, and the decolonisation process was di-
verted into other channels. One of those channels was the concept of ‘associ-
ated statehood’ championed by New Zealand at the United Nations in the 
1960s to cater for the unwillingness of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau to 
move to full independence. Self-government in free association was applied 
in the Cook Islands (1965) and Niue (1974), by the British briefly in the 
Windward Islands after the collapse of the West Indies Federation, and by the 
United States in its Pacific Island Trust Territories. 
Another outcome envisaged in the UN decolonisation documents was po-
litical integration with the metropole. This was applied most systematically 
by France (see table 3), which removed its island colonies from United Na-
tions decolonisation oversight in 1947 and subsequently made them into De-
partements d’Outre-Mer and Territoires d’Outre-Mer (DOMTOMs). This 
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applied to New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia in the 
Pacific; Reunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean; St Pierre et Miquelon in 
the Atlantic, and Martinique and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean. These became 
integral parts of France, each with a substantial degree of local autonomy to 
run local government but all formally subordinated to a central government 
department in Paris. 
Table 3: French Overseas Territories and Departments that are islands 
Overseas Departments Other history 
 Since  
Guadeloupe 1946  
Martinique 1946  
Reunion 1946  
Mayotte 2011  TOM 1976-2003 
Overseas Collectivities  
French Polynesia 2003 TOM 1946-2003 
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon 2003 TOM 1976-2003 
Wallis and Futuna 2003 TOM 1961-2003 
St Martin 2003 Formerly part of Guadeloupe 
St Barthelemy 2003 Formerly part of Guadeloupe 
Special Collectivity 
New Caledonia 1999 TOM 1946-1998 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overseas_departments_and_territories_of_France (1.8.2011) 
The formal integration route was adopted also by the United States for Ha-
waii (statehood in 1959) and partially for the Northern Marianas (common-
wealth status 1975) in the Pacific, and for Puerto Rico (commonwealth status 
1952) in the Caribbean (see Table 2 above). 
Constructing an island sample for the decolonisation period 
To see how political status has related to the material welfare of small-island 
populations over time it is necessary to identify a sample of economies that 
were all non-self-governing before the great decolonisation boom in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century and which followed different political 
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trajectories thereafter. These divergent decolonisation histories provide a 
natural experiment in the economic effects of alternative trajectories. Similar 
work to this, with a substantial data set for the most recent decades, is in 
McElroy and Parry (2012). Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter contains 
a ‘Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories’, within which 
Article 73 requires the administering powers of non-self-governing territories 
to “transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, 
subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may 
require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to 
economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they 
are respectively responsible…” 
This placed a reporting requirement on administering powers which put 
their performance under an international spotlight. Reporting obligations also 
applied to states administering UN mandates or trusts over non-self-
governing territories captured during the two World Wars, under Chapter XII 
of the Charter. In 1946 the eight ‘administering powers’3 submitted a list of 
74 territories under their control which were to be subject to Chapter XI4. In 
addition, under Chapter XII of the Charter eleven territories were listed as 
trust territories5. Subsequent additions to the UN’s list of non-self-governing 
territories brought the total up to 97 entities6, of which 36 are islands or 
groups of islands with populations under 5 million inhabitants. In terms of the 
current world political map these 36 entities comprise 61 individual islands or 
                                                          
3
  Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Notably missing was Portugal, whose dependent territories were not 
included in the UN list until 1963. 
4
  The list can be found in General Assembly Resolution 66(1) ‘Transmission of information 
under Article 73e of the Charter’, 9 February 1946, online available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/3443695.60480118.html (accessed 27 January 2014). 
5
  These are described at www.un.org/en/decolonization/its.shtml and listed at www.un.org/en 
/decolonization/selfdet.shtml (both accessed 27 January 2014). 
6
  Listed at http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml (accessed 27 January 2014). 
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closely-linked archipelagos, as shown in Table 4 (see pages 402-404), or 57 if 
the Netherlands Antilles except for Aruba are treated as an entity. These is-
lands provide the sample for the statistical comparisons that follow.7 The 
research programme, from which this chapter gives some early results, takes 
the small island countries in Table 4 as a representative sample of candidates 
for ‘decolonisation’ after the Second World War, divides them between those 
that (as of 2012) have moved to become sovereign states and those that have 
become sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs), and then compares the two 
groups over time on indicators such as population, income per head, life ex-
pectancy, early childhood mortality, and imports per head. 
Decolonisation outcomes and economic trajectories 
A preliminary question is whether, among the 61 islands in Table 4, it was the 
small ones that became sub-national and the large ones that became sover-
eign. Figure 2 on page 405 shows the pattern across the sample. A tendency 
for non-sovereign status to be more common among very small units is sug-
gested, and possibly some tendency for sovereign status to be more common 
in the population range 500,000 – 1,000,000, but there is no statistically sig-
nificant conclusion to be drawn. The average population of sovereigns in the 
sample is 437,500 and that of non-sovereigns is 243,300 but the standard 
deviations in both cases are bigger than the means.  
 
 
                                                          
7
  Sources: Islands list compiled from http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml, 
plus the 1946 list at http://www.statehoodhawaii.org/hist/nsgt.html and UN Resolution 66(1) 
9 February 1946 at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/3443695.60480118.html (all accessed 
January 2014). Population from United Nations Demographic Yearbook 2012 Table 5 at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2012.htm, accessed January 2014, 
with gaps filled using Wikipedia entries for individual islands. WDI income data from World 
Bank, World Development Indicators, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1#, accessed 29 Jan-
uary 2014. UN income data from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resQuery.asp, accessed 
29 January 2014. CIA income data from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/ 2004rank.html accessed 29 January 2014. 
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Table 4: Islands that were listed as ‘non-self-governing territories’ or ‘trust 
territories’ by the UN at some time since 1946 
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American Samoa American Samoa USA SNIJ
8
 66,000 
  
8,000 
Bahamas Bahamas UK Sovereign 346,900 20,600 21,102 31,300 
Barbados Barbados UK Sovereign 276,302 15,080 14,739 25,000 
Bermuda Bermuda UK SNIJ 64,566 104,590 105,171 86,000 
Cape Verde Cape Verde Portugal Sovereign 517,831 3,830 3,731 4,400 
Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands 
Cocos 
(Keeling) 
Islands 
Australia SNIJ 600 
   
Cook Islands 
Cook 
Islands 
New 
Zealand SNIJ 23,600  14,918 9,100 
Niue New Zealand SNIJ 1,496   5,800 
Cyprus Cyprus UK Sovereign 827,697 26,110 25,580 26,800 
Fiji Fiji UK Sovereign 857,000 4,110 4,507 4,700 
French Establish-
ments in Oceania 
French 
Polynesia France SNIJ 268,500  26,113 22,000 
Wallis and 
Futuna France SNIJ 15,000   3,800 
Greenland Greenland Denmark SNIJ 56,534 
 
40,303 37,400 
Guadeloupe Guadeloupe France SNIJ 401,784 
   
Hawaii Hawaii USA SNIJ 1,360,301 
   
High Commission 
Territories of the 
Western Pacific 
Kiribati UK Sovereign 100,000 2,520 2,077 6,200 
Tuvalu UK Sovereign 10,924 5,650 7,051 3,400 
Solomon 
Islands UK Sovereign 530,669 1,130 1,543 3,300 
Pitcairn UK SNIJ 58 
   
Jamaica 
Jamaica UK Sovereign 2,702,310 5,120 5,187 8,900 
Cayman 
Islands UK SNIJ 54,878  53,393  
                                                          
8
  SNIJ = sub-national island jurisdictions. 
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Leeward Islands 
Antigua and 
Barbuda UK Sovereign 90,801 12,480 12,740 17,800 
British Virgin 
Islands UK SNIJ 21,689  29,436 42,300 
Montserrat UK SNIJ 5,020 
 
12,049 8,500 
St Kitts & 
Nevis UK Sovereign 51,970 13,610 13,777 16,100 
Anguilla UK SNIJ 16,373 
 
19,895 12,200 
Madagascar and 
dependencies 
Mayotte France SNIJ 212,645 
   
Comoros France Sovereign 798,000 840 830 1,300 
Malta Malta UK Sovereign 415,275 19,760 19,265 26,900 
Martinique Martinique France SNIJ 396,308 
   
Mauritius Mauritius UK Sovereign 1,280,924 8,570 9,337 15,400 
Nauru Nauru Australia Sovereign 9,378 
 
12,577 5,000 
New Caledonia and 
dependencies 
New 
Caledonia France SNIJ 250,040  38,869 37,700 
New Hebrides Vanuatu France & UK Sovereign 221,417 3,000 2,869 4,800 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
Aruba Netherlands SNIJ 101,860 
 
23,367 25,300 
Bonaire Netherlands SNIJ 14,006 
 
18,168 
 
Curacao     
   
15,000 
Sint Maar-
ten Netherlands SNIJ 917  18,168 15.400 
Saba Netherlands SNIJ 1,991 
 
18,168 
 
Sint Eu-
stacius Netherlands SNIJ 3,543  18,168  
Puerto Rico Puerto Rico USA SNIJ 3,721,208 18,000 18,634 16,300 
Pacific Islands 
Trust Territories 
Marshall 
Islands USA SNIJ 54,305 4,040 4,748 8,600 
Federated 
States of 
Micronesia 
USA Sovereign 107,839 3,230 3,317 7,100 
Palau USA Sovereign 21,388 9,860 8,853 10,500 
Northern 
Marianas USA SNIJ 48,317   13,600 
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Reunion Reunion France SNIJ 828,054 
   
Samoa Samoa New Zealand Sovereign 184,032 3,260 3,436 6,200 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Sao Tome 
and Principe Portugal Sovereign 163,783  1,397 2,100 
Seychelles Seychelles UK Sovereign 89,770 12,260 10,198 25,000 
St. Pierre and 
Miquelon 
St. Pierre 
and Mique-
lon 
France SNIJ 6,080 
  
34,900 
St Helena and 
dependencies 
St Helena UK SNIJ 4,250 
  
7,800 
Tristan da 
Cunha UK SNIJ 263   7,800 
Ascension  UK SNIJ 702 
  
7,800 
Tokelau Islands Tokelau New Zealand SNIJ 1,400   1,000 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Trinidad and 
Tobago UK Sovereign 1,317,714 14,710 18,067 19,800 
US Virgin Islands US Virgin Islands USA SNIJ 110,000   14,500 
Windward Islands 
Dominica UK Sovereign 69,017 6,440 6,710 14,000 
Grenada UK Sovereign 110,821 7,220 6,989 13,500 
St Lucia UK Sovereign 172,370 6,890 7,204 13,000 
St Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
UK Sovereign 100,892 6,400 6,314 11,800 
In fact the key conclusion to be drawn from Figure 2 is that the choice of 
political status has been wide open across the size range of the sample. A 
second point to emerge from the detail of Figure 2 is that the UK has been far 
less amenable than France and the USA to conceding non-sovereign status for 
its larger territories. The largest non-sovereign with the UK as its metropole is 
Bermuda, with a population of 65,000; above this level all the islands that 
were under UK rule in 1946 have moved through to sovereign independence. 
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Figure 2: Political status and population size of small islands 
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The next question to ask is how income per capita compares today after half a 
century of divergent political evolution in the two sets of islands. A major 
problem is data: the big international agencies which prepare consistent na-
tional accounting measures across economies commonly do not collect and 
publish figures for very small territories, especially if those territories are 
non-sovereign (hence not members of the UN or the World Bank). Of the 61 
island economies in Table 4, only 27 have their Gross National Income per 
capita reported in the World Bank’s ‘World Development Indicators’ and 
these are all sovereigns with the sole exception of Bermuda. The Penn World 
Tables 6.3 covers none of the non-sovereign islands in the sample. The UN 
Statistical Agency’s national accounts database has better coverage: 42 of the 
61 islands in the sample, of which 26 are sovereigns and 16 are non-
sovereigns. The CIA World Factbook covers 50 of the 61 islands, comprising 
26 sovereigns and 24 non-sovereigns, but is less methodologically rigorous 
than the other international organisations. The reliability of the sources, in 
fact, is inversely related to their coverage of non-sovereign territories, but 
data availability prevails, for the moment, over strict rigour. Table 4 shows 
the UN and CIA figures, and Figures 3 and 4 plot the data. 
The impression given by both these charts (in common with the previous 
literature reviewed above, which generally analyses data for territorial units 
without adjusting for population size) - that non-sovereigns among the sample 
tend to exhibit higher income levels than sovereigns today – could be mis-
leading if the charts have been biased by giving undue weight to a large num-
ber of very small economies. Table 5 and Figure 5 show the comparison of 
aggregated income per capita across all the sovereign island populations and 
across the non-sovereigns. This population-weighted calculation confirms the 
proposition that non-sovereigns have an advantage. 
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Figure 3: Political status and income per head at 2012 according to the UN 
Statistical Agency 
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Figure 4: Political status and income per head at 2012 according to the CIA 
World Factbook 
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Table 5: Population-weighted per capita income 2012 compared between 
sovereign and non-sovereign islands 
 
UN data CIA data 
Number of 
islands 
Population-
weighted 
average 
income 
Number 
of is-
lands 
Population-
weighted 
average 
income 
Sovereigns 26 9.316 26 12.740 
Non-sovereigns 16 21.991 23 19.163 
Source: Derived from data in Table 4. 
Figure 5: Population-weighted comparisons of income per head using two 
datasets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from data in Table 4. 
To this point, the statistical information on islands sample used here simply 
confirms previous work showing a positive cross-section relationship be-
tween non-sovereignty and income (McElroy/Parry 2012). The obvious ques-
tion that follows is whether this disparity emerged during and after the 
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decolonisation process, or existed prior to decolonisation. For this, we require 
either time series data going back to 1946, or at least a data set showing in-
come across the islands at 1946 or 1950, that would enable us to see whether 
the modern income disparity was present or absent at the beginning of decol-
onisation. Such income data is not at this stage available on a worldwide 
basis.  
As a first step I have used the UN Statistical Division’s macroeconomic 
database to trace per capita income over the 40-year period 1970-2010 for 26 
of the sovereign islands in the sample and 13 of the non-sovereigns. For each 
economy covered I take Gross National Income per capita in US dollars and 
deflate to 2012 US dollars using the US GDP deflator. I then calculate the 
population-weighted average per capita real GNI for the sovereigns and non-
sovereigns and plot the results at five-yearly intervals. The results of this 
exercise are shown in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 6, the 1970 distribution of 
per capita income is plotted on the same basis as the 2012 distribution in 
Figure 3 above, showing that the shape of the distribution hardly changed 
over the 40 years, although the detailed ranking of individual economies has 
changed, and the leading 1970 sovereign cases Bahamas and Nauru clearly 
fell behind relative to the leading 2012 non-sovereigns Bermuda and the 
Cayman Islands.  
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Figure 6: Political status and income per head at 1970 according to the UN 
Statistical Agency 
 
Source: Data from UN Statistical Division national accounts database at http://unstats.un.org/ 
unsd/snaama/dnlList.asp, weighted using population data from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_ 
of_countries_by_past_and_future_population, (30 Jan. 2014). 
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Figure 7 traces the population-weighted per capita real income of the sover-
eign and non-sovereign groups over the 40-year period and shows that the 
higher incomes of non-sovereigns goes back at least to 1970, and that since 
1970 the two groups of economies have exhibited virtually identical aggre-
gated rates of growth – strong confirmation for Sampson’s (2005) finding that 
recent growth rates are not statistically related to political status. (There are 
signs in the chart that the early-1980s global downturn hit the sovereigns 
harder than the non-sovereigns, but this followed a period when the former’s 
growth had been outpacing the latter’s.) This suggests that the difference
Figure 7: Trajectories of real per capita GNI in 26 sovereign versus 13 non-
sovereign island economies 1970-2010, population-weighted averages 
(Source: as for Figure 4) 
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in material welfare between the two types of political status was established 
already at 1970, which means that either something happened very early in 
the decolonisation era to separate the two groups of islands, or the hypothesis 
of a causal relation running from political status to income differentials (ad-
vanced, e.g., by Bertram 2004) loses ground to the competing hypothesis that 
wealthier territories were more successful in avoiding independence. 
Another way to measure convergence or divergence over time between 
the two groups of island economies is the ratio of per capita income. This is 
shown in Figure 8 over the four decades 1970-2010. The pattern that shows
Figure 8: Ratio of population-weighted GNI per capita between 26 sovereign 
and 13 non-sovereign island economies, 1970-2010 (Source: as for Figure 4) 
 
up is of non-sovereigns falling behind relative to sovereigns during the 1970s, 
but pulling away again in the 1980s before dropping back again in the 2000s. 
Over the forty-year period there is no clear secular trend, but the steep drop in 
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the early 1970s makes it all the more important to push the analysis further 
back to see whether the 1970 data may be an anomaly. 
For one region it is possible to carry income comparisons back a further 
decade. A long-run study of the Caribbean islands has been published with a 
database going back to the early nineteenth century, which offers GDP esti-
mates for the period 1960-1998 (Bulmer-Thomas 2001: Table 10). Figure 9 
compares the time paths of individual islands over that 1960-1998 period, 
Figure 9: GDP per capita of 12 sovereign and 11 non-sovereign Caribbean 
island economies, 1960-1998 
 
Source: Bulmer-Thomas 2001: Table 10. 
Sovereignty and Material Welfare  415 
 
with those that became sovereign during the period shown with dashed lines 
and those that remained non-sovereign shown as solid lines. Island economies 
that have remained non-sovereigns tended to converge at the upper end of the 
distribution over time, whereas islands that became sovereigns grew more 
slowly overall and without apparent convergence. Figure 10 compares the 
path of population-weighted GDP per capita between the two Caribbean 
Figure 10: Population-weighted real GDP per capita 12 sovereign and 11 non-
sovereign Caribbean island economies, 1960-98 (Source: ibid. Tables 2 & 10) 
 
groups, indicating both that the islands heading for non-sovereign status were 
collectively ahead at 1960 and that thereafter they diverged from the sover-
eign island states. This leaves the issue of causality still wide open, but could 
indicate two-way causality: both that the more prosperous islands avoided 
sovereignty, and that non-sovereignty may have boosted their economic per-
formance. However, whether the Caribbean experience can be generalised to 
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islands in other regions remains to be explored. I turn now to two other 
measures that are more readily available for longer time periods: life expec-
tancy, and imports.  
The UN Demographic Yearbook and its historical supplements have in-
formation on life expectancy at birth for 22 of the 61 islands in Table 4 over 
six decades from 1950-55 to 2011. Figure 11 on the next page compares the 
distributions for these two periods, showing that across the two groups of 
islands for which long-run data is available, life expectancy rose substantially 
(by roughly a decade) and there was clear convergence as the laggards caught 
up. At the beginning and end of the period the two economies with highest 
life expectancy were, not surprisingly, the two (now-sovereign) European 
ones in the sample: Malta and Cyprus. Across the 22 economies, the visual 
impression is of a slight overall edge in favour of non-sovereigns, but there 
may well be bias in the samples, especially the non-sovereign sample, where 
higher living standards probably produced more statistical reporting. 
The conclusion here appears to be that differences in life expectancy as-
sociated with eventual political status, which may have existed in the early 
1950s, were increasingly eliminated over time as all island economies con-
verged toward the 80-year level at which gains in life expectancy seem to 
level off. This potentially supports the possibility that today’s non-sovereigns 
may have started out somewhat ahead of today’s sovereigns among our island 
sample, but does not sustain the idea that non-sovereign status confers any 
clear advantage in relation to health outcomes. When average life expectancy 
across the two groups is tracked on a population-weighted basis, the outcome 
depends on the inclusion or exclusion of Puerto Rico – the largest of the non-
sovereigns for which data was available, which already by 1950 had life 
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Figure 11: Total life expectancy at birth in 13 sovereign and nine non-
sovereign island economies 1950-55 and 2011 
 
 
Sources: Most data from UN Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dybhist.htm. 1990s and 2000s data from 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2012/Table21.xls, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2012/Table04.xls, and 
http://apps.who.int/gho/athena/data/data.xls?target=GHO/WHOSIS_000001 
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expectancy of over 60 years after half a century of close connection to the 
USA. The calculation is crude, and prone to errors arising from gaps in the 
data and sample selection bias (only islands for which data was available are 
included). Data was located for 22 sovereigns and 14 non-sovereigns – a total 
of 36 of the 61 islands in Table 4. The results are in Figure 12, first with Puer-
to Rico included and then with it excluded. With Puerto Rico excluded, the 
remaining 13 non-sovereigns started out behind the sovereigns in 1950 but 
had caught up by 1970 and moved well ahead by 2010. 
The life expectancy evidence, therefore, is inconclusive with respect to 
the key question of causality – whether relative wealth preceded political 
dependence, or vice versa. The second panel of Figure 12 is the best evidence 
at this point for the second position. We turn, therefore, to imports per head – 
probably the best proxy for consumption standards for which long-run data is 
available.  
Figure 12: Population-weighted average life expectancy at birth, 22 sover-
eigns compared with 14 non-sovereigns including Puerto Rico 
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Figure 12 cont. 
 
Trade data 
Statistics of merchandise trade were collected and published for most small 
island territories throughout the colonial era, and have continued to appear for 
both sovereign and non-sovereign islands since decolonisation. The World 
Trade Organisation’s online database begins in 1948, but is almost complete-
ly restricted to sovereign states, and for a number of the sovereign islands in 
the Table 4 sample only shorter runs of data for more recent dates are provid-
ed. Other sources fill some of the gaps, and provide figures for some non-
sovereign islands. In this section a preliminary analysis is undertaken by 
assembling per capita import figures in US dollars for as many as possible of 
the islands in our sample at ten-yearly intervals from 1950 to 2010.  
At this stage (early 2014) it has been possible to locate data on merchan-
dise imports per capita in US dollars for only 22 sovereign small-island econ-
omies and eleven non-sovereigns – a total of 33, just over half the economies 
in the Table 4 sample. Future research will be directed to substantially 
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increasing the representation of non-sovereigns. Figure 13 plots the data, first 
with the Netherlands Antilles included and then with this outlier excluded. 
(Imports to the Netherlands Antilles at that time were dominated by oil pass-
ing through the refineries on Aruba and re-exported after processing – in 
other words, were mainly intermediate goods rather than destined for final 
consumption.) 
No clear-cut general conclusions are possible from this exercise. Obvi-
ously two or three individual non-sovereigns (Bermuda, New Caledonia, 
Netherlands Antilles) stand out ahead of the bunch at 1950 but across the 
remainder of the islands covered there is no strong pattern. Provisionally 
Figure 13 on the following page could be consistent with the hypothesis that 
the gap between sovereign and non-sovereign groups opened up during or 
after decolonisation and was not pre-existing - but the fact that the three top 
cases in the import data at 1950 were all economies that later retained non-
sovereign status keeps alive the alternative hypothesis that for at least part of 
the sample causality may have run from economic to political status.  
Repeating the exercise for two post-decolonisation years, 1990 and 2010, 
produces the results in Figures 14 (for 1990) and 15 (for 2010) on the follow-
ing pages for essentially the same sets of islands (American Samoa is added 
in 1990, Aruba appears separately from the rest of the Netherlands Antilles, 
and a couple of other non-sovereigns enter or leave the set as a result of data 
availability).  
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Figure 13: Imports per capita in US dollars in 1950: 22 sovereign and 11 non-
sovereign small island economies 
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Figure 13 cont. 
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Figure 14: Imports per capita in US dollars in 1990: 22 sovereign and 12 non-
sovereign small island economies 
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Figure 15: Imports per capita in US dollars in 2010: 22 sovereign and 12 non-
sovereign small island economies 
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Visually, comparing Figures 14 and 15 with Figure 13 might seem to support 
the hypothesis of non-sovereign political status driving stronger economic 
performance over time, but statistically significant results would still require 
systematic analysis that controlled for other factors, plus a bigger data set 
with wider coverage of non-sovereigns. This remains the object of future 
work. One corrective to the visual impression gained from Figures 13-15 is to 
calculate the population-weighted imports per head across the islands for 
which data was available. The result, in Figure 16, is remarkable. It appears to 
provide quite strong support for the idea that the islands that eventually be-
came non-sovereign (a) started out ahead prior to decolonisation, and (b) 
retained basically the same lead sixty years after (c) experiencing a period 
during the late twentieth century when they pulled strongly ahead of the 
Figure 16: Population-weighted imports per head, US dollars, sovereign ver-
sus non-sovereign island economies 
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sovereigns before falling back again at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Thus analyses that emphasised the superior performance of non-
sovereigns up to the 1990s may have captured a phenomenon that was only 
temporary and that may have been reversed in the past decade. The data are 
not yet, however, strong enough to sustain any definite conclusion. 
Conclusion 
The research programme discussed in this chapter is still in progress and a 
great deal remains to be done. The question of whether non-sovereign politi-
cal status confers economic advantage remains a fascinating one, which has 
produced many research findings at the level of individual island case studies 
while stimulating the search for statistically-valid generalisations. One central 
proposition has stood the test of the work reported in this chapter: non-
sovereign economies at least have done no worse than sovereign ones in rais-
ing and sustaining the material living standards of their populations. The 
choice of political status is therefore not one that can be founded on any ob-
vious superiority of sovereign independence. The opposite hypothesis - that 
non-sovereign status wins out on economic performance - remains unproven 
at the general level, however persuasively it can be argued for the histories of 
particular cases. For non-sovereign island communities facing the possibility 
of moving to sovereign independence – for example New Caledonia and 
Bougainville – the economic evidence analysed here offers no clear positive 
guidelines. Gains in per capita income should not be expected to flow from 
independence; but neither is it clear that the change necessarily implies sacri-
ficing the material welfare of the population. This position is a considerable 
shift from the argument in my previous work that gaining sovereign inde-
pendence has typically involved a trade-off: lower material welfare as the 
price of gaining national identity and pride. But until more long-run data 
spanning the entire decolonisation period is assembled and analysed, the 
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fundamental question of whether there is indeed any general relationship 
between sovereignty and material welfare in small islands will remain open. 
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The MIRAB Model of Small Island Economies in the 
Pacific and their Security Issues 
Clement A. Tisdell 
Abstract: The MIRAB model of Pacific island micro-economies was devel-
oped in the mid-1980s and dominated the literature on the economics of small 
island nations and economies until alternative models were proposed two 
decades later. Nevertheless, it is still an influential theory. MIRAB is an ac-
ronym for migration (MI), remittance (R) and foreign aid (A) and the public 
bureaucracy (B); the main components of the MIRAB model. The nature of 
this model is explained and the importance of distinguishing between the two 
processes involved in it (one based on foreign aid and the other on overseas 
remittance) is emphasised. Evidence is given of the importance of migration 
and overseas remittance for the functioning of some Pacific island mi-
crostates, such as Tonga. Yet, it is argued that no single model adequately 
typifies the economic situations of Pacific microstates and micro-economies 
because of their diversity. Even economies that have been classified as 
MIRAB economies can be very different. The newer TOURAB, SITE and 
PROFIT models have similar limitations. In order to understand adequately 
the economic situation of Pacific island microstates (including their economic 
vulnerability, their sustainability, and political merchantabilities), it is neces-
sary to adopt a more holistic approach which takes account of historical, 
cultural and environmental factors.  
Keywords: Aid, economics of small island nations, migration, MIRAB 
model, Nauru; Pacific island microstates, sea level rise, remittances. 
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Introduction 
The MIRAB model (which outlines the way in which several small island 
economies in the Pacific manage to remain sustainable, despite their com-
parative lack of domestic economic production) was developed by two New 
Zealand economists; Bertram and Watters (1985). It is based on the observa-
tion that these economies rely heavily on remittances from their emigrants 
and funds provided by foreign aid. As pointed out by Bertram (2006), this 
model has been widely accepted and applied not only in the Pacific but also 
to some small economies elsewhere. Bertram (2006:12) expresses the view 
that the MIRAB model is likely to continue to be applicable to many small 
island nations well into this century. Nevertheless, as is pointed out here, 
changes in the nature of the operation of the model are to be expected, and it 
is doubtful if it captures adequately the diverse way in which the economies 
of small island nations in the Pacific operate and have developed. 
In this article, the basic structure of the MIRAB model is outlined and 
some studies providing support for it and examining its consequences are 
reviewed. The applicability of the model is then discussed and changes in the 
nature of its operation and future applicability are considered. This is fol-
lowed by a brief discussion of security, sustainability and vulnerability issues 
involving small island nations in the Pacific. Before concluding, a brief note 
is added on the case of Nauru. 
The MIRAB Model, Evidence Supporting it and its Consequences 
MIRAB is an acronym for Migration (MI) Remittances (R), Foreign Aid (A) 
and the Public Bureaucracy (B); the essential components of the MIRAB 
model. It has been claimed that many small economies in the Pacific Islands 
rely on these four elements to sustain the economic welfare of their popula-
tion (see, for example, Bertram/Watters 1985, 1986; Bertram 1986, 2006; see 
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also Bertram in this volume). There is convincing evidence that this is so for 
some, for instance, the Cook Islands, Samoa and Tonga.  
It is helpful to decompose the MIRAB model into two distinct processes: 
(1) the aid process and (2) the emigration and remittance process. These oper-
ate as follows:  
 Process I depends on the provision of foreign aid which in MIRAB 
economies is mainly used to fund the government bureaucracy. This 
aid provides income for public servants and a portion of this is remit-
ted to their relatives, especially those who lack access to cash in-
come. Expenditure by public servants (by those receiving their re-
mittances) adds to additional employment and to cash incomes in 
MIRAB economies, for example, in retailing, via a multiplier effect. 
Nevertheless, typically, the import leakage from this expenditure is 
high. In cases where foreign aid is tied, this leakage is especially 
high. 
 Process II involves the sending of remittances by emigrants from 
MIRAB economies to relatives (and to others) remaining at home. In 
turn, the spending of those remittances has a local multiplier effect 
on incomes and employment but this is damped by a high import 
leakage.  
Figure 1 on the next page highlights these two processes. There is strong 
evidence that globally the total amount of international remittances to devel-
oping countries significantly exceeds the total value of their Official Devel-
opment Assistance (Ratha/Silwal 2012), and this is probably so for most 
MIRAB economies in the Pacific. With foreign aid being reduced by coun-
tries such as Australia and the USA, many MIRAB economies are likely to 
become relatively more dependent on Process II, the flow of overseas 
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remittances from their emigrants, in order to maintain the economic welfare 
of their inhabitants. 
Figure 1: Flow charts for two processes that sustain the functioning of 
MIRAB economies 
 
Tonga’s economy is heavily dependent on remittances from its overseas mi-
grants. The nature and role of these remittances has been studied in depth by 
Richard P.C. Brown of The University of Queensland. Jimenez-Soto and 
Brown (2012:426) report that “as many as 60 per cent of all households in 
Tonga have at least one overseas migrant, and 90 per cent of households 
receive remittances.” 
Brown, Connell and Jimenez-Soto (2013) find from studies of remittanc-
es by Tongans (and more recently by Fijians) that these are used mostly for 
consumptive rather than for investment. They argue, however, that this should 
not be deprecated because these remittances play an important role in poverty 
alleviation and in providing social protection. Jimenez-Soto and Brown 
FOREIGN AID 
(PROCESS I) 
Foreign Aid 
OVERSEAS REMITTANCES 
(PROCESS II) 
Emigration 
Income mainly for public 
bureaucrats 
Remittances from emigrants 
mainly for relatives 
Some remittances by public 
servants to their relatives 
Expenditure by recipients of 
remittances 
Expenditure by public ser-
vants (and from their remit-
tances) has a positive but 
limited local multiplier effect 
due to high import leakages 
Local multiplier effect pre-
sent but limited due to high 
import leakages 
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(2012) conclude from their detailed study of the role of migrants’ remittances 
in Tonga that these remittances reduced the incidence of poverty by 31%. 
Furthermore, Brown, Leeves and Prayaga (2013) found that considerable 
social pressure is exerted on migrants (often through their church affiliations) 
to donate extra funds when natural disasters strike their Pacific homelands. 
Why do some Pacific microstates rely heavily on continuing foreign aid 
and international remittances for their economic welfare? Why are remittanc-
es (and aid) used mainly for consumption (‘unproductive’ purposes) rather 
than for investment (‘productive’ purposes) in many Pacific microstates? One 
possibility is that the returns on investments in some of these economies are 
low or negative and the scope for investments giving positive returns at home 
are limited (Tisdell 2007). This is probably one reason why the governments 
of Tuvalu and Kiribati invest most of their capital funds abroad (namely the 
Tuvalu Trust Fund and the Reserve Equalisation Reserve Fund respectively) 
(Tisdell 2000a, 2000b). Bertram (2006:2) observed that there were limited 
opportunities for commercial economic investment in the MIRAB economies 
which he and Watters studied (Bertram/Watters 1985). However, Pacific 
microstates are diverse (Tisdell 1996, 2002, 2007, 2008a) and the extent to 
which commercial investment in them can yield positive returns varies. For 
example, the scope for productive investments is likely to be less in island 
nations consisting of atolls (for example, Kiribati and Tuvalu) than in those 
with islands that are mainly of volcanic origin (Fiji) or which are primarily of 
a continental type (New Caledonia). 
If there is little scope for positive returns from investment in commercial 
production in Pacific microstates, then an alternative possible way to sustain 
their economies is by obtaining foreign aid and receiving international remit-
tances. It also follows that there is little scope for aid to act as a catalyst for 
developing self-sustaining commercial production in these microstates. 
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Furthermore, the investment of remittances locally for productive purposes 
will be infrequent if negative returns are likely in most cases. An additional 
consideration is that a higher return may be obtained by investing in offspring 
(to increase their human capital) in order to facilitate their emigration and 
subsequently, their remittances. Poirine (1997) has studied this aspect in de-
tail as far as investment in the education of children in MIRAB economies is 
concerned and stresses its importance.  
It also follows too that many microstates in the Pacific are unable to de-
velop by applying the liberal economic principles of the Washington Consen-
sus. The smallest states (Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu for example) are severely 
restricted in their ability to profitably export goods, although some mi-
crostates are able to benefit from trade in services, such as tourism (Fiji) or by 
acting as a tax haven for banking and finance (Vanuatu). 
How Widely Applicable is the MIRAB Model to Microstates? 
The question has arisen of the extent to which the economies of Pacific island 
microstates satisfy the MIRAB model. First, it can be said that the model 
glosses over significant differences in factors sustaining the economies of 
microstates that have been classified as MIRAB economies. For example, 
Bertram (2006:7, Figure 1) classifies Samoa and Tonga, Kiribati and Tuvalu 
as MIRAB economies but in several ways, they are as different as ‘chalk and 
cheese’. The economies of Samoa and Tonga differ substantially in their size 
and diversity and their physical geography compared to the much smaller 
states of Kiribati and Tuvalu. This incidentally raises the question of what 
criteria should be used to determine what is an island microstate or a micro-
economy? How small must it be? ‘Small’ is a relative term and many dimen-
sions can be used to determine its application. Consequently, judgment is 
involved in categorising an economy or a state as small. For example, Fiji has 
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a large economy compared to Tuvalu, but Fiji’s economy is small compared 
to Australia’s. 
Secondly, while remittances make an important contribution to the eco-
nomic functioning of many Pacific microstates, those received by Samoa and 
Tonga are largely a function of permanent overseas migration of family 
members. Both Tuvalu and Kirabati are much more dependent on remittances 
from family members able to obtain only short-term employment abroad, for 
example, the employment of merchant marines from these countries by Ger-
man shipping lines and those on short-term employment contracts in Austral-
ia and New Zealand. Consequently, the sources of remittances of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu are much more vulnerable to changing economic conditions abroad 
than are those of Samoa and Tonga. For instance, there is intense competition 
from other nations, such as Pakistan, to supply crew for merchant ships. Fur-
thermore, both Kiribati and Tuvalu are comparatively more dependent on 
rents from fishing rights within their Exclusive Economic Zones than are 
Samoa and Tonga. These rents are obtained from distant water fishing na-
tions. 
Thirdly, it has become quite clear that many small island economies can-
not be classified as MIRAB economies. For instance, McElroy (2006) high-
lighted the fact that the economies of some island microstates depend heavily 
on inbound tourism. The acronym SITEs (Small Island Tourist Economies) 
was developed to describe these economies. A third category of island mi-
crostates has been developed by Baldacchino (2006) for which he coined the 
acronym, PROFIT. This somewhat abstruse acronym consists of the follow-
ing components: P (people considerations); R (resource management); O 
(overseas engagement); IF (finance, insurance and taxation); and T (transpor-
tation). Baldacchino highlights the ability of small nations to make strategic 
political decisions in the global context which enhance their economic 
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welfare, for example, act as tax havens, provide flags of convenience for 
shipping, obtain rents from their natural resources and benefit from the pres-
ence of military installations. In some instances, these attributes are combined 
with tourism, foreign aid and remittances. 
A fourth classification of the economies of some small island states also 
exists and was suggested by Guthunz and von Krosigk (1996) prior to the 
SITES and PROFIT models. It is the TOURAB aid and bureaucracy model. It 
typifies those economies that depend heavily on tourism and the distribution 
of aid via the public bureaucracy. It has received little coverage in the litera-
ture.  
The TOURAB, SITEs and PROFIT models underline the diverse nature 
of small island economies. Bertram (2006) accepts the existence of this diver-
sity and uses it to provide a global taxonomy of island microstates. He classi-
fies economies according to the extent to which they satisfy MIRAB, SITE or 
PROFIT characteristics. Oberst and McElroy (2007:175) also provide a clas-
sification of small island nations according to whether they satisfy the 
MIRAB model or the combined PROFIT-SITE models. Note that not all the 
economies classified by Bertram (2006) and Oberst and McElroy (2007) are 
those of sovereign states: some are political dependencies and overseas terri-
tories of sovereign states. However, in neither of these publications are de-
tailed reasons given for including particular island economies in one category 
rather than another. No quantification is provided. For instance, while Ber-
tram (2006) classifies the Cook Islands as being predominantly a MIRAB 
economy, Oberst and McElroy (2007) place it in the PROFIT-SITE category. 
Both Bertram (2006) and Oberst and McElroy (2007) identify Tuvalu and 
Kiribati as having a MIRAB economy, but this fails to take account of their 
significant rents obtained from distant water fishing nations for access to fish 
(mainly tuna) in their very large Exclusive Economic Zones. Furthermore, as 
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mentioned above, there is failure to highlight adequately the extent to which 
these nations depend on overseas remittances based on relatively short-term 
employment contracts. 
Each of these models is intended to identify theoretical (‘ideal’) types but 
the PROFIT model is rather elastic or ‘hazy’. Oberst and McElroy (2007:165) 
claim that “the three aspects that distinguish PROFIT from MIRAB models 
are: the dynamism of the private sector, the active role of domestic policy, 
and the strategic orientation towards diversification. PROFIT examples 
would include tax and insurance havens, offshore banking centres and duty-
free manufacturing exporters”. The way in which the various dimensions of 
the PROFIT model can be measured are unclear. In fact, many of its dimen-
sions do not seem to be quantifiable. On the other hand, the components of 
the MIRAB models can be measured, even though official statistics on remit-
tances are inadequate because remittances are often made informally or di-
rectly by islanders and are, therefore, unrecorded. 
Security, Sustainability and Vulnerability: Issues Involving Pacific Island 
Microstates 
It is generally accepted that island microstates are economically more vulner-
able than larger nations. Reasons for the economic vulnerability of island 
microstates have been outlined by Briguglio (1995). Factors which contribute 
to their economic vulnerability include: 
 Their lack of economic diversification in exported commodities and their 
lack of scope for such diversification given their limited resources; 
 Many are prone to natural disasters (such as cyclones and tsunamis) and, 
unlike large nations, they have limited resources to respond to such disasters 
which often impact on a large proportion of their population; and  
 Land-based subsistence crops (which in some PIC provide a buffer against 
commercial economic instability) may be destroyed or severely damaged. 
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The economic vulnerability hypothesis has, however, not been accepted with-
out dissent. According to Bertram (2006:2): “In a globalizing world, inhabit-
ants of small island economies have open to them a myriad of evolutionary 
responses to external forces that potentially enable them to seize niches of 
opportunity, and thereby insulate themselves from global economic shocks” 
(see Bertram in this volume). This is a similar theme to that expressed by 
Baldacchino (2006). However, I believe it to be too sweeping a view. For 
example, while Brown et al. (2013) accept that island microstates in the Pa-
cific are economically vulnerable, they also point out that some, such as Sa-
moa and Tonga, are significantly insulated by their access to and dependence 
on overseas remittances. Despite this, many Pacific island economies do not 
have access to significant remittances, for example, that of the Solomon Is-
lands. However, the Solomon Islands did receive a major cash injection as a 
result of RAMSI (the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands; see 
Dinnen in this volume) which resulted in the stationing of a sizeable security 
contingent there led by Australia (Anon 2014). The last of this contingent left 
in August, 2013 and so this source of cash inflow stopped. There are also 
worrying signs that the incidence of poverty is rising in Pacific microstates 
for example, in Tonga, despite its being able to access a high level of over-
seas remittances (Jimenez-Soto/Brown 2012). Furthermore, aid donors are 
liable to cut their level of aid when they experience economic difficulties at 
home, demand for the exports of those island economies that have significant 
exports are liable to drop, and the inflow of overseas tourists to island econ-
omies is likely to be curtailed by difficult economic conditions abroad. 
Sustainability 
The question is often posed of whether the MIRAB model of economic de-
pendence can be sustained. In particular, for how long will those who have 
migrated from MIRAB economies and their progeny continue to send 
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remittances to their kin in island economies? Some reduction in the willing-
ness to send remittances can be expected with the passage of time. In order to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of the remittance system, continuous emi-
gration is required. This however, is only possible if countries receiving Pa-
cific Islanders as migrants continue to be willing to receive them. This is by 
no means assured (see, for example, Friberg et al. 2006). 
As far as I am aware, there are no available comprehensive statistics of 
population and labour movements between Pacific islands and from and to 
Pacific island microstates and territories. It would be useful to have such 
information. 
In a few cases, the sustainability of the economies of some microstates 
have depended on the mining of non-renewable resources, such as phosphate 
in the case of Nauru; an unsustainable economic activity. Several states also 
rely on income from renewable but depletable resources, such as tuna. There 
is always a risk of these resources being exploited in a sub-optimal way, and 
even being exhausted, problems not unknown in the Pacific (McDan-
iel/Gowdy 2000).  
A serious problem for Pacific island microstates consisting of low-lying 
islands (such as coral atolls) is the likelihood of sea level rise as a result of 
global warming (Tisdell 2008b). Eventually these nations will become unin-
habitable, and their inhabitants will become environmental refugees. For 
example, Kiribati and Tuvalu are at particular risk of this. In many cases, 
defensive actions (mitigation) of sea level rise can be expected to be ineffec-
tive and uneconomic. No doubt such small microstates will look to other 
nations, such as Australia, to accept their environmental refugees. 
Political vulnerability 
Despite the hypothesis of Baldocchino (2006) that island microstates have 
considerable ability to manipulate larger nations to their advantage, it seems 
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more likely that larger higher income countries have the upper hand in this 
regard. For example, both Nauru and Papua New Guinea were probably more 
willing to accept boat people (refugees) for offshore processing from Austral-
ia because of their considerable dependence on Australian foreign aid. Aus-
tralia also wants to have friendly relations with Indonesia and both sides of 
Australian politics recognise Indonesian sovereignty of West Papua (Chauvel 
2012). The Australian Government does not support the Free West Papua 
Movement (ibid.), and in turn may expect Papua New Guinea to do likewise. 
In that regard, Australia has leverage via the considerable amount of aid it 
provides to Papua New Guinea. There are also doubts about whether Timor 
Leste has received an equitable deal in relation to Australian access to its 
offshore oil and gas, especially since it has been alleged that Australia spied 
on East Timor at the time an agreement was being negotiated with East Timor 
for Australian access to these resources (Lamb 2014; see also Schmitz in this 
volume). This matter has been referred by the Government of Timor Leste to 
the International Court for Justice in the Hague.  
An interesting question is why does Australia not make it easier for indi-
viduals from Pacific microstates to migrate to Australia permanently? The 
populations of some of these states (for example, Nauru and Tuvalu) are so 
small that the migration of their residents to Australia would have a miniscule 
impact on Australia’s total population. It may also be less costly than provid-
ing aid (Tisdell 1990: Ch. 10). Is it because pressures might emerge from 
larger Pacific Island states for a similar deal? Or is it a matter of strategic 
military concern? For example, if some microstates were to become depopu-
lated, would they be taken over by potentially hostile foreign nations?  
There are also other unresolved questions: What would happen to the 
sovereignty of a nation state if all of its population migrated to another state 
(see Blitza and Bertram in this volume)? If all the land mass of a sovereign 
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state (for example, Tuvalu) should be submerged by sea level rise, would it 
lose all of its existing territorial rights? If one of more of the islands of a sov-
ereign state (for instance, Kiribati) should be submerged by sea level rise, 
would its exclusive economic (maritime) zone be correspondingly reduced? 
Some Pacific islands provide important strategic military bases, such as 
Guam for the United States, and may become more important as tensions 
escalate on territorial claims by Northeast Asian countries to areas in the 
Pacific Ocean. However, Australia’s military bases are on its mainland with 
its forward bases being in its far north. Nevertheless, one understands the 
concerns of the United States and Australia about securing defensive outposts 
in the Pacific. On the other hand one wonders why France maintains a signif-
icant military presence in French Polynesia when it no longer has possessions 
in Asia, such as in Indo-China. Is it merely to provide a politically acceptable 
form of aid to French Polynesia? Or is it to bolster the appearance of France 
as a global political power? It might be thought that because French Polynesia 
is a French overseas territory (and therefore, not a sovereign state) it ought 
not be classified as a MIRAB, TOURAB or similar economy. However, the 
boundaries of an economy do not have to coincide with that of a sovereign 
state. Depending on the purpose, and subject to some judgment, the econo-
mies of regions and other geographical areas can be analysed (including the 
economy of French Polynesia) even when they do not constitute sovereign 
states. 
Brief Notes on the Case of Nauru 
To some extent, every Pacific island microstate is unique. This is highlighted 
by the case of Nauru. It is not an archipelago (unlike most Pacific island mi-
crostates) but consists of a small single island formed by a raised coral bed. In 
1888, Nauru became a German Protectorate and in 1906 (as a result of a Brit-
ish initiative) a German and British consortium was formed to mine its 
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phosphate deposits which was in particular demand for fertilizer in Australia. 
Although Germany lost its possessions in the Pacific as a result of World War 
I (Nauru was placed in 1919 under the trusteeship of the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand), phosphate mining on Nauru continued. It was occupied by the 
Japanese in World War II and reoccupied by Australian troops in 1945. Nauru 
was again placed under the trusteeship of Australia, New Zealand and the UK 
in 1947 and administered by Australia. It became a totally independent nation 
on 31 January 1968. McDaniel and Gowdy (2000) state that between 1909 
and 1966, Nauruans received little or no economic benefit from phosphate 
mining on their island. Furthermore, they point out that “mining under occu-
pation and then trusteeship had left more than a third of the island in a state of 
complete destruction” (McDaniel/Gowdy 2000:45). A later source (Anon 
2013:6) claims: “the phosphate reserves on Nauru are almost entirely deplet-
ed. Phosphate mining in the central plateau has left a barren terrain of jag-
ged limestone pinnacles up to 15 metres (40 ft) high. Mining has devastated 
about 80 per cent of Nauru’s land area [and a considerable amount of ma-
rine life surrounding the island has been killed by silt and phosphate runoff]”. 
As a result of pressure from Nauruans and UN bodies, more generous 
phosphate royalties were paid to Nauru in the two years preceding its inde-
pendence (McDaniel/Gowdy 2000:45), and a portion of these was placed in 
the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust. By the time of its independence, Nau-
ru’s phosphate deposits were virtually exhausted. Returns from investments 
by the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust were intended to provide a continu-
ing source of income for Nauru but due to unwise investments and use of 
these funds by the government to cover budget deficits, they were almost 
exhausted by the beginning of this century (Anon 2013), thereby leaving 
Nauru in a dire economic state because it had few alternative ways to earn 
income. It therefore, became highly dependent on foreign aid provided 
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mainly by Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan. In addition, Australia agreed 
in 1993 as a result of an out of court settlement to pay Nauru $107 million 
(Australian) to rehabilitate the mined areas of the island (McDaniel/Gowdy 
2000:46). However, I could not find evidence of any significant rehabilitation 
having been done. 
Given its difficult economic situation, Nauru has had to consider every 
possibility for earning income from external sources. In the 1990s, it became 
a tax haven and a base for money laundering but under pressure from the 
inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, it 
changed its policy in 2003. It has also welcomed the opportunity to house 
those seeking asylum in Australia and arriving ‘irregularly’ by boat in return 
for extra Australian aid. This is a part of Australia’s Pacific Solution to stem 
the arrival of boat people arriving via Indonesia. The Nauruan detention cen-
tre operated from 2001- 2007 then close but was reopened again in August 
2012. Presumably, this centre will not provide Nauru with a secure long-term 
source of income. 
Nauru has some other sources of income such as royalties from fishing 
rights, but these are quite limited. Furthermore, by world standards, its net 
migration rate is low. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2013) reports 
that the estimated net migration rate of Nauru in 2013 was 14.63 migrants per 
1,000 of its population which suggests that (unlike Samoa, Tonga and several 
other microstates in the Pacific) it cannot rely on international remittances for 
its economic sustainability. The CIA also reports that Nauru has no defence 
forces and that Australia is responsible for its defence.  
While there is some evidence that Nauru has used its jurisdictional power 
for manipulative purposes (for example, in changing its recognition of the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan), its global manipulative power ap-
pears to be limited and in acting as a haven for money laundering, it did not 
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escape international attention (Drezner 2001). Baldacchino (2006) claims that 
microstates are so small that their support of economic activities regarded 
internationally as dubious, undesirable or illegal are not noticed and do not 
result in any international retaliatory action. Thus, Nauru does not fully com-
ply with Baldacchino’s PROFIT model although it is true that several sover-
eign microstates in the Pacific trade their votes in international fora in return 
for extra aid and other economic benefits from larger nations and do support 
international economic activities of ‘borderline’ nature. However, many of 
these activities are not sustainable and depend on sporadic opportunities. In 
addition, Nauru is not a magnet for tourism and therefore, does not fit the 
SITE of the TOURAB model either. Nor does it appear to comply with the 
MIRAB model. Bertram (2006:7) does not include it in his taxonomy of mi-
crostates based on this model but Oberst and McElroy (2007:175) classify it 
as being a MIRAB economy. Despite this, it is an economy which depends 
much more on foreign aid than on overseas remittances. This is not clear if it 
is classified as a MIRAB economy. In fact, like most Pacific island mi-
crostates, Nauru has special characteristics which can only be appreciated by 
considering its historical background and its special circumstances. It is only 
by taking into account these aspects that one can understand the challenging 
economic situation it now faces.  
Concluding Comments 
It is doubtful if any of the simple models for describing the economies of 
island microstates and dependencies (the MIRAB, TOURAB, SITE and 
PROFIT models) adequately explain the economic situations that Pacific 
island economies now face because they do not take enough account of his-
torical and cultural factors as well as matters of location. These models do not 
seem to explain (for example) why the economies of Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Malta, Nauru, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Federated States of Micronesia are so 
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different. The historical association of the Pacific island microstates with 
Australia, France, New Zealand and the USA are of considerable importance 
for their economic functioning but the way in which these relationships have 
come about requires delving into the historical background of their develop-
ment. This is underlined by the case of Nauru. Today, China has also taken a 
greater interest in many of these Pacific microstates as part of its growing 
global influence. This could become a concern for those nations (such as 
Australia, New Zealand and USA) that have had the greatest external influ-
ence on these microstates in recent decades. 
The possibility that the populations of some of these microstates (for ex-
ample, Nauru and the Solomon Islands) could sink into abject poverty is an-
other concern, and the problem of how several of these microstates will cope 
with predicted sea-level rises is unresolved. Apart from this, serious health 
problems exist in several Pacific states close to Australia. For example, the 
incidence of malaria is high in the Solomon Islands and in Papua New Guinea 
and in the latter country, tuberculosis (including a strain resistant to antibiot-
ics) is relatively common. These problems are occurring virtually on Austral-
ia’s doorstep. However, it seems likely that Australia will do even less in the 
future to help address these issues because with the election of Tony Abbot as 
Prime Minister in the latter part of 2013, the Australian government is in the 
process of substantially reducing the amount of its foreign aid. The United 
States is also reducing aid to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Mar-
shall Islands (Friberg et al. 2006) but these states may be able to sustain their 
economies as a result of remittances. However, not all Pacific island states are 
able to do this, because of external obstacles to the migration of their citizens. 
Furthermore, the US may add obstacles to migration from Micronesia and the 
Marshall Islands as indicated by Friberg et al. (2006:130-131). This would 
undoubtedly result in great economic hardship for residents of these nations, 
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especially if they experience major adverse consequences from climate 
change. 
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 The Economic Relations between the Pacific and the 
EU: Negotiations for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement exemplified by the Fisheries Sector 
Klaus Schilder 
“The old colonial mentality hasn’t changed. European powers are clothing 
their self-interest in the rhetoric of development, backed with the lure of aid.“ 
(Jane Kelsey, University of Auckland 2005) 
Abstract: Negotiations for a regional free trade agreement between the Eu-
ropean Union and the Pacific Island Countries have been ongoing since 
2004. While the economic significance of trade between the regions is com-
paratively small, regional political and economic integration is a priority for 
the Pacific. The EU has negotiated for comprehensive trade agreements with 
the Pacific, the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). While 
interregional negotiations are subject to controversy, both Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea have signed bilateral Interim Agreements with the EU. In the 
negotiations, Pacific Island Countries are aiming to preserve their policy 
space, also in light of other geopolitical interests in the region. As most coun-
tries in the region depend on fisheries, the sector provides valuable insights 
into the potential effects of trade liberalization towards the EU. In the future, 
EU-Pacific relations will need to be built on a truly joint cooperation strategy 
that takes into account existing power asymmetries between the regions. 
Keywords: Economic Partnerships Agreements, European Union, Fish-
ery, Pacific Island Countries, Trade Agreements 
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Introduction 
The Pacific region is currently experiencing a hitherto unprecedented growing 
global geostrategic attention. Both the traditional trade partners the USA, 
Japan and the European Union (EU) as well as the emerging economies are 
showing an increasing interest in and attention for the region. In addition to 
the - geostrategically as well as commercially- traditionally influential coun-
tries Australia and New Zealand (Schilder 2004), especially the influence of 
China – in the light of the immense demand for resources of the largest global 
economy - in the region is growing significantly. These are joined by India 
and Brazil with their own economic interests as well as South Korea and 
Indonesia. Traditionally Russia, the US and Japan are already pursuing their 
geo-strategic interests, partly through the development and security political 
presence in several island countries. 
The economic importance of trade between the Pacific Island Countries 
and the EU is not particularly high compared to that with the neighboring 
Pacific countries. The top trading partners include the United States, China, 
Russia and Switzerland. The region transacts only about 0.06% of its foreign 
trade with the EU. Exports are dominated by only a few commodities includ-
ing palm oil, coffee, coconut, fish and caviar. EU imports to the region are 
dominated by machines and technical equipment. 
Against the backdrop of the growing multipolarization in the region, in 
2012 the EU issued a notice that describes the growing foreign policy im-
portance of the Pacific (European Commission, High Representative for For-
eign and Security Policy of the EU 2012). In it the action fields trade, envi-
ronment, fisheries, climate change as well as democratization and human 
rights are described as key tasks for a more coherent EU-Pacific policy. Un-
der the 10th European Development Fund, the EU has assured the region 
development cooperation in the amount of 750 million €. But the partnership
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Annual trade flows between the EU and the Pacific (2003-2012). 
 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade (2013) 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147358.pdf) 
 
Pacific Trade Data by Country 2004-2013 
  Trade tariffs (as share 
of government reve-
nues) 
Main export products (share of 
total exports) 
Cook Islands 19.6% Pearls, fish (76%) 
Fiji 26% Sugar, textile, fish (32%) 
Kiribati 19.7% copra, seaweed, fish (41.6%) 
Marschall Islands 21.1% fish, coconut oil (68%) 
Micronesia 15.8% fish (94%) 
Palau 20.8% n/a 
Papua New Guinea 7.3% gold, crude oil, copper (78%) 
Samoa 13.3% fish, cocnut pulp, beer (70%) 
Solomon Islands 23.9% timber (65%) 
Timor Leste n/a crude oil (> 90%), coffee (7%) 
Tonga 54% vegetable, fish (44%) 
Tuvalu 15.1% n/a 
Vanuatu 36.5% copra, beef, timber, cocoa (32%) 
Source: Oxfam Australia (2010) 
(www.oxfam.org.nz/sites/default/files/reports/GEC%20in%20the%20Pacific%20Final%20Oxfam.pdf) 
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with the EU is not always favourable received. Already in 2006, the former 
Pacific strategy of the EU was criticised, in particular with regard to its con-
siderable conceptual and structural weaknesses (Schilder 2006). While great 
importance is attached to the cooperation with the EU in many countries of 
the region, such as the development cooperation, climate protection, ecotour-
ism and renewable energies, there is however a prevailing perception of a 
very unequal partnership in other policy areas. This seems to be especially the 
case in view of the year-long and toughly running trade negotiations. Here the 
EU's ambitious trade and investment policy strategy is not working out, if not 
even likely to fail (Laporte/Piñol Puig 2013).  
The status of negotiations 
The negotiations between the EU and the 14 Pacific ACP countries (PACP) 
about an interregional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) began on 10 
September 2004. These aim for a classical free trade area for agricultural and 
industrial goods, but also for a reciprocal market opening of trade in services, 
investment, competition rules, government procurement, data collection and 
protection of intellectual property rights. Originally, the conclusion of the 
EPA has already been planned for the end of 2007, but the negotiations 
dragged on due to a lacking agreement on the common objectives for such a 
contract (Schilder 2005). In 2007, Papua New Guinea and Fiji initialed a so-
called Interim EPA and signed this in 2009 in order to avoid the interruption 
of preferential market access of canned tuna and sugar to the EU. Papua New 
Guinea and the EU ratified the Interim Agreement in 2011, yet the ratification 
by Fiji is still outstanding to date due to its unstable political situation, but 
also because of reservations towards the content (see below). 
Since 2008, the negotiations for a regional EPA between the EU and the 
Pacific Island Countries have also continued. However, no formal negotia-
tions took place between September 2009 and September 2012. Only in May 
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2013 did the PACP trade ministers meet to verify the progress of negotia-
tions1. When end of 2013 Papua New Guinea withdrew from the talks due to 
a dispute over future fisheries rules, the EU suspended negotiations in Octo-
ber 2013. The new working meeting of negotiators on both sides scheduled 
for March 2014 has not yet taken place. In April 2014, the Ministers for 
Trade and Fisheries stated once again that the negotiations with the EU be 
completed by June of that year2, but in view of the year-long dragging talks, 
these date announcements appear non-binding even within the time con-
straints applied by the EU Commission3. 
The negotiations became also controversial, when the EU Commission 
during the current negotiations on 30 September 2001 and much to the sur-
prise of the Pacific States, presented to the EU Council of Ministers a pro-
posal, whereby the duty- and quota-free access to the European market should 
end by 1 January 2014. By the end of 2007, the EU had issued the Ministerial 
Decision No. 1528/2007, by which the to date granted preferential market 
access conditions of the ACP countries were to be continued for the duration 
of the EPA negotiations disregarding the expiry date of 1 January 2008 as laid 
down in the Cotonou Agreement. With the threat of a new deadline for the 
completion of duty- and quota-free access for non-LDCs belonging to the 
group of Pacific Island Countries, the EU further strengthened the pressure 
which had been kept up during the entire negotiation phase.  
 
 
                                                          
1
  see Pacific Islands Forum Trade Ministers’ Meeting, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 27 
May 2014 (online: www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/in-news/2014/pacific-islands-
forum-trade-ministers-meeting.html, read on 20 June 2014). 
2
  see Sisilo: Let’s go for the Best Possible Deal, Solomon Star 18 May 2014 (online: 
www.solomonstarnews.com/news/regional/518-sisilo-let-s-go-for-the-best-possible-deal, 
read on 14 June 2014). 
3
  see No Deadline to Finalise EPA Negotiations, Fiji Sun 28 May 2014 (www.fijisun.com.fj/ 
2014/04/28/no-deadline-to-finalise-epa-negotiations-eu/, read on 20 June 2014). 
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Interim Agreement with PNG and Fiji 
Even if the end of preferential market access has intermittently been post-
poned to 1 October 2014, the EU leaves Fiji with a difficult choice whilst 
excluding them from the poorest countries (Least developed countries - in 
short LDCs) in the region: 1. Significant damage to the sugar exporting econ-
omy when preferred EU market access is ended or 2. the ratification of the 
negotiated Interim EPA, whereby the nationally available political manouver-
ing space for the diversification of local economic and industrial structure 
becomes clearly limited. Yet just two of the non-LDC Pacific island countries 
have signed an interim agreement with the EU: Papua New Guinea (signed on 
30 Juli 2009) and Fiji (signed on 11 December 2009). The other non-LDCs in 
the region (Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Palau, Nauru, 
Samoa and Tonga) have since 1 January 2008 benefited from the easier mar-
ket access under the EU's Generalised System of Preferences. 
The Interim Agreements are classic free trade agreements for goods. 
They provide duty- and quota-free market access for all exports from the two 
countries, yet with transition periods for rice (expired 2010) and sugar (up to 
2015). In addition, the agreements provide for the gradual opening of local 
markets to European imports. In the case of Papua New Guinea, the country 
has committed to import 88%, in relation to their value, free of customs duty 
from the EU. Exceptions apply for economically important products such as 
meat, fish, vegetables, furniture and jewelry. Fiji has undertaken to let 87% of 
all European imports duty-free into the country within a 15-year transition 
period. The liberalization commitments are staggered: 14% at entry into force 
of the agreement, an additional 2.5% after five years, another 60% after 10 
years and finally 11% by the end of the 15th year. Exceptions apply to meat, 
fish, fruit and vegetables, alcohol and iron goods. Other sections of the 
agreement are dealing with security clauses that permit the temporary 
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reintroduction of tariffs or quotas in case of a potential damage to the econo-
my, with support measures for the compliance with the strict European Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary health standards as well as trade facilitation measures 
mainly in the area of cooperation of the authorities to simplify customs for-
malities. Missing, however, are more specific development policies aimed at 
the establishment and strengthening of regional markets. These include 
measures such as the protection of sensitive competitive industries, the sup-
port of reforms in the tax and fiscal policy aiming at the offsetting of losses or 
the strengthening of intra-regional trade. The German Federal Government 
and the leading Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (BMZ) welcomed the agreement and listed as positive aspects of the 
Interim Agreement – in addition to the substantial improvement of market 
access to the EU – the adaptation of liberalization to the needs of a weaker 
partner, the protection of sensitive sectors, the partial relaxation of rules of 
origin (RoO), the compliance with social and environmental standards as well 
as measures for certification and quality assurance. In view of the food securi-
ty in rural areas but also the preservation of particularly sensitive sectors or 
industries, the BMZ also considers it important to further defer the liberaliza-
tion process. During the negotiations, the BMZ advocated to shape the WPAs 
compatible with development, however only in December 2013 the Federal 
Government supported an initiative by other EU member states for a greater 
flexibility of the negotiating mandate of the European Commission, which 
was pushing for a market opening4. Yet this did little to change the underlying 
philosophy of liberalization and mutual opening of markets within the Federal 
Government either. 
                                                          
4
  Joint letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
and Vice President of the European Commission and the European Commissioners for De-
velopment and Trade, Dec. 5th 2013 (online: http://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/ 
j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vjg0k5ved1vs/f=/blg274173.pdf, read on 16.09.2014). 
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The negotiations have been criticized and rejected by numerous political and 
civil society groups in the region and in the EU since their beginning. Given 
the strong fragmentation of the already small markets, a strong regional com-
petition from a similar range of exports, low purchasing power and deficits in 
communication and transportation infrastructure, the possible economic bene-
fit for the Island Countries appears particularly questionable. In addition, 
expected revenue losses due to the elimination of import tariffs will tighten 
the financial problems of state budgets. The Pacific Network on Globalisation 
(PANG), one of the most prominent civil society voices in the region, critical-
ly followed the negotiations from the beginning (PANG 2008) and recom-
mended their own governments to put an end to them.5 Besides the negotia-
tion’s own lack of transparency, here also the potential loss of an independent 
and sovereign trade control and industrial policy - the so-called policy space – 
is particularly criticized. The following recommendations have been especial-
ly formulated to increase the EPAs’ compatibility to development and to 
avoid any potential damage (European Parliament 2014): 
 Independent, ex ante human rights impact assessments combined with a 
human rights clause, which regularly examines the impact of EPAs on the 
human rights situation in the PACP states and possibly allows for an adapta-
tion of the treaty (Bartels 2014). 
 A maximum flexibility in the design of the reciprocal liberalization obliga-
tions between the parties as well as the adoption of best results from other 
negotiating configurations. 
 Abandonment of negotiations on new issues such as services, investments, 
competition, public procurement policy, intellectual property rights as well 
                                                          
5
  Free Trade Warning, The Fiji Times Online, 20 October 2008 (online: www.fijitimes.com/ 
story.aspx?id=103832, read on 20 July 2014). 
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as tax and fiscal policy, to avoid precedents on a multilateral level in bilat-
eral negotiations. 
 No restrictions on the use of export taxes, among others on commodity 
exports. 
 No most-favoured nation clause6, that can automatically forward commer-
cial advantages granted by the EPA to other trade parties. 
 Existing or negotiated rendezvous clauses 7 should not include topics, that 
are not yet negotiated at multilateral level in the WTO or where there is no 
consensus. 
 Combining of the planned liberalization measures with the realisation of 
concrete so-called Development Benchmarks, which make a progressive 
liberalization subject to the reduction of economic vulnerabilities of each 
country or region (European Parliament 2014) 
The ACP Civil Society Forum had particularly criticized the weakening of the 
regional integrity through the signing of the Interim Agreement with Papua 
New Guinea. It is feared that in the coming regional negotiations, the agree-
ment could set new standards for not yet negotiated issues such as services or 
investment liberalization. Thus there is the risk that Papua New Guinea could 
try to immediately bilaterally negotiate services, investment or other issues, 
for which the other 13 PACP states had demanded a rendezvous clause and 
with that a postponement. Unfortunately, the position of PNG is heavily in-
fluenced by a very powerful business lobby, especially the fishery and mining 
sector. Bilateral negotiations of PNG with the EU would therefore possibly 
result in a collapse of negotiations on a regional agreement. In fact, bilateral 
negotiations with individual members of a federation of states generally 
                                                          
6
  The most-favoured-nation clause states, that all trade concessions granted to a trade party 
should be awarded to all other WTO member states immediately and unconditionally. 
7
  Rendezvous clauses ensure that agreements be reviewed after a first stage of implementation 
and, if necessary negotiations on other topics such as services and investments follow. 
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decrease rather than increase regional integration efforts of the group, since 
they place the excluded members in a less favourable position than the con-
tracting parties. Also, individual states have a lot less resistance against the 
EU's negotiating material than a regional entity whose political bargaining 
power is limited anyway. The WWF also critically noted that the exemption 
could feed into the export of potentially unsustainable fished tuna into the 
EU. Therefore, additional measures for the licensing of industrial enterprises, 
for example, according to the criteria of the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) are necessary (ACP Civil Society Forum 2011). 
Fiji’s dilemma 
The EU continues to exert pressure in the EPA negotiations with its decision 
to definitively terminate the unilaterally granted trade preferences by 1 Octo-
ber 2014. Fiji was able to avoid the negative consequences of the EU decision 
only by ratification or provisional application of the Interim Agreement al-
ready signed. On 17 July 2014, Fiji informed the EU that the country would 
implement the Interim Agreement as of the end of July 20148. Fiji exports 
more than 90% of its sugar to the EU, especially to the United Kingdom. In 
2012, exports were at EUR 37.8 million, a decrease of 39% compared to the 
previous year. For years, the sugar industry – on which directly and indirectly 
depend more than 200,000 jobs in the country – has struggled with substantial 
structural challenges (Weber 2007). Yet in the opinion of the Suva govern-
ment, any possible benefits of the trade agreement with the EU would be 
eaten up by the significant costs of a terminated preferential access of sugar 
exports in the EU. Therefore Fiji vigorously searches for economic alterna-
tives to open up new markets for its ailing sugar industry. The government is 
                                                          
8
  The EU and Fiji implement the Pacific Interim Economic Partnership Agreement, press 
release by European Commission (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-852_en.htm, 
read on 20 July 2014). 
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currently negotiating intensively with countries such as Egypt, Bangladesh, 
Japan and countries in the Middle East about new export contracts9. Also 
Chinese investors have recently shown interest in buying sugar, should Fiji 
not to bring into force the Interim Agreement10. 
Criticism of the Fiji government has also been growing towards other 
sections of the Interim Agreement. In particular, the PACP states are calling 
for an approach of variable geometry, whereby a differentiated negotiating 
approach is applied according to the different economic strengths and region-
al conditions, and not treat all countries the same way in a regional free trade 
agreement. The Interim Agreement is also heavily criticized because of its 
controversial individual provisions, including the issue of development coop-
eration, the protection of emerging industries from premature market opening, 
no prohibition of imposed export duties, of the most favoured nation clause 
nor the arbitration clause11. In this respect, the chief negotiator of the PACP 
states, Robert Sisilo, commented: “No wonder the EC is pushing us towards 
the IEPA, which will not be a ‘stepping stone’ but a dead end road. […] So 
by signing IEPA as the Trade Commissioner was suggesting, PACPs will by 
definition agree to these issues hands down and lose their leverage in negoti-
ating a comprehensive EPA, if this is still going to be negotiated at all.“12  
 
 
                                                          
9
  Red Alert on Fiji’s Fish, Sugar, Island Business, December 2012 (online: www.islandsbusi 
ness.com/2012/12/fiji/red-alert-on-fijis-fish-sugar/, read on 14 June 2014). 
10
  Chinese Investors interested in Fiji’s Sugar, The Fiji Government, 1.3.2014 (online: www.fi 
ji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Press-Releases/CHINESE-INVESTORS-INTERESTED-IN-FIJI%E2 
%80%99S-SUGAR.aspx?feed=news, read on 20 June 2014).  
11
  Arbitration clauses serve the substantive enforcement of protective interests of contracting 
parties (States or investors) of trade and investment agreements. These are quite controver-
sial, particularly when being used for enforcement of private investors’ interests and not for 
the protection of common good. 
12
  PACPs firm on ‘variable geometry‘ stand, Island Business, January 2014 (online: www.islan 
dsbusiness.com/2014/1/business/pacps-firm-on-variable-geometry-stand/, read on 21 June 
2014).  
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European Interests 
As already shown, the importance of economic exchange between the EU and 
the Pacific Island States is in absolute terms not particularly large. Yet rela-
tively speaking, the EU pursues quite offensive economic interests in the 
negotiations. Given that currently about half of the tuna consumed in the EU 
originates from the Pacific Ocean, the access to the regional fishery resources 
is of overriding economic interest for the EU, especially in the southern Eu-
ropean fishing nations. There are also other geopolitical considerations that 
make a closer economic connection of the Pacific to Europe interesting. First, 
the EU Member States want to ensure access to the strategic reserves of raw 
materials in the region. This becomes particularly evident in the European 
investments in deep sea mining initiatives. Secondly comes the support of 
European diplomacy in international negotiating processes. Lastly, the Pacific 
has 12 votes in the negotiations that the EU would like to use (especially in 
the context of the UN) for its benefit. 
Fishing interests in the Pacific 
The South Pacific, particularly the fishing grounds around the so-called Coral 
Triangle between the Philippines, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is con-
sidered as being of great global importance. About a quarter of the global 
tuna catches, including the high priced Skipjack, comes from this region. The 
certified Skipjack catch in 2009 was at 267,087 tons. The EU receives about 
half of its tuna imports from these waters. The tuna is mainly exported canned 
packed, it is mainly used in salads, sandwiches or as a pizza topping. The EU 
is particularly for Papua New Guinea a major export market: Nearly 28% of 
the total tuna exports go to the EU, mainly to Germany and the UK - an in-
crease of 3% within three years (2009-2011). PNG is already the fourth larg-
est supplier of canned tuna in Germany. About 5% of the precooked tuna 
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halves processed in the EU and 4% of canned tuna originate from this coun-
try. 
In 1982, eight island countries under the umbrella of the so-called Nauru 
Agreement (Parties to the Nauru Agreement, short PNA)13 joined forces to 
monitor fish stocks in their exclusive sovereign base areas and adjacent wa-
ters. The purse seine fishery for free swarming Skipjack stocks on the fishing 
boats of Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu without 
the use of fish aggregating devices (fish aggregating devices, short FADs) 
was certified in 2011 in accordance with the sustainability criteria of the Ma-
rine Stewardship Council14 (MSC). This certification provides requirements 
for improving the environmental performance and fisheries management, also 
effective measures to control fishing such as the definition of permitted fish-
ing days or the reduction of bycatch as well as the adaptation of existing lim-
its to scientific findings15. As a result of the certification, 30% of the Skipjack 
catches from the Western part of the Coral Triangle may carry the blue MSC 
ecolabel for sustainable fishing. 
According to numbers of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC) founded in 2004, stocks of Skipjack tuna have cur-
rently not yet been overfished in contrast to the Bigeye and Blue tuna. Ac-
cording to scientific findings of the WCPFC, the catch of Skipjack tuna in the 
region can be made sustainable, provided that the catch of other tuna species 
is excluded (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 2010). How-
ever, given the generally low levels, there is an urgent need for a closer 
                                                          
13
  www.pnatuna.com/  
14
  www.msc.org/de  
15
  Skipjack fishing of PNA countries now MSC certified in Western and Central Pacific, Ma-
rine Stewardship Council, 9.1.2012 (online: www.msc.org/presseraum/pressemitteilungen 
/the-pna-western-central-pacific-skipjack-tuna-fishery2019s-2018free-school2019-set-operat 
ions-gain-msc-certification, read on 24 June 2014).  
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monitoring of hygiene standards in the tuna industry of Papua New Guinea. 
This requires the creation of additional capacity for quality assurance, moni-
toring of tuna fishing and for certification programs. Without strict monitor-
ing and control instruments and in view of an increased trade, the sustainable 
use of Stockfish tuna stocks is threatened. 
Fishery as a point of contention 
In the eyes of the Pacific, the EU has not managed to respond to the complex-
ity of the political and socio-cultural conditions during the EPA negotiations. 
In the current EPA negotiations with the EU, the fishing industry is one of the 
biggest points of contention, since fishery as one of the most important eco-
nomic sectors for the Pacific is of major importance for sustainable growth 
and development. 
In the EPA negotiations, the members of the PACP-group demand par-
ticularly a more flexibility configuration of the global rules of origin (‘global 
sourcing rules’) for fresh, frozen, chilled, smoked and dried fish products. 
Extended global sourcing rules16 would allow Pacific Island States, that do 
not have their own fishing fleets or sufficient fish stocks, to obtain catches 
from third states, to process these in their own country and then to export 
them into the EU labelled with their own certificate of origin. Historically 
speaking, the main reason that prevented the development of the fish pro-
cessing industry in the region was the insufficient catch combined with a too 
small and outdated fleet. Currently however, the EU only grants exceptions 
from the global rules of origin under the Interim Agreement to the states of 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji, and this only for fresh or frozen tuna, which is 
then further processed and canned in the country. With this so-called "change 
                                                          
16
  Preferential rules of origin determine from or in which countries certain products or its 
intermediates may after presentation of a proof of preference be exported or imported free of 
or at reduced rates of duty. By extending the rules of origin, also the value added by pro-
cessing in their own country can be increased.  
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in tariff heading” method, both countries were able to assert their main de-
mands. Yet Shaheen Ali, Industry and Trade Minister of Fiji, made it quite 
clear that Fiji expected from the EU a concrete proposal for a greater flexibil-
ity in the global rules of origin (‘global sourcing’) also for the export of fresh 
and frozen fish in return for further concessions regarding fisheries protection 
and management rules required by them17. The PACP States raised a similar 
request for a regional EPA18. The EU has not yet responded to this, but the 
Interim Agreement provides for a review of the efficiency and sustainability 
implications of preferential rules of origin for tuna stocks, followed by a pos-
sible renegotiation (ICTSD 2008). 
Yet it appeared that the EU tried to instrumentalize the EPA negotiations 
to raise the pressure on the Pacific countries and the Western Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission to enforce their own offensive economic interests in 
fisheries. Moreover, the conclusion of the bilateral Interim Agreement, which 
was clearly advantageous for Papua New Guinea, took the neighbouring Pa-
cific countries by surprise and indicated to them that the extent of the benefits 
ultimately depends only on the bargaining power of each country. In this 
context, Tonga’s Trade Minister and spokesman for the EPA negotiating 
group, Viliami Uasike Latu, declared unmistakenly: “As a member country 
we think we have been mistreated by EC especially when it comes to fisheries 
issues“.19 Yet the European commission considered its concession in the 
negotiations “as a specific relaxation for the PACP and ‘cannot be taken as a 
precedent in other negotiations.’“(European Commission, DG Trade 2007). 
                                                          
17
  No Deadline to Finalize EPA Negotiations: EU, The Fiji Sun, 28 April 2014 (online: 
www.fijisun.com.fj/2014/04/28/no-deadline-to-finalise-epa-negotiations-eu, read on 16 June 
2014).  
18
  Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (2013) Update on the Pacific ACP-EU negotiations, 
10/2013. 
19
  Europe hits back in War of Words with the Pacific over Trade, Radio Australia, 18 June 
2014 (www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/europe-hits-back-in-
war-of-words-with-the-pacific-over-trade/1147312, read on 14 July 2014).  
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The then EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson valued the conclusion of 
negotiations in a letter to Wilkie Rasmussen, the Foreign Minister of the 
Cook Islands, as a special concession of the EU towards a central claim clas-
sified by the PACP States (ibid.). In fact, the concern of not getting to a nego-
tiating conclusion unless concessions on the global sourcing rules were made 
combined with the analysis that the granted preferences should under existing 
regional capacity constraints not lead to an economic disadvantage of Euro-
pean fish processing industries for the foreseeable future, has probably creat-
ed a broad consensus within the EU Commission. 
The EU, however, was consequently not willing to let other Pacific Island 
countries benefit from this preferential treatment. In the regional negotiations, 
it demanded from the PACP states a narrower interpretation of the rules of 
origin for fish than was already granted in the two Interim Agreements. An-
drew Jacobs, EU ambassador in the Pacific, explicitly warned the PACP 
states against believing that similar generous arrangements would be trans-
ferred to a regional free trade agreement (European Parliament 2014). The 
Pacific understood this as a clear sign for double standards in the EU's negoti-
ating strategy. Background of the EU position had been a heated debate with 
the Southern European fishing nations in the European Parliament on the 
development of the rules of origin during the ratification of the Interim 
Agreement with Papua New Guinea and Fiji. Especially Carmen Fraga Esté-
vez, Spanish MEP in the fisheries committee had descibed the preferences as 
completely exaggerated and warned of a potential significant impact on the 
European fishing industry. In her view, Papua New Guinea could become a 
“real “hub” for the processing of huge amounts of tuna from all origins from 
neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, China, the United 
States or Australia" (European Parliament 2010). Indeed, the increased com-
petition by PNG on the global market could mean that in future, particularly 
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the Latin American tuna industry would come under pressure. Here mainly 
Spanish tuna producers (Jealsa, Calvo and Garavilla) had in recent years 
largely invested in processing plants, because most states could under the 
GSP import low-cost produced tuna fillets duty free into the EU. While in 
2010 the tuna fishing in Galicia decreased by 40%, it is however unclear how 
imports from Papua New Guinea might have contributed to this. Scientific 
studies also show that in the medium term, the EU suppliers could even bene-
fit from cheaper tuna imports from PNG, while producers in Southeast Asian 
and West African would lose out (European Parliament 2012). This radical 
opposition against generous global rules of origins in the EU – regardless of 
its actual relevance – is likely to have resulted in a much narrower product 
range (for which the EU would grant such flexibility) in the proposal for a 
regional free trade agreement than in the Interim Agreements, and the insur-
ance of the commission not to grant other bilateral trade partners any similar 
concessions. 
PNG has in recent years- not least because of the joint venture with Thai-
land and the Philippines - expanded its processing capacity for Skipjack and 
related Bigeye tuna with a total investment of 38 million US dollars (as of 
December 2012). The EU is thus in the absurd situation, in which Papua New 
Guinea on the one hand becomes a serious competitor on the canned tuna 
market, on the other hand and due to the rising export of cooked tuna halves 
at competitive cost prices establishes as a major supplier to the European tuna 
industry. Whilst the responsible EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht in 
May 2012 still assumed that the exemptions in the Interim Agreement would 
stilmulate the creation of up to 53,000 jobs by 201620 and lead to revenues 
around 21-70 million US $ and thus significant welfare gains for the country, 
                                                          
20
  Speech of EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht of 29 May 2012 (online: http://europa.eu 
/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-397_en.htm, read on 20 July 2014). 
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the European Commission found in a study commissioned by the European 
Parliament that the employment effects were considerably overestimated. The 
study concludes that the number of jobs could increase to a maximum of 
20,000 by 2018, that between 40 and 85% of the jobs would exist less than a  
Development of of tuna production capacity before and after the exemp-
tion of RoO in PNG (2007-2011) 
 Capacity 
[t/day] 
Estimated actual production capacity [t/day]  
Factory 
 Before exemtion After exemption 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
RD Tuna Can-
ners Madang 
200 
 
120 60 100 100 100 
Frabelle (PNG) 
Ltd. Lae 
100 40 60 60 70 60 
South Seas 
Tuna Wewak 
200 100 90 80 80 75 
Total 500 260 210 240 250 235 
Raw fishing 
consumption 
[t/year] 
 63,700 51,450 58,800 61,250 57,575 
Total produc-
tion [t/year] 
 33,565 27,011 31,054 32,830 31,054 
Source: Europaen Commission, DG Internal Politics (2012) (http://www.europarl.europa-
.eu/document/activities/cont/201210/20121010ATT53391/20121010ATT53391EN.pdf) 
Estimated impact of the exemption on the European tuna industry until 2018 
(Econometric analysis) 
Scenario Profitable for the EU Unprofitable for the EU 
PNG exports in EU 10% increase 20% increase 
Consumption of canned tuna  Higher lower 
Production development 
 - 1%  - 7% 
Development of value-added 
 - 5.2 millions - 43 millionss 
Employment development 
 - 180 jobs  - 1,500 jobs 
Source: European Commission, DG Internal Politics (2012) (online available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/papua_new_guinea/documents/press_corner/20121011_europea
n_parliament_study_on_the_derogation_en.pdf) 
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year and that also the working conditions for the predominantly female work-
force were a cause for criticism (Linpico 2011).  
The same study concludes that the direct negative economic consequenc-
es for the European fishing industry had so far been practically non-
measurable, unless the example was repeated for other countries in the region. 
However, it is assumed by the estimates that Papua New Guinea will substan-
tially increase its tuna exports in the coming years through new investments, 
which could lead to significant adverse effects on the European industry. 
Here a clear development policy benefit is opposed to protectionist interests 
of some EU Member states. 
Estimated Tuna production after growing investment in the sector in Papua 
New Guinea (2013-18) 
Tuna production Tuna consumption [t/day] 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total actual pro-
duction 
275 290 305 320 340 360 
Total production of 
new factories 
90 225 351 436 533 624 
Source: European Commission, DG Internal Politics (2012) (www.europarl.europa.eu/docu-
ment/activities/cont/201210/20121010ATT53391/20121010ATT53391EN.pdf) 
Fiji had for a long time shown little interest in the enactment of the negotiated 
agreement with the EU. Besides the general political instability another rea-
son for this might have been the fact that the only fish factory in the country – 
the majority state-owned Pacific Fishing Company Limited (PAFCO) pro-
duced in Levuka – mainly produced for the British and Canadian market 
(ibid.). Recently PAFCO also completed a contract with the US Bumble Bee 
cannery for the export of Albacore tuna fillets, which are economically not 
interesting for the EU. Parts of the processed tuna come from the Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Kiribati, which do not have a processing industry of their 
own. Currently, there are also negotiating to build its own cannery on Fiji. 
Yet in mid-July 2014 – under supposed political pressure from the EU 
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negotiating team and facing the threat of termination of the trade preferences 
on 1 October 2014 – Fiji made an unexpected political change of course with 
the announcement of the early enactment and subsequent parliamentary ratifi-
cation of the signed Interim Agreement. 21  
Likewise, the EU wants to make possible concessions in the EPA negoti-
ations subject to bilateral fisheries agreements. In particular, the EU ques-
tioned the effectiveness of protective measures implemented for the stocks by 
the regional Fisheries Commission (Western and Central Pacific Fischeries 
Commission - WCPFC). From the perspective of the Pacific, bilateral agree-
ments in turn would facilitate the EU’s economic access to the regional mari-
time resources and further restrict the room for manoeuvre on the part of the 
PACP group. Thus in 2013, Kiribati signed a bilateral fisheries agreement 
with the EU, according to which the EU may fish with four trawlers and six 
purse seines longliners in the waters of Kiribati. The PNA sharply criticizes 
the Agreement, and accuses the EU of neither complying with the restrictions 
on deep-sea fishing days nor on those for the use of fish aggregating devic-
es22. Already in the year 2004, Pacific Heads of State and Government com-
mitted themselves in the so-called Auckland Declaration to the sustainable 
conservation of natural resources in the region. The PACP states are now 
ready to discuss with the EU further improvements in their regional fishery 
protection policy, but expect in return from the EU not to present facts unilat-
erally23. 
 
                                                          
21
  Fiji will ratify the Interim Agreement with the European Union, Pacific Islands News Asso-
ciation, 15 July 2014 (online: www.pina.com.fj/index.php?p=pacnews&m=read&o=93207 
309153c4a127c5de12cafcb9b, read on 20 July 2014) 
22
  Kiribati’s New Tuna Deal with the EU, Islands Business, May 2013 (online: www.islands 
business.com/2013/5/business/kiribatis-new-tuna-deal-with-the-eu/, read on 20 July 2014)  
23
  Special Joint Pacific ACP trade and fisheries meeting, CTA Weblog, 10 December 2013 
(online: http://brussels.cta.int/index.php?option=com_k2&id=8093&view=item&Itemid=, read 
on 14 June 2014) 
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Conclusion 
The limited economic ties between the EU and the Pacific Island Countries 
contribute to a subordinate political importance of the region in the European 
foreign policy. This cannot be obscured by the close development relations 
under the Lomé and Cotonou agreements, which had been growing for dec-
ades. In the past, the EU has set important, but also selectively limited devel-
opment impulses in the region. Despite this or perhaps because of the massive 
and aggressive political pressure by the EU and the assessment of the Pacific 
partner countries of the possible negative consequences of a regional EPA, 
there is a major scepticism throughout the negotiations and a more or less 
distinct lack of interest in signing a regional free trade agreement. The negoti-
ations have now dragged on for more than 10 years, with no agreement in 
sight, that would be beneficial for the foreign or development policy for the 
Pacific Island Countries. Only Papua New Guinea has –apart from the recent 
announcement of Fiji – as part of the negotiations on a bilateral Interim 
Agreement of the EU managed to receive substantial concessions in the fish-
eries that could along with a rightly chosen framework lead to a deepening 
and diversification of the national fishing industry. 
Throughout the negotiations, the EU was not willing to consider possible 
trade alternatives according to the Cotonou Article 37 (6). In addition to ex-
panding the ‘Everything-but-Arms (EBA)’ - preferences, which grants the 
least developed countries duty and quota-free access to the European market, 
for the entire Pacific by providing a ‘EBA region’, which together would 
meet the criteria of the EU market access initiative, also the conclusion of a 
regional free trade agreement would be possible, which would give the EU 
only selective and gradual market access concessions. Against the backdrop 
of the EU's unwillingness to seriously consider such alternatives and, if nec-
essary, to defend against challenges within the WTO, the EU’s rhethoric 
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clothed in development policy is but a half-hearted attempt to conceal its own 
offensive economic interests. This impression is not least underlined by the 
complex architecture of European development aid machinery, which follows 
complex allocation criteria, has insufficient administrative capacity and does 
not take apparent absorption bottlenecks within implementation on the part of 
its partner countries serious enough. The partnership between the EU and the 
Pacific Island Countries appears mostly donor driven with a focus on the EPA 
negotiations. The positive development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement, 
including the strengthening of regional integration and the development of 
supply capacities of local production structures, could eventually be promoted 
without entering into bilateral or regional free trade agreements. This points 
in the perspective beyond the year 2020 – the year of the expiry of the previ-
ous Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries (Nickel 
2012). A new European development policy in the region would on the one 
hand build on a new Pacific Strategy at eye level, taking into account both the 
shortcomings of the past as well as the existing power asymmetries. On the 
other hand, a commercial cooperation could be established, leaving the EU 
interests behind the legitimate regional development priorities, and would 
offer the region credible and regionally specific alternatives for an aggressive 
liberalization dogma of the past. 
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 Mining in the Pacific Island Countries:  
Opportunities and Risks 
Matthias Kowasch 
Abstract: In a world where mineral resources are being depleted, the supply 
and control of raw materials is an important strategic issue. Economic pow-
ers like the United States, France and Australia are interested in mineral 
resources discovered in the Pacific Islands region, especially in Melanesia. 
The chapter links political and economic interests in Melanesia’s mineral 
resources, using examples from West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledo-
nia. The three cases studies have indigenous independence movements, and a 
strong economic interest by external powers. While enormous gold reserves 
were found in West Papua, Bougainville has large copper reserves, and New 
Caledonia possesses around 25% of the world’s nickel deposits. The political 
conflicts around the control of these resources have a long history and are 
unresolved. External actors have geostrategic interests. While France still 
maintains a territorial presence in the Pacific Islands region, Australian and 
American companies are participating in the exploitation of mineral re-
sources in PNG and West-Papua. Resource conflicts often take place in very 
complex social situations where different actors pursue multiple interests. 
The author analyses the social arena where landowners, local governments, 
multinational mining companies and state governments defend different in-
terests and hold different perceptions. 
Keywords: Resource control, governance, resource conflicts, mineral de-
posits, independence movements, Pacific Islands, Melanesia 
476 Matthias Kowasch 
 
Introduction 
The search for natural resources to feed economies is a globalised problem. 
All national economies, but especially the resource-poor countries and the 
growing economies of emerging countries like China and India need a secure 
supply. However, some mineral recources are becoming increasingly scarce. 
Krysler (2012:11) notes: “In recent months, the reports of the imminent 
shortage of raw materials in Germany have significantly increased. The Fed-
eral Association of German Industry [BDI, ‘Bundesverband der deutschen 
Industrie’] even falls in apocalyptic mood. The commodity expert and future 
president of the BDI, Ulrich Grillo, gloomy predicts that the next cold war 
will be a resource war. The BDI assumes among other things that we can not 
afford the energy transition, because the necessary raw materials such as 
copper, cobalt, rare earths or germanium are simply too expensive.” 
The raw material supply has economic and political significance, both for 
the commodity importers as well as for the export states. Bebbington (2012:5) 
highlights how extractive industries produce “both incredible wealth and 
destruction at one and the same time” in the export states. The worldwide 
hunger for resources attracts mining companies to invest in more remote, 
dangerous and previously unexploited regions of the world. The Pacific Is-
land countries, notably in Melanesia, are increasingly affected. Investment in 
the resource sector by foreign companies is mostly appreciated by local gov-
ernments, because the companies bring foreign currency into the country, pay 
some tax revenue, and because they create jobs. 
The present chapter is not primarily concerned with the socio-economic 
impacts or resource exploitation in the local context, resulting from huge 
mining projects, but provides three examples, on the macro- economic scale, 
of a connection between global demand for raw materials, resource exploita-
tion in the Pacific Island countries and broader international strategic interests 
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in the region. The study specifically addresses questions of resource control 
and supply. The different interests of the actors involved are analyzed. Inter-
ests may overlap and lead to conflicts among the actors, thus the discussion 
about the causes of conflicts is a key element of this chapter. The author ques-
tions the interlinking between the abundance of resources and independence 
movements. 
Methods and frameworks 
The present study analyses scientific papers, book chapters, press releases and 
newspaper articles. It is based on several years of fieldwork in the French 
overseas territory of New Caledonia, where the author wrote his PhD entitled 
Les populations kanak face au développement de l’industrie du en Nouvelle-
Calédonie nickel (Kowasch 2010). The fieldwork consisted of empirical stud-
ies in four Kanak villages in the vicinity of the Koniambo project that envis-
aged the construction of a processing plant next to the exploitation of a profit-
able nickel mine. The Koniambo projet is located in the Northern Province of 
the country that is governed by the independence party PALIKA (Party of 
Kanak Liberation). In the villages of Netchaot, Baco, Oundjo and Gatope 239 
persons aged between 16 and 70 years were questioned about school qualifi-
cation, career aspirations, and their hopes and fears over the nickel project. In 
addition, the author conducted informal interviews with representatives of the 
mining company, the provincial government, the local municipality and the 
different landowners. After his PhD, the author dealt with issues of govern-
ance, socio-economic impacts of mining projects and territoriality within two 
CNRT (National Centre for Technolocial Research) funded research projects 
(‘Mining Governance’ and ‘Value of Place’). The results and experiences 
from the different research projects serve as a basis for the present chapter. 
In this chapter I compare three mining sites: West-Papua (Grasberg pro-
ject), Bougainville (Panguna project) and New Caledonia (Koniambo 
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project). In all three cases, the mining sector is interwoven with independence 
struggles. Bougainville and the government of the Northern Province in New 
Caledonia both want to use the mining sector for economic emancipation and 
later for political independence. 
Spatial distribution of mineral ressources in the Pacific Island Countries 
Considering all Pacific Island countries, only Papua New Guinea (PNG), the 
French overseas territory New Caledonia and to a lesser extent, the Solomon 
Islands and Fiji have significant mineral resource deposits. West Papua is – 
after annexation by Indonesia – politically a part of Southeast Asia, but cul-
turally a Melanesian country, possesses important mineral resources, espe-
cially gold and copper. 
While New Caledonia mines almost exclusively nickel and owns about 
25% of worldwide reserves, the independent state of Papua New Guinea 
possesses a large number of valuable ores such as gold, silver, copper, nickel 
and cobalt. PNG also has rich deposits of oil, natural gas and manganese. 
Despite this PNG is ranked 153 of 182 nations on the Human Development 
Index. The largest mining projects are currently Ok Tedi (copper and gold), 
Porgera (gold), Hidden Valley/Hamata (silver and gold), Simberi (silver and 
gold) and Lihir (gold). Other projects are Tolukuma, Sinivit and Edie Creek 
(all gold) (Figure 1 on the next page). In addition, more projects are planned, 
for example Ramu Nickel and the deepwater seafloor mining project Solwara 
where the company Nautilus Minerals intends to commercially explore cop-
per, gold, silver and zinc-rich seafloor massive sulphide deposits in 1,600 m 
depth (see also Imbun 2013:312). 
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Figure 1: Mining Projects in Papua New Guinea (Cartography: M. Kowasch 
2014, Source: Imbun 2013) 
 
In New Caledonia, three smelters process nickel ores from over 20 deposits: 
Doniambo, Goro Nickel and Koniambo (Figure 5). In addition, virgin ores are 
exported to Asia, Australia and Europe. 
Although the Solomon Islands are barely larger than the German ‘Bun-
desland’ (federal state) of Hesse, the country owns rich mineral deposits. 
Gold, copper, bauxite, zinc, lead, cobalt and phosphate are exploited. 
The Fiji Islands mainly produce gold, but also silver and cement. The 
most important mining project is the Vatukoula Gold Mine, which is operated 
by Emperor Gold Mines. The Waisoi project is a second gold mine where 
copper should also be mined. The project is located in the Namosi and 
Naitasiri provinces, approximately 30 km west of Suva. The Namosi joint-
venture where the American company Newcrest has the controlling interest is 
currently conducting exploratory drilling. Other gold deposits in the Fiji 
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Islands are Mt. Kasi, Tuvatu and Cirianui and Dakunimba (for an overview, 
see http://www.domegoldmines.com.au). 
In the small island nation of Nauru, with its nearly 10,000 inhabitants, 
phosphate was mined on a large scale over 90 years. When the phosphate 
reserves became exhausted at the end of the 20th century, the small 21.8 km2 
island resembled a lunar landscape over much of the surface. Once one of the 
richest per capita countries in the world, Nauru now has to ask for develop-
ment aid. The power supply in the hospital is no longer continuously secured, 
wrecked cars are lying on the roadside, and the apartment buildings of the 
foreign mine workers are now empty. The airline Air Nauru had to stop oper-
ations (Folliet 2011). Only a small coastal strip is still usable for agriculture. 
There are few jobs since the decline of the phosphate industry, according to 
the CIA World Factbook 90% of the population of Nauru are unemployed 
(www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook). Other resource-rich 
countries in the Pacific Islands region try to avoid this worst case, however, 
the situation is not comparable to PNG or New Caledonia due to the territorial 
smallness of Nauru. 
Interlinking of Policy and Resource Extraction 
The worlwide growth of communication technologies and the aerospace and 
chemical sectors feed the hunger for resources. Several metals are classified 
by governments as ‘strategic’. ‘Strategic raw materials’ refer to energy 
sources (e.g. oil, gas, coal and uranium) or industrially used resources that are 
necessary for the functioning of contemporary economies (e.g. copper, nickel, 
cobalt, lithium, coltan, etc.), but can also be profitable minerals like dia-
monds, precious stones or gold. In particular, rapidly growing economies 
such as China and the Southeast Asian countries are characterized by a high 
demand. States with an extremely high and or increasing energy consumption 
(e.g. USA or China) need energy sources such as oil and natural gas. Copper 
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for example is needed for the production of electric motors, mobile phones 
are manufactured with coltan, lithium is essential for the production of re-
chargeable batteries, and platinum is used in the construction of fuel cells. 
The world desires increasingly scarce resources, and governments have polit-
ical and strategic interests in a secure importation of raw materials. 
Although Australia is and remains by far the largest inward investor in 
the Pacific Island countries, Chinese investment is growing rapidly (Ko-
wasch/Lindemann 2014). Hayward-Jones (2013:8) notes: “Chinese compa-
nies and investors in the Pacific Islands, mostly from provincial centres in 
China, have expanded beyond their traditional small retail business focus to 
the domain of infrastructure and mining.“ Chinese investment is the most 
visible in Papua New Guinea, where “it has been driven in large part by a 
desire to secure access to that country’s vast natural resources.” The Chinese 
state-owned Metallurgical Construction Group Corporation (MCC) will start 
the exploitation of nickel and cobalt in the Madang province in PNG. With 
US$ 2.1 billion, the Ramu Nickel project represents the largest Chinese in-
vestment in Oceania (http://www.highlandspacific.com; Smith 2013:178; 
Kowasch/Lindemann 2014). The US oil giant Exxon Mobil has invested about 
19 billion US$ in a liquefied gas project in the Southern and Western High-
lands of Papua New Guinea, in order to secure valuable gas reserves 
(http://pnglng.com/project/about). The Papua New Guinea liquefied natural 
gas project is due to start in 2014 and has a lifespan of about 30 years.  
West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledonia have mines that have great 
geopolitical significance. The American mining company Freeport runs the 
large Grasberg mine in West Papua; it’s known as the largest gold mine in the 
world and represents economic interests of the United States in Indonesia. In 
New Caledonia the independence movement of the FLNKS (Kanak and So-
cialist National Liberation Front) uses the nickel sector, in particular the 
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Koniambo project in the north of the main island, for economic and political 
emancipation from France. And in Bougainville the reopening of the Panguna 
gold and copper mine is currently a source of controversy. The mine could be 
an economic support leg for political independence and secssion of Bougain-
ville from PNG. 
The Example of West Papua 
In West Papua (or Irian Jaya, as the region is known of Indonesia), resource 
exploitation and political interests are particularly linked. In 1667 the western 
part of New Guinea came under Dutch influence by a treaty with the Sultan 
of Tidore (Mückler 2013:193). Both British and Dutch tried several times to 
annex the territory, the Dutch succeeded in 1816. In 1936 the Dutch geologist 
Jean Jacques Dozy discovered significant gold and copper deposits in the 
Maoke Mountains on behalf of NNGPM (Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Pe-
troleum Maatschappij). NNGPM was officially a Dutch company, but in fact 
60% of the shares belonged to the US Standard Oil group (40% to Standard 
Vacuum Oil Co. and 20% to Far Pacific Investments Standard Oil of Califor-
nia) (ibid.). Thus, there was an early interest by the US in the lucrative miner-
al resources in West Papua, which later had a decisive impact on the political 
future of the region in the 1950s and 60s. 
In 1942, the Japanese army occupied large parts of Dutch New Guinea. 
The Japanese propagated a policy of a ‘Greater Asian Prosperity Sphere’ and 
thus supported the ideology of ‘Asia for the Asians’. Anti-colonial resent-
ments and pan-Asian sentiments were encouraged. Due to the high Japanese 
military presence, especially on the north coast, the landing and retaking of 
the island by Allied forces in 1944 was broadly welcomed by local people. 
After the defeat of the Japanese, Achmed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta 
proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. On 27 December 
1949, the Dutch Parliament recognized the independence of Indonesia, 
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whether West Papua was part of Indonesia was initially unclear, and the 
Netherlands supported the self-determination of the indigenous Papuan peo-
ple, as envisaged in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. The negotia-
tions between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the future status of West 
Papua, in which the UN also intervened since 1954, ended without a result, 
because Indonesia refused to recognize the self-determination of the indige-
nous Papuans. President Sukarno equipped the Indonesian military with Sovi-
et, American and British weapons to step up Indonesia’s military presence to 
meet the rising number of Papuan rebellions staged by the pro-independence 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), or Free Papua Movement (O’Brien 
2010). Sukarno already wanted to provide the conditions for a military solu-
tion in West Papua. After the independence supporters gained the majority in 
the 1961 elections, the official independence of West Papua was proclaimed 
on 1 December 1961, and the national flag was hoisted. Sukarno saw the 
danger of the new nationalism in West Papua and in December 1961 gave the 
order to occupy the region. The Netherlands replied with military counter-
attacks, and West Papua was prepared for a long-time conflict. In a region 
characterized by lush tropical rainforest and long transport routes, a rapid 
military success seemed difficult. But Sukarno used the two superpowers 
against each other – the Soviet Union and the United States. Both states sup-
plied Indonesia with arms, supporting different camps. The United States 
therefore exerted pressure on the Netherlands to accept the annexation of 
West Papua by Indonesia. US President J.F. Kennedy was supposed to have 
said on the subject of West Papua: “What importance have half a million 
cannibals, when it is the matter to take 200 million Indonesians away from 
the Eastern bloc?” (Quoted in Zöllner 2008:9; Mückler 2013:203). 
Since 1967, the US company Freeport Sulphur based in New Orleans 
(now Phoenix) obtained from Sukarno’s successor Suharto a 30-year contract 
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to mine copper in West Papua. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc’s 
subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia ran the largest gold mine and the most 
cost-effective copper mine in the world with Ertsberg and later Grasberg 
(Mückler 2013:206). Freeport – and indirectly the United States – has there-
fore become an important ally of Jakarta. The Australian company Rio Tinto 
PLC has a joint venture with Freeport for a 40% share of production above 
specific levels until 2021, and 40% of all production after 2021 
(www.riotinto.com). Furthermore, the Indonesian government maintains 
9.36% of the shares in PT Freeport Indonesia (Nakagawa 2008:76). The 
company became the largest taxpayer in Indonesia, the largest foreign inves-
tor and one of the largest employers. According to Couasnon et al. (2013:9) 
the mine contributes 1-2% to the Indonesian GDP and generated receipts of 
US$ 1 billion in 2009. After the takeover of the US mining company Phelps 
Dodge, Freeport became the largest copper producer in the world, with de-
posits in Indonesia, Europe, North and South America. Production at Ertsberg 
started in July 1973. The Ertsberg mine is located at an altitude of 3,500 m 
above sea level, and the high-grade ores are directly under the surface and up 
to 350 m in depth (Mückler 2013:206). The deposits are considered as the 
world’s largest gold and the third-largest copper deposits (see Mealey 1996). 
But in the mid-1980s, the reserves (33 million tons of copper) were exhaust-
ed. Freeport was looking for new deposits, and discovered gold and copper 
deposits at Grasberg in 1988, only about three kilometers away from Ertsberg 
(see figure 2 on the next page).  
The mining operator PT Freeport Indonesia was often exposed to mas-
sive criticism, due to serious environmental pollution and repeated human 
rights violations. Relying on good relations with the Indonesian government, 
the company largely ignored Indonesian environmental laws. Up to 238,000 
tons of toxic waste were transported daily via the rivers Aghawagon and 
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Otomona into the Ajkwa river and later discharged into the Arafura Sea, next 
to the Lorentz National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1999 
(Mückler 2013:207; http://www.earthworksaction.org). The consulting com-
pany Parametrix published an impact study of the Grasberg mine in 2002, 
and explained that the water quality of rivers in the vicinity of the mine do not 
longer allow aquatic life (New York Times, 27 December 2005, in Nakagawa 
2008). Nakagawa (2008:77) stated that sulfur-containing wastewater infiltrat-
ed into the groundwater. A second problem is the large amounts of sediments 
that make the water murky and difficult for aquatic life, especially the coral 
reefs in the Arafura Sea. According to a report by the Indonesian Ministry of 
Environment in 2004, the rivers into which the wastewater from Freeport 
were discharged contained 37,500 milligrams of suspended solids, although 
the Indonesian law allows only 400. A representative of the indigenous 
Amungme people spoke of “Eco-Terrorism” in this context (Banks 2002:59). 
Figure 2: The Grasberg mine in West Papua 
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Human rights have been and are regularly violated in West Papua. Amnesty 
International and other human rights groups have accused the Indonesian 
police and army of kidnapping, torture and killing independence activists. In 
October 1966 for example, Indonesian military murdered 88 men, women and 
children in the village of Gulum in the Baliem area. In 1967 the Indonesian 
air force bombed villages in the area of Ajamaru (see Sharp 1977; Korber 
1998). In 1984 Indonesian elite units killed independence fighters in opera-
tion Clean up (Brundige et al. 2004). In March 2013, 17 men from East Nusa 
Tenggara were tortured for 12 days in a police prison. They were accused of 
being responsible for the death of a police officer. In June 2013, Mako Ta-
buni, a Papuan activist, was shot dead by the Indonesian military near the 
West Papuan capital of Jayapura. A criminal prosecution of the offenders did 
not happen (http://www.amnesty.org). As a result of Tabuni’s death Papua 
activists burned shops and cars. This list of incidents could be continued. 
The oppression of the indigenous Papuans is accompanied by an active 
settlement policy by the Indonesian government. In 1971 the indigenous Pa-
puans represent 96% of the total population in West Papua, in 2010 their part 
was only 49%. The number of non-Papuans rose from 36,000 in 1971 to 
708,425 in 2000. Until 2020, the proportion of Papuans is projected to de-
crease to only 29% of the total population of the province (Elmslie 2000:4-5). 
According to Butt et al. (2002), by 2002 over 20% of the Papuans were in-
fected with the HIV virus, compared to 0.4% in the rest of Indonesia. A West 
Papuan activist speaks in this context of a “slow motion genocide” (ibid:9). 
With respect to the United States, the George W. Bush administration (2001-
09) restarted training and support of the Indonesian military, after previous 
US administrations had stopped it due to ongoing human rights violations in 
West Papua. In addition, the US mining company Freeport has paid the Indo-
nesian military for decades to provide security for the mine. Schilder (2005: 
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63) notes that in 2002, US$ 5.6 billion were paid to Indonesian military. 
Thus, Freeport paid Indonesian officers that were responsible for killings and 
torture in the context of mining and independence struggles. Payments to 
foreign officials are prohibited under US law. Freeport has avoided a public 
statement concerning the accusations. 
On the other hand, in 2002 the company presented an ‘Environmental 
Risk Assessment’ to improve wastewater management. Promises to respect 
human rights were also given. Voluntary trust funds for the support of the 
indigenous peoples (Amungme and Kamoro communities) in the neighbour-
hood of the mine were established. Freeport paid US$ 8.5 million into the 
funds until 2006 and wants to continue to promote them with US$ 1 million 
per year (Nakagawa 2008:82). With the money, Papuan people can purchase 
shares and become “partners” of the mining project. Freeport has also made 
some effort to favour and increase local employment. In 1996 only 600 Papua 
workers were employed at Grasberg. By 2006 their number had risen to 
2,650; 320 of them in the management of the company (Nakagawa 2008:83). 
In 2003, Freeport established the ‘Nemangkaw Mining Institute’, to instruct 
and train local workers. In summary, it must be noted that Freeport has made 
progress in environmental management and the involvement of the local 
population. Nevertheless, the measures are insufficient, considering that the 
company has a total of approximately 17,000 employees. 
On the political scene, law no. 21 on the Special Autonomy of Papua 
granted a greater autonomy to the Papuan Province in 2001, but the Indone-
sian-run development has not benefitted to the indigenous population. In the 
end, there is little hope that Papuans will obtain independence from Indonesia 
in the next few years. O’Brien (2010:53) notes: “Papua’s situation has at-
tracted international attention due to its conspicuous humanitarian dimen-
sions, although perhaps not as much as it deserves.“ In fact, the international 
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community makes little effort to support and defend the Papuan independence 
movement. US-President Obama has renewed the binational relationship with 
Indonesia, making the state a strategic partner in South-East Asia. US Con-
gressman Eni Faleomavaega of American Samoa continues to champion the 
Papuan cause, but he has incurred criticism when he required the US State 
Department to report human rights abuses in West Papua (O’Brien 2010:53). 
For Australia, the Papuan cause remains sensitive. Jakarta distrusts Canberra 
since the Australian support for the East Timorese independence movement. 
The murder of the Australian native Drew Grant on the Grasberg mine road in 
July 2009 has forced the Australian government to re-engage with West Pa-
pua. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), that comprises Fiji, Vanuatu, 
PNG, Solomon Islands and the Kanak FLNKS from New Caledonia, supports 
the independence movement, but still refuses a full membership to West Pa-
pua (Pazifik Infostelle 9/2014:24; see Ratuva in this volume).  
Indonesia still prevents foreign journalists from entering West Papua, 
fearing they will inform the international community about the political situa-
tion there. The Grasberg mine is a no-go area for journalists. Recently, in 
August 2014, two French journalists, Valentine Bourrat and Thomas Dandois 
from the TV channel ARTE, were arrested by the Indonesian military, be-
cause they were arrived with a tourist visa and wanted to film a doumentary 
about the independence movement. They were sentenced to 2.5 months of 
imprisonment and were released on 27 October of the same year (Pazifik 
Infostelle 12/2014:20). This illustrates the continued sensitivity of Indonesia 
about West Papua. Concerning the future of the Grasberg mine, Freeport has 
a contract for exploitation until 2021. Indonesia’s government is actually 
thinking about an acquisition of the mine in order to exploit the copper and 
gold deposits themselves. If this happens, Freeport will lose the third largest, 
and one of the most lucrative mines in the world. 
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The Example of Bougainville 
Figure 3: Mining on Bougainville 
 
The island of Bougainville was the scene of a major mining conflict with 
strong geopolitical dimensions, in which conflict, where more than 15,000 
peoples lost their lives between 1988 and 1998 (Banks 2008:27). The conflict 
took place after the civil war in West Papua and it was the second largest, 
longest, most brutal and costly conflict in Oceania since the end of World 
War II (see Böge in this volume). The ten-year-long civil war in Bougainville 
shows once more the interlinking of resource wealth and political power. The 
superficial starting point for the escalation of the conflict were the events 
concerning the Panguna copper mine, that was the largest open pit copper 
mine in the world at its time of operation from 1972 to 1989. 
Bougainville and Buka, a small island in the North of Bougainville (see 
Figure 3), are geographically part of the Solomon Islands, but belong politi-
cally to the independent state of Papua New Guinea. Bougainville is the most 
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peripheral of all provinces in PNG, and the distance between the state capital 
Port Moresby and the provincial capital Arawa is over 1,000 km. At the end 
of the 19th century, Bougainville and two other islands (Choiseul and Isabel) 
were part of the German colonial possessions in the Pacific. In 1899, Choi-
seul and Isabel were ceded to Britain in order to resolve a dispute over the 
Samoa islands. The arbitrarily drawn boundary line between Bougainville and 
Choiseul remained even after the defeat of the Germans in World War I. 
Australia received the former German New Guinea including Bougainville 
from the League of Nations to administrate it as a Trust Territory. The north-
ern Solomon Islands, however, remained to the British Solomon Islands Pro-
tectorate (BSIP). Australia was interested in the exploitation of natural 
resources discovered in Bougainville, particularly gold. Because of these 
economic interests Australia ignored the local desire for political independ-
ence or joining the Solomon Islands. Instead, Australia established its own 
administrative capacity in Bougainville. In the early 1960s the Australian 
company Conzinc Rio Tinto discovered large deposits of low-grade copper in 
Bougainville. With the increasing demand for copper on the world market 
and new production technologies, which also made profitable the extraction 
of minerals with low ore grades, Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), the 
local subsidiary of Conzinc Rio Tinto, put the Panguna mine into operation in 
1972, before PNG’s independence declaration. The ore reserves were as-
sessed at 900 million metric tons and seemed to secure the long-term exploi-
tation of the mine. During 17 years the Panguna mine was the most profitable 
mining project in PNG and generated approximately 44% of the export earn-
ings and 17% of the internally generated revenue the government (Regan 
1999:17). The government of PNG held 19% of the shares of BCL. Accord-
ing to Regan (1999:17), the operator paid a total of more than US$ 1 billion 
in taxes and dividends to the state. Around US$ 33 million were disbursed to 
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the landowners, US$ 28.5 million as compensation and US$ 4.5 million as 
rent. Some US$ 83 million were paid to the provincial government of Bou-
gainville. A high tax revenue is one explanation why PNG’s government 
never wanted to give independence to the island of Bougainville. So, the 
largest part of royalty payments was disbursed to the state government in Port 
Moresby. Imbun (2013:314) explains that the landowners were unsatisfied 
with the payments: “The landowners of mining and hydrocarbon projects had 
viewed the ‘traditional’ compensable tenets such as land and water use and 
royalties that characterised the Bougainville mine regime as inadequate and 
successfully added equity, trust funds, preferential employment and business 
spin-offs into the agreements. The payments for these resources were not 
significant and often failed to reflect changes in economic and social lives of 
the people.“ 
The main consumers of the copper from Bougainville were Japan, Ger-
many, Spain and the South-East Asian countries. Arawa, the capital of Bou-
gainville, became PNG’s third largest urban centre, because of the infrastruc-
ture development associated with the Panguna mine. The population of Ara-
wa rose from 5,000 to 15,000 inhabitants from 1972-88 (Mückler 2013:166). 
The ethnic groups that lived near the mine (Nasioi, Rorovana, Uruwan, 
Nagovesi and Banoni) suffered under resettlement and land loss. Many land-
owners refused the compensation payments offered by BCL because they 
feared that this meant the sale of their land. The long colonial history with 
arrivals from Germany, Australia, Japan and New Guinea made the landown-
ers additionally suspicious towards an Australian mining company. Land has 
a profound identity value for Bougainvillian people, as is the case with the 
Kanak in New Caledonia and other Melanesian peoples. It is the land of the 
ancestors, and the clan history is written in the territory (Kowasch 
2012a:203). Since BCL had to negotiate directly with landowners, the 
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company supported them in establishing the Panguna Landowners Associa-
tion (PLA). But the PLA was rapidly exposed to accusations of being a 
stooge of the mining company and insufficiently defending the interests of the 
landowners (Mückler 2013:167). Compensation payments led to internal 
tensions and could not satisfy the local opposition to the mine, especially 
because the environmental and socio-economic impacts (e.g. water disturb-
ance and landslides) were considerable. The rapid transition from a subsist-
ence towards monetary economy catapulted the region around the mine into a 
new era, what Oliver (1991:177) described as follows: “[...] these urbanized 
Bougainvillians had chosen to live European lifestyles as completely as their 
incomes permitted, in housing, food, clothing, recreation, etc. [...]”. The capi-
talist lifestyle caught on with increasing incomes and the demand for “west-
ern” consumer goods. The ecological damage included the deforestation of 
tropical rain forests and the pollution of the Jaba and Kavarong rivers with 
heavy metals, especially cyanide and nitrates. Due to the massive slag of the 
mine about 3,000 ha became unusable for agriculture (http://www.unpo.org). 
Because of dissatisfaction with the PLA in 1987 the Bougainvillian politi-
cians P. Serero and F. Ona established a ‘new’ PLA, the New Panguna Land-
owners Association, which was not recognized by the BCL. Opponents of the 
Paguna project now claimed not only higher compensation payments and 
greater involvement of the local people, but a political independence of the 
island from PNG. Fears that the BCL, as a multinational company, could 
manipulate PNG’s government, fueled opposition to the project. Finally, the 
conflict escalated when a Peace Package offered by the state government was 
rejected by the militants on Bougainville. In 1989 Ona founded the Bougain-
ville Revolutionary Army (BRA) that began an armed struggle for the com-
plete independence of the island. The government reacted by sending soldiers 
of the PNGDF (Papua New Guinea Defence Force) to expel the activists 
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from the area of the mine. The conflict escalated into a civil war. The 
Panguna mine gradually ceased operations from May 1989, because the safe-
ty of the workers could no longer be guaranteed (Mückler 2013:169). 
The reasons for the Bougainville conflict have been identified by several 
authors (Connell 1991; Banks 2008; Regan 2010, 2014; Böge 2010; 
Braithwaite et al. 2010; Mückler 2013). The geographer Glenn Banks (2008) 
distinguishes three lines of argument. The strict Marxist-oriented line of in-
terpretation, that sees the cause of the civil war in hostile opposing groups or 
classes, seems to find little support in the scientific community. The anthro-
pologist Colin Filer traced the conflict to the unequal distribution of compen-
sation payments, and to the serious environmental impacts under which the 
local population suffered. Filer (1990:88) puts forward a ‘social disintegra-
tion’ thesis that is also supported by Bainton (2010). Griffin (1990) stressed 
the desire of Bougainvillians for political independence as the main driving 
factor. Mückler (2013) concurs that the independence movement was older 
than the resource conflict over the mine. The demands of the project oppo-
nents were in addition to previously existing claims for independence after 
the beginning of the conflicts around the Panguna mine.  
Griffin (1990) mentions the ethnic differences between Bougainville and 
the rest of PNG as a decisive argument for opposing the Panguna project. In 
the course of this debate Braithwaite et al. (2010) noted that the fight against 
the mine was primarily initiated by young clan members, partly against the 
resistance of the elders and women (Kent/Barnett 2012). Regan (1999:13; see 
also McMillan 1988) also argues that the independence movement was 
crucual, and suggests the mine was a catalyst for the conflict: “However, the 
mine was a catalyst for the conflict rather than the direct cause.” He explains: 
“In the complex political, economic and cultural situation of Bougainville, it 
is naive and misleading to attempt to analyse the origins of the conflict in 
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terms of single causes. [...] Each factor tended to reinforce the importance of 
other factors at different times.“ (Regan 1999:14). 
In 2013 Bougainville proceeds to a state-building process (Böge 2010). 
The island actually has an autonomous status that will eventually lead to full 
independence or to a large degree of autonomy within PNG. Both options 
require the creation of new political institutions. Currently, the reopening of 
the Panguna mine is vigourously debated (Regan at the conference ‘Mining 
and mining policy in the Pacific’, November 2011, Noumea). The question is 
whether the mine should start production before an eventual political inde-
pendence, or afterwards? The Australian company Rio Tinto is interested, and 
consultants have appeared on the island to assess the situation. The mining 
project could, if carefully managed, promote autonomous economic devel-
opment, similar to the situation in New Caledonia where that process is al-
ready underway. 
The Example of New Caledonia 
New Caledonia, a French overseas territory to the South-East of Vanuatu, 
possesses around 25% of global nickel reserves. This ‘green gold’ was dis-
covered in 1864 by the French engineer Jules Garnier on Grande-Terre, the 
main island of the archipelago. The French colonial administration began 
exploitation of the valuable ores quite rapidly. Nickel is used in the produc-
tion of stainless steel, in the aerospace industry and in the making of coins. It 
is considered as a ‘strategic’ mineral. The country produces under 5% of 
globally consumed nickel metal despite its large reserves, because a single 
smelter processed all the nickel ores in New Caledonia until 2010 
(‘Doniambo’ in Noumea). Figure 4 also shows that the Asian countries, espe-
cially China, Indonesia and the Philippines, have started to invest more funds 
in the nickel industry since 2000. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of the global nickel ore exploitation and nickel metal 
production (2000-2009), in % of the global exploitation/production, Source: 
US Geological Survey 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Built in 1910, the ‘Doniambo’ plant is operated by the SLN (Société Le Nick-
el), a subsidiary of the French group Eramet (see Figure 5). But high com-
modity prices at the beginning of the 21st century induced international min-
ing companies to contemplate the immense nickel deposits and to invest in 
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this overseas territory of France. Henceforth, two new metal processing plants 
have been built: once in the Southern Province (Goro Nickel project), the 
other in the Northern Province of the country (Koniambo project) (see Figure 
5). While the Goro Nickel project operated by the Brazilian company Vale 
was completed in 2010, the first smelter in the North (called ‘usine du Nord’), 
run by the Caledonian-Swiss consortium SMSP-Xstrata, started pilot produc-
tion in April 2013. When these new smelters run at full production capacity, 
New Caledonia will triple its nickel metal production (from 60,000 to 
180,000 tonnes). 
Figure 5: Nickel mining and processing in New Caledonia  
 
The Goro Nickel project includes the construction of a port in Prony bay, a 
coal-fired power station and a processing plant that uses a hydrometallurgical 
process. The smelter has a production capacity of 60,000 tonnes of nickel 
metal (as ferronickel) and 4,500 tonnes of cobalt (see Kowasch 2010; Bonval-
lot/Lardy 2012). The hydrometallurgical process means a discharge of acidic 
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wastewaters into the New Caledonian fringing lagoon via a 24 km long pipe-
line. A total of 36,000 m3 of wastewater per day will be pumped through the 
pipeline, which is located in the Havannah channel and lying on the sea floor 
at a depth of 35 m. The project attracted violent protests by local Kanak clans 
during its construction phase, but the protests diminished with the signing of 
an agreement with the mining company, called a ‘Pacte pour un développe-
ment durable du Grand Sud’ (Agreement for sustainable development of the 
Great South). Nevertheless, several local Kanak clans still opposed the pro-
ject. While some of them were employed by the company or subcontractors, 
others continued to fight against it. After several accidents and technical 
problems, nickel production has been suspended since November 2013 for an 
indefinite period. 
In contrast to the Goro Nickel project, the construction of a nickel smelter 
in the North, where the majority of the population is Kanak, should be under-
stood as a political project that provides economic and political emancipation 
from France. The majority shareholder (51%) of the project is the local com-
pany SMSP (Société Minière du Sud Pacifique), which is an investment vehi-
cle of the government of the Northern Province. The Swiss company Xstrata 
holds the other 49% of the shares. Since the Northern Province is governed 
by the independence party Palika (Kanak Liberation Party), the Kanak inde-
pendence movement is directly involved in the nickel industry for the first 
time (Kowasch 2010; Pitoiset/Wéry 2008). After a civil war in New Caledo-
nia in the 1980s, sparked by Kanak resistance to continued French rule, the 
independence movement imposed conditions on new negotiations about the 
political status of New Caledonia. The Kanak leaders required an active par-
ticipation in the nickel sector, and access to adequate deposits to permit con-
struction of a nickel smelter in the North. In return, they accepted an ad-
journment of a referendum about political independence. Nevertheless, the 
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long-term goal was to create the economic conditions for future political 
independence. After their purchase of SMSP (formerly a small company 
belonging to the Lafleur group) in 1990, the Nothern Province, a vanguard of 
the independence movement, became the owner of a mining company, but 
still lacked enough ore deposits to supply a processing plant. For that reason, 
the independence movement asked the French government to support their 
demand to exchange mining titles with the SLN. In 1996 the Bercy Agree-
ment enabled the final exchange of the mining titles of Poum and Koniambo. 
While the SLN got the Poum massif nickel deposits in the North, and an addi-
tional compensation payment, the SMSP obtained the rich Koniambo depos-
its. For a long time the French parent company of the SLN, Eramet, resisted 
the exchange of the mining titles, because they did not want to lose their mo-
nopoly on smelting in New Caledonia. Under pressure from the state gov-
ernment, they finally succumbed. The government did not want to jeopardize 
the negotiations with the independence movement on a new autonomy status 
and was trying to avoid a possible flare-up of ethnic unrest in a politically 
unstable situation. At last, the negotiations resulted in 1998 in the treaty of 
Noumea, that provided for partial devolution from the French state; the trans-
fer of all jurisdictions to the New Caledonian government, except sovereign 
powers (foreign policy, defense, police, justice, currency) (Maclellan 2013; 
Kowasch/Lindenmann 2014; see also Lindenmann in this volume).  
The SMSP, which did not have the necessary funds or the know-how to 
build a nickel smelter, need a srong mining partner to realise the Koniambo 
project. Finally, the government of the Northern Province and the SMSP 
convinced the Canadian group Falconbridge, at the time the third largest 
nickel producer in the world, to invest in the project and to agree with the 51-
49% model. The SMSP, the majority shareholder, would contribute a secure 
supply of ore, and had majority support of the local population for the 
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Koniambo project. Falconbridge would be responsible for the construction of 
the smelter. In 2005, the Swiss mining company Xstrata acquired the Canadi-
an company, and started in 2008 with the construction of the largest industrial 
project ever in the predominantly rural Northern Province (Grenon 2012). 
The Koniambo project comprises a smelter, a coal-fired power plant, a port 
on the Vavouto peninsula and the broader economic development of the Voh-
Koné-Pouembout (VKP) region where the new smelter is located (Kowasch 
2012b, 2010).  
Since the processsing plant was built in a rural area, new infrastructure 
was necessary. Consequently, the government of the Northern Province and 
the three districts making up the VKP region have planned the construction of 
shopping centers, industrial zones, filling stations, and improved socio-
cultural activities for the existing and the new population. New rental proper-
ties are shooting up like mushrooms. However, new apartements cannot satis-
fy the rising demand, resulting in exorbitant rents and land values. Kanak 
customary land has not been exempt from this growth pressure, and indeed 
some clans have profited from it. For example, a shopping centre, new hous-
ing, a filling station, a cinema and a Lapita museum will be built on the cus-
tomary land of the Bako clan, only a few kilometres from the provincial capi-
tal Koné (Kowasch 2012a, 2012b). The number of construction sites in-
creased, and the hotels of the region now live to the rhythm of the mine 
workers and managers. The money flows, and life in the Kanak villages in the 
neighbourhood of the mine is changing rapidly from a largely subsistence to a 
consumer society. But not all people find work and benefit from the new 
revenues. The socio-economic disparities are growing in the Kanak commu-
nities formerly and still in part characterized by great solidarity. The envi-
ronmental impacts of the mining project are considered by the majority of 
Kanak clans as the ‘price to pay’ for economic development and political 
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emancipation. In 2008/09, surveys in four neighbouring Kanak villages 
(Oundjo, Gatope, Baco and Netchaot) showed that only 24% of 239 Kanak 
people interviewed were opposed to the project (Kowasch 2010:372, 
2014:255). This percentage has declined as jobs and income have come on 
stream. 
On the macro-economic level, the Northern Province and the SMSP have 
pursued a strategy of further exploitation of other nickel mines, all to create 
the preconditions for economic emancipation from France. The 51-49% mod-
el has also been applied to projects in South Korea and China 
(Kowasch/Lindenmann 2014). Together with the South Korean partner 
Posco, the SMSP has built a nickel smelter in Gwangyang (South Korea) to 
repay the loans for the co-financing of the Koniambo project more quickly. 
And by exporting to the Gwangyang smelter, in operation since 2008, the 
SMSP also hopes to prolong the life of the mines on the East coast of the 
island that have low-grade ores. The same 51-40% model is envisaged with 
the Chinese partner Jinchuan. A joint-venture agreement has already been 
signed; the future plant 50 km north of the Vietnamese border should become 
operational in 2017. Similar to Bougainville, the government of the Northern 
Province wants to use the mining sector as an ‘instrument’ for political eman-
cipation. But in contrast to Bougainville, the Kanak independence movement 
wants to be the ‘master’ of resource exploitation and will not delegate exploi-
tation to foreign companies.  
Resource Control, Conflicts, and International and National Interests 
The competition for the exploitation and control of mining resources is char-
acterized by complex situations and relationships between the different ac-
tors. They pursue different interests and objectives. In small-scale island 
contexts with small populations such as New Caledonia, some actors hold 
several offices and perform different functions. They can be a landowner, sit 
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in the local parliament and be an entrepreneur in the mining sector at the 
same time. Depending on the situation, they represent the interests of one or 
other group. The representation of interests can change during a conversation, 
and the same person no longer represents the position of the landowner, but 
those of the entrepreneur with very different interests. But all interest groups 
share the goal of a certain control of mining resources. Except for environ-
mentalists and opponents to the mine, the actors want to benefit in any way 
from the mining project. If actors are marginalized, the desire for participa-
tion can change into rejection and organisation of countermeasures. The fol-
lowing graphic (Figure 6) illustrates the different interests of actors involved 
in mining projects. 
Figure 6: Interests in the mining sector of the different involved actors 
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social responsibility (CSR), because doing a project against the will of the 
local population is more and more expensive and demands extensive security 
Mining 
project 
Resource importing 
state 
Main interests: Resource acces, 
secure the supply of resources 
for economic development, 
strategic interests 
Representation of interests in 
the exporting state: ambassy, 
companies 
International mining company 
Main interests: Profit 
maximization, subordimate also 
CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsability)  
Government of 
resource exporting 
state 
Main interests: Economic 
development, 
particpation in the 
project, taxes and 
incomes 
Local government 
Main interests: 
Economic development, 
particpation in the 
project, taxes and 
incomes, representation 
of local interests (i.a. of 
landowners), job 
creation 
Landowners 
Main interests: 
Compensation 
payments, participation 
in the project: 
employment and 
creation of 
subcontracting 
companies, reduction of 
environmental impacts 
502 Matthias Kowasch 
 
measures. Roadblocks and court proceedings can only be cushioned by high 
profit margins. Therefore, an agreement with the landowners in the vicinity of 
the mine is financially reasonable and in the interest of the mining operator. 
Consequently, the mining companies strengthen their CSR profile. There are 
a lot of companies venturing into rural areas that have tried to establish viable 
relationships with local communities (see Imbun 2010). On the other hand, it 
is not necessarily the case that the companies have long-lasting good relations 
with landowners. Imbun (2013:310) emphasizes: “[...] it is not ‘business as 
usual’ for mining companies as they must, on an everyday basis, maintain 
viable relationships with landowners particularly, and local communities 
generally, to operate projects successfully”. The local population in turn 
hopes for jobs and broader economic development in their region. The small-
er the capacity to take an active role in the project, for example as a result of 
religious or ethnic marginalization, the greater their efforts to seek compensa-
tion payments. In northern New Caledonia for example, the local government 
refused royalties, because they pursue an active project participation (share-
holding, employment and creation of subcontracting companies). In West 
Papua, most of the local Papuans are socially marginalized; consequently they 
do not support the Grasberg project. An active participation in the form of 
employment and subcontracting becomes more improbable due to their mar-
ginalization. 
The main interests of local (regional or provincial) governments are 
broader economic development, higher taxes and the creation of jobs for the 
local population. Because governments have to think of the next elections, 
they support highly visible development projects, as for example the con-
struction of roads and cultural or industrial facilities. 
State governements also pursue political goals. The establishment of an 
international mining company brings foreign currencies into the state’s 
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budget. With foreign currencies and tax revenues the government has a great-
er financial capacity for investment in other economic projects, social issues, 
etc. A government can also show a higher state GDP and job creation. Envi-
ronmental pollution and social upheavals are not in the interest of the gov-
ernment, which does not need negative headlines for its own re-election. 
Consequently, they are often played down, while economic development and 
revenues are promoted.  
Mineral exporters have an interest in a secure and reliable raw material 
supply. Therefore, security, control and low prices for coveted raw materials 
have a high priority. In order to ensure the continuity of supply, many import-
ing countries rely on companies that they control or which are domiciled in 
their countries. For this reason, China’s state-owned company Metallurgical 
Construction Group Corporation (MCC) have invested in a mining project in 
PNG (Ramu Nickel). In a similar way, FreeportMcMoRan, the parent com-
pany of PT Freeport Indonesia, represents American interests in Indonesia. 
On state visists, presidents or prime ministers are often accompanied by eco-
nomic representatives and managers who want to develop markets and nego-
tiate favorable conditions for economic projects. In addition to the securiza-
tion of resource imports and the development of national economies is vital. 
The opening of new markets and favorable conditions for economic projects 
promises new revenue streams and high profit margins for the company, 
boosting the economy of the commodity-importing country. 
Countries with important mineral resources such as Papua New Guinea 
and New Caledonia benefit from the rising demand and the high world mar-
ket prices for raw materials. However, the long-term investment in other 
economic sectors is a prerequisite for a sustainable socio-economic develop-
ment. Papua New Guinea proves this, because despite a growing GDP, the 
majority of the local population do not benefit from mining. The gap between 
504 Matthias Kowasch 
 
rich and poor is growing constantly. This analysis is supported by representa-
tives of the resource curse thesis (Auty 1993; Langton 2010; Langton/Mazel 
2008; Robinson et al. 2006). Langton (2012:6) explains: “Despite modernity's 
promise of progress and wealth for all, and the enormous revenue flowing 
from resource extraction projects to governments, many indigenous and local 
peoples living in the shadow of those projects are still disadvantaged, mar-
ginalized and poor.” While the mining company retains the majority of the 
benefits, the local population generally consumes an important part of ‘its’ 
revenues with the purchase of imported goods such as cars, electronic equip-
ment, cell phones and computers, as well as food and beverages. Sustainable 
development through the investment in other economic sectors does not oc-
cur. The phenomenon is also called ‘Dutch Disease’. The term was coined in 
1977 and describes the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands 
after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959. The concentration of 
the Dutch economy on the export of the natural gas resulted in a stronger 
currency. Other exports grew and imports became less expensive, making the 
manufacturing industry less competitive. So, the resource curse as well as 
Dutch Disease leads to a general decrease in economic development.  
In many places, mining projects are a source of conflict between the local 
population, and the mining company and the state government. In West Pa-
pua, the safety of the mine workers can only be guaranteed by a massive 
military presence, which in turn exacerbates the conflict. In Bougainville the 
conflict around the Panguna mine has caused international sensation, because 
the resistance against the mining project led to the flare of independence 
struggles. The following 10-year civil war was terminated by an international 
police intervention under the direction of New Zealand and Australia. 
International interest in strategic and other raw materials, such as coltan 
or nickel have an influence on the domestic political situation and may also 
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improve or weaken bi-national relationships. In the so-called ‘New Great 
Game’ in the Pacific region, mineral resources play an important role 
(Kowasch/Lindenmann 2014; Hayward-Jones 2013, Garnaut 2013). A safe 
raw material transport route through the Strait of Malacca and the military 
control of the South China Sea are current issues, as well as accessing re-
sources in Papua New Guinea and West Papua. Chinese investment is in-
creasing in the Pacific Island countries, although Australia is by far the largest 
donor and most important strategic partner.  
Because of its particular political status as a French overseas territory 
with a large autonomy, New Caledonia is ‘better defended’ against foreign 
influence, although even France is considered as “foreign country” by the 
Kanak Independence movement. A subsidiary of Eramet controls the majori-
ty of the nickel deposits by possessing mining titles. Land rights are an im-
portant issue in mining projects and represent a high potential for conflict.  
In post-colonial contexts land rights are often ambiguous, different land 
legitimacies are overlapping, also because indigenous people were displaced 
as a result of colonization (Kowasch 2012a; Sikor/Lund 2009). In addition, 
customary tenure systems result in several clans and families claiming the 
same place. After a clan has given a name and thus an identity to a certain 
place, the clan holds land rights and can use the place for agriculture or hous-
ing. But the clan also can ‘lease’ the place to another as usufruct (for agricul-
ture or housing). The transfer of land is not a transfer of property rights. 
However, both clans have rights to the place: the first as ‘first owner’, the 
second as ‘land user’ (Kowasch 2012a). Overlapping legitimacies are charac-
terized as a ‘game of power and influence’ (Kowasch et al. 2015, forthcom-
ing), and clans keep alive the history of these places that defines social rela-
tionships. In most cases, patrilineal land rights exist. Mining companies that 
negotiating with landowners about compensation payments have to identify 
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which of the clans have land rights and also if the community is patrilineal or 
matrilineal. Identification of the various groups can cause problems, because 
knowledge about the clan history has been lost over centuries, especially in 
regions where people have a regular employment and where traditions are not 
so preserved. Imbun (2013:313) describes the complexity of land rights and 
the misinformation that can lead to conflicts: “While in many cases it is the 
ability of people, particularly male elders, to remember and encode genealo-
gies to assert their rights in areas of commercial interest, faulty memories in 
oral history and overlapping rights across groups may cause difficulties for 
developers and landowners themselves.” The Mount Kare, Kutubu, Porgera 
and Misima projects in PNG show the complexity of land rights and the diffi-
culties in finding an amicable solution for the distribution of royalties (see 
Imbun 2013). Banks (1996:231) notes that most conflicts in Melanesia are 
linked to the issue of land legitimacy or the distribution of compensation 
payments: “[...] the most common disputes are either over ownership of par-
ticular pieces of land, or over the distribution of the money between occupiers 
and landowners”.  
Conclusion 
The mining projects in West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledonia under-
line the importance of the resource exploitation for the involved actors and 
emphasize the interlinking between geopolitics and economic interests. The 
interlinking can be a source of conflict, because trade in raw materials prom-
ises large benefits, because some resources have a strategic importance, and 
because the various actors defend different interests. Resource control, the 
security of supply, and benefits are at the center of disputes. In the Pacific 
Islands region, especially Melanesia possesses large mineral resources. Dif-
ferent nations and mining companies seek gold, copper and nickel. In particu-
lar, China’s investment in the PICs is increasing.  
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In Melanesia, large parts of the land are classified as ‘customary land’. Land 
is considered as intellectual property by the indigenous people who claim 
compensation payments for the destruction or loss of land. Strathern (2009) 
highlights that land is vital for social relationships between clans and fami-
lies. CSR that includes negotiation over compensation payments has a signifi-
cant influence on developing countries like PNG (see Imbun 2013). So, royal-
ties are subject to negotiations, but are also source of conflict between local 
peoples and mining companies, and between different clans and families. 
West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledonia are examples. But the three 
regions have another common aspect: mining projects are in the center of 
independence movements. While West Papuans fight for political independ-
ence and against the exploitation of their natural resources, Bougainville and 
the Northern Province of New Caledonia use the mining sector for economic 
and political emanciaption. In Bougainville and Kanaky (how the indigenous 
Kanak call their country), the mining sector is seen as an ‘instrument’ for the 
economic development of a future independent state. But in contrast to Bou-
gainville where Rio Tinto is ready to reinvest in the copper industry, the inde-
pendence Kanak movement wants to be the ‘master’ of resource exploitation.  
References: 
Amnesty International (2013): https://www.amnesty.org/en/region/indo-
nesia/report-2013 (accessed: 4 April 2014). 
Auty, Richard (1993): Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The 
Resource Curse Thesis, London. 
Bainton, Nicholas A. (2010): The Lihir Destiny: Cultural Responses to Min-
ing in Melanesia, Canberra. 
Banks, Glen (1996): Compensation for mining – Benefit or Time-bomb? The 
Porgera Gold Mine, in: Richard Howitt/John Connell/Philip Hirsch (eds): 
Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples, Oxford, 223-235. 
Banks, Glen (2002): Mining and the Environment in Melanesia: Contempo-
rary Debates Reviewed, in: The Contemporary Pacific, 14(1) 2002, 39-67. 
508 Matthias Kowasch 
 
Banks, Glen (2008): Understanding ‘resource’ conflicts in Papua New Guin-
ea, in: Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 49(1) 2008, 23-34. 
Bebbington, Anthony (2012): Extractive industries, socio-environmental 
conflicts and political economic transformations in Andean America, in: 
Bebbington, A (ed.): Social Conflict, Economic Development and Extractive 
Industry, London, chapter 1, 3-26. 
Böge, Volker (2010): Peacebuilding and state formation in post-conflict 
Bougainville, Paper presented at the International Peace Research Association 
conference, Sydney- 6-10 July 2010, Peace and Development Com. 
Bonvallot, Jacques/Lardy, Michel (2012): Un grand complexe métallurgique 
dans la province Sud: Vale Nouvelle-Calédonie, in: Jacques Bonvallot/Jean-
Christophe Gay/Elisabeth Harbert (eds): Atlas de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, 
Montpellier, 173-176. 
Braithwaite John/Charlesworth, Hilary/Reddy, Peter/Dunn, Leah (2010): 
Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing peace in Bou-
gainville, Canberra. 
Brundige, Elisabeth/King, Winter/Vahali, Priyneha/Vladeck, Stephen/Yuan, 
Xiang (2004): Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application 
of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control, Paper prepared 
for the Indonesia Human Rights Network, Yale Law School, New Haven.  
Butt, Leslie/Numbrey, Gerdha/Morin, Jake (2002): The Smokescreen of Cul-
ture: AIDS and the Indigenous in Papua, Indonesia, in: Pacific Health Dialog, 
9(2) September 2002, 283-289. 
Connell, John (1991): Compensation and Conflict: The Bougainville Copper 
Mine, Papua New Guinea, in: John Connell/Richard Howitt (eds): Mining 
and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia, Sydney, 54-75. 
Couasnon, Thaïs/Lander, Laura/Rouet-Leduc, Bertrand/von Wolff, Niklas 
(2013): La mine de Grasberg – Bénédiction ou Juron?, Centre d'Enseigne-
ment et de Recherches sur l'Environnement et la Société Environmental 
Research and Teaching Institute CERES-ERTI, Paris. 
Elmslie, Jim (2010): West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 
Indonesian Census: “Slow Motion Genocide” or not?, CPACS Working 
Paper No. 11/1, The University of Sydney, Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Studies, Sydney. 
Mining in the Pacific Island Countries  509 
 
Filer, Colin (1990): The Bougainville rebellion, the mining industry and the 
process of social disintegration in Papua New Guinea, in: Canberra Anthro-
pology, 13(1) 1990, 1–39. 
Folliet, Luc (2011): Nauru, die verwüstete Insel, Berlin. 
Garnaut, John (2013): China muscles US in Pacific, in: The Age, 16.02.2013. 
Grenon, Yonanico (2012): Un projet métallurgique dans la province Nord: 
Koniambo, in: Jacques Banvallot/ Jean-Christophe Gay/Elisabeth Harbert 
(eds): Atlas de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, Montpellier, 177-180. 
Highlands Pacific: http://www.highlandspacific.com/current-projects/ramu-
nickel (accessed: 3 March 2015). 
Imbun, Benedict Y. (2013): Maintaining land use agreements in Papua New 
Guinea Mining: ‘Business as usual’?, in: Resources Policy, 38(3) 2013, 310-
319. 
Korber, Renate (1998): West Papua zwischen Kolonialregime und Postkolo-
nialer Herrschaft: Sozialanthropologische Untersuchungen zu Kontext, Ent-
wicklung und Ausmaß des Flüchtlingsproblems von 1962-1998, Dissertation, 
Universität Wien, Wien.  
Kowasch, Matthias (2010): Les populations kanak face au développement de 
l’industrie du nickel en Nouvelle-Calédonie, PhD Ruprechts-Karls-University 
Heidelberg as well as University Montpellier III, online available at: 
http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/12305. 
Kowasch, Matthias (2012a): Le développement de l'industrie du nickel et la 
transformation de la valeur de l'environnement en Nouvelle Calédonie, in: 
Journal of Political Ecology, 19/2012, 202-220, online available at: 
http://jpe.library.arizona.edu/volume_19/Kowasch.pdf . 
Kowasch, Matthias (2012b): La zone Voh-Koné-Pouembout, in: Jacques 
Bonvallot/Jean-Christophe Gay (eds): Atlas de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, Mont-
pellier, 231-234. 
Kowasch, Matthias/Lindenmann, Peter (2014): New flags, upward forces and 
sheltered harbours – the new ‘Great Game’ in the Pacific Islands region, in: 
Pacific Geographies, Issue 41/2014, 4-9, online at: http://www.pacific-
geographies.org/pg41/PG41_kowasch_lindenmann.pdf  
Krysler, Peter (2012): Gold, Gas und Gier – Eine Spurensuche im Rohstoffka-
sino Papua-Neuguinea, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Schriften zur Ökologie, Band 
28, Berlin, online at: https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/Gold_Gas_und_ 
Gier_V01_kommentierbar.pdf . 
510 Matthias Kowasch 
 
Langton, Marcia J. (2010): The Resource Curse, in: Griffith Review, Edition 
28, online at: https://griffithreview.com/articles/the-resource-curse/ . 
Langton, Marcia J./Mazel, Odette (2008): Poverty in the Midst of Plenty: 
Aboriginal People, the ‘Resource Curse’ and Australia’s Mining Boom, in: 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 26(1) 2008, 31-65. 
Mealey, George A. (1996): Grasberg: Mining the richest and most remote 
deposit of copper and gold in the world, in the mountains of Irian Jaya, Indo-
nesia, New Orleans. 
Mückler, Herrmann (2013): Entkolonialisierung und Konflikte der Gegen-
wart in Ozeanien, Kulturgeschichte Ozeaniens Band 4, Wien. 
Nakagawa, Junji (2008): Freeport’s Grasberg/Ertsberg Mine in West Papua, 
Indonesia, in: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat: Opportunities 
and Challenges for Foreign Investment in the APEC Region: Case Studies, 
Singapore, 74-87. 
Oliver, Douglas L. (1991): Black Islanders, A Personal Perspective of Bou-
gainville 1937-1991, Honolulu. 
Pitoiset, Anne/Wéry, Claudine (2008): Mystère Dang, Nouméa. 
PNG LNG: http://pnglng.com/project/about (accessed: 3 March 2015). 
Regan, Anthony (1999): History of the Bougainville conflict, in: Parliament 
of Australia, House of Representatives Committees: Bougainville: The Peace 
Process and Beyond, Canberra, Chapter 2, 13-39, online available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_represe
ntatives_committees ?url=jfadt/bougainville/bvrepindx.htm  
Regan, Anthony (2011): Deciding the Future of Mining in ‘Post-Conflict’ 
Bougainville, Lecture to the conference “Mining and Mining Policy in the 
Pacific: history, challenges and perspectives”, Nouméa, 21. – 25.11.2011. 
Rio Tinto: http://www.riotinto.com/copper-and-coal-82.aspx#indonesia (ac-
cessed: 3 March 2015). 
Robinson, James A./Torvik, Ragnar/Verdier, Thierry (2006): Political foun-
dations of the resource curse, in: Journal of Development Economics, 79(2) 
April 2006, 447-68. 
Schilder, Klaus (2005): Bergbau im Pazifik, in: Volker Böge/Jochen Loh-
mann/Roland Seib/Marion Struck-Garbe (eds): Konflikte und Krisen in Ozea-
nien, Pazifik Infostelle, 54-69. 
Mining in the Pacific Island Countries  511 
 
Sharp, Nonie (1977): The Rule of the Sword. The Story of West Irian, Malms-
bury. 
Sikor, Thomas/Lund, Christian (2009): Access and Property, in: Thomas 
Sikor/Christian Lund (eds): The Politics of Possession – Property, Authority 
and Access to Natural Resources, London, 1-22. 
Smith, Graeme. (2013): Nupela Masta? Local and Expatriate Labour in a 
Chinese-Run Nickel Mine in Papua New Guinea, in: Asian Studies Review, 
37(2), 178-195. 
Strathern, Marilyn (2009): Land: Intangible or Tangible Property? in: Timo-
thy Chesters (ed.): Land Rights. The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2005, Oxford, 
13-38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Case Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Mining, War and Peacebuilding on Bougainville 
Volker Böge 
Abstract: This chapter explores the causes of violent conflict and successful 
post-conflict peacebuilding on the South Pacific island of Bougainville in 
Papua New Guinea. It investigates the role of mining in the causation of the 
conflict and in the peacebuilding process. It will become clear that mining, 
which was to bring economic development in the context of a globalised 
economy, resulted in extreme environmental degradation and social disinte-
gration, finally leading to the longest and bloodiest war in the South Pacific 
since the end of the Second World War. While post-conflict peacebuilding 
and state formation on Bougainville have been successful so far, the sustain-
ability of peace and political order depends to a large extent on how the 
problem of the Panguna mine, and of mining in general, is resolved. This 
issue had been deliberately shelved during the first stages of the peace pro-
cess because of its divisiveness. In recent years, however, it has re-emerged, 
and a broad variety of stakeholders is working hard to get it right this time. 
Although Bougainvilleans have demonstrated extraordinary ingenuity and 
skilfulness in building peace and political community, the danger of relapse 
into conflict cannot be ruled out, because the mining issue has to be dealt 
with in the context of a globalised economy and an international state system 
both of which have so far not proven conducive to the aspirations, needs and 
wellbeing of the people of Bougainville. 
Keywords: Bougainville, Panguna mine, mining, environmental degrada-
tion, violent conflict, peacebuilding, state formation 
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Introduction 
For almost ten years (1989 to 1998), the island of Bougainville in the South 
Pacific was the theatre of a large-scale violent conflict. Over the last decade 
and a half Bougainville has gone through a comprehensive process of post-
conflict peacebuilding. The primary catalyst for the violent conflict in Bou-
gainville was a giant mining project, the Panguna mine in the mountains of 
Central Bougainville, and the sustainable success of current peacebuilding 
endeavours very much depends on the solution of the Panguna mine problem. 
This chapter explores the contribution of mining to the outbreak of vio-
lent conflict on Bougainville and its role for peacebuilding, focusing on the 
links between natural resource extraction and localized violent conflict, and 
building a case for conflict-sensitive approaches to mining in the interest of 
peace and security.  
Economic exploitation, environmental degradation and social disintegra-
tion as causes of violent conflict 
The island of Bougainville has an area of about 9,000 square kilometers (ap-
proximately the size of Cyprus) and 250,000 inhabitants. Geographically it 
belongs to the Solomon Islands archipelago. Politically, however, it is part of 
the state of Papua New Guinea (PNG), which became independent in 1975, 
after decades under Australian colonial rule. During the time of Australian 
administration, Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), one of the world’s larg-
est mining companies (which became Rio Tinto in 1995), successfully carried 
out exploration on Bougainville in search of copper. In 1967 it established 
Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), with CRA as the majority shareholder. 
Construction of BCL’s Panguna copper and gold mine in the Crown Prince 
Range in central Bougainville started in 1969, and in 1972 production com-
menced. In the 1970s and 1980s Panguna was one of the largest open-pit 
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mines in the world; most of the copper ore was exported to the Norddeutsche 
Affinerie, a copper refinery in Hamburg, Germany. 
Figure 1: Bougainville in PNG 
 
For CRA the Panguna project brought enormous profits, and after independ-
ence it brought considerable revenues for the central government of PNG in 
the far-away capital city of Port Moresby on mainland New Guinea. The mine 
was the largest single source of income for the government and the backbone 
of PNG’s economy, providing about 16% of PNG’s internally generated in-
come and 44% of its exports (Connell 1990). It enjoyed massive support from 
the former colonial power Australia; the Australian government perceived 
Panguna as decisive for sustaining the young nation state of PNG economi-
cally1. 
                                                          
1
  A comprehensive account of the construction, operation, legal context and impact of the 
Panguna mine is given by Wesley-Smith 1988, see also Regan 2003. The view of the mining 
company BCL is given by Quodling 1991 and Quodling 1992. For a brief overview of the 
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For the local people on the ground, however, the mining operation had major 
negative environmental, social and cultural effects. Land was taken from the 
local communities on a large scale as BCL was granted leases for mining, 
tailings disposal, building roads, mining towns and port facilities. Mining 
caused enormous environmental degradation. No environmental impact stud-
ies were conducted before mining started (we are talking about the late 
1960s), and BCL initially provided hardly any environmental safety measures 
(there was no environmental legislation in place at the time mining began). 
Mining replaced agricultural land on a large scale. Loss of land also meant 
loss of sources of drinking water and timber. Tailings were directly disposed 
into the local river system. In the 1970s, 150,000 tons of rock waste and tail-
ings were discharged into the rivers every day from the mine (Brown 
1974:19). This method of riverine tailings disposal (which in the meantime 
has been banned worldwide – apart from PNG) resulted in sedimentation, 
erosion, flooding, loss of fish and freshwater. Rivers were polluted, particu-
larly by heavy metals such as zinc, copper, cadmium and mercury. Sediment 
loads in rivers became extremely high. As a consequence, particularly fertile 
land at the river banks was lost and the rivers became completely devoid of 
fish. Forest depletion impacted on traditional hunting and gathering activities. 
Wildlife declined drastically or even disappeared completely. The ever in-
creasing spread of tailings threatened ever more villages and deprived villag-
ers of agricultural land. In short: the environmental degradation threatened the 
lifestyle of the local population which is closely linked to the land. Land to 
the local communities is not only important as the basis for their subsistence 
and smallholder economy, but also as the core dimension of their whole 
                                                                                                                             
mine’s operation and associated problems see Vernon 2005. For the environmental degrada-
tion caused by the mine see the early assessment of Brown 1974, see also Wesley-Smith 
1988 and Connell 1991. 
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social, cultural and spiritual life2. Loss of land therefore is not only economi-
cally detrimental, but has far-reaching effects on the social fabric and the 
psycho-social well-being of communities and individuals. The social and 
cultural significance of land was widely ignored by the management of the 
mining company and state authorities. 
Environmental degradation was accompanied by social disintegration. 
The establishment of the Panguna mine led to population growth and urbani-
sation at an unprecedented scale. The majority of the overall urban population 
was young male non-Bougainvillean mine workers, mostly from other parts 
of PNG (only a small minority of mine workers were locals). An upsurge of 
law and order problems ensued: rape, assault, gang violence, prostitution, 
alcohol abuse etc. Indigenous Bougainvilleans blamed the mine and the sub-
sequent increase in the number of outsiders for this rise in crime and social 
problems – all the more so as these outsiders were considerably different 
from the Bougainvilleans and had different customs. Bougainvilleans, who 
are very black-skinned people, referred to those outsiders from other parts of 
PNG as ‘redskins’ because of their lighter skin colour, whereas Bougainville-
ans often are called ‘blackskins’ by other PNG citizens. Often redskin work-
ers brought in their wantoks (relatives) and squatted on land without asking. 
Squatter settlements became a widespread phenomenon. The blackskin-
redskin difference contributed to rising tensions. Local people blamed outsid-
ers – workers, expatriate company management and the agents of the central 
government – for not respecting indigenous culture and their status and cus-
tomary rights as the original owners of the land3. 
                                                          
2
  For an overview of the various aspects of social, economic, cultural and political conditions 
in Bougainville before the mine-induced violent conflict see Regan/Griffin 2005. 
3
  On the disintegrative social effects of the Panguna mine in particular and of mining in a 
Melanesian context in general see Filer 1990, Filer 1992 and Wesley-Smith and Ogan 1992. 
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Moreover, the mining project also led to the development of social inequality 
within the up to then rather egalitarian local communities, e.g. between those 
(few) with a job at the mine and those without, between those receiving com-
pensation and those who were left out, between the older generation whose 
representatives had struck a deal with the mine operators and the younger 
generation who had not been included, between men and women etc. This led 
to unrest and infighting within and among communities. In other words: De-
velopment brought by the mining project put pressure on the traditional social 
fabric from outside and at the same time caused frictions within the local 
communities (Boege 1999). 
Finally, the distribution of revenues from mining was highly unbalanced, 
with 62% of BCL gross revenue going to the central government of PNG, 
33% to foreign shareholders (mainly CRA), 4% to the Bougainville provin-
cial government and 1% to local landowners (Quodling 1992). 
Hence the benefits and costs of mine-induced development were per-
ceived by many on Bougainville as extremely unevenly divided, with the bulk 
of the mining revenues flowing to outsiders, and the local communities left 
with the negative environmental and social effects. The people on the ground 
demanded meaningful environmental protection measures, compensation for 
environmental damage and a larger share of the revenues generated. The 
mining company and the PNG government disregarded the concerns of the 
Bougainvilleans and rejected their demands, and this triggered the longest and 
bloodiest war in the South Pacific since the end of World War Two. Natural 
resource extraction, the environmental degradation and social disintegration it 
caused as well as the unequal distribution of mining revenues were critical 
causal factors for this large-scale violent conflict. 
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The violent conflict 
The violent conflict started when young members of the local clans in the 
mine area brought the mine to a standstill by acts of sabotage in late 1988. As 
the PNG police riot squads were unable to cope with the activities of the 
protestors, the central government sent its military (the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force – PNGDF) to the island in March 1989 and declared a state of 
emergency on Bougainville in June 1989. Members of the clans in the mine 
area established the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and began 
fighting the government forces. Fighting that started in central Bougainville 
soon spread across the whole island. The BRA adopted a secessionist stance 
and called for self-determination and political independence for Bougainville, 
pointing to ethnic differences between the Bougainvilleans and the rest of 
Papua New Guineans and stressing historical, kinship and cultural ties with 
the neighboring islands of the Western Province in Solomon Islands4. 
Because of the fighting, the Panguna mine was forced to stop mining op-
erations in May 1989, and soon after the BRA managed to over-run and shut 
down the mine for good, and it has remained closed ever since; even today it 
is in the hands of a faction of the secessionists (see below). 
In its war against the BRA the PNGDF were supported by local Bougain-
villean auxiliary units, the so-called Resistance Forces. In fact, over time it 
was the Resistance that bore the brunt of the fighting on the government side. 
This changed the character of the conflict. From being a war of Bougainville-
ans against ‘foreign’ government troops, it became a war among Bougainvil-
leans themselves. From then on traditional conflicts between different groups 
                                                          
4
  For the sake of completeness, it must be mentioned that there had been secessionist move-
ments on Bougainville before, beginning already in the 1960s; and before PNG became in-
dependent in mid-September 1975 Bougainville had declared its own independence on 1 
September 1975. Bougainvilleans only revoked this step and joined PNG after a provincial 
system of government was introduced for PNG which gave Bougainville far-reaching self-
government competencies.  
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and clans were also fought under the umbrella of the ‘great’ war of secession. 
Parties entangled in local conflicts either joined the BRA or the Resistance. 
At times Resistance units would wage their own ‘private’ wars against BRA 
units over merely local issues, especially land disputes. On the other hand, it 
was not unusual for individual BRA or Resistance units to change sides, or 
for BRA to fight other BRA or Resistance to fight other Resistance. It would 
be misleading to think of the BRA or the Resistance as unitary actors. Rather, 
those entities were made up of largely independent units. There were no clear 
and efficient lines of command and control. The leadership had only rather 
limited influence on the activities of the local fighting units on the ground. 
This also applied to the security forces of the PNG government. They also 
often operated independently from their political and military leadership, 
fighting their own ‘private’ smaller wars that followed the logic of ‘pay back’ 
more consistently than instructions from the government in far away Port 
Moresby. 
Over time the war became more and more complex, and the frontiers 
blurred. There were no two clear-cut sides fighting each other over one single 
distinctive issue as in conventional wars. It was not only the state (of PNG) 
against the secessionists (of the BRA). Rather there was a host of parties 
entangled in various overlapping conflicts. Coherence of the fighting parties 
was mainly based on traditional social ties – of kinship, clan and village. 
What took place on Bougainville was not a war in the conventional sense of 
the term. It was neither war between states, nor was it merely an internal war 
between the central government and its security forces on the one hand and a 
unitary armed opposition on the other.  
Rather, one has to comprehend the Bougainville violent conflict as a hy-
brid social-political exchange, shaped by a patchwork of actors and interests 
from the local and the modern political and economic sphere. The overlap of 
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these spheres with regard to the causes of conflict, the issues at stake, the 
perceptions, values and motives of the conflict actors as well as the forms of 
their (violent) behaviour and activities gave the war its specific features, 
which made it neither a “classical” (inter-state or intra-state) nor a ‘new’ 
war5.  
The main victims of the violent conflict were the civilians. They suffered 
from the collapse of basic services such as health and education and the 
breakdown of infrastructure and public administration. In 1990 the central 
government ordered a total air and sea blockade on the supply of goods and 
services to Bougainville (and later the BRA-controlled areas) which included 
a blockade of medical supplies. This blockade led to the death of thousands of 
islanders in the following years, mainly as a result of the collapse of the med-
ical care system. Out of the number of almost 20,000 Bougainvilleans who 
lost their lives during the war and only a small minority were combatants 
killed in action (approximately 10%), the vast majority were civilians. 
Large numbers of the populace were forced to flee their homes or were 
forcibly resettled during the war. The PNGDF forcibly transferred huge por-
tions of the population into so-called care centres (internment camps under 
the supervision of the military). At times almost 67,000 people lived in these 
care centres under very difficult conditions and were subject to grave human 
rights abuses committed by the PNGDF. Thousands more fled their villages 
to hide in the bush from the PNGDF. Around 2,000 Bougainvilleans became 
refugees in neighbouring Solomon Islands6. 
                                                          
5
  On ‘new wars’ see Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001. Given the complex mixture of issues and 
actors involved in the Bougainville violence it is tempting to use the ‘new wars’ terminology 
to comprehend what happened, and in fact, the Bougainville conflict is exhibiting several 
features of so-called ‘new wars’. However the Bougainville story also comprises dimensions 
that cannot be grasped by the concept of ‘new wars’, see Boege 2006. 
6
  The Bougainville conflict had a major impact on the Solomon Islands and relations between 
PNG and Solomon Islands. Based on kinship ties, many Bougainvilleans found refuge with 
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The security forces of PNG and its local auxiliaries continuously and system-
atically attacked the civilian Bougainville population, burning down houses 
and villages, destroying gardens that people depend on for their subsistence 
agriculture, indiscriminately killing civilians and making people ‘disappear’. 
Members of the BRA and the Resistance also committed war crimes such as 
rape, torture, murder, wilful killings of suspected ‘traitors’, taking hostages, 
destruction of property and pillage. Continuous and systematic mass rapes 
were a particularly terrible feature of the conflict. Thousands of Bougainville 
women were raped, mostly by PNG security forces (Braithwaite et al. 2010). 
In the course of the conflict the non-Bougainville civilian population had 
to leave the island (approximately 20,000 people) (ibid.). These were mainly 
mine and plantation workers and public servants from other parts of PNG and 
their families, but also Chinese shop-owners and white technical experts. 
Non-Bougainvilleans were deliberately attacked, killed and terrorised by the 
BRA with the aim to force them off the island. It can be argued that this was a 
form of ethnic cleansing along the blackskin-redskin divide (ibid.; Regan 
2007). 
Peacebuilding and state formation 
By the late 1990s, a stalemate had developed on Bougainville in which nei-
ther side believed there was anything to be gained by continuing the war, and 
a stable process of post-conflict peacebuilding ensued, with the Bougainville 
Peace Agreement (BPA) of August 2001 as its cornerstone7. Its two core 
                                                                                                                             
their extended families on Solomon Islands close to Bougainville. Others had to move to ref-
ugee camps, supported by the Red Cross and the Solomon Island government. Many Solo-
mon Islanders had sympathy for the fight of the BRA, and the BRA used transboundary links 
in support of its struggle, in particular to circumvent the PNG-imposed blockade. On several 
occasions, PNG navy patrol boats violated Solomon Islands sovereignty in pursuit of BRA 
units, and there were stand-offs between the PNG navy and the Solomon Islands navy. 
Hence the Bougainville crisis led to tensions between the two neighboring Melanesian coun-
tries.  
7
  The text of the BPA in Carl/Garasu 2002:67-85. 
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political provisions are, firstly, autonomy for Bougainville in the framework 
of the state of PNG and its constitution, and, secondly, a referendum on the 
future political status of Bougainville, that is, independence or autonomy 
within PNG, ten to fifteen years after the establishment of an autonomous 
government for Bougainville (which took place in 2005)8. 
The history of the successive steps and stages of the political process that 
led to a comprehensive peace arrangement for Bougainville shall not be re-
counted here. Instead, some of the main characteristics of post-conflict 
peacebuilding shall be briefly recalled9.  
Of utmost importance for building peace, for rebuilding communities and 
re-establishing order was the utilisation of customary forms and institutions. 
As has been said, the conflict was not just a war of secession, but rather a 
complex mixture of such a political war and inter-communal customary sub- 
or mini-wars between local societal entities. Hence the termination of the war 
had to address the ‘higher’ political level as well as the ‘lower’ level of (inter) 
communal conflicts. In the first place this meant that negotiations and agree-
ments between political and military leaders at the top level were not suffi-
cient. Agreements and reconciliation at the grassroots level were of at least 
similar importance, and this inter-communal peacebuilding was largely based 
on customary approaches. 
Many customary peace processes and peace ceremonies have taken place 
at the local level between enemy villages and clans all over the island since 
the end of the war (some of which have not been concluded yet, and more are 
still to come). During the war elders and chiefs had become responsible for 
regulating conflicts and organising community life due to the absence of 
                                                          
8
  The outcome of the referendum will have to be ratified by the PNG parliament. So, in theory 
at least, PNG could sabotage a pro-independence vote. 
9
  For more details on peacebuilding in Bougainville see Boege 2006, 2008, 2012; Boege/Gara-
su 2004, 2011. 
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functioning state institutions. They were also entrusted with an important role 
when violent conflicts had to be settled in the transition phase from war to 
peace at the local level. In doing so, they utilised customary methods of con-
flict resolution. On this basis, the negotiations at the ‘higher’ political level 
finally also led to a comprehensive peace settlement. It was this combination 
of bottom-up and top-down approaches to peacebuilding as well as the inter-
action of state-based institutions and instruments, non-state customary institu-
tions and also civil society institutions (womens’ peace organisations, media-
tion trainings etc.) that made Bougainville a success story of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. 
As customary institutions have proven to be effective in peacebuilding, 
there is a case for their utilisation in the current process of state formation as 
well. The people and the political elite in Bougainville today are confronted 
with the task of building new state institutions. State-building will provide for 
either a completely independent state in the future (with autonomy as a transi-
tional phase to independence) or for a widely autonomous political entity 
within PNG10. 
Many Bougainvilleans – out of bitter negative experience – nurture a 
deep distrust of western-style centralised government structures and processes 
                                                          
10
  Moreover, Bougainvilleans are challenged with the task of developing some kind of a coher-
ent ‘national’ identity as a foundation of a sustainable political community; this might be 
called ‘nation-building’. To a certain extent, such a specific ‘Bougainvillean’ identity devel-
oped during the times of war and peacebuilding. Given that the notion of ‘nationhood’ has 
no roots in traditional Melanesian societies, this was a big leap forward. War and peacebuild-
ing served a unifying function. Nevertheless, dividing lines among the Bougainvillean popu-
lation remain even today. Efforts to build a Bougainville ‘nation’ have to acknowledge that 
there are “sometimes tensions between local identity and our Bougainville identity” (BCC 
2004:56).The Bougainville Constitutional Commission (BCC) therefore talks about the ne-
cessity to “preserve, foster and develop both our local identities and our Bougainville identi-
ty” simultaneously (ibid.). Whether this can actually be achieved remains to be seen. It 
would be negligent to ignore the frictions that exist between customary identity as a member 
of a local community (extended family, lineage, clan) on the one hand and identity as a ‘citi-
zen’ of a ‘nation state’ on the other. – For a very detailed and sensitive account of multi-
layered Bougainville identities see Regan 2005. 
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(see Hassall in this volume). They prefer a system of governance based on 
their own indigenous norms. A strong desire to ‘marry’ local customary and 
introduced liberal-democratic institutions and processes for the purposes of 
state-formation can be felt in all quarters of the Bougainvillean populace. 
This desire is clearly reflected in the Bougainville Constitution, which makes 
comprehensive reference to customary ways and kastom (a Pidgin derivative 
of ‘custom’) (BCC 2004). 
In fact, political order on Bougainville today comprises of elements of the 
Western model of statehood (a constitution, a president and a parliament, free 
and fair elections, a public service etc.) and elements of customary govern-
ance (chiefs and elders, village assemblies, councils of chiefs, councils of 
elders, customary law). To a certain degree these domains merely co-exist, 
with complementarities and synergies, but also frictions and incompatibilities; 
and to a certain degree there are efforts towards deliberate combination and 
integration (the above-mentioned ‘marriage’). So far, governance and the 
containment and resolution of conflicts in this context of hybrid political 
order have been functioning relatively well11. 
The hybrid governance situation is complicated even further due to the 
fact that the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) which was formed 
after elections in 2005 is not the only actor that lays claim to legitimate au-
thority at the state level in Bougainville. There is also the Meekamui move-
ment12. Meekamui is a faction of the former BRA that has not yet joined the 
peace process officially (although it never disturbed or undermined that pro-
cess either). Meekamui has declared the territory under its control in Central 
Bougainville around the Panguna mine a ‘no-go zone’ for outsiders. It has its 
                                                          
11
  On the concept of hybrid political orders see Boege et al. 2009, on hybrid political order on 
Bougainville see Boege 2010. 
12
  Meekamui means ‘holy land’ in one of the local Bougainville languages. 
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own structures of governance and its own military wing, the Meekamui De-
fence Force (MDF). The ‘border’ between the no-go zone and the rest of 
Bougainville is rather porous, and there is considerable exchange. A very 
particular state of fragmented shared sovereignty has developed in the 
Meekamui region. While it is covered by the general provisions of the peace-
building and statebuilding processes (the PNG and ABG authorities claim 
that those provisions apply for the whole of Bougainville), these provisions 
are only partially implemented. On the other hand Meekamui is a ‘state’ – or 
rather a very specific political entity – of its own. In August 2007, meetings 
between the ABG and the Meekamui Movement yielded the Panguna Com-
muniqué, which has provided the basis for a rapprochement between the two 
entities (with some collaboration, especially with regard to the maintenance 
of law and order and the delivery of basic social services). Since then a com-
plicated process of exchange between ABG and Meekamui has been under-
way which might lead to some kind of formal ‘reunification’ of political enti-
ties on Bougainville in the future. At present, however, some sections of the 
population do not acknowledge the ABG as the (only) legitimate government. 
Meekamui (which itself is not a unitary actor, but consists of several factions) 
is in a relatively strong position as it controls the Panguna mine and the ac-
cess roads to Panguna. Any solution to the Panguna mine issue will have to 
take Meekamui into account. 
Mining for independence? 
The Panguna mine problem had been deliberately put aside during the first 
stages of the peace process because of its divisiveness. Over the last years, 
however, it has come to the fore again as all stakeholders are aware that sus-
tainable peace on Bougainville can only be achieved if the Panguna problem 
is solved. Today a broad debate about re-opening the mine (and about the 
future of mining on Bougainville in general) is underway. Based on the BPA, 
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the ABG has comprehensive governing competencies ‘short of indepen-
cence’. Most importantly, the highly sensitive issues of land and natural re-
sources, mining, environment, oil and gas, and trade, commerce and industry 
are in principle under the sole control of the ABG. The current ABG is a 
strong advocate of re-opening the Panguna mine, its main argument being 
that only the revenues from the mine can sustain an independent Bougainville 
in the long term. The ABG also wants to lift the current moratorium on new 
explorations for mining on Bougainville outside BCL’s lease area. It has 
established a mining division, which is assisted by the World Bank in capaci-
ty-building and training of staff, and is working on a Bougainville mining 
legislation13. 
Mining is seen as the most promising option for a substantial increase in 
government revenue and as the main means of economic growth and devel-
opment for an autonomous – and perhaps later on an independent - Bougain-
ville. Hence, if Bougainvilleans want independence – and currently it very 
much looks like the vast majority of them would opt for independence in a 
referendum14 – then they will have to accept mining. An independent Bou-
gainville – so the argument goes – can only survive in a globalized economy 
and in the current international economic and political system if it generates 
value from its mineral wealth. Many Bougainvilleans are convinced by this 
economical-political line of argument, but by far not all of them. For some 
time now talks at different levels and in different contexts have been going on 
about the possibilities of re-opening the Panguna mine and about the devel-
opment of new additional mining projects on the mineral-rich island. There is 
                                                          
13
  At the time of writing (February 2014) the draft new Bougainville mining law is under 
discussion in the Bougainville parliament and public; it seems to be highly controversial. 
14
  “Many observers suggest that a majority of Bougainvilleans would currently opt for inde-
pendence but that a considerable minority would vote to stay with PNG, with PNG exercis-
ing its prerogative under the peace agreement not to ratify the result” (Jennings/Claxton 
2013:7). 
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general agreement that comprehensive discussions with local communities, in 
particular the landowners in the areas directly affected by mining, will be 
necessary before the commencement of planning to resume mining. There are 
divergent views regarding the willingness of the people in the mining area to 
allow mining to take place again. 
As has been said, the mine site and adjacent areas are still controlled by a 
‘hard-core’ faction of the secessionists, the Meekamui movement and its 
MDF. The ABG is in continuous dialogue with the Meekamui movement. 
Without Meekamui consent (or some form of dissolution of the Meekamui 
movement altogether) re-opening of Panguna will be impossible. Within the 
ranks of Meekamui views on re-opening Panguna and developing new mining 
projects seem to differ, with some more open to the idea and others strongly 
against. This reflects the mood of the landowning communities in the mining 
area and mine-affected areas. The strongest resistance comes not from the 
area immediately surrounding Panguna but from more distant communities 
that suffered the greatest environmental damage from the mine – particularly 
those that are downstream, along the Jaba River. 
Landowners from the mining area and mine-affected areas have estab-
lished nine new landowner associations for the different areas (the mine site 
area, the access road area, the downstream area etc.) as well as an overarching 
umbrella organisation; in the process the different competing factions of the 
pre-war Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) have come together again 
in order to protect the rights and interests of the landowning communities. 
Regional public fora on the Panguna question have taken place in 2013 and 
2014 for the different regions of Bougainville, organised by the ABG’s min-
ing division, to inform grassroots Bougainvilleans about the options and to 
collect their opinions. In the Panguna area a specific Panguna Peacebuilding 
Dialogue is underway, based on a Panguna Peacebuilding Strategy that was 
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launched in early 2013. Processes of reconciliation within and between com-
munities in the Panguna mine area and adjacent areas had begun in earnest 
only in 2009. Some community leaders and politicians from these areas have 
put a lot of effort into initiating these processes; other leaders, however, re-
main skeptical and have not yet joined. Although reconciliation will take 
time, it is an essential foundation for meaningful dialogue about reopening 
the mine. There is general consensus that without completion of all outstand-
ing reconciliation processes in the mine-affected areas, the mine could never 
be re-opened.  
Although BCL is still the formal legal owner of the Panguna mine15, BCL 
officials have not had access to the mine site since it was occupied by the 
BRA in 1989. BCL has declared its interest in reopening the mine and com-
missioned a prefeasibility study on the costs and technical requirements of 
redeveloping Panguna. The study, which was completed in November 2008, 
found that there is potential for a viable mining operation at Panguna, alt-
hough the capital costs of redevelopment are likely to be high16.  
In the meantime, BCL and Rio Tinto keep a low profile in Bougainville. 
Company representatives are well aware of the profound distrust (and even 
hatred) still harbored in certain quarters of the populace. They acknowledge 
that reopening Panguna will depend on reestablishing trust and good relations 
with the communities on Bougainville – an immense effort that will take 
considerable time. Some Bougainville political leaders want BCL to come 
back, to clean up the environmental mess it left behind, and to take over 
                                                          
15
  Rio Tinto owns 53,58 % of BCL; the government of PNG 19,06 %; and public shareholders 
27,36 %. 
16  Redeveloping Panguna will cost about US$3.8 billion. Copper reserves are estimated at 
almost 3 million tons, and gold production in the range of 400,000 ounces per year. Panguna 
is potentially one of the world’s largest copper and gold mines, with a processing rate of 50 
million tons of ore per year and a mine life of at least seventeen years. Moreover, BCL holds 
seven exploration licenses in areas adjacent to the Panguna area, and it is widely believed 
that they also contain large deposits of copper and gold. 
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responsibility for mining again: “It is better to deal with the devil you know, 
and the devil that knows us, than a completely new devil”17. Other political 
figures are more open to alternatives to BCL. 
Conclusion: a happy end in sight? 
At this point in time it looks like a majority of Bougainvilleans are pro-
mining, but there is also a relatively strong and determined minority against. 
Furthermore, among those in favour of re-opening, opinions on the precondi-
tions differ widely; questions are, for example: 
whether the old Bougainville Copper Agreement (BCA) is null and void and a 
new agreement should be negotiated from scratch or the old BCA should be 
renegotiated, 
whether BCL/Rio Tinto should pay compensation first before negotiations 
about a new agreement or about adjustment of the old BCA can commence, 
or the compensation issue should be part of such negotiations18, 
whether only the landowners should decide about re-opening or the decision 
should rest with the ABG, or all people of Bougainville should decide, e.g. in 
another referendum, 
whether the referendum on independence should come first and then the re-
opening of the mine, or the other way round, 
whether BCL/Rio Tinto has to clean up the environmental damage it left be-
hind (the effects of which can still be felt today) first, or environmental clean-
                                                          
17
  ABG President John Momis. A Ministerial Statement to the Bougainville House of Repre-
sentatives, Tuesday 31.12.2013. New Dawn on Bougainville 31 December 2013 
(http://bougainville.typepad.com/newdawn/page/2).  
18
  The Umbrella PLA, for example, says that for them compensation is a pre-condition for any 
negotiations about re-opening Panguna, whereas the ABG President Momis holds that only 
after the mine is operating again the compensation issue can be addressed in earnest. The 
Meekamui sticks to the initial BRA demand that Rio Tinto pay 10 bn Kina (~ 5 bn €) in com-
pensation.  
Mining, War and Peacebuilding on Bougainville  533 
 
up and new substantial environmental protection measures have to come with 
the re-opened mine19. 
It can be envisaged that a rather protracted process of discussion still lies 
ahead. At least, however, there is consensus that the issue has to be resolved 
peacefully, and that Bougainvilleans have to come to a unified position first 
before commencing negotiations with external actors (the PNG government 
and the Australian mining company – or other foreign companies for that 
matter). Again, in order to prevent new violent conflict it is of utmost im-
portance to reach a very broad consensus among Bougainvilleans. Only on 
such a basis, formal negotiations about re-opening the Panguna mine can lead 
to sustainable results and old mistakes and their fatal consequences can be 
avoided. 
It remains to be seen how much the various stakeholders have learned, 
and how deep and sustainable the lessons were. The ABG is focused on the 
potential economic benefits of mining, but it also acknowledges the im-
portance of a social license to operate; whether the central PNG government 
has an equally balanced view is unclear. Given the fragility of the sociopoliti-
cal context, it would be dangerous to give undue priority to economic consid-
erations and to set aside social and cultural considerations as less important. 
Moreover, the question whether Bougainville is only economically viable as 
an independent state based on the revenues generated by a re-opened mine (as 
argued by the current ABG) or whether there are alternatives like agriculture, 
fisheries, (eco-)tourism etc. (as argued by some of the ABG’s critics) should 
be discussed more thoroughly and more open-minded20. 
                                                          
19
  Environmental clean-up is predicted to be a large-scale, very long and very expensive exer-
cise. UNEP has agreed to assist Bougainville with the preparation of the clean-up. 
20
  If there will be a referendum on independence as planned between 2015 and 2020, it is 
highly unlikely that the mine will re-open before the referendum, and it will definitely be 
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So far, Bougainville has been one of the rare success stories of contemporary 
post-conflict peacebuilding (in comparison, for instance, to Irak, Afghanistan, 
Mali, Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegowina, Kosovo, Guatemala and several 
others). Whether the story will culminate in a peaceful future or not very 
much depends on how the mining issue is dealt with. At this point in time, 
Bougainville also has the potential to become another kind of success story, 
namely of conflict-sensitive and conflict-relevant redevelopment of mining in 
a post-conflict situation.  
What is needed to achieve this is firstly, the creation of a stable political 
environment as a precondition for re-starting natural resource extraction; this 
means continuing and deepening the ongoing processes of peacebuilding and 
state formation, and secondly, a comprehensive process of dialogue and en-
gagement that includes all stakeholders, company/ies, communities and their 
traditional leaders, state agencies, ex-combatants, community-based organisa-
tions and NGOs -, and that particularly addresses the concerns of the local 
population. Ideally, conversations would focus on: 
the past: what went wrong with mining on Bougainville, and why. This is to 
achieve a common understanding of the history as the basis for reconciliation 
(and compensation) and for (re-)establishing trust; 
the present: based on reconciliation and mutual trust, expectations and needs 
of communities, company/ies and other stakeholders can be discussed and 
current grievances and concerns can be addressed; 
the future: identification of visions and ways forward, building of consent 
(within and among as well as between communities, companies and state 
agencies), collaborative planning, decision-making and implementation, and 
                                                                                                                             
years before the mine could generate revenue for the ABG. So one will have to think about 
alternatives anyway, at least for a transition period. 
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establishment of procedures for addressing grievances and solving disputes in 
the future. 
Such a dialogue process would have to be sequential. Without having 
sorted out the problems of the past and without reconciliation it will not be 
possible to plan for the future. This means in particular that the effects of 
mining and its contribution to violent conflict will have to be dealt with. This 
implies that BCL/Rio Tinto takes responsibility for the damage done and the 
wrongs committed in the past and demonstrates willingness to make repara-
tions to communities. Furthermore, the distribution of revenues from resource 
extraction will have to be changed in favour of the landowning communities, 
the local population and the ABG. Finally, comprehensive environmental 
rehabilitation and protection measures as well as sustainable community de-
velopment projects need to be implemented so as to avoid a repetition of the 
mistakes of the past which led to violent conflict in the first place. 
Doubtless it is questionable whether all this could be achieved. The peo-
ple of Bougainville and their political leaders find themselves in a difficult 
position regardless. They are determined to build sustainable peace and a 
functioning political community – both of which must be genuinely home-
grown, not merely copies of alien (‘Western’) models. Such models have 
proven to be unworkable in the historical, social and cultural context of Bou-
gainville. At the same time, however, the Bougainvilleans have to build peace 
and political community under conditions not of their choice, conditions that 
they cannot change. They have to position themselves and their ‘holy land’ 
within a globalised economy and an international state system which has 
proven so far to be not conducive to their aspirations, needs and wellbeing. 
Bougainville was incorporated into the global economy by way of a gigantic 
mining project, with the natural resources extracted from the land shipped 
overseas, along with the profits. Meanwhile the Bougainvilleans were left 
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behind with their land and communities destroyed, with an extremely bloody 
protracted violent conflict as the result; and they were incorporated into the 
international state system as part of a ‘nation-state’ to which they did not feel 
they belonged. It has taken them more than a decade of hard work in recon-
struction, reconciliation and peacebuilding to lift themselves out of misery, 
and they have demonstrated their extraordinary ingenuity and skilfulness in 
doing so. Now, however, the danger of relapse into the old conflicts cannot be 
ruled out, precisely because the global economic and political environment 
has not changed: a global economy hungry for copper and gold, and a global 
society dominated by the international state system. Under these circumstanc-
es it is only ‘natural’ for the ABG to push for re-opening of the Panguna mine 
as the backbone of a future independent state of Bougainville. For the sake of 
the people of Bougainville one could wish there were other alternatives. 
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 The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands – 
Achievements, Transitions and Prospects
1
 
Sinclair Dinnen 
Abstract: The Solomon Islands experienced an internal conflict between 
1998 and 2003 that resulted in the collapse of government structures and 
services, including the police force, and the closure of commercial enterpris-
es. Unable to resolve the crisis on its own, the Solomon Islands government 
requested help from its regional neighbours, leading to the deployment of the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003. Mobilised 
under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum, RAMSI was led and largely 
funded by Australia. It aimed to restore security and stability in the archipel-
ago through a combination of policing and law enforcement, institutional 
strengthening with central government agencies and measures aimed at re-
viving the national economy. As the 10-year mission comes to an end, Solo-
mon Islands remains fragile and faces major challenges as it contemplates 
the future. It is unlikely that economic growth will be able to match popula-
tion growth and the rising popular expectations. Reliance on logging is likely 
to be progressively replaced by mining, with the potential for accentuating 
patterns of uneven and enclave development that contributed to the original 
conflict. These and related issues are examined in the context of Solomon 
Islands recent history.  
Keywords: Solomon Islands, regional intervention, security, statebuild-
ing and development 
                                                          
1
  This paper is a revised and updated version of an article published in Security Challenges, 
8(4), Summer 2012, 61-71. 
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Figure 1: Solomon Islands 
 
Introduction 
RAMSI was mobilised in direct response to a request for assistance from the 
beleaguered Solomon Islands government (SIG) in 2003. Ethnic tensions 
(known locally as ‘the tension’) between the people of Guadalcanal and Ma-
laita, the two largest islands, erupted in 1998. Around 35,000, mainly Ma-
laitan, settlers were forcibly displaced from their homes in areas surrounding 
the national capital, Honiara, on Guadalcanal. Armed skirmishes occurred 
between rival militias representing the two island groups. The Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force (RSIPF) fractured along ethnic lines, leading to a break-
down in government authority.2 While the Townsville Peace Agreement 
(TPA) in October 2000 ended the spectre of an all-out ethnic war, the country 
remained militarised and ex-militants and rogue police engaged in collective 
                                                          
2
  In the absence of a military force, the police constitute the principal coercive and enforce-
ment agency of the Solomon Islands state. 
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and opportunistic violence in Honiara and parts of rural Guadalcanal and 
Malaita. Government revenues dropped drastically with the closure of major 
commercial enterprises, essential services ground to a halt in many areas, 
while the compensation process adopted as the principal instrument of 
peacemaking became rapidly corrupted (Fraenkel 2004). Confronted with 
national bankruptcy, lacking any effective enforcement capacity, and viewed 
as deeply compromised by many citizens, it became clear that SIG was inca-
pable of resolving the crisis on its own. 
The arrival of RAMSI in mid-2003 under the auspices of the Pacific Is-
lands Forum (PIF) was welcomed by most Solomon Islanders. Although 
regional in character, the mission was led by Australia, which also supplied 
the bulk of funding (around $AUD 200-250 million per annum), personnel 
and other resources. Smaller but significant contributions have come from 
New Zealand and other Forum member states. The restoration of law and 
order was entrusted to the mission’s police, the Participating Police Force 
(PPF), comprising around 330 police officers with back-up from 1,800 mili-
tary personnel. RAMSI has evolved considerably over a ten year period in 
terms of its operational priorities, organisation manner of engagement. Con-
sistent with liberal peace approaches, restoring security was linked to a more 
ambitious state-building exercise aimed at strengthening the central agencies 
of the Solomon Islands’ state and encouraging investor-led growth (Al-
len/Dinnen 2010:299-327). Ten years later, and following an estimated in-
vestment of more than AUD$2 billion (Lake 2013), the mission has moved 
into a transitional phase. This has entailed a gradual reduction in the size of 
the mission, including the complete withdrawal of its remaining military in 
2012. It has also involved the progressive absorption of RAMSI’s develop-
ment programs into more regular aid arrangements managed by bilateral and 
multilateral donors (Coppel 2010). While RAMSI’s early successes in 
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restoring security attracted well-deserved praise, much remains to be done in 
order to fulfil the mission’s prescriptions for a stable, secure and self-
sufficient Solomon Islands. Outstanding questions include the sustainability 
of gains made over the last decade and the extent to which the island nation’s 
own leaders and institutions can maintain and build on these. There are also 
concerns regarding Solomon Islands’ capacity to manage the structural prob-
lems and conflict stresses that contributed to the original tension in the late 
1990s. Many of these remain unaddressed, and some are likely to become 
accentuated in light of anticipated economic and demographic trends. 
This paper examines these issues in the context of Solomon Islands’ re-
cent history. The first section examines the larger international strategic con-
text that informed the initial decision to deploy RAMSI and that helped shape 
the character and priorities of the mission. This is followed by a section on 
the background to the tension and the myriad factors that contributed to the 
internal crisis. Section three looks at RAMSI’s evolution since 2003 and its 
main achievements. The final section considers the island nation’s prospects 
in the years ahead. 
The Strategic Context of Intervention 
Australia had declined several earlier requests for armed assistance.3 An ap-
proach by SIG to the UN in September 2002 was abandoned after it became 
clear that any Security Council vote was likely to be vetoed by China owing 
to Solomon Islands’ recognition of Taiwan (Ponzio 2005:173-188). The Aus-
tralian government’s decision to mobilise and lead the regional mission in 
2003 resulted from a confluence of strategic considerations. Concerns with 
regional instability had been growing in Australian policy circles from the 
                                                          
3
  These included requests by Prime Minister Ulufa’alu and his successor Manasseh Sogavare, 
the first as early as 1999 and later during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) in 2002 (Lineham 2006). 
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late 1990s following political upheavals in Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji and Solomon Islands. Combined with the limited impact of tradi-
tional soft power approaches, these concerns underscored the need for more 
effective forms of engagement on the part of Australia as the leading regional 
power in the Southwest Pacific.  
Australia’s view of its own national interests and regional leadership re-
sponsibilities were also changing following the 9/11 2001 attacks in the U.S. 
and subsequent bombings in Bali in 2002 and Jakarta in 2003. The American-
led ‘war on terror’ established a new lens for viewing the phenomenon of 
‘state failure’, linking it directly to the generation of subnational and transna-
tional threats to regional and global security.4 This, in turn, provided a justifi-
cation for a spate of international interventions in post-conflict and fragile 
states, and was adopted by the Australian government as the official rationale 
for its intervention in Solomon Islands.  
The clearest exposition of this emergent framing was made by the Aus-
tralian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in an influential report on Solomon 
Islands. Identifying the archipelagic nation as the Pacific’s first ‘failing state’, 
ASPI warned of it becoming a “petri dish in which transnational and non-
state security threats can develop and breed” (ASPI 2003:13), and called for 
the Howard government “to reconsider the policy paradigm that has shaped 
Australia’s approach to our Southwest Pacific neighbours ever since they 
became independent” (ibid.:7). A “sustained and comprehensive multination-
al effort” (ibid.:39) was proposed for Solomon Islands, with the restoration of 
law and order to be followed by a sustained state-building exercise to “build 
new political structures and security institutions and address underlying social 
and economic problems” (ibid.). 
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  See, for example, USA 2002:iv. 
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The timing and shape of the intervention owed as much to Australia’s adop-
tion of this model of liberal peace as it did to actual developments in Solomon 
Islands (Allen/Dinnen 2010). Consideration of the particularities of local 
context was to a large extent subordinated to the application of the larger 
strategic framework and its formulaic prescriptions. These entailed robust 
external interventions with a strong accent on security, state-building and 
neo-liberal economic reform. Each element is reflected in the three pillars 
around which RAMSI is organised: law and justice; the machinery of gov-
ernment; and economic governance. While beleaguered authorities in Honiara 
had been requesting some kind of intervention since 2000, what had changed 
by 2003 “was the Australian government’s reading of the situation in Solo-
mon Islands and its implications for Australia” (Hameiri 2012:412). This 
reading, in turn, represented a shift away “from a particularist and develop-
mental lens to a global and security lens in viewing Pacific developments” 
(Fry/Kabutaulaka 2008:16). 
Background to the Tension 
The Solomon Islands has never had a ‘strong’ or ‘effective’ state as measured 
by its institutional capacities or ability to project authority throughout its 
territory. Although the tensions exacerbated the fragility of the state, the 
events that unfolded from the late 1990s were as much a consequence of this 
underlying fragility as they were a source of it. The centralised state inherited 
from Britain at independence in 1978 has struggled to consolidate in Solomon 
Islands’ socially diverse and geographically fragmented environment. Around 
eighty languages are spoken among a population of just over half a million 
people dispersed across an archipelago comprising six main islands. Individ-
ual identities remain relentlessly localised, with little sense of ‘nation’ or 
shared political community. Former Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni fa-
mously declared that Solomon Islands was “a nation conceived but never 
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born” (Mamaloni 1992:14). Contemporary forms of ‘community’ for the 85% 
of Solomon Islanders living in rural areas revolve around complex interplays 
of kinship and exchange relations, friendships, church membership and myri-
ad claims to customary land. Most people continue to live on the margins of 
the modern state and formal economy, relying on local systems of informal or 
customary governance for their welfare and security needs, and on a mix of 
subsistence agriculture, fishing and cash cropping for everyday survival.  
The centralisation of political power continues to be contested in many 
places, as it was during colonial times. Much of this contestation has revolved 
around the allocation of scarce public resources, the unfulfilled promise and 
uneven pattern of post-independence development, and the failure of succes-
sive governments to deliver essential services, such as education and health. 
Solomon Islands’ political culture shares important characteristics with its 
Melanesian neighbours. The strong party system on which the Westminster 
system is premised has failed to take root and a highly personalised style of 
‘big-man’ politics prevails. Accessing and redistributing state funds through 
patronage networks based on kinship is a key dynamic of political behaviour 
and has contributed to instability and corruption, accentuated by a corrosive 
nexus between elements of the political elite and the notoriously corrupt 
Asian-dominated logging industry (Dinnen 2008:339-355). It has been argued 
that the potential disruption to political patronage networks posed by the 
declining demand for log exports during the Asian financial crisis in the late 
1990s and the election of a reformist government resulted in deliberate acts of 
destabilisation by vested political and business interests (Hameiri 2007:409-
441, 2008:357-371). 
The small formal economy – logging, fishing and, increasingly, mining – 
has failed to match the needs and expectations of a rapidly growing and 
youthful population. Spatial inequalities associated with longstanding patterns 
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of uneven development have encouraged internal migration from less devel-
oped regions to areas offering better employment and economic prospects, 
and improved access to services. Migration from the densely populated and 
undeveloped island of Malaita to Honiara and adjacent areas in rural Guadal-
canal over many years has accentuated social and cultural differences be-
tween ‘settlers’ and ‘indigenous’ groups. Local resentments have been di-
rected at the perceived monopolisation of employment and other development 
opportunities by Malaitans, and their involvement in land transactions viewed 
as contrary to Guadalcanal customs (Kabutaulaka 2001). This sense of griev-
ance was experienced most acutely by the inhabitants of Guadalcanal’s re-
mote southern Weather Coast, where the rebellion that heralded the tension 
originated. More generally, extractive industries, such as logging and mining, 
can have seriously divisive social impacts at local levels and contribute to 
growing conflict stresses (Naitoro 2000; Dinnen et al. 2011). In addition, their 
enclave character is likely to fuel perceptions of relative deprivation. 
Demands for greater political devolution and provincial autonomy have a 
long history in Solomon Islands. Perceptions of a progressive withdrawal of 
state from rural areas and a widening gap between Honiara – where political 
and economic power is concentrated – and the rest of the country are shared 
by many Solomon Islanders. The dissolution of Area Councils from the mid-
1990s onwards saw the demise of an important mechanism for the delivery of 
government services and public works at local levels (Dinnen/Allen 2013). A 
related aspect of these popular grievances concerns the perceived failure of 
the formal sector of government to engage with the informal community 
governance systems and leadership structures that prevail throughout the 
archipelago. While under enormous stress in many places owing to the char-
acter and pace of change, these local systems based on a blending of custom, 
Christianity and tenuous linkages to bits of state, retain high levels of 
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legitimacy among rural Solomon Islanders. While dissatisfaction with the 
workings of the centralised state has resulted in disengagement in some local-
ities, it has more usually led to strident calls for greater engagement with 
government, through a devolved system that can link with existing communi-
ty governance structures, including traditional mechanisms as these have 
evolved (Allen et al. 2013). 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
Australian leadership of the regional mission was contingent on securing the 
consent of Solomon Islands’ authorities and member states of the Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF). Forum Foreign Ministers endorsed Australia’s plan of 
intervention, while the Solomon Islands Parliament unanimously passed the 
Facilitation of International Assistance (FIA) Act 2003, setting out the pow-
ers and immunities of mission personnel. Described as a form of “co-
operative intervention” by the then Australian Foreign Minister Downer5, 
RAMSI was to operate through Solomon Islands national laws and respect the 
island nation’s sovereignty (Fullilove 2006:33). Under the FIA Act, the Sol-
omon Islands Parliament was to review RAMSI annually and could, in theo-
ry, terminate the mission by revoking its consent. The wide-ranging mandate 
combined security and development objectives: 
Ensure the safety and security of Solomon Islands; 
 Repair and reform the machinery of government, improve govern-
ment accountability and improve the delivery of services in urban 
and provincial areas; 
 Improve economic governance and strengthen the government’s fi-
nancial systems; 
                                                          
5
  Alexander Downer, ‘Our failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Is-
lands’. Address at the launch of the ASPI Report, Sydney, 10 June 2003. 
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 Help rebuild the economy and encourage sustainable broad-based 
growth; and 
 Build strong and peaceful communities.6 
RAMSI’s initial phase, led by the PPF, focused on the restoration of law and 
order. This was to be followed by a period of consolidation and institutional 
reform, and, finally, the building of sustainability and self-sufficiency among 
Solomon Islands’ institutions. In addition to the highly visible police and 
military presence, civilians from a range of Australian government depart-
ments7 were placed as advisers in various ministries and agencies. In this 
regard, RAMSI has been described as “the most comprehensive whole of 
government strategy towards a fragile state of any donor to date” (Pat-
rick/Brown 2007:87). As well as Australia’s substantial commitment of funds 
and personnel, no fixed exit date was specified. The mission was coordinated 
in Solomon Islands by a Special Coordinator’s Office, headed by a senior 
Australian diplomat, while Australian-based agencies operated through an 
interdepartmental committee in Canberra. 
Security was restored quickly and peacefully. Large numbers of firearms 
were handed over to mission personnel, while well-known militant leaders 
were apprehended to be processed subsequently through the criminal courts. 
This intensive period of law enforcement placed considerable pressure on 
other parts of the fragile criminal justice system, and the mission placed a 
number of international personnel in relevant agencies, including as magis-
trates, lawyers, clerks and prison officials. In addition to their executive polic-
ing role, the PPF also began the longer-term task of cleaning up and rebuild-
ing the RSIPF. Over 400 officers resigned or were removed, amounting to 
                                                          
6
  As listed on the RAMSI website: http://www.ramsi.org/about/what-is-ramsi.html 
7
  Australian government departments participating in RAMSI included: the Departments of 
prime Minister and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs and Trade, AusAID, Defence, Australian Feder-
al Police, Attorney-General’s, Customs, Treasury, and Finance and Administration. 
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more than one quarter of the total workforce. Other early achievements in-
cluded restoring stability to government finances. Improvements in public 
financial management and tax collection saw government revenues increase 
by around 170% during RAMSI’s first three years (Kukoc 2007). Legislative 
and policy provisions were enacted to support private sector investment, 
while measures were taken to strengthen Solomon Islands’ accountability 
mechanisms, including the Office of the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, 
and the Leadership Code.  
Inevitably, there were also set-backs. Serious public disturbances oc-
curred in Honiara in April 2006 following national elections (Dinnen 
2008b:1-38). Two days of rioting and opportunistic looting destroyed much 
of the capital’s Chinatown and served to highlight the underlying fragility of 
the peace. Manasseh Sogavare’s subsequent election as Prime Minister her-
alded a dramatic deterioration in bilateral relations between the Solomon 
Islands’ and Australian governments. A staunch nationalist and critic of the 
mission, Sogavare sought to reassert his government’s control over RAMSI 
and curb what he viewed as Australia’s dominant influence. This, in turn, 
provoked strong resistance from political leaders in Canberra (ibid.:17-26). 
Although these differences were fought out at the highest levels of the two 
governments and did not necessarily affect operational relationships, they 
inevitably cast a shadow over the future of the mission. In doing so, they also 
exposed the inherent vulnerability of the ‘co-operative intervention’ model to 
the vagaries of shifting local political allegiances.  
Changes of government in each country in late 2007 provided a much-
needed circuit breaker. Improved relations with the Melanesian countries – 
Solomon Islands and PNG in particular – were a high priority for the new 
Australian government led by Kevin Rudd. Although there was no radical 
change in substantive policy, there was a distinct change in tone with 
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Australian pronouncements now couched in the more constructive language 
of ‘partnership’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘mutual responsibility’.8 RAMSI’s 
evolution and capacity for learning were most apparent in this later period 
(Braithwaite et al. 2010). A recurring criticism raised by local and regional 
observers during the first phase of the mission related to Australia’s domi-
nance of key decision-making and the perceived marginalisation of Solomon 
Islands’ and regional stakeholders. While to a large extent an inevitable con-
sequence of the asymmetry in resources and capabilities between the different 
stakeholders, as well as the initial prioritisation of RAMSI’s security agenda, 
the period since 2007 saw the creation of more space for Solomon Islands’ 
and regional voices to actively participate in the shaping and implementation 
of the mission.  
New consultative arrangements included the 2009 Solomon Islands-
Australia Partnership for Development that sought closer collaboration be-
tween the two governments in meeting agreed development goals. A Forum 
Ministerial Standing Committee (FMSC) was established,9 as was a ‘triumvi-
rate group’ comprising senior officials from SIG, PIF and RAMSI,10 while a 
Partnership Framework was designed to increase alignment between the 
mission’s work and the priorities of SIG.11 These mechanisms reflected a 
growing sensibility to local concerns and priorities that had previously been 
overlooked. The earlier emphasis on law enforcement was broadened through 
support to locally-led reconciliation processes, including the establishment of 
                                                          
8
  This change in tone was expressed most clearly in the Australian and Papua New Guinean 
Governments’ Port Moresby Declaration of 6 March 2008. 
9
  The FMSC comprises past, present and future Foreign Ministers of Forum Chair countries, 
as well as the Foreign Ministers of Solomon Islands, Australia, and, since 2009, PNG. 
10
  The ‘triumvirate group’ comprises the Solomon Islands Government Permanent Secretary to 
RAMSI, the Honiara-based PIF Representative to Solomon Islands, and the RAMSI Special 
Coordinator. 
11
  Progress under the Framework is monitored by a Joint Performance Oversight Group co-
chaired by the Special Coordinator and Solomon Islands Prime Minister. 
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a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 2009. There was also a 
lessening of the mission’s initial reluctance to facilitate national dialogue 
around issues of political decentralisation.  
Transition and beyond – Solomon Islands’ future prospects 
As it marked its tenth anniversary in July 2013, the mission still enjoyed high 
levels of popular support. The People’s Survey 2013 revealed that that 86% of 
Solomon Islanders surveyed continued to support RAMSI’s presence.12 This 
is unusual for a prolonged international intervention and an indication of the 
strengths of local perceptions about the critical role of the mission. Although 
uneven across sectors, there is evidence of improvements in government 
service delivery. A substantial amount of public debt has been retired, while 
the formal economy has been growing consistently, with GDP growth averag-
ing around 7% since 2004 (Allen 2011:6). Rumours of renewed ethnic 
tensions in Guadalcanal in early 2012 were dismissed unequivocally by 
spokespersons for the two former rival militias (Marau 2012). The RSIPF 
successfully managed protests associated with latest change of government in 
November 2011, while reported incidents of serious crime remain low by 
regional and international standards. 
Although an indicator of the success of the mission, high levels of popu-
lar support also suggests a continuing lack of confidence by Solomon Is-
landers in their own institutions and anxiety about a possible return to conflict 
without the presence of RAMSI. For example, according to the 2011 People’s 
Survey, 65% of respondents believed that the country was not yet ready for 
RAMSI to scale back its activities, while only 19% said it was. Ironically, the 
success of the mission in restoring security and administrative functionality 
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  The Peoples Surveys, commissioned by RAMSI and undertaken by the Australian National 
University, have been gauging local views across the Solomon Islands since 2006 on a range 
of social, economic and development issues. They can accessed on the RAMSI website: 
http://www.ramsi.org/ 
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may have inadvertently induced high levels of dependency among many 
Solomon Islanders, rendering RAMSI indispensable for their country’s con-
tinuing stability. This dependency has been evident in varying degrees across 
different sectors of government, as well as extending from the highest levels 
of political leadership to citizens in rural localities. This in turn raises ques-
tions about the effectiveness of RAMSI’s efforts to rebuild local capacities 
and empower Solomon Islanders to resume control over their own destiny.  
The mission’s extensive police-building engagement illustrates some of 
these dilemmas,13 many of which are common to all large interventions (see, 
for example, Ignatieff 2003:162). Despite signs of improvement, the People’s 
Surveys reveal that Solomon Islanders still have limited confidence in the 
capabilities of their own police force. While in part a legacy of the earlier 
tension, there is evidence that Solomon Islanders are now evaluating the local 
police in relation to the much better resourced and highly professional mis-
sion police. The RSIPF inevitably come off worse in such comparisons. An 
irony here is that the continuing presence of the PPF, whose primary task for 
some time has been to rebuild the RSIPF, may actually be accentuating this 
lack of confidence on the part of many citizens. Likewise RAMSI’s substan-
tial financial and other support to the RSIPF – around two-thirds of the total 
costs of policing– may have reduced the pressure on SIG to adequately re-
source the RSIPF.  
With much of RAMSI’s development work focused on central govern-
ment agencies in Honiara, many rural Solomon Islanders still face major 
problems of access to state services. This includes access to the RSIPF and 
the state justice system. Beyond the national capital, the RSIPF has some 28 
police stations and posts located in the provinces. The former are usually 
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  The following discussion draws on Dinnen/Allen 2013. 
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based in provincial capitals, leaving a scattering of smaller police posts in 
selected rural areas. Significant disparities exist in the distribution of police 
personnel and other assets in different parts of the country. For example, just 
over half the total number of RSIPF officers are stationed in Honiara which is 
home to less than 20% of the total Solomon Islands population. By contrast, 
only 7.5% of the police are located in Malaita province with around 30.3% of 
the national population. It is only recently that more attention has been given 
to the development of a model of community policing that will be able to 
extend the reach of the RSIPF across the archipelago and that will be sustain-
able in light of the fiscal constraints facing SIG.  
In addition to the findings of successive People’s Surveys, recent re-
search by the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs and the World Bank’s 
Justice for the Poor Program demonstrates the extent to which rural Solomon 
Islanders continue to rely on their own village-based mechanisms for manag-
ing everyday disputes and ensuring community safety (Allen et al. 2013). 
Different configurations of three overlapping justice systems – kastom,14 
church and state systems – are found in different areas, with the former being 
most commonly used to resolve local disputes. Rather than being archaic 
remnants of a pre-modern past, these local systems are highly dynamic and 
manifestly capable of adaptation. Although weakening in many places under 
the weight of rapid change, and while they may suffer from lack of accounta-
bility and inconsistency with human rights standards, they retain a high level 
of legitimacy among most Solomon Islanders. RAMSI’s singular focus on the 
state policing and justice systems has largely neglected the role of these non-
state actors and processes. The World Bank research provides a strong case 
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  The term ‘kastom system’ is used here to refer to local rule systems whose authority lies in 
appeals to locally-specific bodies of kastom (custom) or tradition, and that are typically ad-
ministered by local ‘chiefs’. 
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for engaging with the realities of legal pluralism in Solomon Islands by fos-
tering linkages between different security and justice providers. This would 
potentially enable greater alignment between the diverse sources and forms of 
regulation at local levels. In the long term, it could lead to the development of 
more socially attuned and fiscally sustainable approaches to managing dis-
putes, as well as helping to prevent the kind of conflict escalation that oc-
curred in the late 1990s.  
A broader lesson from recent international state-building interventions is 
the importance of nation-building as a related but distinct process to state-
building. In its literal sense, nation-building is about the development of a 
sense of shared political community among the citizens of a particular state. 
Although loyalties to kin and family groups are likely to remain a strong 
foundation for individual identities in such a socially diverse country, the 
importance of extending the loyalty of Solomon Islanders to the idea of Sol-
omon Islands as a nation-state is increasingly recognised. While there are 
clearly limits to the role of external actors in such complex historical process-
es, state-building clearly needs to be embedded in the larger project of nation 
making. Among other things, this requires a significant broadening of the 
narrow technical state-building perspective that dominated in earlier phases of 
the mission.  
RAMSI has been sensitive to local concerns about the potentially destabi-
lising effects of its drawdown and eventual departure. The current Partnership 
Framework provides the master transitional strategy of graduated withdrawal 
and the mission’s drawdown is calibrated according to the completion of 
agreed objectives in relation to different activities rather than being bound by 
strict timelines. It is clear that some form of external security guarantee will 
be required for the foreseeable future. The next phase in RAMSI’s transition 
will cover the period 2013-17. Since 1.7. 2013, RAMSI’s three development 
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pillars (law and justice, machinery of government and economic governance) 
have shifted across to development programs managed out of the Australian 
and New Zealand High Commissions. During the next four years, it is antici-
pated that RAMSI’s main role will be to work with the RSIPF. A small con-
tingent of the PPF, now based almost entirely in Honiara, will continue to 
support the RSIPF. A switch in the modality of external assistance is taking 
place, reflecting the transition from post-conflict stabilisation to a more regu-
lar development assistance approach.  
The need for long-term international support is premised on an apprecia-
tion of the structural challenges facing the island nation, including its relative-
ly poor economic prospects and the conflict stresses these are likely to induce. 
Many of the underlying factors that contributed to the original tension remain 
unaddressed. A recurrence of conflict remains a real risk with international 
evidence confirming the cyclical character of conflicts in fragile states (World 
Bank 2011). Analysis by the World Bank (2010) demonstrates how economic 
growth in Solomon Islands since 2003 (average per capita growth of 3.6 per 
annum) has been largely driven by the influx of aid flows (38% of GDP on 
average since 2003) and unsustainable levels of logging. Set against an annu-
al population growth rate of around 2.6%, even these growth rates have been 
unable to bring incomes back to pre-tension levels. According to recent fore-
casts, commercial logging stocks are expected to be exhausted by 2015, lead-
ing to a dramatic anticipated drop in government revenues. Planned new 
projects in fisheries, mining, tourism and agriculture, even if successful, are 
unlikely to make up for the shortfall that will result from such a development. 
As well as the impact on revenue and jobs, the demise of the notoriously 
corrupt logging industry “is likely to place pressure on local patronage net-
works and exacerbate socioeconomic grievances, thereby partly recreating 
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conditions that contributed to the original outbreak of violence in the late 
1990s” (Allen 2011:2). 
Despite the mission’s considerable accomplishments, Solomon Islands 
remains vulnerable to future instability. Projections indicate that likely medi-
um-term economic growth will increasingly be concentrated around Honiara 
or around enclave resource development, especially mining. This is likely to 
accentuate historical patterns of uneven development and associated griev-
ances over relative deprivation. Rapid and unplanned urban growth, typically 
involving informal settlements on customary or state land, has considerable 
potential for generating conflict over land use, as well as entrenching real and 
perceived inequalities in the distribution of incomes and services. Likewise, 
experience in Papua New Guinea and the neighbouring island of Bougainville 
attests to the links between mining projects and new patterns of rent-seeking 
and local-level conflict.  
RAMSI has undoubtedly succeeded in its initial task of restoring security 
and stability to Solomon Islands but the outstanding challenge will be in sus-
taining these achievements in the longer-term. This is now well understood 
among senior mission officials, as it has been understood by Solomon Is-
landers for many years. It is also reflected in the acknowledgement that while 
RAMSI will disappear, substantial international support will be needed for 
many years to come, albeit in the form of bilateral and multilateral aid pro-
grams provided by Australia and other international partners.  
The implications for Australia’s engagement in Solomon Islands of the 
recent change of government in Canberra remain unclear at this stage. On 
assuming office, the new conservative administration led by Tony Abbott 
announced its intention to re-absorb the Australian aid agency – AusAID – 
back into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). This an-
nouncement came as shock to many observers of aid politics in Australia and 
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raised concerns that the relative autonomy of the aid program would become 
a casualty as Australian aid becomes more closely aligned to the strategic and 
trade interests that animate foreign policy. Other observers have been more 
sanguine, pointing to similar organisational changes in other bilateral donors 
that have not dramatically affected the character of their aid programs. The 
relatively few public statements from the new government on its new foreign 
policy directions indicate that Australia’s near neighbours, including Solomon 
Islands, will remain a focus for engagement. While it is unlikely that the new 
government will do anything to jeopardise the very substantial Australian 
investment in Solomon Islands over the past decade, it seems likely that its 
strong ideological commitment to development through trade will have some 
impact. Time will tell. 
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 Australian Military Interventions in East Timor: 
Real- or Moralpolitik at work? 
 
Manuel Schmitz 
 
Abstract: Australia intervened in 1999 and 2006 militarily in East Timor. In 
both cases, Australia’s actions were important to end violence and destruc-
tion in the former Portuguese colony. Considering the considerable costs of 
both interventions, the question arises why Australian governments decided 
to employ military forces. Were the decisions driven by moral concerns, the 
desire to help a neighbour in need? Or were cold-hearted interest-
calculations behind the decisions to intervene? In other words: Were the 
interventions an example of Moral- or of Realpolitik? The essay discusses the 
various arguments for each perspective and concludes that it was neither a 
clear case of Moralpolitik (as the Australian governments likes to portray it) 
nor just an exercise in Realpolitik (as many civil society actors paint it). In-
deed, judged by the motivations, the two Australian military interventions in 
East Timor were a mixture of Real- and Moralpolitik, norms and interests 
were of importance. 
Keywords: Australia; East Timor; humanitarian intervention; foreign 
policy; Indonesia; INTERFET; Moralpolitik; Operation Astute; Realpo-
litik 
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Figure 1: Timor-Leste 
 
Introduction 
Big is beautiful, at least in international relations. Small states normally do 
not receive much attention, neither from decision-makers nor from academ-
ics. In the international arena the big players, which command over people, 
territory, resources and possess military, might and economic leverage, take 
centre stage. East Timor, Timor-Leste or Timor Loro Sae in the two official 
languages – Tetum and Portuguese – of the country, is not big: Its territory 
covers 14,870 km² (global rank 160 of UN member states) and is home to 1.2 
million people (global rank 158). Certainly, there are smaller states. Countries 
like Singapore and Qatar have less territory; Luxembourg and Cyprus have 
less people. But East Timor is not only small; it is not even rich, unlike the 
other mentioned small states. According to data from the World Bank its 
GDP in 2012 stood at $1.293 billion, resulting in a GNI per capita of $ 3,620 
and is therefore considered to be a “lower middle income country” (World 
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Bank 2014). It should be noted, however, that East Timor achieved this status 
only recently. When the country gained its official independence in 2002 it 
was considered to be the poorest country in Asia. Responsible for the remark-
able improvement is the exploitation of East Timor’s oil and gas reserves, the 
only driver of economic development in the country. But while its oil and gas 
reserves make all the difference for East Timor, for the global market the 
reserves are not of importance: In 2012 its total oil production placed it only 
on rank 51 of the world’s producing countries (EIA 2013).1 Because East 
Timor is neither big nor rich it should get not much attention in the interna-
tional arena. 
Surprisingly, East Timor became an international issue, especially in 
Australia. In the fall of 1999 Canberra took the lead in the International 
Force for East Timor Mission (INTERFET), a multinational armed peace-
keeping mission, which was authorized by the United Nations to restore 
peace and order in East Timor after a referendum on independence had led to 
a security and humanitarian crisis in the then Indonesian province. Some 
years later, Australia again headed a military mission in East Timor, the In-
ternational Stabilization Force (ISF). The Operation Astute, as it was known 
in Australia, was charged with the task to return order to the country after a 
dispute between elements of the security apparatus threatened to result in a 
bloody civil war.  
Sending the troops abroad is always a risky decision for governments, es-
pecially in democratic systems. In the worst case, a country finds itself entan-
gled in a long-lasting conflict, in which it loses its soldiers for reasons that are 
difficult to communicate to a critical domestic audience. Even in the best case 
– the conflict is ended quickly and without much bloodshed – governments 
                                                          
1
  The gas reserves are not yet exploited. 
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are faced with a considerable financial bill, since military interventions do not 
come cheap. The question arises, why Australian governments did decide, 
nevertheless, to intervene with military forces in small East Timor. Were the 
decisions driven by moral concerns, the desire to help a neighbour in need? 
Or were more sinister motives behind the decisions to intervene? In other 
words: Were the interventions an example of Moral- or of Realpolitik? 
The answer to this question is important for several reasons. East Timor 
is small, weak and close to Australia, as are many Pacific Island States. Seen 
from Canberra, Timor-Leste is part of an “arc of instability”. Therefore, the 
two episodes provide lessons about Australia’s behaviour towards smaller 
states in its neighbourhood. (Besides, Australian military planners and for-
eign-policy makers, certainly, have drawn their lessons from the engage-
ments.) Furthermore, the decision to send soldiers abroad is a very serious 
one: the life of Australian citizens is risked in the endeavour. Its severity 
makes it a particularly good case to reveal the drivers of Australian foreign 
policy in general. Finally, the discussion of Australia’s motives may be a 
small contribution on the wider debate about normative vs. interest motives in 
foreign policy making.  
I begin by discussing the central terms of the essay – Realpolitik and 
Moralpolitik – in the context of Australia’s foreign policy. This is followed 
by an analysis of the INTERFET mission that examines the main reasons for 
Australia to intervene. The next section answers the same question about 
motives for the ISF mission. In the final section I will summarize the find-
ings. 
Real- and Moralpolitik in Australia’s foreign policy 
The term Realpolitik was coined by a German political thinker (Ludwig Au-
gust von Rochau) of the mid-nineteenth century, but its essential features can 
be traced back to Machiavelli, if not Thucydides. At the core of the concept is 
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the belief that in the international arena states should act according to their 
interests, mainly defined in gaining and defending power vis-à-vis other 
states. To ensure survival in a hostile international environment, states must 
pursue a cold-hearted policy based on rational calculations of the possible. 
What is possible is determined by the power structures of the international 
systems, not by domestically defined limits such as the respect for human 
rights and the rule of law (Waltz 1979:117; Carlsnaes 2002:334).  
The opposite of Realpolitik is Moralpolitik. A state’s behaviour should 
follow moral concerns about what is wrong and right, and not simply declare 
might over right. Norms that are central to a state’s domestic politics should 
not be forgotten on the international stage. Thus, values and principles should 
guide action, not interests. Foreign policy becomes less focused on achieving 
particular gains for the state, but should be more oriented towards universal 
principles. A truly normative actor does not ask “What is good for me?” but 
“What is good for the wider community?” (for a good discussion of norma-
tive actors see Tocci 2008).  
Australia, as most states, likes to see itself as a force for good interna-
tional relations. The Australian Foreign Minister (1988-1996) Gareth Evans, 
of the Australian Labour Party, argued in the 1990s that Australia should act 
as a “good international citizen”. In a book co-authored with Bruce Grant he 
explains: “The rules of international behaviour should not be different from 
those governing every other kind of human behaviour. [...] We are idealistic 
because it is the nature of men and women who live by the precepts of democ-
racy to believe that they can change the world for the better” (Evans/Grant 
1995:42). Non-Labour politicians may be a little less enthusiastic about mo-
rality in international affairs and putting more emphasis on interests, but are 
nevertheless reluctant to paint Australia’s foreign policy as being driven by 
amoral ‘realistic’ concerns. Australia’s Prime Minister (1996-2007) John 
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Howard projects his own vision of the country’s international prestige on the 
outside world when he stated: “We are seen as a fair-minded and generous 
country. We are seen as a country that stands up for what it believes in. […] 
Australia is a liberal democracy with global political and economic interests 
and a proud history of defending freedom against its enemies.” (Howard 
2006a) And his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer proclaimed: “At the core 
of foreign policy are Australian values, which guide our approach to the 
world.” (Downer 2006a) 
It is fair to say that there is a bipartisan consensus that Australia should 
not deny its democratic nature on the global stage. But there is also a biparti-
san tendency to deny a conflict between interests and values. Most often Aus-
tralian politicians, like politicians in general, like to blur the lines between 
Real- and Moralpolitik in order to foster support for actions abroad. Alexan-
der Downer, Foreign Minister from 1996 to 2007, states for example: “It is 
interesting that what is morally right so often makes practical good sense.” 
(Downer 2001) But pursuing one’s own interests and be true to one’s own 
moral values at the same time may be less often possible than decision-
makers like us to believe. Therefore, it may be a good idea to ask the follow-
ing questions to distinguish between Real- and Moralpolitik in the case of 
Australia’s military missions in East Timor: Was Australian military person-
nel sent to East Timor first and foremost to advance Australia’s interests? Or 
was the well-being of the East Timorese at the forefront of Australian consid-
erations? 
INTERFET 1999-2000 
For centuries Portugal did not pay much attention to its colony in East Timor, 
nor did Australia (except for a short time during World War II). The eastern 
part of the island of Timor, located only around 650 km to the north of Aus-
tralia, only became an issue to Australia after the end of the authoritarian 
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regime in Lisbon in April 1974 had led to a political awakening in East Ti-
mor. But a country even more concerned was Indonesia. When during the 
course of 1975 it became clear that Fretilin, a left-leaning independence party, 
gained the upper hand in the political struggle in East Timor, the authoritarian 
and strongly anti-communist New Order regime in Jakarta became alarmed. 
Fearing an “Asian Cuba” at its doorstep, Indonesia invaded East Timor in 
December 1975, only a few days after Fretilin’s declaration of independence. 
The Indonesian annexation (since 1976 East Timor was regarded as an Indo-
nesian province by Jakarta) was resisted by the majority of East Timorese and 
for the next quarter of a century the country witnessed tremendous violence. 
(For an overview see Nevins 2005). It is estimated that at least 100,000 
Timorese died during the Indonesian occupation (CAVR 2006). Many critics 
characterized the events in East Timor even as genocide (Kohen/Taylor 1979; 
Jardine 1999).  
Australia’s reaction to Indonesia’s aggression, human rights violations 
and breach of international law must be described as Realpolitik. Right from 
the beginning the decision-makers in Canberra were aware of the unfolding 
drama at Australia’s doorsteps but did not take a stance against Jakarta. Mili-
tary options were never even discussed; diplomatic support for the East 
Timorese plight was refused. In fact, Canberra became a key backer of Indo-
nesia’s annexation and one of the few countries that accepted the incorpora-
tion of East Timor into Indonesia not only de facto but also de jure: Good 
relations with the big neighbour Indonesia were not to be jeopardized by 
taking a stance for small East Timor. (For a detailed account of Australia’s 
East Timor policy between 1974 and 1998 see Schmitz 2010:132-211; Leaver 
2001.)  
Only in December 1998 Canberra indicated that its position towards the 
East Timor may have changed: In a letter to Indonesian President Habibie the 
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Australian Prime Minister Howard argued for an independence referendum in 
East Timor, while at the same time indicating that continued Indonesian sov-
ereignty may be the best option. Indeed, such a referendum on East Timor’s 
future status was held in August 1999. 78.5% of the voters rejected the offer 
of special autonomy within in Indonesia and voted for independence (the 
voter turnout stood at 98.6%). The campaign had seen widespread violence, 
but after the declaration of the results on September 4, the situation escalated 
even further. Pro-Indonesian militia with the support of Indonesian military 
circles went on rampage and plunged East Timor into chaos and violence 
(Kingsbury 2000). It is estimated that during the crisis more than 1,400 peo-
ple were killed and around 250,000 fled their homes. Around 75% of East 
Timor’s infrastructure (schools, hospitals etc.) was destroyed within weeks 
(Schmitz 2006:36). Although these numbers were not known at the time, it 
was clear to outside observers that a humanitarian catastrophe was taking 
place in East Timor.  
Unlike in 1975, Canberra took the initiative, diplomatically and militari-
ly. In the diplomatic arena it pushed for a UN authorized peacekeeping mis-
sion, lobbying Washington and other Western powers to support such an 
intervention. Furthermore, it campaigned the Indonesian government to invite 
such a peacekeeping force to East Timor. When Jakarta finally agreed on this 
(pressured by Washington) Australia took the military lead in INTERFET, as 
the mission was called. The mission was headed by Australian Major General 
Peter Cosgrove, who commanded, at the peak, over more than 11,000 person-
nel coming from 23 countries (among them 191 troops from Fiji). Australia 
provided the largest contingent with 5,700 soldiers. Within weeks after the 
first arrival on 20 September 1999 order was restored and on 23 February 
2000 the mission officially ended. However, Australian troops stayed on as 
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part of United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UNTAET 
(Australian Army 2012). 
For Australia INTERFET was the largest military deployment since the 
Vietnam War. Furthermore, it was the first time Canberra took the command 
over a multinational force. Before the deployment many voices warned that 
INTERFET would face fierce resistance from the pro-Indonesian militias. 
The decision to send troops was thus risky.2 It was also costly: A report by 
the Australian Auditor General estimated the costs of Australia’s military 
deployments at 1.4 billion Australian Dollars (Australian Auditor General 
2002:24).3 The Howard government even had to introduce a temporary tax 
levy in order to finance INTERFET (Australian Politics 1999). 
Australia’s INTERFET engagement is clearly a reversal of its former 
East Timor policy. But does a change in policy mean a change in motives? A 
critical view of Canberra’s policy holds that Australia still did practice Real-
politik and pursued its security and economic interests above all. How con-
vincing is this? 
Looking at security interests first, it could be argued that Australia was 
driven by the wish to weaken the big neighbour Indonesia, a view very often 
heard in Indonesia (Soesastro 2000:129). Indeed, if the international system 
resembles a dog-eat-dog environment, as is the underlying assumption of 
Realpolitik, the weaker the neighbour the more secure a state becomes. In the 
case of Australia, it is fair to argue that Australia’s public mind showed a 
certain apprehension towards Asia in general and Indonesia in particular at 
the end of the nineteen-nineties, as has been the case for decades. Many Aus-
tralians looked at its giant neighbour (Indonesia’s population stood at 205 
million in the year 2000 compared to Australia’s 19 million) with fear and 
                                                          
2
  Fortunately only one Australian soldier lost her life during the deployment, due to illness.  
3
  During 1999 and 2000 the Australian Dollar stood at around 0.40 of the US Dollar.  
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suspicion (Philpott 2001; Sherlock 1999:28). The purpose of INTERFET then 
would have been to secure the separation of Indonesian territory: A final step 
to secure a quasi-colony for Australia and a signal to other troublesome terri-
tories like Aceh and Irian Jaya that their separatist cause is not lost, weaken-
ing Indonesia even further.  
There are a couple of counterarguments to this. First, it is doubtful to 
what extent the secession of East Timor could have resulted in a weakening 
of Indonesia. Holding on to the province was financially costly to Jakarta. In 
order to justify its occupation, the Indonesian regime invested heavily in East 
Timor’s development since the beginning of the nineteen-eighties, but the 
province remained one of the poorest in Indonesia, straining the central budg-
et (Sherlock 1996). Furthermore, the unlawful occupation tarnished Jakarta’s 
international reputation. According to Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik, East Timor was a “pebble in the shoe” of Indonesia on the internation-
al stage. It is known that Indonesian President Habibie and his advisors could 
see the merits of letting East Timor go. To their minds, Indonesia without 
East Timor would not be weaker but stronger. In this respect, they were right, 
as the last decade has shown. 
Second, while it is true that segments of Australia’s society looked fearful 
towards Indonesia, this anxiety should not be overstated. At the time of IN-
TERFET more and more Australians saw Asia not only as a threat but also as 
an opportunity. No longer could Australia just be described as the “misplaced 
continent”, a Western country located in the South and suffering the “tyranny 
of distance” from its former European mother countries (Bell 2000). In the 
security domain Canberra and Indonesia were even tied through a Security 
Agreement (Crowhurst 1998). What most Australians feared was not a strong 
Indonesia, but a weak one. A disintegrating Indonesia going through a pro-
cess of balkanization, a scenario not considered unlikely by most Western 
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observers at the time, was in fact one of Australia’s biggest security concerns 
in 1999. Foreign Minister Downer stated for example in April 1999: “Our 
political and strategic interests are obvious. Take a glance at any map – it 
doesn’t take an expert in strategic policy to understand that what happens in 
our own neighbourhood will affect us more deeply and more quickly than 
events that occur in most other areas of the world.” (Downer 1999) Indonesia 
as a failing state at Australia’s doorsteps was not in the interest of Australia, 
because it would have been impossible for Canberra to shield itself from the 
repercussions. ‘Waves’ of migrants heading in boats to Australia’s affluent 
shores were a nightmare for most voters in 1999 as they are in today’s Aus-
tralia. To see Australia’s intervention as a plot to weaken Indonesia is there-
fore not very convincing.  
What about Australia’s economic interests? As mentioned in the intro-
duction East Timor possesses oil and gas reserves. Was it at the end simply 
about oil? Interestingly, many East Timorese suspect that this was Australia`s 
hidden agenda. Certainly, there can be no denial that Canberra tried to take 
advantage of the power asymmetry between Australia and East Timor when it 
negotiated the exploration of oil resources in the Timor Sea with the newly 
independent state. The Australian government played hard to gain as much 
concessions from the Timorese as possible. But follows from this that IN-
TERFET was driven mainly by the thirst for oil? 
Again, various arguments can be made against such an interpretation. 
First, Australia’s economic interest cannot be reduced to oil alone. Australian 
companies had widespread business interests in Indonesia at the time, among 
other sectors in the mining industry. Taking a confrontational stance against 
Jakarta could have jeopardized Australian commercial interests. The smooth 
relationship between Australia and Indonesia in the past, despite the ongoing 
human rights violations in the province, indicated that economic concerns 
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could only tilt the balance against a pro-Timor stance (Aubrey 2000:139). 
And an independent East Timor was not even necessary for Australia to gain 
from Timor’s oil wealth. Already in 1989 the Australian government had 
signed a treaty with the Suharto regime that allowed for Australian oil exploi-
tations in the Timor Sea. The terms of the agreement were favourable to Can-
berra, because Jakarta was more interested in diplomatic than economic 
gains. Thus, profits were already made under the current arrangement (for a 
critical account see Aditjondro 1999). Pressing for a change, which would 
certainly endanger business interests, did not make economic sense.  
Can it therefore be conclude that INTERFET was indeed a case of 
Moralpolitik? A caveat is necessary here: It may not have been in the national 
interests of Australia to intervene in East Timor, but it was in the interest of 
the Australian government. Australia’s Realpolitik towards the East Timor 
issue, pursued by all governments from 1974 to 1998, had in recent years 
become more and more unpopular with the Australian public. A heterogene-
ous East Timor lobby, which consisted of the Timorese diaspora, human 
rights groups, solidarity organizations, church groups, and even veteran or-
ganizations, had been successful in portraying the conflict in East Timor as a 
David vs. Goliath-story. When the situation escalated in Sep-tember 1999 it 
became the top story in Australian media and the public de-manded from its 
government to take a stance. Faced with the choice between an unpopular 
Realpolitik-approach, which would not have endangered the relationship with 
Jakarta, and a very popular Moralpolitik-strategy, the government reluctantly 
decided to do the popular (Chalk 2001:237). Australia became East Timor’s 
“reluctant saviour” (Fernandes 2004). 
Operation Astute 
After INTERFET Australian troops remained in East Timor: Canberra pro-
vided military personnel to UNTAET, the UN-mission that administrated 
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East Timor until the country became officially independent on 20 May 2002 
to UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor), the follow 
up peacekeeping mission between May 2002 and May 2005, and to UNOTIL 
(United Nations Office in Timor-Leste), a small mission charged with sup-
porting the institutions of the new state. UNOTIL was supposed to end in 
May 2006. After all, East Timor was considered to be a case of successful 
nation-building by the international community. But this perception was to 
change rapidly in the spring of 2006. East Timor went from showcase of 
nation-building to failing state status. What had happened? 
Between April and May 2006 a conflict within the national security appa-
ratus spilled over into wider sections of the society, resulting in communal 
violence between civilians. Within weeks the country stumbled into chaos 
and disorder: at least 37 people were killed, over 150,000 Timorese fled their 
homes, and thousands of buildings were looted and burned. Public life came 
to a standstill, state institutions failed, government lost control (Schmitz 2006, 
2007). On May 24 the Timorese government requested military assistance 
from the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal. The 
first Australian troops arrived one day later. Together with its international 
partners, Australia managed to stop a further deterioration, but it took the 
young nation years to achieve a sense of normality again. The mission was 
finally ended in March 2013. 
As in 1999, Australia did take the lead in the International Stabilization 
Force (ISF). The Australian deployment, called Operation Astute, consisted 
at the peak in June 2006 of around 2,650 soldiers and about 200 police 
(UNSC 2006). Again, it was a rather costly exercise in peace-keeping: The 
total costs add up to 1 Billion Australian Dollar. But fortunately only two 
Australian soldiers lost their live during Operation Astute, both in accidents. 
In comparison, in Afghanistan 40 Australian servicemen died between 
574 Manuel Schmitz 
 
February 2002 and June 2013. While Operation Astute may not have been a 
high risk mission it nevertheless meant a serious commitment by Australia 
(for an overview see Blaxland 2014:198-208). 
What were the Australian motives to intervene? First, it should be pointed 
out that the East Timor crisis of 2006 did not raise as much interest in Aus-
tralia’s public and media as the crisis of 1999. The events in Timor did not go 
unnoticed, but there was no public outcry to act. East Timor was one issue of 
many in Australian politics at the time. Thus, unlike in 1999, the Howard 
government did not need to pay too much attention to domestic concerns. 
Nevertheless, the Australian government presented itself as fighting for a 
good cause. Prime Minister Howard on June 9, 2006: “We’re doing that 
[sending troops to East Timor] because it’s the right thing to do, it’s the right 
thing to help a country like East Timor, a tiny country of a million people.” 
(Howard 2006b) And his Foreign Minister Downer talking about Australia’s 
contribution to nation-building in its neighbourhood stated in July 2006: “You 
cannot create stable societies in a matter of a few years – we’ve always said 
that. These are 20 and 30 year projects we’re pursuing. But we’ll continue to 
pursue them, continue to make progress. Not for our own sakes – we’re not 
there for treasure, despite the wacky conspiracy theories. We’re there be-
cause we’ve been asked and because we can make a difference.” (Downer 
2006b) 
Such a benign perspective is supported by the simple fact that Australia 
did respond to a formal request by the Timorese government. Australia was 
invited and it is indeed doubtful that Timorese authorities could have ended 
the crisis by themselves. On the other hand many Timorese questioned the 
impartiality of the Australian government. The Howard government had been 
critical of the governing Fretilin part under Mari Alkatiri in the past years. 
Furthermore, Canberra had demonstrated in diplomatic disputes with Dili 
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over oil issues, fishing rights and refugees problems that it was just too will-
ing to pursue its interests above all (Balint 2005). On the diplomatic stage, 
Canberra’s action between 2002 and 2006 had reminded many of bullying. 
And, many Timorese had not forgotten Australia’s Realpolitik attitude during 
the Suharto years. For these reasons, it might be a good idea to ask for Aus-
tralia’s interests behind Operation Astute.  
To start with, it should be pointed out that the Australian government had 
less to lose with Operation Astute than in case of INTERFET, because East 
Timor was no longer part of Indonesia. There was neither the risk of weaken-
ing the big neighbour nor of damaging the diplomatic relations with Jakarta. 
In fact, the Indonesian government even supported Australia’s intervention 
(Nason 2006). Furthermore, because with Operation Astute Canberra fol-
lowed an invitation by the Timorese government, diplomatic objections by 
other actors (such as China) were not to be feared.  
Instead, Australia could gain reputation, not as a champion of human 
rights (that are not of concern in a Realpolitik strategy), but as a middle pow-
er, which is able to project its power overseas. It is telling that a text on the 
official website of the Australian Navy described Operation Astute as a “text 
book example of littoral maritime power projection” (Stevens 2006). Certain-
ly, it was a show of Australian capabilities, and as such it served two purpos-
es with regard to Australia’s power.  
First, the Australian engagement portrayed East Timor as Australia’s 
backyard. This perspective is neither fair nor flattering to the Timorese, but 
for Australia to have a backyard can be seen as adding to its prestige. Only 
powerful states have backyards. Already in 1997 a foreign policy White Pa-
per called ‘In the National Interest’ stated: “Australia’s international stand-
ing, especially in East Asia and North America and Europe, is influenced by 
perceptions of how well Australia fulfils a leadership role in the islands 
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region.” (Australian DFAT 1997:69) In line with this thinking and in his 
famous outspoken way, Australian Prime Minister Howard remarked during a 
State Visit to Washington in May 2006 on current problems in the Pacific 
region: “I’ve always taken the view, and the Government’s always taken the 
view, that this is primarily an Australian responsibility. The Pacific is our 
backyard and we are the country that has the prime responsibility for looking 
after the security exigencies as they arise.“ (Howard 2006c) Not surprisingly, 
Australia’s refusal to put its troops under UN-Command was interpreted by 
some commentators as an attempt to assure that Canberra not only bears the 
risks but also wins the laurels (Dodd 2006).  
Second, the successful demonstration of military might has a deterring ef-
fect. It demonstrates future adversaries that a country is able to defend itself 
or its interests. Surely, there is no immediate threat to Australia to the extent 
that outside powers aim to invade Australia. But all defence policy is an in-
surance against dangers, which lurk in the future.  
Maybe such an interpretation of Operation Astute as an exercise in power 
maximizing is too critical. But there is no denial that security concerns were a 
main driver for Australia’s reaction to the East Timor crisis of 2006 (Firth 
2012:149; White 2007:126). It all comes down to the Australian fear that East 
Timor could become a failing state. Indeed, during the course of May and 
June 2006 the Australian government repeated the assessment that the crisis 
in East Timor resulted from poor governance. The Australian Prime Minister 
stated for example on 29 May: “The fundamental problem in East Timor is 
that the country is not being governed...” (Howard 2006d) And on 9 June 
Howard remarked: “...this has certainly been a reminder of the fragility of 
many of these small island states [...] There was a view a generation ago that 
no matter how small the country might be it should have its independence 
without a lot of thought being given at the time to whether some of those 
Australian Military Interventions in East Timor  577 
 
countries were viable.“ (Howard 2006e) Australian diplomacy made it clear 
that Australia as a neighbour had a “vital interest in ensuring that Timor-Leste 
developed as a stable democracy”, as the Australian Representative to the 
United Nations put it (United Nations Security Council 2006b). 
The notion of failing states as a security liability was well established in 
Australia in 2006. For some years, Australian security thinking had followed 
the international trend to see weak states as dangerous (Smith et al. 2001:122; 
Nguyen 2005). According to this view, fragile states invite transnational ter-
ror groups and international organized crime to set up camp in a state that is 
unable to exercise control over its territory. Poverty, misery and chaos may 
lead to civil unrest and humanitarian disaster, forcing people to leave their 
failed countries and become refugees. Not to mention the dangers of pandem-
ic diseases, environmental degradation, and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. These so-called ‘non-traditional security threats’ were high on 
the security agenda of Western states, at the latest since 9/11. In Australia 
more specifically there has been talk about an ‘arc of instability’, consisting 
of the small island states to the North, including East Timor (Firth 2005:181). 
Indeed, East Timor was not the only island state witnessing political turmoil: 
the Solomon Islands faced a similar crisis (see Dinnen in this volume). The 
Australian intervention of 2006 must be seen in the context of this debate on 
failing states and an arc of instability. Australia sent its troops to prevent a 
state from failing and becoming a security threat to Australia. 
It is striking, how powerful the ideas about failing states were in the 
minds of Australian decision-makers. In fact, even if East Timor would have 
become a failed state, the security consequences for Australia would have 
been minimal. The threat of terrorism? East Timor is neither Afghanistan nor 
Pakistan. The idea that radical Islamistic groups – and these are the terror 
groups feared most by Australia – would set up camp in the predominantly 
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Catholic nation (98% of the population) is rather ridiculous. Organized 
crime? East Timor is not Somalia or Colombia. The communication and 
transportation lines connecting East Timor to the international community are 
so weak that it would be folly for international (!) crime syndicates to use 
East Timor as a base. And piracy would not be profitable enough, since there 
are no major sea lanes passing the island. Pandemic diseases? Again, East 
Timor’s isolation would make an outbreak of a pandemic – and there has 
been none so far reported – less threatening than an a comparable event in, 
say, Indonesia, a country considered to be a hotspot for Avian influenza by 
the World Health Organization. Environmental degradation? East Timor is 
too small to produce significant environmental costs to its neighbours. Prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction? Of course, there are none in East 
Timor. Refugees? Historically, the East Timorese have fled to the mountains 
in case of crisis and they did so in 2006. Furthermore, most Timorese were 
too poor to ever pay human traffickers. In fact, Timorese boat people have 
never been a major problem for Australia, not even during the bloodiest years 
of the Indonesian occupation. To sum it up: A failed East Timor would not 
have been a major security threat to Australia. Therefore, Operation Astute 
might to be considered a textbook case of misperception in international rela-
tions. 
Conclusion 
The two cases have shown that moral concerns did play a role in Australia’s 
decisions to intervene in East Timor in 1999 and 2006. The statements made 
by Australian politicians painting the engagements as humanitarian interven-
tions were not merely window-dressing to assure a sceptical domestic audi-
ence. In both cases, Australia did take political, military and financial risks to 
help the East Timorese. While East Timor became independent first and 
foremost because the Timorese fought for it for decades, Australia nevertheless 
Australian Military Interventions in East Timor  579 
 
played a constructive role, at least at the very end in the years 1998 and 1999: 
Canberra acted as a midwife in the birth of the new nation. It took on this 
role, because an active civil society pressured its government to take humani-
tarian concerns seriously. To this extent Australia’s democratic nature did 
make a difference. During the crisis of 2006 domestic considerations were 
less prominent in Australian decision-making. Nevertheless, the Australian 
government decided to answer the Timorese call for help. It is fair to say that 
on this occasion Australia acted less as a bully than as big brother (a role that 
included the right to make patronizing comments). But without Australia’s 
intervention, East Timor could have faced a civil war.  
However, it would be naive to see only moral considerations behind the 
Australian decisions. In 1999, the Australian government was as much con-
cerned about its political fate as about the suffering of the Timorese. The 
Howard government was indeed a reluctant saviour. And in 2006, the fear of 
a failed state in its neighbourhood and the wish to show Australia`s power did 
make it certainly easier for Canberra to commit to a military mission. Interest-
ingly, there was not as much to lose as was feared by Australia, because a 
failed state East Timor would not have resulted in serious security threats for 
Australia. But the misperception did make a stable East Timor a more valua-
ble goal for the Howard government. In both cases, therefore, interests were 
part of the calculations. To sum it up: Judged by the motivations, the two 
Australian military interventions in East Timor were a mixture of Real- and 
Moralpolitik, norms and interests were of importance. It should not be forgot-
ten, however, that the deployment of military force very often indicates a 
failure of diplomacy beforehand. Seen from this perspective, Canberra still 
has a lot to learn in its dealings with its surrounding states. After all, a true 
Australian Moralpolitik would mean the commitment to turn a backyard into 
a neighbourhood. 
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 Shifting Sands: Fiji’s ForeigŶ PoliĐy aŶd GeopolitiĐal 
Reconfiguration of the Pacific  
Steven Ratuva 
Abstract: Since the 2006 coup, Fiji’s foreign policy went through a signifi-
cant shift, primarily as a result of sanctions by Australia, New Zealand, Unit-
ed States and European Union and its suspension from the Pacific Island 
Forum and Commonwealth. As a consequence Fiji enlarged its circle of in-
ternational support and building up its regional and global status by engag-
ing more intensively with alternative friends such as China, forging new dip-
lomatic ties with numerous countries, becoming chair of G77, strengthening 
its foothold within the Melanesian Spearhead Group and setting up its own 
Pacific Island Development Forum. This has reconfigured the regional geo-
political dynamics in a significant way and to some extent shifted the centre 
of political gravity away from Australia and New Zealand, whose reaction 
has been to reclaim their regional dominance. This chapter examines some of 
these dynamics and the implications on Fiji’s regional position as well the 
impact on the broader regional geopolitics. 
Keywords: foreign policy, sanctions, reconfiguration, geopolitics, diplo-
macy 
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Figure 1: Fiji Islands 
 
Introduction 
Shifts in Fiji’s foreign policy in recent years have been shaped by a syncretic 
mixture of internal, geo-political and strategic factors. Fiji’s new-found power 
in the new geopolitical reconfiguration of the Pacific is a result of how it has 
been able to strategically leverage its position amongst the small island states, 
against Australia and New Zealand, after its suspension from the Pacific Is-
lands Forum, the Pacific’s premier gathering of leaders, after the 2006 coup. 
The rise of Fiji’s influence is at the cost of the dominance of Australia and 
New Zealand, the undisputed post-cold war neo-colonial hegemonic forces in 
Pacific geopolitics. Fiji’s attempt to cement its sub-regional hegemony and 
the concurrent demise of the Australian and New Zealand influence must be 
contextualized in the larger geopolitical scenario, especially the increase in 
China’s influence in the Pacific and the US reaction to this and how Fiji posi-
tions itself in relation to posturing by the two powers. 
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Within this broad framework, this chapter focuses on Fiji’s new foreign poli-
cy initiatives and how these have been shaped by, and in turn, shape regional 
geopolitics and discusses some of the implications on Fiji and the region 
generally. 
Shifts in Fiji’s foreign policy 
Fiji’s foreign policy since independence can be understood at three levels—
the international, regional and sub-regional levels. While each has its own 
specific characteristics and dynamics, they are linked in complex and dynam-
ic ways. Let us look at each in detail. 
Firstly, in the international domain Fiji has always had a pro-Western 
stance in relation to ideological alliance and UN votes. As a former British 
colony, it naturally gravitated towards the Anglophone global camp, in par-
ticular, US, Britain, New Zealand and Australia. Because of Australia’s and 
New Zealand’s geographical closeness, Fiji’s economy, education and cultur-
al ties have been strongly linked to these two countries. However, normal 
diplomatic relations between these three countries have often been thwarted 
by the coups in Fiji which have often provoked the wrath of the two countries 
which readily imposed sanctions on Fiji. The major condition for the lifting of 
the sanctions was often Fiji returning to electoral democracy. This has led to a 
very temperamental and fragile relationship since the first coup in May 1987 
and the latest after the 2006 coup. Normal relation was recently restored after 
the 17 September 2014 Fiji general election. 
The sanctions against Fiji after the 1987 coup motivated Fiji to seek al-
ternative international friends, a strategy which led to the look north policy, a 
general reference to Asia and more specifically, China. Asian countries such 
as Malaysia were very supportive of Fiji after its suspension from the Com-
monwealth and sanctions following the 1987 coup. Malaysia has had a long 
historical association with Fiji, even before independence, in the areas of 
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political relations and economic development including Fiji’s emulation of 
Malaysia’s affirmative action program (Ratuva 2013). The fact that Malaysia 
and other Asian countries had authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states or 
had gone through military coups, meant that their positions on Fiji’s military 
coups and post-coup military governments were more accommodating than 
those of western liberal democracies such as US, UK, Australia and New 
Zealand (Ratuva 2011).  
Following Fiji’s isolation after the 1987 coups, Fiji embraced China in its 
look north policy primarily because of its vast resources, growing world stat-
ure and historical-cultural links between Fiji and China. About 3% of Fiji’s 
population are of Chinese ancestry and the post-1987 coup minister for fi-
nance, Mr Jim Ah Koy, a prominent Fijian businessman, who aggressively 
pushed for Chinese investment in Fiji, had Fijian-Chinese ancestry. Part of 
the deal was that Chinese businessmen were able to enter Fiji without the 
usual visa requirements if they were able to provide FJ$100,000 investment 
money upfront. This led to a wave of Chinese immigrants entering Fiji, 
amongst them transnational criminals involved in drug trade (Tarte 2010). 
There was also an upsurge in Korean investment and immigrants as the look 
north policy extended to other Asian countries.  
During the period of the cold war, Fiji’s foreign policies were very much 
aligned with the US bloc and under US pressure, Soviet ships which used to 
frequent Fijian ports, were banned from entering Fiji in the early 1980s 
(Robie 1992). Things began to take a dramatic turn as a result of the signing 
of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT) or Rarotonga Trea-
ty in 1985 which effectively banned nuclear weapon and powered ships from 
entering ports in the signatory countries, including Fiji (Pacific Island Forum 
1985). Despite this, US nuclear-powered ships still entered Fiji ports and this 
led to the formation of the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG), which spent the 
Fiji’s Foreign Policy  589 
 
next decade protesting not only against French nuclear testing in the Pacific, 
also nuclear waste dumping by Japan in the northern Pacific and US nuclear-
powered vessels in the Pacific (Robie 1992). 
The post-cold war regional politics was largely driven by Australia’s se-
curity interests, manifested in its “cooperative intervention” doctrine, inspired 
by the obsessive paranoia that the Pacific “arc of instability” poses a terrorist 
threat to Australia’s security (Fry/Kabutaulaka 2008). Although based on 
flimsy logic, this fear-mongering strategy largely shaped Australia’s attitude 
towards the Pacific and while it may have worked in relation to the Regional 
Mission Assistance to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI, see Dinnen in this vol-
ume), it did not work for Fiji after the 2006 coup (Hayward-Jones 2014). 
RAMSI was possible through the Biketawa Declaration, a regional security 
agreement which enabled members of the PIF to “intervene” in any member 
country provided they were invited (Pacific Islands Forum 2000; see Holtz 
and Blatt in this volume). While the Biketawa Declaration worked in the 
Solomon Islands, it failed in Fiji after the PIF could not ensure that Fiji car-
ried out its election in 2009 as Frank Bainimarama the coup leader promised 
them. Despite this, through Australia’s and New Zealand’s insistence, Fiji 
was suspended from the PIF and instead of submerging Fiji in economic and 
political disaster as intended, Fiji was able to leverage itself towards greater 
global significance by becoming Chair of the G77 (a loose association of 132 
member developing countries set up to promote the collective economic in-
terests of its members as well as enhance their capacity for negotiation in the 
United Nations), Chair of UNDP and more than doubled its diplomatic rela-
tions worldwide (Swami 2012; see Hasenkamp in this volume). In addition, 
Fiji intensified its international peacekeeping operations for the UN, in Af-
ghanistan and Syria, a continuation of its global peacekeeping involvement 
since 1978 (Ratuva 2011). 
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Secondly, Fiji’s relationship with the other small island states has a different 
type of configuration and of intensity compared to Fiji’s relationship with 
New Zealand and Australia. While Australia and New Zealand look at Fiji as 
a delinquent juvenile state which needs to be disciplined and kept under con-
trol, the small island states see Fiji as a model ‘big brother’ who provides the 
political shield against the hegemonic accesses of New Zealand and Australia. 
However, over the years, Fiji’s behaviour as a mini hegemon has angered 
some small states who felt that Fiji had selfishly acquired to itself most of the 
benefits of regionalism (Crocombe 2001). Amongst these were its control and 
conversion of Air Pacific, originally a regional airline, into a national carrier 
and recently renamed it Fiji Airways and hosting of and acquiring direct ben-
efits from regional organizations such as the PIF and University of the South 
Pacific. It is for this reason that Fiji’s attempts in the past to host the Secre-
tariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) had been met with fierce resistance, 
although at the moment it already hosts more than half of the SPC staff in the 
Suva headquarters. The main headquarters is located in Noumea, New Cale-
donia, an overseas collectivité of France 
Fiji has had its own share of disputes with island neighbours such as the 
dispute over the Minerva Reef with Tonga, Fiji’s nearest neighbour. This 
almost flared up into a full-fledged military confrontation as the navies of the 
two countries engaged in threatening posturing. Fiji also has differences with 
Vanuatu over its maritime boundary, in particular, Fiji’s claim to Conway 
Reef, located South West of Fiji and Fiji’s refusal to recognize Vanuatu’s 
claim to Hunters and Mathews Islands, now claimed by France (via New 
Caledonia). Fiji signed an agreement with France where Fiji would recognize 
France’s claim to Hunters and Mathews Islands while France would recog-
nize Fiji’s claim to Conway Reef. These sorts of boundary disputes are bound 
to increase as a result of the growing interest in deep sea mining. 
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There are other areas where Fiji’s regional ambitions have undermined the 
interests of its neighbours. In early 2014, Fiji banned Solomon Airlines planes 
from landing in Nadi, Fiji’s largest airport, as a result of disputes over landing 
rights. This followed Fiji’s termination of Nauru’s national carrier, Our Air-
line, from landing in Fiji as Air Kiribati because of disputes over landing 
rights. In both cases, both airlines posed a threat to Fiji Airway’s monopoly in 
the region.  
After Fiji’s suspension from the PIF, it set up its an alternative regional 
organization called the Pacific Island Development Forum (PIDF) which 
consists of government leaders, civil society and the private sector in the 
region. The structure of the PIDF is in contrast to the PIF which consists 
largely of political leaders and attempts for engagement by Pacific civil socie-
ty organizations in the past have been denied. The PIDF poses a direct threat 
to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PIF and Fiji has positioned itself to 
leverage both to further its regional geopolitical ambitions. One way of doing 
this is to stay outside the PIF despite the fact that the suspension has been 
lifted and there is now an open invitation for Fiji to re-join the forum. Fiji’s 
precondition for re-joining is the reform of the PIF structure to ensure that 
development partners such as Australia and New Zealand are not to be full 
members of the organization. In other words, Fiji would only to re-join the 
PIF on the condition that New Zealand and Australia are excluded from the 
organization.  
Naturally, Fiji’s demand for Australia’s and New Zealand’s expulsion 
from the PIF has been met with trepidation by the two countries which fear 
that their only means of exerting their dominance in the region is through 
multilateral engagement via the PIF. For Fiji, re-joining the PIF will weaken 
its newfound regional power immensely given Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
dominance in the organization. It will also mean compromising on the power 
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and legitimacy of the PIDF which Fiji has used effectively so far as leverage 
against regional dominance by Australia and New Zealand. By hosting the 
Pacific leaders in a summit with India’s prime minister in Fiji on 19 Novem-
ber and with China’s president on 21 November 2014, Fiji used the oppor-
tunity to showpiece its status as a Pacific hub and conduit between the Pacific 
region and major global powers (Rounds 2014). 
At the sub-regional level, Fiji’s membership of the Melanesian Spear-
head Group (MSG) is probably Fiji’s most economically lucrative foreign 
policy engagement within the region, outside New Zealand and Australia, 
Fiji’s two largest tourism markets. More than 80% of all the Pacific wealth is 
in the MSG region. Papua New Guinean (PNG) in particular is a large market 
for Fijian investors and at the same time Fiji has provided investment oppor-
tunities for PNG capital in Fiji’s booming tourism industry. Fiji’s political 
forays within the MSG has also created division and instability especially as 
some of Fiji’s policies impinge on the sovereign interests of countries like 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and PNG. Fiji was chair of the MSG in 2012 until 
the baton was handed over to the FLNKS, the Kanak political movement in 
New Caledonia. 
The Fiji-China-relations 
The three-day visit to Fiji by the president of China from 21 to 23 November 
2014 cemented a longstanding diplomatic relationship which started in 1975 
when China first established its embassy in Fiji (Rounds 2014). Although 
China, unlike the Americans, has no substantive base in the Pacific, it has 
consolidated a foothold in Fiji through its strategic manoeuvrings in the form 
of increased aid and intensified military relationship and high level diplomat-
ic links with Fiji, a country which has been regarded by Australia and New 
Zealand as a ‘pariah’ Pacific state since the military takeover in 2006. Fiji has 
taken advantage of its antagonistic relationship with the two sub-regional 
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powers to facilitate China’s forays into the central Pacific and use it as a lev-
erage to reciprocate to the hostile posturing of its two larger neighbours.  
The demise of Australia’s and New Zealand’s power in the Pacific and 
the concurrent increase in Chinese influence in Fiji and the Pacific has been 
cause for anxiety for the US. As an anti-Chinese gesture, it lifted sanctions on 
Fiji as well as normalized diplomatic links and urged Australia and New 
Zealand to do the same. However, there was concern by the two countries that 
to engage with Fiji before the election would be seen as succumbing to the 
whims of the military regime which they vehemently detested and a slur on 
their own hard-line stand on democracy in Fiji. The solution they sought has 
been to engage with Fiji in an incremental manner through a series of initia-
tives such as restoration of diplomatic ties, resumption of aid, support for the 
constitutional reform and election process while maintaining travel sanctions 
for regime supporters until after the election in September 2014. Bob Carr, 
Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs justified these progressive engage-
ments on the grounds that the “democratic reform (in Fiji) was encouraging 
and irreversible” (Parry 2012). Full diplomatic relations were eventually 
restored after the election. 
By intensifying engagement initiatives with Fiji, the US hopes to lessen 
Fiji’s growing support for China, a reversal of the post-cold war stance when 
the US turned its back on Fiji and the Pacific islands generally as symbolized 
by the closure of the USAID office in Suva. During the cold war, aid was a 
crucial tool of anti-Soviet containment as part of the broader strategic denial 
doctrine of ANZUS (Australian, New Zealand, United States) alliance. The 
renewed interest of the US in the Pacific as shown by the reopening its 
USAID office in Port Moresby has rekindled a new surge of geo-political 
tension. Because of its central location as the economic and political hub of 
the South Pacific, it has been argued that Suva may become a centre of 
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contestation for US-China geo-political rivalry which will reverberate around 
the Pacific (Winiera 2012). 
Visits by Chinese surveillance ships and senior Chinese officials have be-
come a common occurrence. The Chinese president first visited Fiji as vice-
president in 2009. According to cables from the New Zealand Embassy re-
leased by Wikileaks, New Zealand and Australia attempted unsuccessfully to 
stop Jinping’s visit to Fiji because it would “send the wrong message in light 
of international efforts to urge the government in Suva to carry out democrat-
ic reforms" (Field 2011). The cable went on to say that "Fiji remained strate-
gically important for China and Beijing was privately candid about linking 
development assistance and economic engagement with guaranteed political 
support on issues of interest to China” (ibid.).  
One of the most politically significant Chinese projects in Fiji is the set-
ting up of a Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy (CISD) in col-
laboration with the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) one of 
the leading foreign policy research institutes and think tank for the Chinese 
government. The SIIS has been tasked with training Fijian diplomats and 
other civil servants along the lines of the Chinese intellectual and ideological 
lenses. Creating a cadre of Chinese trained Fijian intelligentsia will be a pow-
erful tool to shape policies which are sympathetic to China’s global interests. 
Even more worrying to the US is the speculation that China may set up a 
military establishment of sorts in Fiji and this suspicion is continuously 
fuelled by the increasing military ties between the two countries in terms of 
training and provision of equipment. In January 2013 Major General Quian 
Lihua, Chief of Foreign Affairs Office in China’s Ministry of Defence visited 
Fiji as part of “annual defence co-operation briefing”(Pacnews 22 January 
2013:6). Being the highest ranking Chinese military official to be welcome 
into Fiji, Lihua’s visit was both symbolic and strategic, more so after he 
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discussed delivery of military hardware in the form of Chinese-made naval 
boats and other equipment to strengthen Fiji’s military capability. The two 
sides made an agreement that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “would 
help and support the Fiji Military Forces (FMF)” in the areas of “co-
operation, training and development” (ibid.). 
The dilemma for the US is that while its Asia-Pacific pivot is meant to 
contain these sorts of Chinese influence, especially military overtures, the 
challenge is to devise a diplomatic strategy to win back Fiji’s loyalty. The 
US’s military links with Fiji goes back to Second World War when Fiji was a 
base for the US military during the Pacific war (Lowry 2006) and military 
links continued over the years through training for Fiji military officers in the 
US. During the cold war Fiji was ideologically aligned with the US and Fiji, 
like many other Pacific island states has always been part of the US voting 
bloc in the United Nations.  
After the lessening of US presence in the South Pacific after the cold war, 
Australia became the proxy hegemon whose role as ‘deputy sheriff’ was to 
keep Pacific island nations within US-Australian orbit through aid and diplo-
macy. This was articulated in the form of a series of policy initiatives such as 
“pre-emptive intervention,” “cooperative intervention” and “partnership for 
development and security” which came into being after 9/11 to ensure that the 
Pacific “failed states” which made up the “arc of instability” did not pose any 
threat of terrorism and international crime to Australia (Wainwright, 2003). 
The expectation for Australia’s role as a US lapdog to keep the Pacific states 
within its sphere of loyalty failed. Some of the reasons for this included Aus-
tralia’s patronising foreign policy and bullying tactics which generated nega-
tive images of Australia amongst Pacific island states, lack of substantive 
impact of ‘boomerang’ aid programs (most of the aid goes back to Australia 
through Australian consultants) and lack of sensitivity to Pacific island views 
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(Kelsey 2004). Paradoxically, Australia’s weaknesses turned out to serve 
China’s interests and encouraged Chinese forays into what was once a US 
sphere of influence. 
Buoyed up by the success of its regional manoeuvres and increased re-
gional and international attention, Fiji may not be in a hurry to be readmitted 
into the PIF as it enjoys its new-found power. However, Fiji’s increasingly 
bloated ego risks fizzling out prematurely as it begins to seriously fathom the 
realities of geo-political brinkmanship. While playing the China card gives it 
political and psychological advantage in the geo-political manoeuvring game, 
economic and technical reliance on China can become a liability. Some of the 
problems Fiji is facing include poor quality of infrastructure built by Chinese 
companies, failure of some Chinese companies to pay for workers’ provident 
fund, failure of Chinese companies to follow building codes and increase in 
illegal activities such as human trafficking associated with the Chinese un-
derworld. On the basis of these unsavoury experiences, the Fiji government 
has reassessed its technical preference by contracting three New Zealand 
companies to build and repair Fiji roads instead of the once preferred Chinese 
companies such as China Railway. Beneath the veneer of public political 
showmanship is latent anxiety about the appropriateness of Chinese technolo-
gy and development ethics. 
The extent of Chinese influence in Fiji will be ultimately determined by 
the internal political dynamics in Fiji as well as the changing regional re-
sponse to these internal realities. If Fiji re-joins the PIF, it will lose some of 
its autonomy and power over Australia and New Zealand. This could poten-
tially weaken China’s links with Fiji and undermine China’s power ambitions 
in Oceania generally. This may not necessarily imply that China would retreat 
from Fiji, but rather, China may be forced into a situation of long term 
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cooperation with the US (and by extension, Australia and New Zealand) in 
their engagement with Fiji.  
The second scenario is that Fiji’s re-admittance into the PIF and lifting of 
the sanctions by Australia and New Zealand could provide Fiji with the op-
portunity to use the China leverage as a tool of vengeance against Australia 
and New Zealand. Because of China’s long term investment in Fiji through 
development aid, Fiji is unlikely to ditch China so easily even after Fiji has 
normalized relations with Australia and New Zealand. For Fiji, China has 
been a trusted friend at a time when it was isolated and humiliated. Prior to 
his visit to Fiji on 21 November 2014, China’s President Xi Jinping said: “I 
hope my visit will help strengthen political mutual trust, enhance co-
operation in areas such as economy, trade, agriculture, forestry, fishery and 
tourism, expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges, deepen multilat-
eral co-ordination and co-operation, and take China-Fiji traditional friend-
ship to a new height." (Chaudhry 2014:1).  
This scenario will probably provide Fiji with the opportunity to engage 
more proactively and aggressively with the two contending sides (China and 
US) to extract maximum advantage in terms of economic benefits and politi-
cal mileage. While the two powers find Fiji an important ally in the South 
Pacific, it is doubtful if they would expand too much energy competing over 
its control because there are other more serious issues of conflict to deal with 
in South East Asia. Instead of a cold war type battle over Fiji, they would 
most likely agree to allow each other space to deal with Fiji while keeping a 
close eye on what the other is doing. 
New powers and Fiji’s relations 
China and the US are not the only two global powers interested in Fiji and 
generally the Pacific. There are other global players such as Taiwan, Russia, 
Georgia, Israel and the Arab League which have been active lobbyists to win 
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the hearts and minds of the small Pacific states primarily for the purpose of 
soliciting recognition and mobilizing UN votes. Economically challenged 
small Pacific islands states are deliberately targeted because of their perceived 
susceptibility to accepting financial reward in exchange for political favour. 
Fiji in particular has been targeted because of its influential position within 
the region. 
Two countries who were pioneers of this patronage strategy are Taiwan 
and China whose Tom and Jerry chequebook diplomacy game has left behind 
a legacy of instability and corruption in the region (Crocombe 2007). Six 
Pacific countries (Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Palau and Mar-
shall Islands) recognize Taiwan and seven (Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, 
Papua New Guinea, Niue and Federated States of Micronesia) recognize 
China. Australia and New Zealand aside, most, if not all, of the island states 
receive aid from both countries rather than just from the country they recog-
nize. Fiji plays a rather ‘balanced’ approach by officially recognizing China, 
while at the same time hosting a Taiwanese embassy under the guise of the 
Taiwan Trade Mission. 
Russian has been campaigning through provision of aid for recognition of 
the two breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while 
Georgia has been doing the reverse. Buoyed by Russian patronage, Abkhazia 
itself has been directly involved in giving aid to specifically targeted coun-
tries. Tuvalu established diplomatic ties with Russia in September 2011 as 
well as received aid in the form of water from Abkhazia during the serious 
drought in 2011. Just a year earlier Tuvalu received US$12,000 from Geor-
gia. Russia provided US$50 million aid to Nauru after Nauru recognized 
South Ossetia (Brooks 2012). Vanuatu’s recognition of Abkhazia in May 
2011 caused some confusion amongst its leaders and differences amongst 
leading Vanuatu government officials but nevertheless it became the fifth 
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state to recognize Abkhazia’s independence after Russia, Nicaragua, Vene-
zuela and Nauru. However, this recognition was retracted a month later in 
June 2011 after a change in government. The big catch for the two countries 
was Fiji given its strategic importance and influence in the Pacific. Georgia 
donated 200 netbook computers for Fiji schools in October 2011 following 
the visit by Georgian Foreign Minister, Grigol Vashadze. 
Russia, it appears, has an even grander scheme reminiscent of its cold 
war ambitions. It too wanted to send out a message, at least in some symbolic 
form, that Ms Clinton’s “Pacific century” rhetoric should not be seen purely 
as a Chinese-American affair. It appears that Russia still wants to be seen as a 
strong regional power whose significance has not dissipated even after the 
cold war. One of Russia’s major symbolic acts as a regional power was to 
invite Pacific islands foreign ministers to Fiji in February 2012 for “top-level 
meeting” with Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov (Malo 2012). The 
Pacific islands foreign ministers who attended showed their support for Rus-
sia in return for possible aid. The Russian foreign minister’s visit also gave 
Fiji the opportunity to reassert its central position in the Pacific and regional 
conduit for major power politics between Russia, China and US.  
However, unlike the Chinese and Americans, Russia has virtually no 
presence and real influence in the Pacific and the US pivot does not really 
consider the former cold war warrior as a potent adversary as threatening as 
the Chinese. However, it may be in a position to take advantage of the US-
China tension to make probing inroads and even exert influence. For instance, 
Fiji’s Minister for Defence and National Security, Joketani Cokanasiga an-
nounced that the Fiji Government was to enter into “an agreement with Rus-
sia’s Federal Service for military and technical cooperation” (Naikaso 2013). 
Russia’s involvement in the Pacific is significant because as a traditional 
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Pacific power it no doubt contributes to a situation of multi-polar geo-politics 
in the Pacific which may dissipate some intensity from the US-China tension. 
Israel and the Arab League have also been active antagonists in the clam-
our to mobilize support on the vote to upgrade Palestine’s status in the UN to 
non-member observer state similar to the Vatican. Fiji has traditionally been a 
strong supporter of Israel in terms of UN votes, diplomatic relations through a 
Suva-based honorary consul and Christian-linked connections. By and large, 
Israel’s approach has been silent and executed largely through US influence 
with the belief that 14 Pacific island states would continue to support Israel at 
the UN. The Arab League was more forthright in using what Callick (2010:1) 
referred to as “generous charm offensive” through the launching of a US$54 
million development fund and the formation of a new Arab-Pacific Co-
operation Forum sponsored by United Arab Emirates (UAE). This followed a 
visit to the Pacific by UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan and a trip to Abu Dhabi by heads of government and foreign minis-
ters of all 14 Pacific island states. In Abu Dhabi, the Pacific island states 
expressed “the concern of Arab states regarding the conflict in the Middle 
East, in particular in Palestine" and "agreed on the need to settle all outstand-
ing disputes and issues based on relevant Security Council resolutions and the 
principles of the Road Map recognising that the views of the Arab states were 
crucial to a just, comprehensive and permanent peace" (quoted in Callick, 
2010:1). Again Fiji became the operational point for UAE in the Pacific be-
cause Fiji is the only Pacific state with an embassy in UAE.  
Although the much anticipated UN General Assembly vote overwhelm-
ingly favoured the Palestinians as expected, three Pacific island states (out of 
9 Pacific islands UN members), Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micro-
nesia and Palau, who are recipients of the US funding under the Compact of 
Free Association with the US, together with Nauru, a near bankrupt country, 
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voted ‘No’ with the US. Of the 41 abstentions five, namely Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu together with Australia were from the 
Pacific and of the 138 which voted ‘Yes’, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiri-
bati together with New Zealand, were from the Pacific (see Hasenkamp in 
this volume). The ‘No’ votes indicated the US economic and strategic stran-
glehold on the countries concerned and the abstentions showed a shift away 
from direct Israeli support to a ‘neutral’ position presumably to please both 
the US and Arab League. Nauru and FSM were rewarded for their ‘No’ vote 
through a “lavish” invitation of the leaders of the two countries to Israel to 
meet the Israeli president, prime minister and minister for foreign affairs with 
promise of aid (Sofer 2010; Madsen 2012). By abstaining, Fiji was aware of 
its commitment both to the non-aligned movement as well as to the US bloc 
which it had traditionally supported. It also showed its growing independence 
in terms of foreign policy objectives and approaches. 
Another case of UN vote mobilization involved Australia, Luxemburg 
and Finland who were all vying for non-permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council, for the Western European and Others group. Both Luxem-
burg and Finland sent representatives to attend the PIF meetings to lobby for 
support. While this was going on, Fiji was actively campaigning against Aus-
tralia’s bid to counter Australia’s campaign against Fiji’s participation in the 
UN peace keeping operations. Sensing Fiji’s intentions, Australia eventually 
withdrew its UN campaign against Fiji and later went on to win one of the 
two seats with Luxemburg winning the other.  
Japan, a traditional Pacific aid donor and strong ally of the US is also 
wary of China’s growing influence in Fiji and the Pacific but its main interest 
is in fishing and its strategic priority is closer to home where it is involved in 
sovereignty disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the 
South China Sea. The Japanese Embassy in Fiji looks after Fiji, Kiribati, 
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Nauru, Tuvalu and Vanuatu and this enhances Fiji’s regional profile in a 
significant way.  
Fiji’s relationship with India was further cemented as a result of the visit 
by the Indian prime minister on 19 November 2014. Amongst other things, 
India promised more aid in the area of medicine, IT, rural development and 
small industries as well as lifting of visa requirements for Fiji citizens visiting 
India. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting developments is Indonesia’s close 
links with Fiji and the MSG. While this may be seen by some as an attempt to 
pre-empt and possibly undermine any support for West Papuan independence 
amongst the MSG members, it can also be seen as an opportunity to discuss 
the difficult West Papua issue face to face with Indonesia. Although Fiji has 
been supportive of the West Papuan issue in the recent past by hosting the 
West Papuan independence leaders in Fiji in 2011, strong Indonesian lobby-
ing and influence has changed this stance. As a sign of this closeness, the 
Indonesian president was invited to the PIDF summit in Fiji in 2014 and 
pledged $20 million to help in climate change programs.  
Perhaps the least known foreign link to the Pacific is Cuba, which has in-
creased training programs for Pacific medical doctors. About 8 medical stu-
dents from Fiji are now studying in Cuba. Although a long-time adversary of 
the US, its presence in the Pacific does not pose any threat whatsoever to US 
interests in the region. 
Fiji’s dominant role as a regional power was further consolidated as a re-
sult of the visit to Fiji by the Indian prime minister on November 19 and the 
Chinese president on 21November 2014. Fiji invited the Pacific islands lead-
ers to attend summits with the two leaders. In doing so, Fiji had reinforced its 
claim as a regional hegemon, a claim which does not go down well with PNG 
which sees itself as the largest and most powerful island state in the region. 
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The competition for Pacific leadership between the two states has been 
around since the 1970s. 
Fiji plays a vital role in the multi-layered geo-political dynamics in the 
Pacific and the multiplicity of players, driven by different interests, makes the 
Pacific geo-political scene fluid and unpredictable. Fiji has taken advantage 
of this to further its own geopolitical interests by not only raising its own 
regional and global profile, also drawing the other small Pacific island states 
to its orbit. Like other small states, Fiji has strategically taken advantage of 
the opportunity to maximize the benefits for itself by playing the game of 
multipronged political gamesmanship. While the big powers may see the 
small states like Fiji as potentially controllable chess pawns, the small states 
have used their ‘smallness’ as an opportunity to pit the main powers against 
each other as a pragmatic and economically rational way of extracting mone-
tary and development benefits, some of which are useful for national devel-
opment and some of which merely end up in the pockets of the elites (Cro-
combe 2007). 
To Fiji’s advantage, perhaps one of the most interesting developments in 
all these is Australia’s ‘demotion’ as America’s ‘deputy sheriff’ in the Pacific 
as the US moves in to take direct control engagement with Pacific states. This 
can been as a consequence of Australia’s neglect of the Pacific as an Australi-
an strategic studies expert warns: “We (Australians) need to be careful to 
avoid looking like the South Pacific is an afterthought to Australia’s broader 
strategy. While Canberra continues to talk of the ‘Asian Century’, the Pacific 
Islanders are certain that it is an ‘Asia Pacific Century.’ Our Pacific Island 
neighbours know that their place in evolving global geo-politics depends on 
effective relationship with Asia. That’s why they’re extending and expanding 
these relationships while strengthening compatible traditional arrangements” 
(Herr 2012:1). 
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In response to Australia’s decline in influence, Herr adds, “Whether anyone in 
Canberra wants to admit it, Australia has suffered a retreat from influence 
within our region and its institutions; a decline of support from our neighbors 
in the United Nations; and diminished respect from key allies in the South 
Pacific on regional affairs” (ibid.). 
This may indeed be the case at one level, but the reality is more complex. 
While Australia may have lost political prestige, its cultural and economic 
influence is still very strong and it is still the destination of choice for most 
Pacific migrants as well as largest aid donor, largest exporter and largest 
tourism market in the region (Chand 2012). While Fiji enthusiastically ma-
noeuvres its political leverage against Australia, Australia still remains Fiji’s 
largest source of tourism and trade and the cultural and sporting links be-
tween the two countries have a long history.  
This paradox coupled with the influence of multiple players testifies to 
the fact that Fiji’s geopolitical interests are often shifty and contradictory and 
sometimes involves a syncretic mixture of long term strategic goals and short 
term pragmatic interests. It is for these reasons that it is not possible, by any 
stretch of the imagination, to generalize about Fiji being neatly categorized as 
singularly loyal to either side of the US-China divide. 
Conclusion: The paradoxes of exclusion  
Fiji’s suspension from the PIF and anti-coup sanctions by Australia and New 
Zealand paradoxically worked in Fiji’s favour because it transformed its iso-
lation into a powerful fulcrum for geo-political leveraging. One of Fiji’s ma-
jor policy directions was to bolster its pro-China ‘look north’ policy as an 
alternative to the traditional Australia-New Zealand links. Fiji also used its 
‘free’ status outside the PIF to mobilize the economically and politically 
powerful MSG sub-regional bloc to harness its leveraging power, isolate 
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Australia and New Zealand from the MSG as well as weaken the regional 
legitimacy of the PIF.  
Fiji’s initiative to form the PIDS as a UN voting and lobbying bloc for 
small Pacific states independent of Australia and New Zealand within the UN 
further strengthened its position in the eyes of the island states. Fiji’s growing 
self-confidence was given a major boost after it was elected chair of the G77. 
Perhaps the most daring tactical manoeuvre by Fiji was to mobilize the Pacif-
ic island leaders for an annual solidarity meeting prior to the annual PIF lead-
ers’ conferences since 2010. Seen by some as an alternative to the leaders’ 
forum, it is now accepted as an established regional event which was later 
formalized as the PIDF from 2013 to give it more development focus as well 
as institutional permanence.  
Although Australia and New Zealand are not part of the PIDF, by and 
large they still wield enough hegemonic presence to influence the decision-
making consensus within the PIF leaders meeting and thus nullify the possi-
bility of any pro-Fiji bloc swaying decisions within the PIF. Although Pacific 
island leaders would support Fiji’s readmission into the PIF during the PIDF 
meeting in Fiji, they would suddenly reverse their tune or merely remain mute 
when facing Australia and New Zealand across the table during the PIF lead-
ers meeting. PIF protocol dictates that decisions should be arrived through 
consensus and voting is avoided at all cost to project an image of unity rather 
than division. This type of manufactured consensus, patronizingly justified 
under the ideological rubric of Pacific Way, has often undermined the views 
of the smaller island states in favour the powerful countries like New Zealand 
and Australia.  
The challenge for Fiji is how it is able to balance both its own geopoliti-
cal interests with its regional obligation. Fiji has often acted unilaterally at the 
cost of other regional neighbours and in the process undermined its own 
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respectability as a regional leader. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
being tied down by regional obligations could overshadow Fiji’s ambitions to 
become a significant player in the world stage. It appears that Fiji’s chosen 
approach is to use a multi-pronged tactical manoeuvre; firstly by rallying 
loyal the Pacific states through the PIDF and secondly by using its position as 
a regional hub to further its international ambitions as we saw in hosting of 
regional summits with the leaders of India and China.  
The danger, however, is whether Fiji’s continued rise as a regional power 
is driven by real economic and political muscle or is it merely an exercise in 
ego projection. If the former is the case then Fiji is destined to become the 
‘Singapore of the Pacific’, a model it is now pursuing in earnest. If the latter 
is the case then a bloated ego could be precondition for illusive notions of 
self-grandeur, a psychological condition which may be unsustainable, if not 
self-harming. 
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 Perceptions and Preconditions for Democratic 
Development in Fiji
1
 
Manfred Ernst 
Abstract: The article examines one of the key dilemmas in the democracy 
discourse – how can democracy ‘work’ realistically in countries of the Global 
South? Historically, democracy has developed quite differently in various 
contexts and across time. As such, political, cultural, social and economic 
forces, rooted in the Euro-American context, have stimulated and trans-
planted the concept of democracy worldwide. It is argued that the dynamic 
process of democratic development is inherently interwoven with the develop-
ment of ‘capitalism’ in the economic sphere, with ‘liberalism’ as the over-
arching political ideology. The development of democracy in the West, espe-
cially since the end of WWII, is contrasted with the development of demo-
cracy in the Global South, which took place under different conditions. The 
view that new democratic states everywhere must imitate the Euro-American 
model is questioned through recommending a theoretical and practical re-
conceptualisation of views along the lines of hybrid political orders or hybrid-
ity of governance. These arguments are substantiated by a summary of views 
of a representative sample of people concerning their perspectives for demo-
cratic development in Fiji. The article concludes with recommendations for 
the development of a framework for ‘deepening democracy’.  
Keywords: Democracy, Colonialism, hybrid political orders, develop-
ment 
                                                          
1
  This article is based on the author’s chapter on ‘Democracy’ in Voices of the People – Per-
ceptions and Preconditions for Democratic Development in Fiji (Boege et al. 2013). 
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Introduction 
Since gaining its independence in 1970, Fiji has been dealing with the conse-
quences of nearly a century of racially-divisive British colonial rule. It has 
experienced four coups in the last twenty-seven years, the first two of which 
occurred after the election of Fiji’s first multi-ethnic government in 1987. The 
coup leader - a senior military officer - claimed to be acting to save the 
iTaukei from subjugation to other ethnic groups. Five years of military rule 
ensued, during which the country was expelled from the Commonwealth, 
became a republic and adopted a new constitution which was heavily 
weighted in favour of the iTaukei (the 1990 Constitution). By the mid-1990s, 
moderate politics returned to prominence, and a more balanced constitution 
was passed into law (the 1997 Constitution). Fiji’s third coup, in 2000, fol-
lowed the first general election under the 1997 Constitution, which produced 
another multi-ethnic government and the country’s first Indo-Fijian Prime 
Minister. Fiji’s fourth coup took place in December 2006; the reasons given 
for carrying out this coup were the need to establish universal suffrage for all 
Fijian citizens; to ensure that electoral reforms enabled that universal suf-
frage; to rid the country of corruption; and to establish a truly multi-ethnic 
society in which racial issues would no longer be the determining factors in 
policy formulation, nor the basis for, nor the driving force in, politics 
(NCBBF 2008). The government has announced that there will be general 
elections by September 2014. Prime Minister Bainimarama stepped down as 
commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces and is leading a new polit-
ical party named ‘Fiji First’. Whether the new party, that has the full backing 
of the military, will accept the verdict of the ballot box and have their soldiers 
retreat to the barracks if their party loses the elections, is a question that oc-
cupies the imagination of many people in the build-up campaign (Lal 
2013:15). 
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While the causes for each coup, it is claimed, differ, public discourse has 
increasingly raised questions about the most appropriate governance system 
for Fiji. There have been competing claims that, on the one hand, democracy 
is a ‘foreign flower’ which does not work well with traditional systems of 
governance, and, on the other hand, that democracy is the only viable political 
governance system. Moreover, public discussions about both Fiji’s present 
and future are marked by discontent and divisions along ideological, religious 
and ethnic lines, and economic interests. What has not been sufficiently artic-
ulated is the option of developing a form of democratic governance that is 
most suited to a context laced with a multiplicity of cultures and religious 
traditions, as well as philosophical thought. It is for these reasons that it was 
felt that an extensive and impartial inquiry that includes the views of all sec-
tions of society was needed in order to formulate feasible and durable solu-
tions to Fiji’s deep-seated governance problems. This, and the desire to assist 
Fiji in its search for a more appropriate and suitable form of governance, are 
the motivations for this study, and subsequently, this report. There is plenty of 
evidence to suggest that democracy in its various forms is far from the cure 
for all governance problems around the world. There is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that democracy in its various forms is far from the cure it has been 
touted as being for governance ills around the world, especially after the col-
lapse of the former Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, 
the 20th century was marked by the worldwide spread of democracy.  
This paper provides an analytical framework based on the understanding 
that liberal modern democracy – as promoted by OECD countries over the 
past two decades – is an inherently Euro-American understanding of democ-
racy.2 It will be shown that this understanding developed in a historical 
                                                          
2
  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international 
economic organization consisting of 34 countries, 26 of which are European countries, as 
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context that is completely different from the historical experiences and cul-
tural practices of countries in the Global South.3 The view that the Western 
liberal model of democracy forms the basis for economic development and 
wealth for the benefit of all, and should therefore be adopted by the rest of the 
world, is not only a-historical but flawed, based as it is on the unsustainable 
exploitation of resources, combined with massive, irreversible environmental 
destruction, and a deepening global economic crisis that affects the majority 
of people all over the world today (Held et al. 1999; Randers 2012).4 
In contemporary research into political culture and comparative politics, a 
central question is: ‘What determines the emergence, survival, and develop-
ment of democracy?’ (Geddes 2007:317-339; see also Welzel/Inglehart 
2007:297). The following brief historical overview serves to show how de-
mocracy developed in Europe and in the British settler colonies, namely the 
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in specific historical, 
cultural, social and political contexts (Stephens 2005; Spruyt 2007:212). 
Moreover, it will be shown how the development and spread of democracy is 
inherently inter-woven with the development of capitalism in the economic 
sphere, and the political ideology of liberalism. Following that, the develop-
ment of democracy in the West will be contrasted with the development of 
democracy in the Global South, which took place under very different condi-
tions, especially since the end of WWII. Here the view that new democratic 
                                                                                                                             
well as the United States and Canada, Chile and Mexico, South Korea and Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand. It was founded in 1961 with the common aim of stimulating economic 
development and world trade, and promoting democracy and the free market economy. 
3
  The term ‘Global South’ refers to those post-colonial countries that are either still developing 
or remain under-developed, and are marked by conflict, high levels of poverty and inequali-
ty. The other term often used by developed states, especially OECD states, to describe such 
countries is the ‘Third World’. 
4
  See especially Held et al. 1999, chapters 3 – 5 and 8. In 2052, Jorgen Randers draws on his 
experiences in the sustainability arena and the use of global forecasting tools; this book also 
includes the predictions of more than 30 leading scientists, economists and other thinkers re-
garding global development for the next 40 years. 
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states everywhere must imitate and follow the Euro-American model will be 
questioned, by referring to a re-conceptualization of views along the lines of 
hybrid political orders or hybridity of governance, which provides a more 
useful theoretical and practical approach. This general overview will be fol-
lowed by a summary of the views and responses of both focus group partici-
pants and interviewees in Fiji, regarding their perspectives for democratic 
development. This paper concludes with recommendations that incorporate 
some key elements for a framework for ‘deepening democracy’. 
The limits of measuring democratic development  
In recent years, considerable efforts have been made to measure and classify 
democracy by institutions such as Freedom House, based in the United States, 
and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (In-
ternational IDEA), which is based in Sweden, and has 24 states as members. 
In addition, the Intelligence Unit of a leading conservative international fi-
nancial magazine – The Economist – publishes a detailed report annually; this 
is known as The Democracy Index, which attempts to measure democracy, 
and to classify and rank the nations of the world accordingly. The Index is 
based on the ratings of 60 indicators, which are grouped into five categories, 
namely (1) electoral processes and pluralism, (2) civil liberties, (3) the func-
tioning of government, (4) political participation, and (5) political culture 
(Democracy Index 2011:12). Each country is rated on a scale of zero to ten in 
each category, with their overall democracy index indicated by averaging out 
these five scores. These index values are then used to categorise countries as 
one of four types of regimes, namely; ‘Full Democracies’, ‘Flawed Democra-
cies’, ‘Hybrid Regimes’, and ‘Authoritarian Regimes’: 
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Table 1: Democracy Index 2011 
 No. of countries % of countries % of world population 
Full democra-
cies 
25 15.0 11.3 
Flawed de-
mocracies 
53 31.7 37.1 
Hybrid regimes 37 22.2 14.0 
Authoritarian 
regimes 
52 31.1 37.6 
 167 100 100 
Note: ‘World’ population refers to the total population of the 167 countries 
included in the Index. Because this Table only excludes micro-States, this 
constitutes nearly the entire world population. (Source: Democracy Index 
2011:2.) 
In the 2011 report, Fiji appears in the ‘authoritarian regimes’ category, ranked 
123rd out of 167 countries, with a score of 3.67. Fiji is grouped together with 
countries such as Haiti, Russia, Egypt and China. The only other Pacific Is-
land nation included in the Index is Papua New Guinea, which is listed as a 
‘flawed democracy’, and ranks 67th with a score of 6.32 (Democracy Index 
2011:12). Five years ago, in the Index of 2007, Fiji was classified as a ‘hybrid 
regime’, and ranked 91st with an overall score of 5.66 (Democracy Index 
2007:4). The top-ranked country in the Democracy Index is Norway, with an 
overall score of 9.80 (Democracy Index 2011:11). In view of measurements 
such as these, there has been great interest in building democratic institutions 
worldwide, especially in the post-colonial societies of the Global South. This 
has become of major concern to both political scientists and political practi-
tioners from OECD donor countries. Building democratic state institutions is 
presented as the way forward for providing a solid and sustainable framework 
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for development, security and peace.5 This approach is informed by the dis-
course on so-called ‘fragile states’, which has become fashionable in main-
stream Western political thought6 - because fragility of statehood is perceived 
as a threat to security and development, building stable states is seen as a 
political necessity of primary importance (see Holtz and Dinnen in this vol-
ume).  
At the same time, democracy, as promoted by Western governments’ aid 
agencies and international NGOs, not only focuses on state-building, but also 
on building democratic states using the Western (or Euro-American) model 
employed by developed OECD countries. These countries are presented as 
being the most advanced democracies, and against this backdrop, post-
colonial countries in the Global South, such as Fiji, are seen as more or less 
deficient democracies. As noted above, conventional indices are used to 
measure the stability of states and/or their level of democracy, and to rank 
states accordingly.7 These rankings are presented by their proponents as cul-
turally and politically neutral; however, in doing so, they neglect the episte-
mological and political bias of the ranking system, and overlook the political-
ideological climate in which they were conceived.8 At the same time, they 
serve obvious political purposes. For example, rankings, such as those of 
Freedom House, generate ”a profound impact on international relations, 
                                                          
5
  For this line of thought in the donor community, see e.g. AusAID 2006; OECD-DAC 2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011; UK DFID 2005 and USAID 2004 and 2005. For full references, see the 
end of this chapter. 
6
  Overviews of the fragile states discourse are provided by the edited volumes by Debiel and 
Klein 2002, Milliken 2003, Rotberg 2004, Schlichte 2005, Jones et al. 2007, De-
biel/Lambach/Reinhardt 2007 and John 2008. For full references, see the end of this chapter. 
7
  Apart from their political-ideological bias, the indices also have their methodological weak-
nesses; see e.g. the critique of the Freedom House Index by Giannone (2010). A more con-
textually sensitive approach is pursued by International IDEA, which seeks to avoid bias 
against non-Western forms of governance, and views democracy as being a permanent work 
in progress (International IDEA 2001 and 2008; for full references, see the end of this chap-
ter). 
8
  For a critique of the political-ideological (neo-liberal and neo-conservative) partiality of the 
Freedom House Index, see Giannone 2010. 
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humanitarian policies, development aid, and foreign policy of governments” 
(Giannone 2010:91). On the other hand, to ”establish democracy rankings 
based entirely on Euro American understandings of what democracy should 
be is to rule out the possibility and necessity of generating inflicted forms of 
democratic governance consistent with different circumstances” (Koelble and 
LiPuma 2008:7).  
Furthermore, the mainstream approach utilized by the Western model of 
democratization legitimizes and propagates the (neo-) liberal democratic 
model in a pseudo-neutral ‘scientific’ manner; it lacks a self-reflexive ques-
tioning of one’s own judgments about governance and democracy. Critics 
argue that the underlying assumptions are highly a-historical and a-cultural, 
that promoters of state-building along Western lines ignore context and cul-
ture, promote a narrow understanding of democracy, and present a highly 
idealised picture of Western liberal democracies (see ibid). At the same time, 
they expose a limited understanding of the actual structures and processes of 
governance in countries that are labelled fragile states and/or deficient democ-
racies.  
In fact, the current Western mainstream discourse on so-called fragile 
states and deficient democracies, as well as its corollary (the promotion of 
conventional democratic state-building along the lines of the Western OECD 
model state), is of little use in understanding the realities of governance in 
post-colonial states in the Global South, and for supporting home-grown 
democratic development. In these post-colonial states, including Pacific Is-
land countries, state institutions are not the only institutions which fulfill 
functions that, in the model Western state, are clearly state obligations. Local-
ly-rooted social entities (e.g. extended families, clans, tribes and village 
communities) and traditional authorities (e.g. village elders, chiefs, healers, 
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‘big men’ and religious leaders), determine the everyday social reality of 
large parts of the population. 
Moreover, as seen in Fiji and the Pacific, state institutions are to a certain 
extent ‘infiltrated’ and overwhelmed by local, customary non-state ‘informal’ 
institutions and social forces, which operate according to their own logic and 
rules within state structures. This leads to the departure of state institutions 
from the Western ideal in post-colonial societies. On the other hand, the in-
trusion of state agencies impacts on non-state local orders as well. Local cus-
tomary institutions, as well as modern non-state institutions (for example 
churches and trades unions), are subject to deconstruction and re-formation as 
they engage with, and are incorporated into, state structures and processes. 
They do not remain unchanged; rather, they respond to and are influenced by 
the institutions of the state apparatus. They adopt an ambiguous position in 
relation to the state, appropriating state functions and ‘state talk’, whilst sim-
ultaneously continuing to pursue their own agenda. 
Hybridized governance 
In the course of these interactions, governance is hybridized; that is, the inter-
face of introduced (liberal democratic) state institutions and local customary 
non-state institutions constitutes what can be called a ‘hybrid political order’.9 
In hybrid political orders, diverse and competing authority structures, sets of 
rules, logics of order, and claims to power co-exist, overlap, interact and 
intertwine, combining elements both from introduced Western models of 
governance, as well as those stemming from local indigenous traditions of 
governance and politics, with further influences exerted by the forces of glob-
alization and associated societal fragmentation. The terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘hy-
bridization’ are used to characterise these processes and political orders, 
                                                          
9
  On the concept of hybrid political orders, see Boege 2008, 2009 and Boege et al. 2009. 
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because they focus on a combination of elements that stem from genuinely 
different societal spheres which follow different logics, and because they 
affirm that these spheres do not exist in isolation from each other, but perme-
ate each other, and, consequently, give rise to specific political orders that are 
characterized by the closely interwoven texture of their separate sources of 
origin. 
In hybrid political orders, different types of legitimate authority, beyond 
the rational-legal authority legitimized by liberal democratic procedures, can 
be found; traditional and charismatic types of legitimacy co-exist, compete 
and interact with rational-legal legitimacy, leading to the hybridization of 
legitimate authority.10 There continues to be a limited understanding of this 
diversity of co-existing and interacting types of legitimacy in mainstream 
Western political and academic discourse. Local understandings of legitimate 
authority stemming from indigenous customs and cultures may clash with 
liberal Western understandings of legitimate democratic governance (Lat-
tas/Rio 2011:17).  
The liberal democratic model focuses very much on the institutions and 
procedures of democracy, and, in particular, competitive (multi-party) elec-
toral processes. It is conventional wisdom in Western political thought that 
elections are central to establishing legitimate democratic governance; how-
ever, this is not necessarily true in non-Western societal-cultural contexts 
                                                          
10
  Max Weber distinguishes three ideal types of legitimate authority, namely legitimacy based 
on (1) Rational grounds – “resting on a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules 
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal author-
ity); (2) Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial 
traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (tradition-
al authority); or finally (3) Charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the specific and ex-
ceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the norma-
tive patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority)” (Weber 1968:46, 
see also Weber 1978:215). In the formally democratic states of the Pacific, hybridized forms 
of legitimacy prevail today, combining rational-legal, traditional and/or charismatic sources, 
see e.g. Boege 2009. 
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such as the Pacific Islands. Rather, the competitive dimension of liberal dem-
ocratic elections, as well as the notion of a formal political opposition, is alien 
to customary practices in Pacific communities, and those assuming positions 
of power on the basis of such competitions are not necessarily seen as legiti-
mate authorities. 
In hybrid political orders, government and administrative office bearers 
do not enjoy authority primarily by virtue of being democratically elected 
representatives, nor as appointed servants of the citizenry. Rather, their legit-
imacy stems from sources beyond the rational-legal realm of the state and its 
procedures. For example, these leaders obtain their positions of power 
through being selected to stand for elections in the formal liberal democratic 
process due to their status in kin groups, such as their extended families, clans 
or tribes. Accordingly, their points of reference are not ‘citizen voters in con-
stituencies’, but members of their kin groups. They enjoy legitimacy not be-
cause of the belief of citizens in the democratic process as a means to endow 
authority, but because of the belief of members of communities in their cus-
tomary right to lead; they are not legitimate authorities as a result of being 
elected according to liberal democratic procedures, but rather because they 
can refer to other sources of legitimacy, usually rooted in custom and culture. 
Moreover, elected leaders themselves “do not necessarily understand, follow, 
adopt or even necessarily believe in the legitimacy of the formal institutions 
associated with the so-called OECD institutions which are being advocated 
and pursued by the international community” (Hogg/Leftwich 2008:1). 
Rise and Development of Democracy after WW II 
Since the end of World War II, the worldwide spread of democracy has inten-
sified. Many political leaders who hold very diverse views profess to be dem-
ocrats, and political regimes of all kinds use the term ‘democratic’ to describe 
themselves, regardless of the fact that what these regimes say and do is often 
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considerably different (Held 2006:1). It is hard to find any government in the 
contemporary world that does not either call itself democratic, or promise to 
restore democracy (Dahl 1989:313). Various attempts to quantify the devel-
opment of democracy in the world conclude that more than 60% of all coun-
tries today have in place at least some minimal forms of democratic institu-
tions and procedures (Beetham et al. 2008:5; see also Democracy Index 
2011:2). Given this background, the vast majority of contemporary political 
and social scientists agree that democracy is the predominant form of gov-
ernment in the world today. It appears that nowadays governmental and non-
governmental organisations alike consider democracy as an end unto itself 
because of the widespread conviction that democracy initiates economic de-
velopment, contributes to poverty reduction and peace-building, and leads to 
greater protection of human rights (Beetham et al. 2008:5).  
Nonetheless, there is still no universally accepted definition of democra-
cy. However, there does seem to be a common understanding that, at a mini-
mum, the fundamental features of democracy include:  
 Majority rule, and the protection of minority rights; 
 Regular, free and fair elections of representatives on the basis of 
universal suffrage;  
 Citizen’s rights and responsibilities; 
 Protection of human rights including: 
- Freedom of speech and religion; 
- The right to equal protection under the law; 
- The opportunity to participate fully in the political, eco-
nomic, and cultural life of society; and, 
 Commitment to the values of tolerance, co-operation, and compro-
mise (Lindsay 1951, Dahl 1956, Beetham et al. 2008). 
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Origins and Development of Democracy in the Western World 
It is a widely held view amongst scholars that democratization initially took 
place in the emerging capitalist economies of Europe, in which small groups 
of rich elites usually held political power. Stephens, for example, sees the 
relationship between capitalist development and democracy as occurring in 
the shifts of balance of class power, in a process that weakened the power of 
the rich (landlords and large capitalists), and strengthened the lower classes 
(2005:2). Urbanization, industrialization, and new forms of communication 
and transportation contributed to the rapid gain of the capacity for self-
organization, in the form of an emerging trade union movement, co-
operatives, and all sorts of social clubs. It has also been argued that capitalism 
is positively linked with democracy because it “shares values and culture, and 
facilitates its development” (Almond 1991:468). This view is partly built on 
Schumpeter’s classic publication Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, in 
which he stated that “historically the modern democracy rose along with 
capitalism, and in causal connection with it (…) modern democracy is a 
product of the capitalist process” (1966:296-297). Following this argument, 
Dahl concludes that, “it is an historical fact that modern democratic institu-
tions (…) have existed only in countries with predominantly privately owned, 
market oriented economies, or capitalism if you prefer that name” 
(1990:143).  
The argument that democracy promotes and supports capitalism appears 
valid when considering the historical experiences of 14 advanced capitalist 
democracies today.11 With the exception of Italy and France, all these 
                                                          
11
  Stephens subdivided these countries into five categories: (1) early democratizers, such as 
Switzerland, France, and Norway; (2) countries with social democratic dominance, such as 
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden; (3) an exceptional case - that of Great 
Britain; (4) the breakdown cases of Germany and Italy; and (5) the British settler colonies of 
622 Manfred Ernst 
 
countries are part of the exclusive group of 25 countries with the premium 
label ‘full democracies’ (Democracy Index 2011:11). To varying degrees, 
these countries have in common the existence of social security policies for 
low-income earners and unemployed people (such as housing supplements, 
child and child-raising benefits), social welfare assistance in the form of 
money or food vouchers, health insurance and pension insurance, all of which 
are characteristic of so-called ‘welfare states’. As stated by Almond, these 
policies have been developed in order to reduce or eliminate the negative 
impacts of capitalism (1991:472). Other authors point out that the acceptance 
of institutions such as trades unions and political parties with socialist tenden-
cies, were ‘strategic decisions’ by leaders of the ruling upper and middle 
classes on realizing that the cost of oppression would by far exceed the costs 
of concessions in the form of the above-mentioned welfare measures (Flo-
ra/Heidenheimer 1981).  
According to Cammack, at the heart of the development of democracy in 
Western countries was the establishment of stable capitalist regimes, which 
found a balance between maintaining the authority of the traditional elites, 
and granting a degree of political participation to the masses without losing 
control (1997:13).  
Democracy, Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism 
In essence, liberalism can be defined as a political ideology that began in the 
18th century in England, and which promoted social development by introduc-
ing laws and reforms in order to prevent revolutions (Rueschemeyer et al. 
1992:80-81). Central to the idea of liberalism is a focus on the individual and 
self-determination. As a political movement, it supports liberal democracy, 
human rights, constitutionalism, fair and free elections, freedom of religion, 
                                                                                                                             
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA (Stephens 1979:115). See also Rueschemeyer 
et al. 1992:121-154. 
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and free trade. During the 19th century, liberalism became increasingly identi-
fied with democracy. In the 20th century, liberalism became more and more 
associated with the economy, as democracy helped to provide an ideological 
justification for the defence and protection of private property by force, if 
necessary (Held 1997:9-12). This has contributed to the development of a 
model of democracy that is based on debate, voting and decision-making by 
majority rule. One of the fundamental problems for democratic development 
in the Global South is the huge difference between this Western notion and 
the prevalent values and practices of societies like Fiji, which are based on 
dialogue, consensus-seeking and common rule (Galtung 2000:145). 
During the second half of the 20th century, in particular since the 1970s, 
Milton Friedman played a leading role in a new school of thinking that fierce-
ly opposed any welfare state tendencies by promoting so-called ‘free market 
programmes’, in an attempt to radically transform capitalist economies, as 
summarized in the classic statement of Friedman’s economic philosophy in 
Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman 1982). Due to Friedman’s position at the 
School of Economics at the University of Chicago, this new approach became 
known as the ‘Chicago School’ approach. The common term for the ortho-
doxy of such economic policies is ‘neo-liberalism’. The term ‘Washington 
Consensus’12 is also widely used to refer to a neo-liberal or market fundamen-
talism. At the core of the neo-liberal agenda are: the elimination of the public 
sphere, total liberation for corporations, and minimal social spending. “In 
every country where Chicago school policies had been applied over the past 
three decades, what has emerged is a powerful ruling alliance between a few 
                                                          
12
  The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined in 1989 by the economist John Williamson. It 
describes a set of specific economic policy descriptions that have been used as standard re-
form packages, promoted by institutions such IMF and the World Bank, for use in develop-
ing countries in crisis (on the regional impacts in Pacific see Schilder and Holtz in this vol-
ume). 
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large corporations and a class of mostly wealthy politicians” (Klein 2007 15). 
Another term for a newly emerging system that removes the boundaries be-
tween big government and big business is ‘corporatism’13. The main conse-
quences of economic liberalism for states, communities, the economy, and 
finally democracy, are “‘huge transfers of public wealth to private hands, 
often accompanied by exploding debt, an ever-widening chasm between the 
dazzling rich and the disposable poor and an aggressive nationalism that justi-
fies bottomless spending on security” (ibid.). The medicine prescribed by the 
Chicago school ‘spin doctors’14 usually includes tax cuts, free trade, privat-
ized services in all areas of public life, cuts to social spending, and deregula-
tion. Today, the key concepts of economic liberalism are promoted by, for 
example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the World Bank), the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Neo-liberal policies and strategies are, to varying degrees, used by govern-
ments all over the world (e.g. USA, the European Union, Australia, and New 
Zealand). 
The Development of Democracy in the Global South 
There is a general consensus that state formation and democratization outside 
the Western experience took place in very different environments, and under 
different circumstances (Spruyt 2007:229). Like many other states in Africa, 
Asia and the Caribbean, Fiji gained independence after the former colonial 
power (Britain) withdrew. Decolonized countries had a much shorter period 
of time to gain experience in state formation, and to build a democracy based 
on their own history, cultures, and value systems, than Western states. As one 
                                                          
13
  ‘Corporatism’ describes the system of running a state using the power of organizations such 
as businesses, which claim to act in the best interests of the majority of people. 
14
  The term ‘spin doctors’ describes so-called experts whose job it is to present the policies, 
actions, or words of a person or organization to the public in their best possible light.  
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author bluntly put it “for better or worse, it is the European state system 
which has been superimposed on the rest of the world” (ibid:231). 
If the optimum pre-conditions for the development of democracy are ma-
terial prosperity, urbanization, and the existence of a political culture that 
encourages tolerance and participation, how could developing countries lack-
ing most of these pre-conditions establish, develop and sustain democracy? 
How can the emergence and survival of democracy under quite different 
social, economic, political and cultural conditions take place? How can coun-
tries that have been colonized and exploited for hundreds of years build de-
mocracy on social and economic structures changed and shaped by the colo-
nizers?  
Legum reports that, at a meeting in Washington, a World Bank expert 
asked the former President of Tanzania the question: ‘Why have you failed?’ 
Nyerere replied: “The British Empire left us a country with 85% illiterates, 
two engineers and 12 doctors. When I left office in 1985, we had 9% illit-
erates and thousands of engineers and doctors. At that point our income per 
capita was twice what it is today after the Structural Adjustment programme. 
We now have one third less children in our schools, and public health and 
social services are in ruin. During those years, Tanzania has done everything 
that the World Bank and the IMF have demanded” (Nyerere quoted by 
Legum 2012:32). 
Legum commented that the fact that after independence the standard of 
living rose for more than a decade is usually forgotten. Nyerere was referring 
to the overlooked fact that, after independence, African standards of living 
rose for more than a decade. It was the debt crisis and the collapse of many 
export prices that forced African states such as Tanzania to seek help (ibid.).15 
                                                          
15
  The roots of the debt crisis lie in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when Western banks were 
desperately seeking outlets for the huge liquid reserves placed with them by oil producing 
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Given this background, democratic development in the context of the de-
colonization of Third World countries constituted a much more drastic step 
into unknown territory than for Western countries. Transferring the letter and 
spirit of the ‘Westminster model’ to, for example, Australia, where the level 
of economic development was relatively high, education almost universal, 
and where most people shared a common language and culture, was a very 
different matter from transferring this model to newly-independent, develop-
ing countries with their economic under-development, mass illiteracy, and 
cultural heterogeneity (Pinkney 2003:43).16  
If there is any lesson that can be learned from the European experience 
with democracy, it is that the building of democracy and the consolidation of 
democratic institutions are long and complex processes. Democracy does not 
happen quickly, or because elections are held; the histories of Western de-
mocracies show that it takes substantial periods of time, as it often involves 
lengthy struggles for freedom from authoritarian governments.  
Democracy and the New Global Order 
This brief historical overview serves to illustrate that the development of 
democracy and the development of welfare states are interwoven but distinct 
processes. With focus on Fiji, it should be noted that the development of 
welfare states took place under favourable, special conditions that existed in 
only a limited number of countries. It should also be noted that, when the 
Cold War ended (as symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall), capitalism 
                                                                                                                             
countries, the pace of whose profits far out-stripped their ability to spend this money. ‘Those 
banks persuaded poor countries to take loans at the then prevailing low interest rates. It 
seemed to be a wonderful opportunity for all concerned. With time, the loans were mostly 
rolled-over, and of course, interest rose at compound rates, as global mobile capital became 
apparently scarcer. Hence the debt trap’ (Legum 2012:32-33). 
16
  In Fiji, cultural heterogeneity had resulted from the indenture system introduced by Great 
Britain, which resulted, at independence, in the people of Indian descent forming about 40% 
of the population. Those of Indian descent had completely different cultures, languages and 
religions (Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism) to those of the fairly homogenous existing iTaukei 
population. 
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became the dominant system in the world economy. In this context, it is im-
portant to be aware that democracy is a political philosophy; in the same way 
capitalism dominates the world economy, it has been suggested that democra-
cy as a system of governance, together with free market capitalism, is without 
alternative, and is the likely “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ 
and the ‘final form of human government” (Fukuyama 1992:2).  
This view has been challenged by other authors, who rightly argue that 
democracy is a form of organization of social power in the public arena that 
cannot be separated from the economic and social structure on which that 
power rests (Boron 2005:31). The triumph of liberal democracy within the 
globalized capitalist economy (as held by Fukuyama) goes together with the 
erosion and decay of the international state system (Held 1995:27). There is 
little – if any – material basis for expecting significant improvements in these 
economic and political relationships; on the contrary, material development in 
the world economy is likely to worsen in the foreseeable future. It is hardly 
the case that the free market economy and democracy, or economic and polit-
ical freedom, work together for the benefit of all people. The assumption that 
there is such a thing as a sovereign democracy in the capitalist world econo-
my is actually an illusion, because the prevailing system of ownership and 
control results in substantial inequalities in wealth and income (Frank 
1993:12; Dahl 1991:333). In the globalized capitalist economy, it also be-
comes increasingly difficult to determine and control economic policies at 
national level. 
Just how serious a threat neo-liberal policy married to corporatism is for 
democracy is well-summarized in the following quote: “Until the fall of the 
Berlin Wall (…) the global system was run by politicians. Since then it has 
been run by economists and financiers, rather like a macrocosm of the corpo-
rate world (…) Corporates are not working for a broad range of stakeholders 
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and economies are not working for the populace (…) For the past thirty years 
or more, the agenda (of the corporate world) has focused entirely on share-
holders return. This inevitably results in an obsession with share prices (…) 
The best way to protect the share price is to protect the earnings, and the 
easiest and fastest way to do that is to cut costs (…) Companies are gutted 
beyond recognition and millions of employees sacrificed for a short-term 
share price boost. This share market monster must be fed regularly. So mer-
gers and acquisitions become an essential part of the corporate repertoire 
(…) The notion that the stock price is the be-all and end-all of corporate 
performance is so ingrained that it seems to have been handed down on stone 
tablets. In reality it is an outgrowth of the go-go 1980s and ‘90s. The related 
notion that shareholders are the only stakeholders with a legitimate claim on 
the corporation is just as ingrained and just as new” (Legum 2012:39). 
This means that the wishes of the people forming the electorate in a de-
mocracy become secondary to those of the owners of foreign as well as local 
capital. It also explains why a change of government does usually not lead to 
a change of policies, because “[t]he global market has given the invisible 
hand of the market a carte blanche to pick up democratically elected govern-
ments by the scruff of their necks and slap it around if it attempts to put the 
needs of its electorate above the interests of international capital” (ibid:40). 
An Alternative Approach 
In Pacific Island countries in particular, state institutions are not the only 
institutions that fulfill functions which, in the model Western state, are clearly 
a state’s obligations. ‘The state’ often has little relevance to many people in 
rural areas. Rather, local non-state customary institutions, which have their 
roots in their pre-colonial past, still play an important role in the everyday life 
of the majority of people and communities. 
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In fact, “whether the democratic institutions that emerged from northern ex-
perience indeed are appropriate to the historic conditions of the South” 
(Gaventa 2006:9) is certainly an appropriate question, all the more so as the 
flaws and shortcomings of the liberal representative model of democracy 
become more and more obvious. There is a gulf between the promise and the 
practice of democracy, which leads to disenchantment with democracy, not 
only in the Pacific Islands, but also in the Western heartlands of liberal de-
mocracy. 
The liberal democratic model focuses very much on institutions and pro-
cedures of democracy, particularly competitive (multi-party) electoral pro-
cesses. In this model, people are mainly voters, private economic actors, and 
consumers of rights and services, which are provided by state institutions that 
are democratically legitimized by means of elections. This is in essence dem-
ocratic elitism: the people have the right to choose the elites by whom they 
are governed by means of a democratic process – namely elections. 
The win-lose logic of elections contradicts the consensus-oriented men-
tality of Pacific Islanders who strive, whenever possible, for outcomes that 
allow everybody to ‘save face’ and maintain good relationships (that is, not to 
‘lose’ an election contest, and be forced into ‘opposition’). The Westminster 
model, which relies on confrontation between government and opposition, 
‘clashes with the Pacific ideal of consensus decision making. The govern-
ment/opposition split is considered to be divisive and wasteful of scarce fi-
nancial and human resources’ (Henderson 2003:229). For example, with 
regard to Fiji, Ravuvu explains that villagers did not understand the need for a 
formal opposition: ‘It made no sense to them to actually pay people to work 
against the government and against their chosen leaders in Parliament’ 
(Ravuvu 1991). Accordingly, competition between political parties, also seen 
as a vital ingredient of liberal representative democracy, is not necessarily 
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perceived as a positive democratic feature by people in the Pacific. Rather, 
‘parties have proved to be a particularly divisive factor in the Pacific context’ 
(Henderson 2003:230). Usually, parties are not built around distinctive politi-
cal programmes and along clear ideological lines; instead, they are rather 
loose unions of individual candidates that temporarily join forces for election 
purposes. Commitment to any specific party is very weak, with ‘party hop-
ping’ a frequent phenomenon. Governments are often built on rather shaky 
and shifting party coalitions, and changes of government are frequent due to 
splits in such coalitions (Larmour 2005:235). Multi-party systems are weak, 
and political parties and their members do not enjoy much prestige as constit-
uent elements of democratic governance. 
In conclusion, then, mainstream Western political science thinking still 
follows a modernist path, the assumption being that there will be develop-
ment from an undemocratic or pre-democratic tradition to democratic moder-
nity, using Euro-American states and societies as a yardstick for such devel-
opment. This thinking leads to the presupposition that all democratic states 
must emulate the Euro-American template, and if they don’t, they are ‘in-
complete’, that is, democracies ‘with adjectives’ (‘illiberal’, ‘deficient’, ‘vir-
tual’, and ‘defective’) (see Collier/Levitsky 1997). This line of thought pro-
motes “a very specific and idealised notion of democracy (…) [It] tends to 
support a one-size-fits-all approach and pays little attention to local context 
and pre-conditions” (Gaventa 2006:15). A change of analytical perspective 
would acknowledge the different modernity/ies of the societies of the Global 
South, and, accordingly, the existence of different forms of democracy/ies as 
works in progress, adapting to the historical and cultural conditions in those 
societies. People must be free to define democracy on their own terms, in-
stead of imposing a universal (that is to say Euro-American) definition of 
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democratic governance on them. “Attempts to force a country to be ’demo-
cratic’ make a nonsense of the term” (Henderson 2003:239). 
Voices of the People – A Summary 
To conclude, a summary of the findings on democracy of the research project 
on ‘Perceptions and Preconditions for Democratic Development in Fiji’ 
(Boege et al. 2013:34-50) that was carried out between 2011 and 2013 will be 
presented.17 
The majority of focus group participants appeared to know little about the 
origins, history and development of democracy, although a few participants in 
each group demonstrated familiarity with some of the key elements of democ-
racy, such as equality, human rights, the rule of law, and participation in deci-
sion-making through elections. Focus group participants clearly view the 
current system in Fiji as undemocratic by virtue of the lawfully elected gov-
ernment being ousted through a coup in 2006, the Constitution abolished, and 
Fiji ruled since then by a military government, through the issuance of de-
crees. In addition, human rights have been violated and there were (and still 
are) restrictions in place with regard to the freedom of expression. Given a 
choice of governance systems, the vast majority of participants prefer democ-
racy for Fiji, and a substantial number of participants are – for a variety of 
reasons – opposed to or critical of the current government. It should be noted, 
however, that a small majority of participants expressed their appreciation for 
                                                          
17
  Convinced of the importance of recognizing the views and wisdom of the people of Fiji in 
devising a form of governance that is appropriate and suited to Fiji’s historical cultural con-
text, specific local political conditions, and aspirations of her people, the research report is 
based on a systematic exploration and analysis of views of Fijians from all sectors of society. 
This was achieved by means of holding 41 focus group discussions involving 330 partici-
pants, and conducting 83 in-depth interviews with individuals representing government, civil 
service, judiciary, academics, church leaders, civil society organisations, civil servants, lead-
ers of political parties and business. In determining the sample for both focus groups and in-
terviews, great care was taken to accurately reflect the composition of Fijian society in terms 
of gender, religion, ethnicity, age, education, status, living conditions and geographical dis-
tribution. The full report is available on the website of the Pacific Theological College 
www.ptc.ac.fj  
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certain programmes, projects and policies introduced by the military govern-
ment. Nevertheless, there is agreement between supporters and opponents 
alike that there is a need for reform of the electoral system, and the introduc-
tion of regulations for political parties and aspiring politicians.  
A comparison between responses of participants in focus group discus-
sions and interviewees shows some striking similarities, but also some differ-
ences. The major differences between responses from participants and inter-
viewees can mostly be ascribed to the different levels of formal education and 
status of the two groupings. Most focus group participants are representative 
of the majority of Fijians, who have low to moderate incomes, being in in-
formal or formal employment, living in villages, towns and settlements. The 
vast majority of participants have had at least some sort of formal education: 
most have completed primary school, although very few have undergone 
secondary school or studies at tertiary level. In contrast, the interviewees 
represent a much smaller section of the social strata of Fiji, having medium to 
higher incomes, the majority having degrees from tertiary institutions, and 
being in leading positions at different levels of government, religious organi-
zations, civil society, business, and political parties, or being traditional lead-
ers. Because of these differences, interviewees naturally exercise a much 
greater influence on the public discourse on democracy, and provide more 
differentiated and reflective opinions on democracy and other related areas.  
Similar to focus group participants, the vast majority of interviewees ex-
pressed their support for democracy as their preferred model of governance, 
rejected in principle the idea of bringing about change through coups, and 
also rejected any sort of racially-based politics. Similarly, the majority of 
interviewees support reforms of the electoral system. Because some inter-
viewees are politicians, or have been involved in politics in the past, there 
was less criticism of the role and function of political parties and politicians. 
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It also became clear that the interviewees’ responses were often based on their 
personal backgrounds, or personal experiences; this is especially true for 
those who either suffered or benefitted from the last coup. In broad terms, 
those interviewees who suffered as a result of the last coup are mainly tradi-
tional leaders and representatives of NGOs who have expressed criticism of 
the military, as well as trades union leaders and people who lost their jobs 
because they were dismissed by the current government. On the other hand, 
the majority of interviewees who are part of the government, such as civil 
servants and ministers, as well as many of the business representatives, ex-
pressed their support for the current government in different ways.  
Turning to the broader picture, having a liberal democracy in a ‘sover-
eign’ country may be better than having no democracy at all, but it is still far 
from the ideal of democracy, which is, by definition, the government of the 
whole people by the people equally represented. Looking at the economic 
fundamentalism which underlies the globalized capitalist economy, one les-
son that can be learnt is that relying purely on voting every four or five years 
is inadequate for controlling economic policy. Representation may be a nec-
essary precondition for democracy, but it can only be genuinely democratic 
when reinforced by the enhanced participation of citizens at all levels of deci-
sion-making in all spheres of public life. This increased participation would 
need to be complemented by the insertion of democratic principles into eco-
nomic life, which in turn would require the introduction of new clauses into 
the ground rules or basic laws of the free-market and trade system at global, 
regional and national levels. Eventually, this would require a fundamental 
rethinking of the relationship between democracy and the economy. 
As has been outlined in the first part of this paper, conventional demo-
cratic state-building aims at replicating the liberal representative model, by 
applying a standard recipe of support for elections and state institutions, with 
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some additional assistance for civil society (Carothers 1999). Civil society in 
this context, however, is also understood along Western lines, with NGOs, 
community-based organizations, business associations, and trades unions etc. 
constituting elements of ‘civil society’; at the same time, the Western ap-
proach ignores actors and institutions which do not fit into its understanding 
of civil society, such as chiefs, elders, healers, charismatic religious leaders 
etc., thus missing the realities on the ground in the countries of the Global 
South. 
This liberal representative model of democracy is challenged by ap-
proaches that aim at deepening democracy: “In this view, democracy is not 
only a set of rules, procedures and institutional design, and cannot be re-
duced to only a way of competition amongst parties (…) Rather, it is a pro-
cess through which citizens exercise ever deepening control over decisions 
which affect their lives, and as such it is also constantly under construction 
(…) Full democratic citizenship is attained not only through the exercise of 
political and civic rights, but also through social rights, which in turn may be 
gained through participatory processes and struggles” (Gaventa 2006:11). 
In other words, this ‘deepening democracy’ approach transcends conven-
tional understandings of liberal representative democracy, through creating 
and expanding more participatory and socially inclusive forms of democra-
cy.18 The focus of ‘deepening democracy’ is on new democratic arenas and 
spaces (Cornwall/Coelho 2004), and on participatory governance at the local 
level in particular. This approach is close to deliberative understandings of 
democracy (Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2000), which shifts the focus from a 
‘voting-centric’ democracy to a ‘talk-centric’ democracy (Chambers 2003), 
                                                          
18
  Famous examples are the Porto Alegre experiment (Manor 2004), and what became known 
as ‘forum politics’, which preceded the new activist-based innovative movements of Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s. This approach is fully explained and further developed in the final 
chapter of this report with regard to its applicability in Fiji (see Boege et al 2013:187-190.  
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and to concepts of empowered participatory governance (Fung/Wright 2003). 
In this context it can be argued, for example, that contestation among com-
bative political parties is not the only possible democratic model; consensus-
seeking in village or town meetings is another real option.  
After eight years of military rule on the 14th of September 2014 the Fijian 
people will elect a new government. Whatever the outcome will be it is hoped 
that the newly elected government will realize that the country needs a more 
robust and engaged civic life than the one it has been accustomed to since 
independence. 
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